THE PROBLEMS OF THE WAR—
& THE PEACE
A Handbook for Students
By NORMAN ANGELL

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LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN
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BY THE SAME AUTHOR


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THE PROBLEMS OF THE WAR—AND THE PEACE.

PART I.

THE CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR.

The Superficial Causes.

THE surface causes of the war were these: The heir to the Austrian throne was murdered by a political assassin as the result of a long agitation against Austria in which the Servian Government was supposed to be implicated; following the assassination came a severe Note from Austria to Servia in which the Servian Government was ordered to take various strong measures to stamp out the agitation against Austria and to allow Austrian officials to participate in the work; Servia not complying immediately with these orders, Austria declared war on Servia; Russia thereupon told Austria that the affairs of Servia were of vital interest to Russia, and that Austria must withdraw some of her demands; Austria, supported by her ally Germany, would not give way; Russia mobilised her armies; Germany declared war on Russia; France was bound by an alliance to help Russia, and Great Britain was considered bound by an understanding to join France, and still more bound by a treaty to defend the neutrality of Belgium, which had been violated by Germany for the purpose of her attack on France.

What Lay Behind.

It is certain that no mere question of the punishment of assassins could possibly involve Europe in a titanic conflict. Behind that ostensible cause lay the race
divisions of the East and the confused struggle of opposing groups among the nations. The Germans wanted to fight for the domination of Europe or to resist the domination of Russia, and Russia wanted to assert her position as the natural leader and protector of the Slav peoples.

In the second part of this outline of study there is some examination of what is meant by this domination and subjugation, and of what either group could achieve by it—an enquiry which we must carry out thoroughly if we are to understand the real problems of war and peace. But in this section it is important to get rather at the material facts, and an honest examination of those facts seems to show that everyone was afraid of everyone else.

It may be perfectly true that the Prussian military caste were determined to impose their rule upon Europe; conceivably it might be true to say the same thing of the Russian governing caste. But that is not what the rulers of either country told their peoples. Germans, as a whole, do not believe that they are fighting to make the Prussians masters of Europe (it so happens that the Prussians before the war were not particularly liked by anyone in the other States of Germany), but what the German people are told by the military caste and what they believe is that they are threatened by the Russians, and that their expansion is being checked by a network of alliances and understandings directed against them.

Why the Germans Feared Russia.

The influence exercised over the minds of Germans by fear of Russia is a factor which English students of the problem generally leave out of account. It cannot be left out of account if we are to get at the bottom of the material external facts of this war, and understand the motives that entered into it.

Why should the Germans fear Russia? Well, we
ourselves were very much afraid of the expansion of Russia until a year or two ago. It is a vast Empire covering over 8,000,000 square miles, and having under its despotic government a population of 170,000,000. Figures of this magnitude are meaningless unless one can compare them with those of another country; so let us take the area and population of the German Empire as a measure. Germany covers 208,000 square miles, or one-fortieth of the area covered by Russia, while the German population amounts to 65,000,000, or about one-third that of Russia. The history of Russia during the nineteenth century is described by Seignobos, the French historian, as the history of the Russian Government's struggle against "several groups of peoples united by a series of conquests under the same rule, who preserved their own particular dress, language, and religion, and lived side by side without blending." The Russian Empire was thus, like the Austrian Empire, a conglomeration of peoples; a single tie bound them together, subjection to the power of the autocratic Tsar, their absolute, uncontrolled sovereign." The German Government is also to a large extent autocratic, and there is always a tendency on the part of autocratic and ambitious governments who believe in the advantages of military domination to be afraid of the growth of each other's power.

Russia and Great Britain.

The story of the jealous rivalry between the statesmen of Russia and the statesmen of Great Britain (the people of the two countries took little part in this), a rivalry which began in 1830 and has continued down almost to the present day, can be read in any history book. It arose chiefly out of Russia's expansion in Asia, which was believed by some British statesmen to menace our position in India, and partly out of Russia's natural desire to acquire an ice-free port as an outlet for her great inland empire.
Apart from the supposed Russian menace to India, the question at issue between us which is most likely to be revived is that of the Dardanelles, a narrow strait leading from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Marmora, which gives access to the Bosphorus and the Black Sea. The British support of Turkey against Russia was defended on the ground that Russian possession of the Dardanelles would have given her the connecting link between Europe and Asia, which in bygone days constituted Constantinople a seat of empire and the possession of which by Russia would have enabled her to threaten the route to India. The war (of the Crimea) which arose out of this rivalry, and which is now admitted to have been grossly unnecessary by men of all parties, is best studied, perhaps, in the biographies of the two men who stood almost alone in opposition to that war—The Life of Richard Cobden, by John Morley, and The Life of John Bright, by G. M. Trevelyan. At the present time the governments of both countries have come to recognise that there is no question of vital interest between them, and that the policy of "pinpricks" in Asia, which led to so much friction, was altogether a mistake. It may be hoped that at the end of the present war the question of the Dardanelles may be definitely settled, perhaps by their neutralisation.

The fact remains that we ourselves at one time went so much in fear of the growth of Russian power as to be led into a war to check it. But if we had any ground at all for such fear—any excuse for it—Germany had infinitely more excuse for her fear. Her eastern frontier is directly exposed to these vast hordes of only partially civilised people, under an autocratic government—a people who are as yet undeveloped industrially, and therefore largely unaffected by the difficulties which confront a highly organised industrial nation, like Germany, when war comes.

When we remember that the Emperor of Russia can
call upon nearly two hundred millions of Slavs from Asia and from Eastern Europe, we may at least have more respect for the German fear of the Slavs than we have for the anti-Russian policy of British statesmen a generation ago. It must be said, however, that the ill-feeling between Russia and Germany, the governments of which used to be friendly, is largely due to German support of Austria in questions arising out of the Balkan problem and Russia's claim to exercise protection over the smaller Slav populations. The German landowners and merchants have also made themselves disliked in Russia, and many liberal Russians believe that German influence has been partly responsible for the reactionary tendencies of the Russian Government. German support of Austrian influence against Russian in the Balkans had probably more to do than anything else with breaking up the traditional friendship between the Prussian and Russian Courts, and this was probably dictated by fear that if the Southern Slavs became independent they would be under the influence of Russia and would make her so powerful as to be dangerous to Germany.

Germany, France, and Alsace.

Another cause of fear on the part of Germany was the constant menace of the French, who never ceased to whisper of revenge—revenge for the defeat of 1870 and the recapture of Alsace-Lorraine.

The history of Alsace is a curious one, and makes an excellent illustration of the difficulty of finding the rightful owner of disputed territory. Alsace was a part of Roman Gaul; it was conquered by the Franks, and became part of the dominions of the early French kings. In the tenth century it was acquired by the Emperor of Germany, and the inhabitants became more German than French. At the end of the Thirty Years' War, in 1648, Alsace became part of the dominions of Louis XIV. of France by right of conquest, and
remained French until 1870, when it was ceded to Germany as part of the terms of peace. To whom, then, does Alsace belong? The inhabitants are largely of German speech and origin. The conquest by Louis XIV. was as bitterly resented up to the time of the French Revolution as the German rule was resented immediately before the present war. Alsace is, in fact, one of the great problems of Europe. To give it back to France would not settle the dispute, since, owing to German immigration, there are perhaps more pro-Germans than pro-French in Alsace to-day. Simply to transfer the province from one government to the other would be merely to transfer the weight to the other scale. We must postpone a fuller discussion of the general problem of the "ownership" of territory to the second part of our study. Here we can only note that the one solution which gives any promise of finality would be to create another little self-governing community from the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. There would then be a belt of neutral States stretching from the Italian frontier to the North Sea—Switzerland, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, Belgium, Holland.

German Fears.

To return to our consideration of the fear that made this war. It must be admitted that, whatever the rights and wrongs of the Alsatian question, the Germans might reasonably fear that their western neighbours would avail themselves of any menace from Russia to seek that revenge which they have nursed for over forty years; and when we remember that there was an alliance between France and Russia, backed by a strong friendship with Great Britain, we can see that it was not difficult for German militarists to play upon the fears of the German people. It must be remembered that before the unification of the German Empire, the German States and people had frequently suffered greatly from the interference of
their neighbours, and the Government were able to appeal to the memory of these injuries when they wanted to increase their military strength. It was indeed the memory of the troubles which weakness and disunion had brought upon them that induced the other German States to put themselves under the leadership of the great military power of Prussia, as the one safeguard against foreign aggression.

France and Her Colonies.

The fears of the French people were based mainly on the extravagant writings of the advocates of Pan-Germanism, which threatened war with France for the purpose of annexing not so much French territory in Europe as French colonial territory. Since the war of 1870 the French colonies have been greatly extended, and the Pan-Germanists have strongly resented this expansion, especially as the colonial trade policy of France has not favoured the "open door," and has been less generous to other Powers than that of Germany or Britain. The Morocco incidents of 1908 and 1911 had left a very bitter feeling behind, both in France and Germany. Moreover, the French believe that their rapid recovery from the war of 1870–71 has been a disappointment to Germany and that the latter Power cherished the dream of completing the work by another war. As the population of France is stationary and that of Germany is very rapidly increasing, the French were afraid of being outnumbered and sought to redress this disadvantage by their alliance with Russia and the entente with Great Britain.

The Expansion of German Power.

It must also be remembered that in the atmosphere of suspicion which has brooded over Europe during the last hundred years, the very fact that Germany has grown from a collection of feeble little States into a great, united Empire has given cause for uneasiness
among her neighbours. In 1808, when Prussia was completely crushed by Napoleon, there was little or no trace of unity or organisation among the German-speaking peoples. The shock of defeat, however, appears to have put a fresh spirit into German life and thought. Within seven years of the battle of Jéna Prussia was sufficiently powerful to lead a successful combination of forces against Napoleon himself, and since that time Germany has grown steadily and rapidly in unity and strength, until she has reached a point at which she ventures to issue a challenge to the world. Out of the attempt to destroy Prussia by force of arms has grown a German Empire based on military power. Militarism as the foundation of a State is insecure. In time of peace any State so built is in danger of collapsing; but militarism cannot be destroyed by force from without, and the German Empire, which has grown up out of the defeat of Jéna, is now threatening civilisation because her rulers have always been able to convince their subjects that they were menaced by powerful enemies.

The Menace of Pan-Germanism.

Our own fears of Germany are a little more difficult to state simply. It was feared that a defeated France might leave the way open to German aggression against us, and that, if she were not checked, Germany, by annexing Holland and Belgium, could make herself such a great Power that she would threaten us at sea and one day seize our colonies and break up our Empire. There were many people who believed that the creation of the German navy was directed against this country; and they considered that the domination of German foreign policy by Prussia, which has always been an aggressive power, and the traditions of Bismarckian diplomacy rendered the intentions of the German Government suspect. It was also believed that the German desire for colonies and spheres of influence
oversea would lead her into conflict with Great Britain, and unhappily these possible causes of friction had not been removed by an agreement between the two Powers similar to that which put an end to the friction between France and Britain. The Germans have always told us that their great fleet was only intended to protect their own commerce, but many people in Britain, perhaps the majority, thought that Germany's desire to make herself a great Naval, as well as a great Military Power was inspired by a wish to challenge our naval position, which we held to be a vital interest on account of our insular position and great maritime trade.

Some idea of Pan-Germanism, the propaganda which is so largely responsible for the fear of Germany in France and Britain, can be obtained from General von Bernhardi's book, *Germany and the Next War*, though the influence of this book on German thought before the war has been greatly exaggerated. *Germany and England*, by the late Professor Cramb, also gives a sympathetic account of the worst type of Prussian philosophy.

*What had Russia to fear?*

We have now seen to some extent why Austria and Germany feared Russia, France, and Britain, and why they were themselves feared by France and ourselves. We may now ask whether Russia, or the Russian people, was also influenced by fear. The cause for Russia's fear is not so plain. Her vast territory is truly impregnable to serious invasion, and beyond the actual and immediate evils of war itself she has little to lose even by defeat. Moreover, she is so little dependent on foreign trade, and so small a proportion of her population is engaged in industry, that the ordinary life of the country is not greatly affected even by a great war. Nevertheless Russia was to a large extent influenced by fear: the fear that Slav States like Servia would be dominated by non-Slavonic Powers—that is to say, by Austria or Germany. Although the Russian
Government is autocratic and many Russians are strongly opposed to its methods, there is a very strong national feeling—and it is probable that the nation is really behind the Government in the desire that Russia should act as leader and protector of the Slav peoples, whom they believe to have a great future—which has been retarded by the jealousy of the Western Powers.

The Artificial Austrian Empire.

The peculiar nature of the Austrian Empire justified to some extent the fear and suspicion with which it was regarded by neighbouring peoples. This Empire—two distinct Sovereign States, Austria and Hungary—comprises altogether five kingdoms and nine or ten smaller groups, duchies, principalities, etc., which have been gradually absorbed either by Austria itself or by Hungary. People of thirteen different nationalities, speaking five or six different languages, inhabit these territories, and practically the only link between them is that they are all under the rule of the Hapsburg family—the old reigning House of Austria. The Archduchy of Austria, which was the original Hapsburg possession, is almost purely German; but the other parts of the Empire, which have been acquired either by marriage or by conquest, are inhabited by very mixed peoples. Hungary, for instance, which came under the Austrian rule by the marriage of a Hapsburg with the heir to the Hungarian throne, contains a population of which 51 per cent. are Magyars, 12 per cent. Germans, 12 per cent. Slovaks, 16 per cent. Rumanians and the rest Croats, Serbs, and other races. Similarly, in Galicia 53 per cent. of the population are Poles and 48 per cent. Ruthens, and these two peoples are in violent antagonism.

The problems connected with Austria are all due to these race antagonisms and the attempt to group these various peoples under a single sovereign. On the eastern frontier an attempt was made to strengthen
the Empire in 1907 by annexing the States of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in violation of a solemn international treaty—an act which probably hastened the break-up of the Empire by infuriating the Serbs and increasing the hostility of Russia. Among the other Austrian problems which must be studied in connection with the war is the question of Trieste. This town is the principal port of Austria, but it is inhabited almost entirely by Italians, who would naturally prefer to be governed by their own countrymen. There are also a great number of Italians in the Trent district, and Italians consider that these districts should have been given to Italy at the same time as Venice, which was an Austrian possession till 1866, and very tyrannically ruled by them.

It is only fair to say that Austria has made great efforts to render her subject races in Austria proper contented, by giving them good government and home rule in local affairs; but this policy has been hampered by the Hungarians, who have behaved very badly to the Slav peoples under their rule and have opposed every project of federal autonomy and equal treatment for all the nations of the Empire. It is the inclusion in the Austrian Empire of a great number of Slavs which has made her jealous of the growth in power of the Slav nations in the Balkans. Her policy has always been to weaken these peoples and to sow dissensions among them. This policy has brought her into conflict with Russia and has greatly embittered the Serbians, who are of the same race as the inhabitants of some of the provinces of Austria-Hungary. Hence the desire among many of these latter people for union with Serbia and the constant friction between the Austrian and Serbian Governments.

Poland.

Another difficult problem is presented by the old kingdom of Poland, which was broken up and divided
between Russia, Austria, and Prussia in 1795. Strong national feeling has been retained by the Poles during the hundred years which have passed, and high hopes have been raised that in the settlement after this war their kingdom will be recreated. Three generous manifestos were issued after the outbreak of war by the Emperors of Russia, Austria, and Germany, each promising a wide measure of self-government to the Poles. How far these promises will be fulfilled remains to be seen, but it is only fair to state that the Austrian section of Poland has hitherto proved the most contented and leniently governed. The Austrian Poles did in fact rally to the support of Austria; while the Russian Poles, on the other hand, have asserted their belief in Russia’s good faith in promising Polish reunion.

Other outstanding difficulties and disputes in the European situation can only be briefly indicated here, but should be carefully studied by those who seek to understand the meaning of the war and the questions which must be taken into account in the terms of peace.

The Neutrality of Belgium was guaranteed in 1831 and again in 1839 by Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia. In 1870, when France and Prussia were at war, Great Britain intimated that, if Belgian neutrality was violated, by either Power, she would join with the other to defend it. This guarantee was broken by Germany in 1914, and that act was the immediate cause of Great Britain’s declaration of war on Germany. The reason why Germany acted in this way was that France had made her frontier against Germany so strong that German strategists considered their only chance of beating France, before the Russians could make themselves felt, to be an invasion through Belgium.

The mouth of the Scheldt, the river upon which Antwerp is situated, is in Dutch territory. Hence
even the possession of Antwerp makes it useless as a naval base unless Dutch neutrality is violated. The alleged designs of Germany on Holland are accounted for by the fact that the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt are both Dutch; their possession by Germany would give her good naval bases very near the British coast, and would also allow her to make any commercial restrictions on the rivers which she thought useful. Britain has always very much disliked the idea of Antwerp passing into the hands of a hostile Power, and it was largely this consideration which brought about the guarantee of Belgian neutrality.

The Schleswig-Holstein Grand Duchies were under the King of Denmark till 1863, when Prussia, under the direction of Bismarck, went to war, with the help of Austria, against Denmark. In 1866, after the war between Prussia and Austria, Schleswig-Holstein was annexed to Prussia. There was a great deal of diplomatic cheating connected with the annexation, and great ill-feeling was aroused. The outstanding fact for us, however, is that Holstein is almost entirely inhabited by Germans, while Schleswig contains 184,000 Danes, who are practically all collected in the northern part, near the Danish frontier.

A War of Fear.

With mutual fear working in the minds of the peoples of Europe, it is easy to see that this war has been in large part caused by the preparation which each country has made to protect itself against the others. France allied herself with Russia to protect herself against Germany, and by that alliance was dragged into a war in which she was not directly threatened. German statesmen persuaded the German people that they needed a fleet to protect their trade, and the building of that fleet roused our fear of German aggression, and made our policy somewhat definitely
pro-French and anti-German. For mutual protection Germany and Austria formed an alliance the consequence of which was that a quarrel between Russia and Austria involved both allies in war against Britain, France, and Belgium as well as Russia.

The war is therefore, as writers have said, a war of fear—the fear of the aggression of the other party: French and British fear of Pan-Germanism, German fear of Pan-Slavism.

But, you may ask, why should either group want to be "top dog," predominant in Europe? Would Germans, as a whole, be any better off if the Pan-German dreams were realised?

We come here to a fundamental problem which can only be answered by a study of the general problem of war and its motives, which is the subject of the Second Part of our Study.

Books.

With regard to books on the subjects dealt with in Part I. of our Study, it is difficult to keep the list within reasonable limits.

A great many of the official documents issued by the various Governments concerned in the negotiations immediately preceding the war are collected together in The Diplomatic History of the War, by M. P. Price.

The British Government's penny Blue-Book is also valuable, and the French Yellow Book contains some documents which do not appear in either of the other collections.

The last two volumes of The Cambridge Modern History—The Growth of Nationalities and The Latest Age—contain many chapters of interest. A good historical atlas is most necessary to an understanding of the problems of race and nationality in Eastern Europe. Ramsay Muir's Atlas of Modern History may be suggested to students.
The following books are also recommended:

Austria-Hungary.
*The Hapsburg Monarchy*, Wickham Steed.

Russia.
*Modern Russia*, G. Alexinsky.
*A Year in Russia*, M. Baring.

The Balkans.
*Turkey and the Balkans* (People’s Library).
*Macedonia*, H. N. Brailsford.
*The Balkans Revisited*, Foster Fraser.

Germany.
*Bismarck* (Heroes of the Nations), Headlam.
*Germany* (Home University Library), C. Tower.
*Pan-Germanism*, Usher.
*Germany and the Next War*, Bernhardi.

Poland.
*Poland, the Knight among Nations*, Van Norman.

General.
*The National Principle and the War* (Oxford Pamphlet), Ramsay Muir.
*Modern Europe*, Emil Reich.

**QUESTIONS ON PART I.**

1. Who are the Slavs? Had Austria or Germany reason to fear them?
2. What is Pan-Germanism? What reason had (a) Russia, (b) France, (c) Britain, to fear the Pan-German movement?
3. Could the war have been prevented by either Austria, Servia, Russia, Germany, France, or Britain? If so, how?
4. Give a brief sketch of the history of Alsace. To whom does the province rightly belong?
PART II.

THE ROOT CAUSES OF WAR.

Summary.

When we come to examine the deep underlying causes of war it will be found—as I think I can show—that these are due not so much to any lack of good-will or good intentions on the part of mankind as a whole, as to a number of very widespread mistakes and mental confusions which are to be found to some extent among the people of every country of Europe, though in an especial degree among the ruling classes of modern Prussia. The study of these mental confusions can be dealt with most clearly by dividing them into three different sections, which will be dealt with in the following pages, and which may be briefly summarised as follows:

1. Those arising out of a crudely fatalistic view of politics: the assumption that it is no use trying to correct false ideas, because men are not responsible for their ideas and because their "fighting instincts" render war "inevitable"; or that man's conduct is not influenced by his ideas since he is not guided by "logic"; that war is not, like law or churches, or any other human institution, the result of human effort and opinion, good and bad, but is imposed by outside forces which men cannot control.

2. Those due to what has been called the One-sided Aberration—i.e., the failure to realise that in all matters connected with the relations between men the action of one party makes only half the operation, and that we must necessarily misunderstand the operation as a whole unless we think of the acts of the two parties together, as that defence necessarily implies attack, sale purchase, inferior superior; that to annex a province and its inhabitants is
not to annex wealth, since the inhabitants own the wealth; the tendency to consider a problem of two parties—war—in terms of one, as when we are told that the way for a nation to be sure of peace is to be stronger than its enemy, an "axiom" which, stated in the terms of the two parties, amounts to saying that for two nations to keep the peace each must be stronger than the other.

3. Those arising out of misconceptions as to the nature of government and the place of political authority in the modern world, as that one country can "own" another—as when we talk of England owning Canada, or a country owning the source of its raw material, although Englishmen would no more own the cotton fields of Louisiana by annexing that State than they now own the wheat fields of Canada; or when we assume nations to be trading corporations, or economic or intellectual units that can be controlled or "removed" by the military power of other similar units.

It may be shown, I think, that nearly all the mistakes, the bad arguments, and the confused reasoning that cause war among civilised people can be fitted in to one or other of these three broad sections; and that if we can possibly get men to think clearly and simply on these points, the danger of future wars will have disappeared, and the peace which ends this war will be a lasting peace.
CHAPTER I.
THE RELATION OF IDEAS TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDUCT.

Not only to Learn but to Teach.

Our problem is not merely to know this subject, but to know it in such a way that we are able to make plain to others as well as to ourselves where current ideas are wrong; not merely to know the truth about international relations, but to know why that truth has not been recognised. This involves not merely a knowledge of certain definite facts in economics and politics and history, but a knowledge of how men's minds work on this problem: why they have been led astray, in what manner they can be corrected.

The method of study here outlined has kept permanently in the foreground this consideration: that to get at the truth does not suffice. That is one part of the object. What is for us an equally important part is to get at it in such a way that we shall be able to bring it home to our fellow-men. Unless we can do that, all our labours and learning will be sterile so far as practical human affairs are concerned.

Moreover, the question of the extent to which men are capable of realising great social and political truths, and being guided by that realisation, is part of the problem of war itself—it is not a question which concerns us only when we come to persuade others of the truth of our opinions. All parties to the discussion admit that if all men were perfectly wise, there would be no war; that if men realised their best interests, they would not go to war. At the base of the whole problem of war, therefore, rests the question: Can men be brought to see their best interests and to be guided thereby? And after the question of possi-
bility comes the question of means, of method. If we can do it, how can we do it? Since war exists because men had and have false ideas, how can these false ideas be corrected? And, of course, the first useful question in tackling that problem is this: How have the false ideas grown up? Why have men not realised their real interests in this matter in the past? How is it that human wisdom has so miserably failed, and that men's minds have been twisted and their mental vision blinded?

Now, curiously enough, though this problem of psychology—a problem of the working of the mind in its largest sense, of the process by which false ideas are born, by which they are corrected—is an important part of the problem of war itself, it is generally lightly dismissed by those who deal with the subject.

**How Our Minds Work.**

Any ordinary conversation on a subject of some complexity will reveal the difficulty of getting at the real basis of a particular opinion. It is a common experience that most arguments on any subject begin not at the real point of difference between the two parties at all, but at some point a long way therefrom, and it is only when one or the other has been pushed back bit by bit and is finally entrenched that it is realised what this underlying difference is. And, generally, the argument is sterile until that underlying point is reached. Even when a combatant does not see clearly himself what the real point of his own case is, he has nevertheless generally a strong instinctive sense of the strength of his reserves, until their weakness has been exposed. He will not yield until he realises the weakness of those reserves. One of the first objects, therefore, of a debater who means business should be to come at once to these fundamental reserves hovering vaguely somewhere in the recesses of his opponent's mind, engage them, and
show their weakness. It would save a lot of battles and of useless fighting if the abler and stronger of the two combatants could at the start point out to the other that these final reserves upon which that other is in reality depending are, as a matter of fact, of no avail. Perhaps that is not the most useful illustration. Put it this way: in testing the strength of any structure begin with the foundations. If they are shaky, it does not matter how strong the upper stories may be. If you begin with the upper stories and leave out the foundations, all your tests and demonstrations may be useless, and an infinite labour of inspection and examination may have been wasted. The whole might have been saved by beginning at the bottom.

A Basis of Agreement.

Now the foundations of our problem have been already indicated. Can men be brought to see their best interest and be guided by wisdom and reason? That is the main question.

Very rarely does either party to our discussion realise what that question involves, nor how essential it is that for any useful discussion we should realise its relation to the whole problem.

To raise it at the beginning enables us to start from a point of agreement. As I have said, all parties are agreed that if men were perfectly good and moral and wise, there would be no war. If no nation robbed or wronged or angered another, and men were too tender-hearted to take pleasure in the excitement of killing, obviously there would be no war. At the back of every militarist mind there is the impression that to work out the principles of peace we must imagine an unreal man—a man that does not and cannot exist on this earth. Though the militarists may agree that war may properly be deemed "the failure of human wisdom," as Bonar Law called it, as much could be said of the law courts or the policemen, since if men
were perfectly wise and good neither would exist. And what the militarists—all of them—have in mind is that, as human wisdom will always in some measure fail, war will always go on. And the absence of war in some circumstances might conceivably mean an absence of righteousness, just as the absence of the law courts and policemen might—and generally does—imply an absence of civilisation; although if men were angels, neither would exist.

**The Mistake Which Causes War.**

This, then, is the all-important question: "Can the wisdom of men as a whole be so far strengthened as not merely to enable them to realise abstractly the folly of war and to devise means of avoiding it, but to use those means and be guided by this wisdom, and not by their passions and impatience?"

That man has fighting instincts and always will have them, that he does not act on "reason" nor be guided by "logic," that wars are the result of forces beyond the control of the makers of theories, is a position which the average man regards as so impregnable that the great majority hardly think it worth while to defend any other, and with a superior smile deem it sufficient to give us a glimpse of this majestic fortress and then invite us to amuse ourselves with the futile battles outside it.

And so far his instinct is correct. Not only is the question I have put to you an important question in deciding our attitude to life and politics, not only is it the question which must be answered if we are to make any progress in this discussion at all, but it represents practically, as well as philosophically, the most important phase of the whole problem. I suppose I have answered as many questions from the general public as any man who has had to deal with a discussion of this subject (our public lectures have been mainly a matter of answering questions), and I
do not hesitate to say this: that if our notions on this point were less hazy and defective than they are, and if one other mental confusion (which I shall touch upon in the next chapter) were cleared up, all other difficulties whatsoever would disappear. If in these two matters—one upon which I have just touched and that upon which I shall touch directly—the bulk of men could think straight, we could dispense, in the problems of war and peace, with any special knowledge of economics or history. Just those things which are of common knowledge, without the help of special book-learning, would amply suffice to render European society as secure from political wars as it is happily now secure from religious wars or from a massacre of St. Bartholomew.

Let us return, then, to the question which I have already put before you: "Can the wisdom of men as a whole be so far strengthened as not merely to enable them to realise abstractly the folly of war and to devise means of avoiding it, but to use those means and be guided by this wisdom, and not by their passions and impatience?"

The Militarist Answer.

In answer to this question the militarists say: "Men do not act from reason, from an intelligent realisation of their interest, but from temper, passion, their fighting instinct, blindly."

Well, suppose that were absolutely and fatally true, and men were "bloodthirsty, savage creatures," as the editor of the Spectator says, fighting from the lust of destruction, what would be the conclusion to be drawn from it? The conclusion, say the militarists, is that you should give them as many destructive arms as possible, so that their capacity for damage while in their condition of blind rage should be as great as possible.

Is that the right conclusion? Or is not the con-
clusion rather that, if man is really that kind of animal, it is the duty of all of us to keep destructive weapons out of the hands of such an irresponsible creature, and to use such lucid intervals as he may have to persuade him to drop them?

If to that someone replies that the conclusion is not that all parties should be highly armed, but only ourselves, he is, of course, assuming that the British alone are a reasoning people. This is an instance of that failure in reasoning dealt with in the next section.

_Fatalism and War._

So much for the bearing of that proposition on the question of armaments. But if you apply the same test to the same proposition in reference to another conclusion drawn from it by the militarists, you will get still more notable results.

Some people say: Men don’t act from reason or logic; wars are in the nature of men; all your theorising is “talk.” At the crucial moments men are swept off their feet by forces which they cannot control.

Again, suppose that were absolutely and completely true, what is the conclusion to be drawn?

Well, it is evident that if that were absolutely and completely true, all learning, all accumulated knowledge, all books and churches, codes, Ten Commandments, laws, would have no effect on human affairs, and that in so far as their practical work is concerned they might just as well be swept away.

As a matter of fact, among great masses of men—in the Eastern world—pure fatalism is predominant. “Kismet, it is the will of Allah.” It is an attitude of mind associated either as a cause or an effect—for the moment it doesn’t matter much which—with the crudest forms of Oriental stagnation; it marks those who, at least as far as this world is concerned, have no hope. It is, indeed, a statement of the proposition that it does not matter how a man
uses his mind or moral effort, since his conduct is determined by impulses and forces that are stronger than his own will, whatever moral or intellectual effort he may make.

Now, this has only to be pointed out to be evident. It is certain, therefore, that the proposition in the crude form in which I have expressed it—the form in which it is most generally made—cannot be absolutely and completely true.

Is Reasoning Useless?

You will note this, therefore, that the militarist has not asked himself in any clear and fresh and real way what his own proposition means, what even the immediate and necessary consequence of it must be. Otherwise he would not believe in it. To say that reasoning and the effort to know the truth do not affect human conduct is to condemn all those activities which mark the man from the beast. To say that man is always in danger of losing his head and of acting in opposition to his own best interests is not an argument for furnishing him with the instruments of destruction.

It is essential in any discussion to realise, and have your opponent realise, how much of his case is involved in his proposition. In order to do that one may outline and support a counter-proposition; then see how near one can get to reconciliation. And the counter-proposition which I think one could fairly set up against the fatalistic doctrine which we have been discussing might be outlined somewhat as follows: Human wisdom is a very frail thing indeed; yet, however we achieve it, whether by instinct, intuition, "putting two and two together," or what you will, it is the ultimate foundation of human society. Its very frailty, therefore, is an argument for all that may tend to strengthen it and against anything which may tend to weaken it.
The Fatalist View Restated.

But if by chance the militarist has examined with any effectiveness the consequences of his proposition as to the futility of human reason and the helplessness of man, he will have arrived at a conclusion somewhat of this kind:

"War is the last resort in a collision of two rights. That is to say, two parties believe that each has right on his own side and will not yield to the other; when this is the case, and when the questions involved are important enough, there is no outcome but force, and we can accept that fact because victory will in the long run go to the party which has the greater earnestness, the greater spiritual passion, the greater cohesion, and so forth. Man's instinct is in all crises a surer and better guide than argumentation. The deeper truths, which we know to be true, but which we are quite incapable of defending by argument, are those things which we know by instinct. As a matter of simple fact, time and again in history you have two parties both of whom are pushed by all their instincts to settle their differences by resort to the sword. And the outcome has been as true and as just as any that could have been devised by a court of lawyers or arbitrators, judging by dry law and the argumentation of legal advocates."

The Trial by Ordeal.

Now, however this statement of the case for war may disguise it, it is nevertheless a plea for the superiority of physical force to the force of the mind, of the material thing to the thing of right or conscience. It is merely the statement in less crude terms of Napoleon's saying, "Providence is on the side of the biggest battalions." Or it is the whole of the philosophy which stood behind the trial by ordeal. One may find among the reasons urged by old defenders of "trial by ordeal" pleas far more eloquent from this point of view, and
far more persuasive than any of those made in our day on behalf of collective warfare. The old lawyer urged with great sincerity that God would not permit the arm of the innocent man to be scalded when boiling oil or boiling water was poured over it or when it was plunged into a cauldron. Still less would God permit, when accused and accuser met upon the field, that the innocent should be slain and the guilty should escape. But to-day if you deny the justice of this argument in the case of the individual, why should we suppose that it would be any truer in the case of nations? We have recognised that a mere conflict of physical strength in the case of individuals does not establish the rights or wrongs of the case. It establishes nothing except which of the two is the stronger, or, in the case of the ordeal by boiling oil, which has the thicker skin. And just as in the establishment of justice and right between two different people we cannot escape the need for understanding, so we cannot escape the need for understanding in the establishment of right and justice between groups of men.

I have, in the introduction to *The Foundations of International Polity*, attempted to show that the appeal to force is an effort to escape the responsibility and labour of thinking the thing out, as was the case with the "ordeal." If the judges had any strong feeling of the clear justice of the case, any strong feeling that one of the parties had been outrageously ill-treated, their consciences would have revolted at the idea of submitting the issue to the "ordeal of battle." But when the ideas of law and justice and obligation are obscure and ill-defined, so that judgment is difficult, the judges naturally desire to escape the labour and responsibility of thinking the thing out and to submit the matter to the outcome of mere physical conflict, and the outcome of physical conflict, the arbitrament of the sword, is at the end only an accident as far as the moral issues are concerned, dependent on the amount of force
The peace or the sharpness of the sword, not on principles of justice or wisdom. Indeed, it is only where the issues are not clear that anyone thinks of appealing to force, or rather of appealing to the superiority of the judgment of warfare as against the judgment or conscience of mankind. Perhaps the whole case against the appeal to force rather than the appeal to reason, on behalf of justice, can be summarised by saying that justice will not be secured by laziness in thinking and that the labour of the mind, not the labour of the body or the risk of the body, is necessary to secure the triumph of right.

Muscle versus Brains.

Those who defend war on "moral" grounds do not see plainly that this view of the superiority of physical force to intellectual force as a means of settling differences is really a claim for matter as against mind, a claim for muscle as against brains, for the dead weight of material things as against the spiritual things, and a refusal to judge between right and wrong. It is shutting up the mind and the conscience; it is the excuse for temper and impatience. A crowd gets excited or angry, patriotic or jingo, and this very fact is taken as a justification for war upon someone else. We lose our tempers and call it patriotism. A lynching party justifies itself in the same way. Indeed, warfare is very often only a lynching party on a great scale.

The idea that wars are not made by men, but are imposed upon us like the earthquake and the storm, is so deepset in the mind of the militarist that he attributes the same error to the peace-man. Ninety-nine out of every hundred militarists will tell you that pacifists are people who believe that "war is impossible," and every war is taken as a triumphant exposure of the folly of their ideas.

Danger of Confusion.

There are two grave dangers of confusion at this
point of the discussion. One is the confusion between the use of force and the resistance to force needed to maintain order, and the other is the notion that because reason breaks down, and because at times the very foundations of human society crumble, that in some way is a justification of the incidents which mark its crumbling. Let us take the last point first.

Two persons, or two parties, or two nations do sometimes lose their heads and do come to blows; therefore, in the last resort, says the militarist, physical force is the only appeal. But because the parties resort to physical force that is not an argument for not trying to avoid it, and not so managing our relationship that we shall be as little likely as possible to resort to it. In a badly managed community, where even agriculture is not developed, one may get periods of famine where cannibalism is resorted to—it happened during some of the Irish famines, and it happens during some of the Russian famines now. Conceivably one might argue from that, that cannibalism is justifiable. Well, so it may be in certain circumstances, but the fact that it is resorted to is not an argument for so neglecting the tilling of the soil that it is likely to be resorted to. Rather is it an argument for saying: “If we do not cultivate our fields we shall suffer from hunger and be compelled to eat our children; let us, therefore, cultivate our fields with industry.” In the same way we should argue with reference to the use of force: “If we neglect the understanding of human relationship, and the cultivation of the mind and character, we shall in periods of tension get to flying at one another’s throats, because we shall not be able to understand the differences which divide us. And that will lead to murder. Therefore, let us so understand human relationship that we shall not be likely to descend to that kind of thing, and let us, perhaps, establish some sort of machinery for the settlement of difficulties so that those kinds of abominations shall be avoided.” In other words,
because physical force may represent the failure of human wisdom, and the last resort, that is no argument for the glorification of folly, no justification of war as the first resort.

As to the other difficulty, the other confusion between the use of physical force and resistance to it, I can only refer the reader to the two passages in which I have attempted to make this very important distinction quite clear (see pages xxix and 161, *The Foundations of International Polity*). I could wish that the disparagement of reason with which I am now dealing were confined to militarists. But it is not.

*The Obligation to be Intelligent.*

I do not doubt that the insistence which I have laid upon the fact that mere good intention will not put an end to war has irritated very many whom I highly esteem. But if the reader has followed me so far he will realise that this glorification of intention which comes of an inner impulse and is not a matter of close reasoning and clear thinking is also part of the tendency to shirk the labour of the mind. It implies a belief that while men must labour with their bodies, while that is the primitive curse imposed upon all mankind, they need not labour with their minds. That, while it is a moral duty not to be idle in body, there is no moral duty not to be idle in mind; in a word, that there is no moral obligation to be intelligent and to know our jobs. Now, not merely do outstanding facts of history show pretty clearly the failure of mere good intention—the association of a desperately low standard of civilisation like that of the early Christian centuries in Europe, or in certain of the Eastern countries to-day, with a great readiness for self-sacrifice, marked by the hermit and the anchorite of early Christian times, by a self-torturing fakir in the modern Orient—not merely do we see the most frightful cruelties inflicted by men of the very best intentions on themselves and on others, as
PROBLEMS OF THE WAR

evidenced by the torturings of the Inquisition, but this notion that any improvement of intention will abolish war implies that the mass of mankind who accept war are morally inferior to those who oppose it. I do not believe that, but let us suppose it is true. Here are two instincts: the instinct of the jingo who, hearing of outrages upon his countrymen in the Transvaal or elsewhere, clamours for war; the instinct of the pacifist who feels that war would be the greater evil of the two. How are we to show to the other man that our instinct is right and his is wrong, save by a mental process of comparison and analysis of facts, etc.? I remember in this connection, by the way, lecturing once in a German University, and during the discussion which followed my lecture one sceptical German professor spoke in the following sense: "I am not sure that I have understood everything that Mr. Angell has been telling us, but I have strongly the intuition that he is right." And on the other side of the room another sceptical German professor shouted out: "And I have strongly the intuition that he is all wrong." Now what part can mere intuition and instinct play in the reconciliation of the two?

**Instinct or Reason?**

I sometimes wonder whether the philosophers so fashionable of late, engaged upon the glorification of instinct and intuition, have ever played such a game as tennis or golf. If they have, they must know this, that one's instincts and intuitions are very frequently wrong. In tennis you cannot get a ball over the net until you learn to check the instinct, a very strong one when one first learns, to run into the balls which you receive. It is the same with a dozen games that one could mention, one has to check impulses which are at times tremendously strong before one can do so simple a thing as catch a ball or understand the management of a bat or a golf club or a racquet. And society is a little more complicated than any of these things. The general
relation of head to heart in such a thing as the understanding of a problem like this is the occasion of infinite confusion.

I have illustrated one confusion thus:

On the other side of the street you catch a glimpse of a man wanted by the police for the revolting murder of a little girl. At once your sentiment is excited to an intense degree; it blazes up in wild clamour and you give the hue and cry, and the crowd catch the man. And then you see that on his left hand he has five fingers: the murderer had only two. Now, because your mind is capable of certain purely logical processes—and thanks only to that—the wild current of your sentiment is immediately changed, and you are now mainly concerned to see that an innocent man does not suffer a threatened lynching. You are just as "sentimental" as before; the engine of your heart is beating as vigorously, the emotional power is just as great but it happens (to state the thing in mechanical terms) to be turning the wheel of action in an opposite direction because certain levers, which are your mental perceptions, have been shifted by contact with certain facts. Most militarists and some pacifists say: "The engine alone is what matters; provided only that that has plenty of power you can throw away your steering gear as an encumbrance, and the driver can shut his eyes." Well, it is because mankind has often been guided by that idea that history is so largely a record of bad accidents.

For note this: in an age of simpler enthusiasms the steering gear in this case might not have worked so well. In an age when most men believed that any ordinary murderer would not hesitate to call in the ever-convenient witch to remedy so trifling a matter as a missing finger, the simple logical mechanism by which you recognised the man's innocence might not have worked; you would have wanted to see whether God indicated the man's innocence by allowing his
arm to be boiled for half an hour without injury. And
goodness of heart, the affection of the crowd for their
own children, their detestation of so abominable a
crime as child murder, would have cost an innocent
man his life and fair name.

Why Instincts must be Guided by Reason.

So in the problem of war. The good-hearted fellow
who reads on his way to work that the Boers are
"murdering girls in the Golden City" will, if his
previous knowledge of these things is still in the
witchcraft stage, shout with the loudest for the
execution of "Kroojer." He would make part of
"wildly, unreasonably sentimental" crowds. But I
doubt if you could, when in that condition, "breathe
into his heart the sentiment of Peace." If you urged
his duty to his brother Boer he would want to know
about his duty to the sister Englishwomen being
murdered in the Golden City.

But if previous to his hearing of these stories—if,
during the ordinary course of his education by dis-
cussion and reading, at times when he is not shouting
in a crowd—he had formed certain definite notions
which so bore on the likelihood of these things as to
cause him to suspect the story to be either a mis-
chievous fake or silly rubbish, he might still, it is
true, be just as angry, but his anger would be directed,
not against Boers, but against wicked politicians and
lying newspapers. Again, the levers of the mind
would not have affected the force of the emotion
given out by the heart, they would merely have
changed the direction of the resulting action. Without
the chauffeur on the car—who is in this case the mind—
the energy generated in the engine is just one of the
blind forces of Nature; never wholly beautiful while
blind (we may deem the instinct of motherhood, for
instance, wholly beautiful, yet it may lead a tiger to
tear a living child in pieces to feed its cubs), but
worthy almost of worship when they take to themselves the eyes of free will and intelligence.

The whole attitude of the pacifist "intuitionalist," as of the militarist, assumes that ideas are not the children of other ideas, that opinions have not a father and a mother, but that, like Topsy, they "just grewed." If we are to stop the evils which are caused by certain ideas we must make some inquiries as to their parentage.

*Are We Guided by Reason?*

It is necessary again and again to urge that we no more assume that men will act rationally than we assume that war is impossible. Even an exceptionally clear-sighted and well-informed critic was once guilty of the confusion involved in the following remark: "Mr. Norman Angell is convinced that mankind is guided by reason." Mr. Norman Angell is convinced of nothing of the kind. About nineteen-twentieths of the time mankind seems to be guided by the negation of reason. I am convinced that when mankind acts wisely it is guided by reason. The trouble is that most of the time it doesn't act wisely. What I am convinced of is that its only hope lies in wisdom, and that that is the thing we must nurture and cultivate.

I have referred elsewhere* to such well-known changes in the attitude of men as are connoted by the cessation of private and religious warfare. Men used to fight duels, and they have ceased or are ceasing to do so; men used to believe that misfortunes were brought upon them by witches, and to put to frightful tortures the old women whom they believed to be guilty; men used to take delight in the struggles and wounds of combats between gladiators; witnesses and prisoners in courts of justice used to be tortured; zealots for some other faith than that of the majority

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* The Great Illusion, Part II., Chaps. II. and V.; International Polity, pp. 50-55.
used to be burned. What is it which has caused men to cease doing all these things if it is not the gradual increase of the knowledge of facts and the application of reason to those facts? There was an eminent Catholic in the fifteenth century who said this: "It would be impossible for us Catholics to sit at table with a heretic, because he carries with him a certain odour which is personally intolerable to us." Was not that impression instinctive? The odour has at all events disappeared in consequence of certain books appealing purely to reason. It is from the collection by whatever means of a myriad facts that instinct grows, and it is by the application of reason to those facts that instinct is corrected and made to contribute to man's advance.

This Section Summarised.

This whole section of our subject may, therefore, be summarised thus: The foundation of the militarist's case—whether avowed or not—is the theory that man, by instinct and necessity, must, in things that matter, fight; that this instinct, "human nature," will always defeat "theories." This necessarily implies that men do not and cannot control their own actions; that such changes for good as distinguish the modern man from the man of the Stone Age, the Anglo-Saxon from the cannibal, are not the result of thought, of changing ideas, of gathered experience, of comparison, of knowledge, of the organisation thereof, of science, but that all this has been done for man by some outside mechanical force, that it is a gratuitous gift which he does not deserve because it is not the result of any effort on his part. The militarist theory also necessarily involves the conclusion that public opinion is something quite outside ourselves, and involves also, of course, a complete failure to realise that when we talk of public opinion we are public opinion; when we talk of nations
being irrational, we are the nations; so that even in our Church service war, pestilence and famine are classed together. War, like earthquake, "descends upon us," there being no recognition that, after all, while we do not make the earthquake we do make war. Thus, also, the persistent idea in the mind of the militarists that pacifists are trying to prove the impossibility of war; whereas, of course, they are trying to prove the folly of war, and human folly is by no means an impossibility. We have at all times to shout this distinction at the top of our voices; war will always go on if men are foolish enough to wage it.* In almost every discussion you will find your opponent is trying to make it appear that the dispute is as to the possibility or likelihood of war. Of course, if war were impossible we should have no earthly reason for worrying about the question. If war is likely as the result of human folly, that is one of the strongest arguments that exists why we should concern ourselves with preventing it by correcting human folly.

Further, the belief that men cannot control their own conduct is a denial in varying forms of moral responsibility: if the forces of blind instinct will always overwhelm the efforts of man's intelligence, then not merely is it no good making moral or mental effort, but he cannot be blamed for being overcome by something stronger than himself.

Finally, if, as many people say, men are not affected by reason, argument, accumulated knowledge, does it not follow that those things in the shape of learning, education, books, churches, and the rest are useless? If that is not the conclusion, what is the conclusion? And if we assume that men are likely to fight blindly

* Mr. Churchill said on one occasion: "We have sometimes been assured by persons who profess to know that the danger of war has become an illusion." I know of no one who professes to know that the danger of war has become an illusion. It is the benefits of war which we declare to be an illusion.
and without reason, are we to conclude from that that they should be rendered as destructive as possible by being armed as much as possible?

**Books on this Part.**

As to the bibliography of this part of the subject, it is my impression that formal logic and scholastic philosophy is almost less than no good for our purpose. Although the old conflict between Determinism and Free Will is involved in the questions raised in this chapter, I believe that to tackle those problems after the fashion of the schoolmen would be only to confuse our minds, and that we should keep our feet on the ground by discussing those things in the terms of our own subject rather than in the scholastic terms. In formal logic one should, of course, be sure of terminology (in order to avoid it), and Jevons's little book is perhaps the best for that purpose. Better than the usual form of treatise on logic is a book like J. M. Robertson's *Letters on Reasoning*, which I can cordially recommend as distinctly helpful.

On the philosophical aspect of the subject treated in this chapter, however, there is one book which no serious student should on any account fail to read, and that is the first half of Mill's *Essay on Liberty*. That is, in the view of the writer, one of the very few books that really help a man to think as distinct from the books that merely furnish him with facts. I cannot sufficiently emphasise the necessity of thoroughly absorbing the first half of that masterpiece (the second half does not so much matter). As a word of warning, I would say that certain literary mandarins who include this book in their "superior person" condemnation of Victorian literature do not know what they are talking about.

In the matter of historical reading on this phase of the question there is no one incident more worthy of study than the fact of the cessation of religious warfare.
Here is this great fact, this great change in European society. In the fifteenth or even in the sixteenth century in any part of Western Europe a man was exposed to the risk of persecution, death, massacre, and war on account of his religious beliefs. It was not merely a fact of politics which might pass over a man's private life, as does often a fact like an autocratic or monarchical form of government as distinct from a republican one, but it was a real and ever-present danger pursuing a man as it pursued the Huguenots and the earlier heretics, into family life, threatening him in mind, body, and estate with terrors so formidable that we in our day can hardly conceive them. To abolish this peril, to wipe it away, to give to European society security from it, was one of the few real steps that have been made, one of those few things that can be definitely marked as "progress," one of the few real transformations. And it came about within a period of two hundred years or less, and the factors were, as we know, first and last those of public opinion, those of a changed mind and a different idea of human relationship, and of the place that force should occupy in human affairs. Mere machinery, constitutions, treaties, played no part among the causes of this change; they only followed as the result, followed generally a long way in the rear of changes that were purely intellectual and moral.

No study is more worth while to the student of this subject than the details of this miracle.

History will have nothing to say to us on this subject unless we conceive of it as the story of the development of the mind, or, if you prefer, the story of a world community. This idea, which began for practical purposes with Kant, has been steadily growing since his time; and, as Bryce has put it: "The fact is that world history has become one history."

I know of no small book which so well embodies
this conception as The Living Past, by F. S. Marvin (Oxford University Press). This little work brings out very clearly that intellectual interdependence of the world which so long preceded material interdependence, which is, indeed, almost as old as written history itself. It shows the interaction of intellectual and moral forces, the rôle of the factor of intercommunication, in which must be included not merely the means of travel and transport, but the communication of ideas through the written and spoken word.

Our bibliography on this section of the subject should include the following minimum:

3. Lecky, (A) History of Rationalism, (B) History of European Morals.

And if possible, the following:

Myer's History as Past Ethics.
Ruffini, History of Religious Liberty.
Draper, History of the Intellectual Development of Europe.

Jevons’s Logic.

It will be noted that the historical works all bear on the problem of the relation of ideas to social and political conduct, which is the first part of our subject; and should be read with special reference to the cessation of religious war, the disappearance of the duel, of private war, of trial by war; to the growth of law, the cessation of hostilities between groups, the decline of fanaticism. Read not with the idea of remembering disconnected facts, but to establish in your own mind how those things have worked out in the past.
QUESTIONS ON PART II., CHAP. I.

1. "In such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things."

Bernhardi: "Germany and the Next War." (Page 15).

Do you deem therefore that the victory of the Turks over the Christians in the Balkan Peninsula four hundred years ago was a demonstration that they were the right and proper masters thereof? Does this law indicate that Louis XIV. was right in taking Alsace from Germany or Bismarck right in taking it back from the French; or the French right in now trying to retake it from Germany? Did the military might of Napoleon I. give him the right to the conquests that he made?

2. "Efforts are also often made to stir up ill-feeling between the other States, so as to have a free hand for private schemes. This is the policy on which England has built up her power in Europe, in order to continue her world policy undisturbed. She cannot be justly blamed for this; for even if she has acted with complete disregard of political morality, she has built up a mighty Empire, which is the object of all policy, and has secured to the English people the possibility of the most ambitious careers. We must not deceive ourselves as to the principles of this English policy. We must realise to ourselves that it is guided exclusively by unscrupulous selfishness, that it shrinks from no means of accomplishing its aims, and thus shows admirable diplomatic skill."

Bernhardi: "Germany and the Next War." (Page 281.)

What general moral as to the moral advantages of the war system do you draw from this?
CHAPTER II.

THE OUTSTANDING FAILURE OF REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

The problem of war and peace and all that relates thereto—the relationships of nations, the defence of our country, the preparation for war—are all problems of two or more parties; yet they are almost invariably discussed as if they were problems of one.

There is an outstanding illustration of this in a favourite saying of Mr. Churchill's. He laid down this rule:

"The way to secure peace is to be so strong that victory in the event of war is certain."

Now that is a classic instance of a problem of two parties being treated in terms of one. For if we apply the principle to the two parties here is the result that we get:

If two individuals, or nations, or groups of nations, want to keep the peace each must be stronger than the other.

Now, there is no one fault of reasoning which so marks the discussion of this subject as that involved in Mr. Churchill's rule—the fault, that is, of discussing a problem of two or more parties in terms of one.

A Further Illustration.

A characteristic illustration of the same thing was that contained in several of the early criticisms of The Great Illusion. The Times and the Spectator, to say nothing of the Daily Mail and other popular organs, said in effect this:

"Mr. Angell writes as though armaments were mainly concerned with attack or the motives leading thereto; whereas armaments are for defence. The
nations maintain their armaments for the purpose of defending their territories, not for the purpose of invading others."

Now, if armaments are for the purpose of defence they are for the purpose of repelling attack, and are therefore pretty intimately concerned with the question of attack, the motives which may lead thereto, the advantages which may be gained thereby. The propositions of these wise critics amount to saying this: "The nations of Europe will shortly be engaged valiantly defending their homes against the armed hosts who resolutely refuse to attack them. This Armageddon will be particularly murderous and the battles particularly appalling because each army has for years been training itself to leave its neighbour alone. They will all defend themselves heroically to the last man against the attacks which nobody will consent to make."

And exactly the same order of reasoning is that of Major Stewart-Murray, who says: "The peace of the world depends upon the armed forces of the nations."

Which is just the same as saying, that if the nations had no armies the wars between them would be appalling.

The Importance of this Matter.

Now, it may strike the student that all this is of a simplicity so great as to be almost childish, certainly not to be worth one of the three broad divisions into which this great subject is arranged.

But it is a commonplace of the treatment of those things that matter in human affairs that mistakes are not due to a lack of special knowledge but to the failure, in arriving at an opinion, to keep in mind at one and the same time the several elements of the same facts—the facts themselves being generally equally available to the learned and to the unlearned.
The educated Roman or Greek who was quite sceptical as to the witchcraft and augurs had no larger knowledge of the physical science than the sixteenth century judge who did believe in the supernatural power of witches. The difference between the two types of mind was in clearness of thought.

G. K. Chesterton has talked somewhere of the half-witted persons who think with one lobe of their brain at a time instead of the two lobes at once. That would indicate the kind of failure of reasoning with which we are dealing. Defence, for instance, necessarily implies attack. There cannot be any defence unless someone attacks or intends to attack. War, defence and attack, like top and bottom, father and child, front and back, superior and inferior, sale and purchase, friend and enemy, are all double facts, as opposed to what may be called simple facts. It is impossible, that is to say, to conceive the whole without the two parts. And yet, as we have seen, although they are bound together, although the one necessarily implies the other, we do not keep the two elements parallel in our minds. We vision first the one element to the exclusion of the other, and then the other to the exclusion of the one. We cut a living fact in half and then regard each half as a living thing. This was borne in upon me strikingly once when in my younger days I encountered in argument two amateur economists. One argued at great length and in great detail on the assumption that a market was a place where things were bought and not sold; the other argued at equal length and in equal detail on the assumption that a market was a place where things were sold and not bought. To neither did it really occur—and, indeed, neither was fully capable of understanding—that a market is necessarily a place where things are bought and sold, and that there cannot be a purchase without a sale nor a sale without a purchase.
The "One-sided Aberration."

It is this failure of reasoning which Novikow called the "One-sided Aberration." I have attempted to indicate in the introduction to the *Foundations of International Polity* (pp. xxxix. and xl.) that it is this confusion in thinking which lies at the bottom of most failures of the social sense. The social sense, after all, resides in a capacity to see the mixing of the two parties in a social relationship, and, of course, all social relationships reside in the mixing of two or more parties.

There is scarcely a feature of our subject in which confusion is not occasioned by this one-sided aberration. Thus we find it even in a serious, and, on the whole, fair and carefully reasoned review in the *Quarterly Review*, in a long plea for the moral utility of war. The author begs us to remember that but for war Greek culture would have gone down at Marathon before the attacks of the Persians. The true statement is, of course, that but for war the moral possessions of the Greeks would not have been threatened.

In the same way Admiral Mahan said that the utility of armaments had been shown by the war which Britain fought against Napoleon and her success therein. She was able by virtue of her arms to carry on her trade in relative security, which but for her force she would never have been able to do. Again, but for war—Napoleon's war—Britain would have been even more secure than she was and her trade far greater than it was.

Again, we are told that the unification of Germany was only made possible by the fact that by the strength of her arms Germany was able to resist the intrigues of Louis Napoleon, which would have prevented German unity. Yet, if war had been out of the question, if Louis Napoleon had not threatened the use of his force, Germany would not have had to go to war in order to be free to manage her internal affairs in her own way.
By turning things upside down in this way, pacifism has always been represented as the enemy of nationality. Whereas, of course, it is war which is the deadly enemy of nationality. If political groups had given up settling their differences by arms, as the religious groups have done, Finland, Poland, Alsace, Ireland, would no more be suffering from the oppression of military masters than the Protestants in France are now suffering from the oppression of the more powerful Catholics. So long as military force entered into the settlement of religious differences, any group was in danger of oppression by a more powerful one. But so soon as there was a realisation on both sides that military force should be kept out of it, then all parties became secure in their religious possessions.

The Necessity for Defence.

Which brings us to a conclusion touched upon in the last section, but which in part also belongs to this—namely, that defence, resistance, the determination to see that the other man's force is not used against you, is not, properly speaking, the adoption of a policy of force, but the refusal to let force control things. The pacifist no more urges that a nationality should submit to oppression than he would urge that Huguenots should deny their faith because a more powerful party threatened it. The man who does not believe that military force should be used in the settlement of religious questions, who is opposed to the employment of force in those questions, puts the blame upon the man who uses it, not upon the party who resists it. We all see now that war in the domain of religion is monstrous. Imagine someone, however, arguing this way: "War in the religious domain bad! War in the religious domain unjustifiable! Why, it is glorious; it is the mother of all the virtues! Just look at the Huguenots defending their faith; just look at those dying at the stake rather
than deny their faith; do you mean to say they should not have fought?" Of course, no one means that they should not have fought, but we all mean that they should not have been compelled to fight. It is a noble thing to see a man go to the stake for his faith, but it is a vile thing that he should be compelled to do so. The resistance to the Inquisition was magnificent; the fact of the Inquisition was an abomination. No sane man to-day would ask that we return to the massacres of Alva in the Netherlands or of Cromwell in Ireland; that we should tear out the eyes of children, crush the feet of a man to pulp for being mistaken on some point of theological dogma, disembowel girls in the street in the name of Christ—no one wants to return to these things, no one pretends that these are noble things, or that we are not the better for having got rid of them. It was the resistance to these things which was noble. Yet if there had been no resistance there would have been no war. That does not make us justify war, because equally there would have been no war if those things had not been inflicted.

Yet although this simple distinction is clear to us in the kind of warfare that has passed, that between the religious bodies, we seem quite incapable of making the same distinction in the case of warfare between political bodies.

Our opponents praise "war" as a good thing because the resistance to it on the part of an oppressed people is noble. It would be just as sensible to praise the Inquisition as a good thing because the resistance to it implied noble qualities on the part of those who suffered.

Surely the truth is that alike in political and religious matters force should neither be used nor submitted to.* As Novikow says, a man's first duty is not to defend his country; his first duty is not to

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* See Foundations of International Polity, pp. xxx, xxxii.
attack anyone else's. All our trouble comes from the failure in that duty.

*Why Men Praise War.*

It will be realised from the foregoing that through this type of misconception comes all the argument in favour of war as "the mother of all the virtues." The Ruskin view of war being valuable as developing noble qualities is practically never urged saved by those who have this fatal capacity of dealing with one half of a fact at a time, and forgetting the other half while so doing.

The half of the fact which, for the purpose of making the argument, the defender of war on moral grounds overlooks is this: that he himself is in favour of peace.

Even the most rampant Jingo clamouring for unlimited armaments will tell you that he wants them in order that the peace may not be broken. The German Emperor, Mr. Roosevelt, Lord Roberts, Lord Charles Beresford, Mr. Blatchford, Mr. Strachey, Mr. Whibley, every mortal man who need be regarded in this discussion, tells you that he is in favour of peace; that he wants to spare his country the horrors of war. And every one of those I have mentioned has argued in favour of war (which he wants to prevent) and against peace (which he wants to promote).

*Some More Results of the One-sided Aberration.*

Of course this failure to see the two elements of the same fact at one and the same time is particularly noted in all those questions which arise out of the desire to annex territory. There is, for instance, the idea that when you annex a province you annex a market, overlooking the fact that you annex at the same time the people who are supplying and will continue to supply that market; or that when you annex so much
"wealth" or property, you annex at the same time the people who own the wealth and the property.*

This, perhaps, is one of the best illustrations of the truth that most of the errors on this subject arise first, from defective reasoning, and, secondly only from lack of knowledge. No special study, for instance, is necessary in order to know that an army always takes the best men physically of the population; so that if a nation is much at war, its best men get killed off; and that the same thing is taking place in the case of the nation with which it is fighting. And as the effect of victory is to incorporate the beaten—i.e., presumably "inferior"—people into the victors' population, the net effect of warfare must be the survival of the unfit and the steady worsening of the nation. All that was needed to arrive at this result was to think about it. Yet that even famous authors have not thought about it at all is proved by the fact that men have written learned books in defence of war as a means of the survival of the fit, and have not troubled to give a word of explanation as to the process just indicated. They have simply accepted carelessly current words about the survival of the fittest, allowed their minds to form false pictures on the strength of those inaccurate words, and on the false basis so formed have erected their fantastic theories.

* There is a story which I sometimes tell at lectures, and which other lecturers may find useful as illustrating the truth that some luminous and outstanding test fact will give us an indication of the value of some of the most abstruse theories. I was once standing watching the gambling at Monte Carlo, and while doing so a shabby individual came up to me and showed me weird and puzzling columns of figures, which he said represented an infallible system he had discovered, a means whereby I could break the bank and win a million francs. Now, I know if I had attempted to investigate those figures and argued with him about them I should have been lost, for they dealt, of course, with the laws of chance, and the laws of averages, and things about which philosophers will quarrel till the end of time. But there was not the least necessity to do that, because there was an outstanding fact which gave me the measure of the value of the system. Its owner wanted to sell it for twenty francs. As I told him, in the face of that fact I was not interested in his figures.
Thus, even in those cases where it may be preferable to call attention rather to the facts of the case than to the errors of the reasoning, it will be found that the facts themselves are visible and of common knowledge. One does not, for instance, need to have a detailed knowledge of history to realise that a readiness to fight is not necessarily associated with nobility of character. The Venezuelans and the Costa Ricans, always fighting, are not nobler than the Canadians or the Australians, who do not often fight.

The facts dealt with in Chapters IV. and V. of the second part of *The Great Illusion* (now republished in *Prussianism and its Destruction*) are readily available to anyone of quite ordinary reading.

QUESTIONS ON PART II., CHAP. II.

1. "Nations are under no illusion as to the unprofitableness of war in itself. . . . To regard the world as governed by self-interest only is to live in a non-existent world, an ideal world, a world possessed by an idea much less worthy than those which mankind, to do it bare justice, persistently entertains."


*What moral motives do you suppose animate a Power like, say, Germany in her aggression upon Belgium or France?*

2. "As the motives of the several wars cited rose far above a mere financial advantage, so their results have been beneficial from a nobler point of view. The preservation of the North American Union, with the abolition of the degradation of mankind in slavery, and of the disastrous economical condition of slave labour; the welding of the German race into the German nation, followed by the great industrial and economic advance, which only a unified administration could have insured; the detachment of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria from the rule of Turkey, the benefit to the inhabitants of those provinces, attested by the results and newly witnessed to in recent years by the miseries of Albania under continued Turkish rule; the advantage to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines from the substitution of American influence, or American control,
for that of Spain; the opportunity of Japan and her national security, purchased by the successes in Manchuria at a money cost far exceeding in proportion that of any of the other wars named—all these are instances of benefits secured by war, and which could not have been secured by law, for in no one of the cases was there a law which could have accomplished the specific result.”

Mahan: “Armaments and Arbitration.” (Page 111.)

“'We owe to successful war, waged by a small and hardy nation skilled in arms, the priceless heritage of Greek culture which would not have been ours had the Persians won at Marathon. We owe to successful war the fact that England, Holland and North Germany to-day have an outlook on the world quite other than would be theirs had the counter-reformation not been checked by force of arms. Where would the spirit of freedom be found in our time if the Armada had not been beaten, if the war in the Low Countries had ended in a Spanish victory, if Gustavus had not led his Swedes to fight and die at Leipsic? Would it have been better for Europe that Valmy had not been fought, that the ragged legions of liberty had never been urged to their great counterstroke against the reactionary forces of the old monarchies by the glorious mad music of the 'Marseillaise'? Would it have been better for the world that, when the French war for freedom became perverted into war for conquest, it had not been checked in Russia, in Spain, and on the sea at Trafalgar, and checked by force of arms? If Napoleon failed to enslave Europe, it was only because a sufficient number of Europeans were prepared to die in battle to prevent him from succeeding in his undertaking. Such measure of success as he attained is to be attributed to the fact that for many years he was able to persuade an adequate number of Frenchmen to die for the ideal he stood for, while his opponents failed to induce an adequate number of their subjects to die for the polity under which they lived. The pressure of war educated the peoples and welded the populations into nations of men ready to die for the preservation of their nationality; and before the new national ideal France went down in October, 1813. In all this, where is the economic motive of war?”

Quarterly Review, July, 1912
How far was the use of armed force the origin of the evils from which the above-mentioned wars gave deliverance?

Since it was the slave-holders who appealed first to war, the French who tried to prevent German unity by war, Turkey who conquered and held the Balkans for four hundred years by war, Spain who held down her colonies by military force, would it not be true to say that it is the belief of nations in war which created these evils in the first instance? Do you consider that this passage furnishes an instance of a familiar form of failure in reasoning?

In what instance has armed force prevented the freeing of peoples from bad government? Does history show no other way than war by which civilisation can be spread?

3. "Leaving aside all questions of political and military advantage, however, we will confine ourselves to considering the purely economic gains accruing from such a victory. First, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, not to speak of the northern provinces of France which would, all told, represent a population of twenty millions, would pass into German hands. These States are, as Mr. Angell informs us, in a better financial position than Germany, and the average wealth per capita is greater than is the case with the individual German; thus they would represent a taxable value of at least thirty millions of German citizens and increase by fifty per cent. the taxable and financial resources of the German Empire. Thus the burden of taxation distributed over a larger and wealthier population would press far less heavily upon the individual German than at present. Mr. Angell tells us that at the present time the German Chancellor is at his wits' end to make both ends meet. Would not the acquisition of three wealthy States do something to simplify his problem? Again, the northern seaports of France and the ports of Holland and Belgium, gates through which flow the largest proportion of the commerce of Continental Europe, would be in German hands and subject to German taxation; without, therefore, directly taxing a single Frenchman or Hollander or Swiss, Germany could secure a revenue of £50,000,000 per annum."

A Rifleman: "Struggle for Bread." (Page 92.)
“Taking the case of a purely Franco-German war we shall have greatly over-estimated the total direct and indirect cost to a victorious Germany at £200,000,000; against this must be set off a French war indemnity of at least an equal amount (we have seen that a war indemnity can, if intelligently utilised, be made of profit to its recipient), and, moreover, the increased financial resources due to the annexations of Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and the northern French seaports, an all-round increase of taxation which may be estimated at £100,000,000 per annum. Surely enough to make attack worth a Government’s while as a business proposition! But it may be said that the financial disorganisation caused by the war would hit the small States and Europe generally, thus materially reducing the financial resources which it is proposed to tax. But the financial stability of a modern State is far less easily over-balanced than many people imagine. France, after all the sufferings of 1870, with fire and sword carried through her fairest provinces, within a single decade so far recovered herself as to be in a far superior financial position to the very Power which had conquered her; with the shorter duration, therefore, of a modern war, the economic reactions, if more conspicuous, must be in reality far less than was the case formerly. There might, and probably would be, a temporary depression all round, a run on credit, etc., but this depression would be merely temporary.”

A Rifleman: “Struggle for Bread.” (Page 95.)

“Again, consider the case of a Russo-German war. That Germany could gain anything material from such a struggle may be dismissed as unlikely; it was for this reason that Bismareck advised friendship with ‘our eastern neighbour,’ but does the same thing apply to a victorious Russia? Would the occupation of Hamburg or Bremen be of no advantage to the Russian Empire? Or in the case of an Austro-Russian war, would not an Austrian triumph mean ultimately the possession of Salonika and control over the greater portion of the Balkan peninsula? Would not this mean the power to impose preferential taxes in favour of Austrian goods upon the whole of the Balkan States? Would this be a financial futility? The idea that war between civilised States cannot produce economic advantage does not bear the test of close examination.”

A Rifleman: “Struggle for Bread.” (Page 105.)
Do you gather that Germany could thus add to her revenue without increasing her expenditure? Would the forcible annexation and retention of three rebellious States reduce the German Chancellor's troubles? In the light of the enforced abandonment by Britain of the Colonial System of preferential taxes and levies, do you regard the above schemes as workable?

4. "Mr. Angell writes that the case of the small States constitutes 'one of the most remarkable of economic-sociological phenomena in Europe.' It may be due to the innate stupidity of a militarist writer, but to me Mr. Angell's treatment of this very complex problem appears merely to stamp his reasoning as brilliant but superficial. From the purely military standpoint these small States are, in fact, far more militarily secure than their larger neighbours. The guiding principle of modern warfare is the doctrine, 'full strength on the decisive point,' and this decisive point is invariably the main body of the enemy's army, for only by decisively beating this latter in battle is it possible to attain a decisive result. Germany therefore cannot invade either Belgium or Switzerland until she has decisively beaten the French army, for you cannot win battles by marching away from the enemy, nor is it safe to divert a single man or gun from the near vicinity of the expected decisive battle. That under the military aspects of the problem Germany may attempt a rapid flank march through either Belgium or Switzerland, or both, to turn the French fortified frontier is of course only to be expected, but the point is that such movements would be but a means to an end, the defeat of the French army, and that only a very small portion of Belgian or Swiss territory would be traversed, and that no important fighting would take place on Belgian or Swiss soil. These States would, in fact, experience comparatively little of the horrors of war and sustain far less damage in credit or material resources than either France, if defeated, or Germany, if in like case."

A Rifleman: "Struggle for Bread." (Page 112.)

Does this dispose of the argument that the economic and financial standing of the small States shows national prosperity to be not dependent on military power?

5. "His other proposition, that the extension of national
territory—that is, the bringing a large amount of property under a single administration—is not to the financial advantage of a nation, appears to me as illusory as to maintain that business on a small capital is as profitable as on a large."

Mahan: "Armaments and Arbitration." (Page 110.)

Do you therefore conclude from Admiral Mahan’s principle that the inhabitant of Russia, which is very many times larger than Switzerland or England, is very much more prosperous than the inhabitant of either of these other countries?

6. "In the past, when governments were little responsible to the people, wars were made irrespective of popular feeling from motives of advantage purely. To-day all recent history shows that governments are reluctant to go to war; but they recognise, and the people sustain them, that war may come, and that if it does it will expose the nation to vital injury to its ‘financial and industrial stability.’ This is quite different from the apprehension that the reason of an enemy for declaring war is to inflict such injury."

Mahan: "Armaments and Arbitration." (Page 152.)

If all governments are reluctant to go to war, why is there danger that war may come?

7. "There can be little doubt that these matters will be settled in a manner far more advantageous to the world by leaving them to the play of natural forces. It will be better to depend upon the great armaments, as institutions maintaining peace, which they have done effectually for forty years in Europe itself, and not to demoralise the European peoples by the flood of socialistic measures which will follow upon the release to a beneficiary system of the sums now spent on armament. It is not worth while to cajole ourselves with the belief that money economised from armament will be money saved to the State."

Mahan: "Armaments and Arbitration." (Page 13.)

Comment on this passage.
CHAPTER III.

MISCONCEPTIONS AS TO THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PLACE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY.

This third chapter, unlike the two preceding chapters, is concerned not with a confusion in reasoning, but with a misconception of facts, although that misconception of facts is often complicated by the two forms of confused reasoning dealt with in the two preceding chapters.

The misconception of facts may be sub-divided into two sections: (a) political; (b) sociological.

A Mistake About the State.

The first—the political misconception—is indicated sufficiently by a passage from the Foundations of International Polity, which, for your convenience, I here reprint:

The current conception is based upon the image of a State as the economic executive of its citizens, as a limited liability company, or its board, is the economic executive of its shareholders, and a Church is the spiritual executive of its members in the matter of dogma or discipline.

I am afraid this confusion is not merely a "vulgar error." No less a person than Admiral Mahan assures us that the struggle for territory between nations is justified economically by the fact that just as a steel trust has an advantage in owning its own ore-fields, its stores of raw material, so a country has an advantage in owning colonies and conquered provinces. We see at once the idea: the nation is a commercial corporation, like a steel trust.

Well, of course, a moment's reflection shows us that the analogy is an absolutely false one; that
these pictures of nations as rival units competing one against the other bear no sort of resemblance to the facts.

To begin with, the nations, except in so far as the carrying of letters, and in some cases the manufacture of matches and tobacco, are concerned, are not commercial corporations at all, but political and administrative ones, with functions of a like kind to those possessed by our villages, towns, or counties, and Germany no more competes with Britain than Birmingham does with Sheffield. It is not the State which owns and exploits the ore-fields or farms, or factories, in the way that the Steel Trust owns its sources of raw material. The State merely polices and guarantees possession to the real owners, the shareholders, who may be foreigners. The mere fact that the area of political administration would be enlarged or contracted by the process which we call conquest has little more direct bearing upon such economic questions as the ownership of raw material by the populations concerned than would the enlargement of a town's area by the inclusion of outlying suburbs have upon the trading of the citizens of such towns. It is, of course, conceivable that they, or some, might incidentally gain or incidentally lose; but an increase of wealth is no necessary consequence of the increase of municipal territory, else it would be true to say, "The people of Toulouse are, of course, wealthier than the people of Tours," or those of Birmingham than those of Nottingham. We know, of course, that we cannot determine the wealth of a person by the size of the town in which he lives. The largeness of the administrative area may be incidentally a distinct economic disadvantage, as much in the case of a city as in the case of a country.

But the foregoing is only one small part of the fallacy of approximating a nation to a commercial
firm. Not merely is it untrue to represent the nation as carrying on trade against other nations, untrue to represent the State as a corporation carrying on the trade of its people, but it is just as untrue to represent the nations as economic units in the field of international trade. We talk and think of "German trade" as competing in the world with "British trade," and we have in our mind that what is the gain of Germany is the loss of Britain, or vice versa. It is absolutely untrue. There is no such national conflict, no such thing as "British" trade or "German" trade in this sense. An ironmaster in Birmingham may have his trade taken away by the competition of an ironmaster in Essen, just as he may have it taken away by one in Glasgow, or Belfast, or Pittsburg, but in the present condition of the division of labour in the world it would be about as true to speak of Britain suffering by the competition of Germany as it would be to talk of light-haired people suffering by the competition of the dark-haired people, or of the fact that those who live in houses with even numbers are being driven out of business by those who live in odd-numbered houses. Such delimitations do not mark the economic delimitations; the economic function cuts athwart them; the frontiers of the two do not coincide; and though we may quite legitimately prefer to see a British house beat a German one in trade, that victory will not necessarily help our group as a whole against his group as a whole.

When we talk of "German" trade in the international field, what do we mean? Here is an ironmaster in Essen making locomotives for a light railway in an Argentine province (the capital for which has been subscribed in Paris), which has become necessary because of the export of wool to Bradford, where the trade has developed owing to
the sales in the United States, due to high prices produced by the destruction of sheep-runs, owing to the agricultural development of the West. But for the money found in Paris (due, perhaps, to good crops in wine and olives, sold mainly in London and New York) and the wool needed by the Bradford manufacturer (who has found a market for blankets among miners in Montana, who are smelting copper for a cable to China, which is needed because the encouragement given to education by the Chinese Republic has caused Chinese newspapers to print cable news from Europe)—but for such factors as these, and a whole chain of equally interdependent ones throughout the world, the ironmaster in Essen would not have been able to sell his locomotives. How, therefore, can you describe it as part of the trade of "Germany" which is in competition with the trade of "Britain" or "France" or "America"? But for the British, French and American trade it could not have existed at all. You may say that if the Essen ironmaster could have been prevented from selling his locomotives the trade would have gone to a British one. But this community of German workmen, called into existence by the Argentine trade, maintains by its consumption of coffee a plantation in Brazil, which buys its machinery in Sheffield. The destruction, therefore, of the Essen trade, while it might have given business to the British locomotive maker, would have taken it from, say, a British agricultural implement maker. The economic interests involved sort themselves, irrespectively of the national groupings.

The notion that it is the nations, and not the trades, which are the rival economic units can be put to a very simple test—the test of progression. "Great Britain" (adopting for the moment the ruling classification) has admittedly the greatest
interest in foreign trade, and it is she who is supposed to be feeling most keenly the competition of rivals. Now, suppose that by some magic she could annihilate all these rivals—Germany, the United States, Austria, France, all of them, sink them beneath the sea—would Great Britain be the richer? She would be faced, not merely by bankruptcy, but by the starvation of millions of her population; something like a third of it would actually die for want of food, or leave the country.

What, of course, we fail to realise in this connection is that trade is necessarily exchange; if we are to sell anything to anyone the buyer must have money. He can only obtain that money by selling something. If we do not sell we cannot buy; and so, when you come to the complex groups embracing all sorts of trades and industries which our modern nations represent, each must, in order to be a customer, be also a competitor. Roughly, and largely in the European nations, he is a customer to the extent that he is a competitor. It is a noteworthy fact, the full significance of which I have not space to deal with now, that it is occasionally those nations which most resemble one another in their industrial make-up that are mutually the best customers. Great Britain sells more per head of population to Belgium, a highly industrialised nation, than to Canada or Russia, mainly agricultural nations.

What, however, I am dealing with here is not an ignorance of certain statistical facts, or a failure to understand certain obscure points in economics; not the use of mere loose language, but a fundamentally untrue conception, a false picture of the State in its relation to the economic activities of its people.

The Division of Labour.

Practically the whole of the main misconceptions
with which we are concerned in this chapter are dealt with in the passage just quoted. It would be possible to analyse them still further, but as the passage is already a sufficiently-condensed one, the effort of doing it for yourselves will show you more clearly than explanatory analysis could do its bearing on conquest, annexation, imperialism, military protectionism, and practically all the misconceptions with which we have to deal. There are, however, further illustrations of the same proposition on pages xxiii, xxiv and xxv of the Introductory Summary to the same book. As I there point out, the division of labour in business and in thought, which is the machinery of co-operation, has brought about interdependence between groups in one nation and groups in another which has accomplished two things—it has destroyed not merely the economic, but the moral and intellectual unity of States, and rendered the exercise of force by one State against another, for intellectual or moral as well as for material ends, futile because irrelevant, and for that reason ineffective to promote the end in view.

The facts here indicated, thoroughly grasped, will enable the reader to appreciate, in reading the chapter on Credit and International Relations, that international credit is not a device elaborated by bankers and financiers and disconnected with the general methods of society, but that it is on the contrary a necessary part of the whole life of modern Europe closely connected with all the other activities of mankind.

**A Passage to Answer.**

Now, as showing the application of these propositions to the kind of problem with which we have to deal, take the following vigorous statement of the militarist case for the advantages of victory, and expose, step by step, the fallacies underlying it:

"Assuming the German fleet to prove victorious..."
we will pass to the consideration of how far it would be possible for Germany to benefit economically by such a victory.

"Germany's gain would be England's loss. The British manufacturer undersold by his German rival would be obviously forced from the markets, in every branch of our foreign trade German competition would cut the ground from under our feet, British capitalists would be ruined, British workmen thrown out of employment, and Britain reduced to a mere economic appendage of the German Empire. Our natural wealth in coal and iron mines could not be wholly destroyed, but our great foreign trade would wither away and die under the oppressive influence of German sea-power as if from the touch of a magician's wand. We would supply Germany with raw materials, we would supply Germany with articles of luxury, the latest sartorial fashions perhaps, but here our commercial possibilities would end, Germany victorious at sea would strangle our trade and industries as we ourselves strangled the trade and industries of Ireland in the eighteenth century.

"There is no conceivable reason why the German Government should not, under such circumstances, resuscitate Napoleon's Berlin decree and declare the British Isles to be in a state of blockade to all ships which had not first touched at German ports. Germany being by hypothesis in a position to actually enforce such a decree, this would act with disastrous effect upon British commerce. Hamburg and Bremen would replace London and Paris as the centres of the world's commerce, and become the universal markets for barter and exchange which, as we have, in our introductory chapter, noted the advantages conferred by a favourable position with regard to the world's trade routes, cannot but react beneficially upon German commerce. Again, by
giving preferential harbour dues to native shipping whilst exacting higher rates from foreign Powers, Germany could not fail to capture the world's carrying trade. The Englishman, unable because of higher harbour dues to compete in freightage with the German shipper, must inevitably be shouldered off the great trade routes. We ourselves played a somewhat similar game with the Dutch; surely every Englishman remembers Cromwell's Navigation Act and the part it played in building up British shipping. Here, then, are two distinct economic advantages to be gained by military conquest, nor, I think it will be admitted, are they inconsiderable ones.*

The Confusion about the Nature of the State.

The confidence with which this passage is written would probably lead the great majority of careless readers to accept its conclusions without question. Yet from beginning to end it is a tissue of bad reasoning based on false assumptions.

The passage contains not only the fallacy about the functions of the State dealt with in this chapter, but also the use of an historical analogy which on examination tells heavily against the writer's own argument, and a failure to realise that trade and commerce are matters in which two or more parties are concerned—an instance of the One-sided Aberration discussed in Chapter II. of this Part.

With regard to the first point it should be noted that throughout this passage "Germany" is treated as a trading concern competing directly, as a business firm, with the other nations of the world. As soon as we remember that trade is not carried on by Governments but by individual merchants and manufacturers, and that one German merchant competes with another as

well as with foreign merchants, the loose reasoning of the writer becomes apparent.

In what way would the victory of the German fleet help the German manufacturer to undersell the British manufacturer? For a hundred years the British fleet has been supreme, but has that prevented certain Germans from underselling certain Britons even in British Colonies? The truth is, of course, that the connection between naval rivalry and trade competition is an entirely imaginary one. Underselling is achieved by efficiency in production, the possession of a good supply of cheap raw materials and by the skill of the artizans and merchants. The merchants of a country like Switzerland, without a single man-of-war, can and do undersell British merchants in many parts of the world. We have here an instance of the confusion dealt with in this chapter, the misconception about the nature of the State, carried to absurd lengths.

*Napoleon's Failure.*

When we turn to the historical analogy we have only to look at our history-book to see how futile Napoleon's Berlin Decree proved and how foolish a victorious Germany would be to imitate it. The following passage shows what the distinguished historian, Dr. Holland Rose, thinks of this measure. Writing of Napoleon, he says:

"Very characteristic was his reply on March 24th, 1811, to a deputation from the General Councils of Commerce and Manufacture in France. . . . After twitting the deputation with its lugubrious opinions, he proceeded to justify the Continental system, and stated that in about six months his sword would pierce England to the heart. As for his tariff, it would remain unchanged, for it did the utmost harm to British trade. The French Empire would soon produce enough sugar, indigo, and perhaps cotton, to do without imports of those articles, and Europe would
no longer need trade with England and the Colonies. . . . As for England, she would soon be bankrupt.

"The whole address illustrates his proneness to illusions on the subject of commerce. That wise counsellor Mollien, often noted that his master had failed to grasp some of its essential facts; and the Emperor's letters yield proof that he believed the extreme dearness of colonial wares in Europe to be more harmful to the English vendor than to the Continental consumer—a notion as mistaken as his suggestions that the confiscation of these products would be a good way of replenishing the coffers of Prussia, Westphalia, and Naples.

"The course of events was to prove that nothing could shake his belief in the efficacy of these suicidal devices. State after State was flung into the crucible of his mighty experiment; yet the looked-for result never came. Finally, in his constant straining after the one final expedient that must assure the ruin of England, he came to the death grapple with Russia. It is difficult to believe that this was the man who in other domains of thought sneered at idéologues. He himself was the chief idéologue, the supreme dupe of the age. As he looked round on the Europe of his day, he took no count of the mighty forces that were guiding England with the strength of youth, and were connecting all parts of the world by indissoluble ties; what he beheld was a mirage conjured up by his vivid fancy and boundless egotism."

**The One-sided Aberration Again.**

We may now return to our militarist advocate in order to note that he is also a victim of the One-sided Aberration. For throughout the passage I have quoted he writes on the assumption that international trade can be the exclusive possession of the people of one nation; whereas, trade being a matter of exchange, it is in its nature an affair concerning two or more
problems. Thus "Rifleman" starts off with the statement that "Germany's gain would be England's loss," which is equivalent to saying that if your best customer grows richer, you yourself will be poorer. And he then proceeds to suggest various measures by which Germany might try to increase the amount of her own buying and selling by decreasing the amount of buying and selling done by the people with whom she trades.

Sociological Problems.

There remains the sociological division of this chapter—that is to say, the problem of policing, the place of force in society, the defence of nationality and the part played by military power in its defence, the relation of the Western world to "inferior" races, the Yellow Peril, etc.

I want, as an introduction to the study of this branch of the subject, to give you a hint of certain mechanical forces that are necessarily set in motion, as soon as men begin to co-operate, by so apparently simple a device as the division of labour; of the process by which these forces so act as progressively to nullify the efficacy of the physical coercion of one party to the division of labour by another, rendering our current estimate of the worth, whether moral or material, of coercion false because it ignores the weight of these forces.

I want to show first that this mode of social action, according to which it is to our interest to act indirectly against the forces of Nature—that is to say, first by using our energy to secure power over someone else, and then using that power to compel him to apply his energy to Nature—is uneconomic in the larger sense of the term; it represents a waste of human effort.

The exercise of coercion over other men necessarily presumes resistance (if there is no resistance, coercion is not necessary). The energy expended is met by the
resistance of the "coercee," and to the extent to which such resistance is effective you get merely a cancellation of force or energy, which is, of course, quite unproductive. I will try by illustration to make clear what may be obscure in abstract definition.

An Illustration.

Here are two men: one is digging, the other is standing over him with a whip or a weapon. We are apt to think of one as bond, and the other as free; but both are bond. If the man with the whip or weapon is thirsty, and wants to go to the river to drink, he cannot—his slave would run away. He is sleepy and wants to sleep—equally he cannot. He would like to hunt—equally he cannot. He is bound, tied to the slave as much as the slave is tied to him. His work of control, compulsion, watching, whatever you care to call it, is not directly productive at all; it is only indirectly productive, necessitated by the resistance of the slave. If we can imagine the slave driver or owner, wearied with this arrangement, saying to the slave, "I am going hunting, and if you will stay here and do this task during the day, I will give you half of the proceeds of my hunt," and the slave agreeing to this, you double the productivity of the two men; you have two producing instead of one. Indeed, you have more, because if the offer is such as really to involve a voluntary agreement on the part of the slave—a desire to do the work in order to get the reward—all the energy which the slave originally devoted to looking for a chance of escape is now liberated for his task. This is the economic case against slavery, as at bottom it is the economic case against robbery, conquest, and every other form of human coercion, which means to some degree always the cancelling of energy by resistance, instead of its fruitful use against Nature, which is the final source of all wealth, however obtained.
Another Illustration.

A further development of this process can be illustrated in another way. Here are two tribes of one hundred men each living on opposite sides of the river, both engaged in growing corn or in some other simple form of agriculture. It occurs one day to one of the tribes that it would be much simpler to go and take the corn of the other tribe than to labour at growing corn themselves. So some fifty of the best-trained men sally forth to despoil their neighbours. The second tribe resist; some of the fifty are killed, a portion of the corn is captured. The first tribe then argue that they did not employ force enough, and they begin to increase the number of their fighting men and, by definite training, their efficiency. The second tribe, determined not again to be the victims of spoliation, do the same, and you start a competition of armaments, with this result: that at the next foray you find seventy-five men of the first tribe ranged in battle against seventy-five men of the second. We will assume that the first tribe is successful, beats the seventy-five of the defenders—who, like themselves, have been devoting their energies to warlike training, and not to the production of grain—and as the result of their victory they capture grain produced by twenty-five men. Thus the result of labour in warlike preparations, the production of weapons, training, etc., of seventy-five men yields an amount of wealth represented by the labour of twenty-five men. Would not the result have been exactly three times as great if their forces had been turned directly against Nature instead of using it against men?

*How We Depend on One Another.*

But that by no means covers, even in fundamental principle, the whole of the case. It will have occurred to you, of course, that the embryo of society is to be found in the division of labour. If we were not
compelled to divide our labour, if in order to get what we want it were not necessary for one to do one thing and one another, not only would there be no trade and commerce—there would be no courts of law, no society at all. If each could really suffice for himself, without the co-operation of others, we should be just in the condition of the animals that feed upon the plants, indifferent as to whether all other individuals of their own species disappear or not—truly independent, truly self-sufficing, and therefore with no obligations to others, and others having no obligations to us. But from the moment that we wear clothes, or eat bread, or have our teeth filled or our appendix removed, we cease to be independent, we cease to be indifferent to the disappearance of other of our species: really we cannot remove our own appendix. And if you make even a cursory list of the number of people that are necessary to supply your clamant daily needs, you will find, of course, that they number not half a dozen, or a dozen, or even hundreds, but, if you make the calculation correctly, hundreds of thousands. And if you have ever dreamed dreams of an ideal world in which you would live as part of some simple village community, independent of the rest of the world, I wonder whether you have fully considered all that is meant by the surrendering of such things as literature, music, books, being able to hear from your friends and writing to them, having an anaesthetic when your leg is to be removed as the result of an accident, saving your women from excessive labour—for in all ideal village communities the women are old at twenty-five as the result of unceasing physical fatigue—of seeing something of the world, or keeping your mother's portrait when she is dead. For if you are not prepared to give up these things, if you desire even the smallest proportion of them, you must resign yourself to the existence of a complex community, and to the communication with foreign countries, invention,
laboratories, scientific investigation. And if you calculate all that this means, you will find that you are depending not upon this little community, but upon hundreds of thousands, millions of men, whom you have never seen and never can see, many living on the other side of the world, dependent upon them, it may be, for your very existence, as I shall shortly show.

The important thing for the moment is that by division of labour you have created a condition of dependence upon others, and that dependence upon others necessarily implies a limitation of the force which you can use against these others. Even in slavery, if the master is dependent upon the labour of the slaves, the force he can use against them is limited—he cannot kill them. As the division of labour increases in complexity, a progressive stultification of force takes place, as I have detailed elsewhere.

Interdependence Makes Force Useless.

The fact that complete interdependence means the complete stultification of force is illustrated by the position of two men in a boat of whom I read once in a book of adventure. The boat was leaky, the sea heavy, and the shore a long way off. It took all the efforts of the one man to row and of the other to bale. If either had ceased, both would have drowned. At one point the rower threatened the baler that if he did not bale with more energy, he would throw him overboard; to which the baler made the obvious reply that if he did, he (the rower) would certainly drown also. And as the rower was really dependent upon the baler, and the baler upon the rower, neither could use force against the other. The threat of death itself became ineffective in such circumstances.

To the degree, then, to which interdependence is complete, force becomes ineffective.

How Communications bring about Interdependence.

But I want to indicate certain other factors that
operate. Imagine two villages separated for most months of the year by an impenetrable swamp. In this condition each village is compelled to produce nearly all that it needs itself—the condition of most villages in Europe a generation or two ago. But imagine that the swamp has been cut by a canal, and that the situation of one of these villages is particularly suitable for the production of foodstuffs, and the other for the production of metals and fuel. What will inevitably happen is that, as the result of this improvement in communication and cheapening of transport, one village will be mainly engaged upon producing foodstuffs, and the other upon producing coal and iron. In a greater or lesser degree they will make an exchange of their products. Now, in the first condition, where there was no exchange, and where each village produced all that it needed, one can imagine the men of the first village attacking the second, raiding it, carrying off its goods, and not themselves suffering even by the annihilation of the second village. (It was the condition of border villages a century or two ago.) But after the construction of the canal, when the improvement of communication has led them to divide their labour, it would serve little purpose for the miners to wage war against the food producers; and if in doing so they wiped them out in the old-fashioned way, they would be threatened with starvation. And the condition of interdependence would be none the less even if it were indirect—that is to say, if one village, mainly agricultural, annoyed at paying too much for its implements, raided a second village where they were made, and ruined the purchasing power of this village so that it could no longer buy the coal of a third village, which happened to be the main market of the agriculturists of the first village. Although you may find your market in consumer A, you will ruin it, perhaps, by attacking B, upon whom A is dependent.
The Change in One Hundred Years.

Now, you know, of course, that that is the condition of the modern world. The intercommunication represented by the canal, which renders possible the division of labour between otherwise separated communities, and without which such division of labour is not possible, is the characteristic factor of our time. I think it is certainly true to say that one hundred years ago communication was less effective in Europe than it had been two thousand years previously. But this last one hundred years has drawn capitals at opposite sides of the world more closely together, and placed them in more intimate communication than neighbouring country towns in the same state were in before the day of steam and telegraphy. And yet we assume that the relationships between these groups, transformed as they must be by this marvellous new element of interdependence, are exactly what they were before it existed. I am not exaggerating. It is positively laid down by our greatest authorities on the relations of nations that the factor of power, of force, is what it was in the days of Cesar, of Machiavelli, of Clausewitz; that of fundamental change there is none. Yet the factor of communication represents progressive forces which must fundamentally transform the relationships between the communities affected by them. That canal, obviously representing a revolution in the relationship of those two villages, is yet declared by the wise men of those two villages in no way to affect that relationship!

How Ideas have not Changed.

It is, of course, not the mere fact of contact which has rendered them interdependent, but the division of labour which that improvement of communication has brought about—the new fact that the prosperity of either of these communities is conditional upon the due performance of its functions by the other.
Not only does existing political and economic literature still employ the language of international conditions which have in fact disappeared, but the underlying ideas of such literature ignore characteristic developments of our time. If one compares an average modern treatise on a problem of international politics—whether it takes the form of a leading article in a newspaper, or the more pretentious treatment of a quarterly review, or the books of any recognised authority on the subject—with a corresponding treatise of the eighteenth century, it will be found that the language and ideas are fundamentally identical, the evident assumption on the part of the twentieth-century writer being that the essential facts of the problem have not changed. Yet the facts have so changed as to render what were obvious truths in the eighteenth century absurdities in the twentieth.

A further attempt is made to show the character of human co-operation in many passages in The Great Illusion and The Foundations of International Polity—notably, for instance, pages 186–194 and all Chapter IV., Part II., of The Great Illusion, and pages xxi to xlvi and all Chapters III. and IV. of Polity.

It is of the utmost importance to get a clear idea of how the thing works before worrying about disconnected facts: the process, the general law, are so infinitely more important in the first instance than the facts which they explain.

Some Great Questions for Study.

As part of the larger sociological division of the subject, one may include the relationship of the inferior races, the Yellow Peril, and so forth. Of course, if Western civilisation is really threatened by the Yellow Peril, it is high time we composed our imaginary differences between ourselves. A united Western civilisation would not have much to fear from the yellow man; a disunited Western civilisation might
conceivably be overthrown. But some of the economic errors underlying the fear of the yellow man—cheap labour and the rest of it—are precisely the errors with which we have been dealing. It will clarify our minds on the subject if we apply them to the problem of the lower races.

Of course there is a very large literature dealing with our relations to Asiatic and other inferior races, from John Stuart Mill down, but it is hardly necessary even to indicate it. I would suggest, however, that the problems connected with mixed races might well be studied by taking a practical example.

A Practical Example.

Spanish America, especially countries like Brazil, with their mixture of white, negro, Indian, and sometimes Asiatic, on the whole a fairly successful mixture, is bound to modify some of the easy-going theories which have been popular of recent years. When one sees, as I have seen, a Brazilian millionaire, in whose veins runs the blood of all the races I have mentioned, dining cheek by jowl with, and as the host of, a member of one of the Royal Houses of Europe, talking French with him on subjects implying wide reading and cultivated ideas, and then remembers that this same Brazilian would in New York be refused admission to any but low-class negro hotels, would, if his race were recognised, not be allowed to enter a railway train except in the Jim Crow car, one can realise that interesting things are going to happen, especially also when these same "niggers" begin to marry their heavily dowered daughters to scions of the European nobility.

Suggestions about Books.

The bibliography of this, the third, chapter is, of course, a very large one, but I would underline the following books:

Hartley Withers' *Meaning of Money.*
Bastiat's *Economic Sophisms.*
Houston Stewart Chamberlain's *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century.*
Finot's *Race Prejudice.*
David Starr Jordan's *The Blood of the Nations.*
William Sumner's *War, and Other Essays,* published by the Oxford University Press.
David Jayne Hill's *World Organisation and the Modern State.*

Of the modern writers on our relations with the black races, Bryce and E. D. Morel are particularly worth attention. Of the recent books dealing with the historical side of the subject, H. S. Perris’s *Pax Britannica* (particularly dealing with Anglo-American relations) is useful, as is also G. H. Perris’s *History of War and Peace,* published in the Home University Library.

**Hints to Readers.**

To those who have given much effort to thrashing out an intricate subject, the following recommendation will hardly be necessary. Never tackle a book with the idea of swallowing it whole, of absorbing all the facts that it contains pell-mell. Having formed an assumption or working hypothesis, see how the facts presented by a given author bear on that one assumption or hypothesis. One assumes, for instance, on the basis of previously observed facts, that the process by which Europe achieved religious toleration was about as follows: The object of the respective religious reformers of the Renaissance was not the establishment of toleration, but the enforcement each of his own particular dogma. But the need of establishing one dogma as against another involved necessarily an appeal to argument and reason, and finally the unconscious adoption of the method of experimenting and proving each step, and the increasing employment of this method changed the mental attitude of all those intellectually active in Europe; its employment was
still further stimulated by the wonderful results which it gave in the field of physical research, and the change of mental attitude on the part of those active in the affairs of the world brought about that state of mind which stopped the religious wars and gave us liberty from religious tyranny, a thing which, but for this change in mental outlook, governmental regulation of itself could never have secured.

With this method of reading clearly in mind, take, for instance, Lecky's *History of Rationalism*, for the one sole purpose of seeing what light it throws on your hypothesis. In reading reject everything that does not throw any light thereon, and, having read the book for that purpose, it will be quite possible to read it all again for the light it may throw on a quite different matter. Just to read at large is, I should judge, from certain necessarily limited observations which I have been able to make, worse then useless; it merely befuddles the mind of otherwise intelligent men. I suppose we all have the experience that some of the stupidest people we know are those who have read the most books. The net result of their reading is to give the type of mind revealed in those magazines of useful information that used to be published in the 'seventies and 'eighties, when apparently millions were thrilled to learn that the word "chariot" was mentioned in the Old Testament 1,742 times; or that the postage stamps used annually by the Bank of England would cover Clapham Common.

Such, then, are the three chapters of this discussion. The analysis of itself will do little more to ensure good reasoning on the subject than a knowledge of the "parts of speech" does to ensure good speech. But it will be of service, if applied, in the detection of definite errors.

The student will have realised at this stage that very many, perhaps most, of the questions with which he
has to deal touch upon all the divisions—that is to say that in dealing with any one question he will have to call in some measure on all of the three divisions.

*The Method Applied.*

Take the case of the *Daily Mail* leader-writer who says that, "notwithstanding all our protestations of a desire for peace and our homage thereto, the sentiment of nationality will always oppose an insuperable barrier to the realisation of that ideal. For in defending their nationality men will always forget that war does not 'pay,' and will whip out their swords without any consideration whatever of that point."

Here, of course, one has to call on the first division of our subject in order to show that the sentiment of nationality is not an unchanging force from the outside—that it has been modified, changed, and transformed within the last three hundred years; that it declines and increases with the centuries, owing to the passage of ideas from mind to mind, of discussion of facts, of exchange of experience; that it is influenced by such factors as the lucidity of a writer or a group of writers, like those which arose in France in the middle of the eighteenth century. While we are discussing it it is changing, and while the *Daily Mail* leader-writer is writing he himself is weakening or strengthening a given conception. And yet he talks as though he, being part of the people or the nation, were the helpless victim of an outside force which he cannot even question or divert in however small degree. The philosophy and the facts are against him on that point.

We have to take in the second division of our subject in order to show that nationality can never be threatened by the preference of a people for their own country. It is only threatened by the preference of people for other people’s countries. Nationality can never suffer from the desire to preserve our own; only
from the desire to destroy somebody else's. If we really believe in nationality and the right to it, as we believe in the right to religious faith—our own as well as other people's—nationality would be in as little danger from war as is the Catholicism of Cardinal Bourne from the British Army, or the Conservatism of Mr. Balfour from the Territorials. And we have to call on the third division of our subject in order to show that the mere fact of a German victory would not wipe English law, literature, or language from the earth, any more than the mere fact of German victory in 1871 wiped French literature and French intellectual influence from Europe.

And in dealing with this last subject we have to show the inter-relation of economic and moral factors—show that it is precisely the intangibility of material wealth which makes it impossible for a conqueror to uproot intellectual or spiritual possessions.

I think it will be realised that, without the analysis which we have just undertaken, the immediate and instantaneous exposure of the nature of the fallacies underlying the leader-writer's plea would hardly be possible.

The following quotations from representative militarist writers should be examined and answered in a similar way.

**QUESTIONS ON PART II., CHAPTER III.**

1. "Eliminate, if you can, the competition between the several nationalities, so as to suppress the armaments; substitute for these the artificial system of compulsory arbitration and disarmament, and you will have realised a socialistic community of States, in which the powers of individual initiative, of nations and of men, the great achievement of our civilisation so far, will gradually be atrophied. The result may be that European civilisation will not survive, having lost the fighting energy which heretofore has been inherent in its composition."

Mahan: *Armaments and Arbitration*. (Page 10.)
Do you regard the population of the States of the British Empire—Australia, Canada, etc.—which have never seen war, and are removed from the more pressing likelihood of it, as standing in danger of the failure of individual initiative? Or as comparing badly in this respect with the populations of those South American States, or the States of South-eastern Europe, that have known much war?

2. "The natural law, to which all laws of Nature can be reduced, is the law of struggle. All intrasocial property, all thoughts, inventions, and institutions, as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of the intrasocial struggle, in which one survives and another is cast out. The extra-social, the supersocial, struggle, which guides the external development of societies, nations, and races, is war. The internal development, the intrasocial struggle, is man's daily work—the struggle of thoughts, feelings, wishes, sciences, activities. The outward development, the supersocial struggle, is the sanguinary struggle of nations—war. In what does the creative power of this struggle consist? In growth and decay, in the victory of the one factor and in the defeat of the other! This struggle is a creator since it eliminates."

Clauss Wagner: *Der Kreigals schaffendes Weltprinzip.*

(Quoted by Bernhardi, page 11.)

"National entities, in their birth, activities and death, are controlled by the same laws that govern all life—plant, animal, or national—the law of struggle, the law of survival

. . The idea of international arbitration as a substitute for natural laws that govern the existence of political entities arises not only from a denial of their flats and an ignorance of their application, but from a total misconception of war, its causes, and its meaning."

General Homer Lea: *Valour of Ignorance.*

Do you conclude from the foregoing that it would be better for the English and the Scotch to be still at war? If not, how is the assumption underlying these passages vitiated? Which of these two nations has been "eliminated" in keeping with the alleged Law of Survival? What is the common misreading of the biological analogy reflected in these passages?
3. "National power is surely a legitimate factor in international settlements; for it is the outcome of national efficiency, and efficiency is entitled to assert its fair position and chance of exercise in world matters."

Mahan: *Armaments and Arbitration*. (Page 84.)

"The existence of might is no mere casual attribute, but the indication of qualities which should, as they assuredly will, make their way to the front and to the top in the relations of States."

Mahan: *Armaments and Arbitration*. (Page 85.)

"Military efficiency is not a quality which stands alone or can be considered by itself; military efficiency is but a symptom of national efficiency . . . every great ruling race which has strongly impressed the world's history has been equally prominent in the arts of war and peace . . . the decay of one quality merely symptomises the decay of others . . . hence the warlike nation does inherit the earth."

A Rifleman: *Struggle for Bread*. (Page 179.)

*Give a list of the warlike nations of the earth—that is to say, the nations whose populations have fought much (in the New World as well as in the Old)—and a list of those nations which during the last generation or so have fought little; then indicate why you regard the first list as expanding and rising nations and the second as dying or decaying.*

4. "This highest expansion can never be realised in pure individualism. Man can only develop his highest capacities when he takes his part in a community, in a social organism, for which he lives and works. He must be in a family, in a society, in the State, which draws the individual out of the narrow circles in which he otherwise would pass his life, and makes him a worker in the great common interests of humanity. The State alone, so Schleiermacher once taught, gives the individual the highest degree of life.

"War, from this standpoint, will be regarded as a moral necessity, if it is waged to protect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation. As human life is now con-
stituted, it is political idealism which calls for war, while materialism—in theory, at least—repudiates it.

"If we grasp the conception of the State from this higher aspect, we shall soon see that it cannot attain its great moral ends unless its political power increases. The higher object at which it aims is closely correlated to the advancement of its material interests. It is only the State which strives after an enlarged sphere of influence that creates the conditions under which mankind develops into the most splendid perfection. The development of all the best human capabilities and qualities can only find scope on the great stage of action which power creates. But when the State renounces all extension of power, and recoils from every war which is necessary for its expansion; when it is content to exist, and no longer wishes to grow; when 'at peace on sluggard's couch it lies,' then its citizens become stunted. The efforts of each individual are cramped, and the broad aspect of things is lost. This is sufficiently exemplified by the pitiable existence of all small States, and every great Power that mistrusts itself falls a victim to the same curse."

Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War. (Page 18.)

Do you gather from this that the Russian must be a higher type than the Swiss or Belgian, who share in "the pitiable existence" of a small State?

5. "The armaments of European States now are not so much for protection against conquest as to secure to themselves the utmost possible share of the unexploited or imperfectly exploited regions of the world—the outlying markets, or storehouses of raw material, which, under national control, shall minister to national emolument. The case is much like that of the ownership of ore-fields by the Steel Trust, of which we have heard so much; the natural, and certainly not unwise, wish of the manufacturer to command his own sources of fuel and raw materials."

Mahan: Armaments and Arbitration. (Page 113.)

"It is the great amount of unexploited raw material in territories politically backward, and now imperfectly possessed by the nominal owners, which at the present moment constitutes the temptation and the impulse to war of European States."

Mahan: Armaments and Arbitration. (Page 110.)
"A vigorous colonial policy, too, will certainly improve the national prosperity if directed, on the one hand, to producing in our own colonies the raw materials which our industries derive in immense quantities from foreign countries, and so making us gradually independent of foreign countries; and, on the other hand, to transforming our colonies into an assured market for our goods by effective promotion of settlements, railroads, and cultivation. The less we are tributaries of foreign countries, to whom we pay many milliards, the more our national wealth and the financial capabilities of the State will improve."

Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War. (Page 272.)

Do you consider that the facts of colonial history on the one hand and industrial history on the other confirm the assumptions here made?

What is the difference in commercial fact between the "control" of Canadian wheat fields by the British Government and the ownership of ore-fields by a Steel Trust?

In actual practice does political control ensure favourable purchasing terms? Can raw material be obtained other than by purchase?

6. "Disarmament will not abolish war, you cannot abolish war from a competitive system of civilisation; competition is the root-basis of such a system of civilisation, and competition is war. When a business firm crushes a trade rival from the markets by cut-prices there is exactly the same process at work as when a business nation crushes a trade rival by physical force; the means vary, but the end in view and the ethical principles in question are identical; in both cases the weaker goes to the wall: in both cases it is woe to the vanquished."

A Rifleman: Struggle for Bread. (Page 209.)

"So the German, the Englishman, the Frenchman, and the American all produce a far greater quantity of manufactured goods than their own countryfolk can consume, and so all alike seek to dispose of their goods abroad, either to people who do not produce such goods, but have natural resources either in timber, wheat, &c., by which they can pay for them, such as the Argentine Republic, India, Canada, &c., or to one another; but if the Englishman sells goods in Germany he is competing with the German.
manufacturer, and if the German sells goods in England it is vice versa, and so on throughout the world. And if the Englishman sells goods in Turkey or Argentina he is taking trade from the German, and if the German sells goods in either of these countries—or any other country come to that—he is taking trade from the Englishman; and the well-being of every inhabitant of the great manufacturing towns, such as London, Paris, or Berlin, is bound up in the power of the capitalist to sell his wares; and the production of manufactured articles has outstripped the natural increase of demand by 67 per cent., therefore new markets must be found for these wares or the existing ones be 'forced'; hence the rush for colonies and feverish trade competition between the great manufacturing countries. And the production of manufactured goods is still increasing, and the great cities must sell their wares or starve. Now we understand what trade-rivalry really is. It resolves itself, in fact, into the struggle for bread.'

A Rifleman: Struggle for Bread. (Page 54.)

If Jones of Leeds is selling harvesting machinery to a ranch in the Argentine, which is exporting its wheat to German workmen manufacturing rails for China, why is it false to represent England and Germany as rival business firms competing for trade in South America?

Is available "trade" limited in amount? Can armed force be used to compel people to buy a certain make of manufactured goods?

7. "Such was the fate of the invaders so long as the Roman Empire retained its military efficiency unimpaired, but when, owing to incapacity in high places and insubordination in low, the Roman army failed to cope with the invader, then it was a different story. Fair provinces were ravaged and towns stormed and sacked, fire and sword made havoc of one of the most refined luxurious civilisations the world has ever seen, the Empire of the West crumbled to pieces in an orgy of lust and brutality, delicate Roman ladies became the slaves of dirty, greasy, evil-smelling barbarian lords, stately villas sank in flames and ashes, a riot of bloodshed swept over Gaul, Spain, and even Italia itself, and the cause of all this was that far to the north some obscure barbarian people, equally unknown to history,
the Romans, or their invaders, was hungry. And a like cause produced not one war, but a whole cycle of wars, and not one cycle of wars, but every cycle of wars ever since the world began."

A Rifleman: *Struggle for Bread*. (Page 23.)

*The Picts invaded England "because they were hungry," and as Scotland is now much more thickly populated than then, are we to expect another Scots' invasion? Europe supports a hundred times the population to-day that it did in the time of the Romans. Has this extra food been produced by war or co-operation? Would Europe be less or more hungry if it returned to the days of perpetual fighting?*

8. "Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population. Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors—that is to say by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity."

Bernhardi: *Germany and the Next War*. (Page 14.)

"Here we are up against the hard root of the whole international problem ever since the coming of Bismarck some fifty years ago. The key of European politics is the magnificent organisation of Germany for war, industry, and science—its central position in mid-Europe abutting on seven different States—its poor access to the sea and its expanding population, hidebound on every side by hostile and suspicious neighbours, and, to crown all, its limitless pride, ambition, and thirst for dominion. A mighty nation of 65,000,000, with such superb resources both for peace and war, and such overweening pride in its own superiority and might, finds itself closed up in a ring-fence too narrow for its fecundity as for its pretensions, constructed more by history, geography and circumstances than by design—a fence maintained by the fears rather than the hostility of its weaker neighbours. That is the rumbling subterranean volcano on which the European State system rests."

"It is inevitable but that a nation with the magnificent
resources of the German, hemmed in a territory so inadequate to their needs and pretensions, and dominated by a soldier, bureaucratic and literary caste, all deeply imbued with the Bismarckian doctrine, should thirst to extend their dominions and their power at any sacrifice—of life, of wealth and of justice. One must take facts as they are, and it is idle to be blind to facts, or to rail against them. It is as silly to gloss over manifest perils as it is to preach moralities about them. There they are . . .

England, Europe, civilisation is in imminent peril from German expansion.

"In what quarter is the peril probable, and in which way is it to be met? Now, more than ever, it is to be looked for in Europe, after the great changes made, and others imminent, in South-East Europe. With our fleet in the highest state of development, anything like attack upon it, or on these islands, may be reasonably put aside. It is not indeed impossible, especially under the new conditions of aerial machines. And due preparation must be made to meet it. But the far more imminent risk is that Belgium, Northern France, Holland, either one or all, may be the object of assault; or in the case of the Low Countries, of practical control without actual war. We know that systematic preparation for this has long been made."


Is Germany at present overcrowded? What is the density of its population compared with Belgium? Did anything prevent Germans from going to any part of the world? The Low Countries being more densely populated than Germany, would it relieve her population-pressure to annex these areas?

9. "Leaving this argument for the nonce, let us pass on to consider the economic loss to Great Britain which would result from the loss of Canada. The only Power which can be seriously conceived as effecting the conquest of Canada is, of course, the United States, and, bearing in mind the relative population, wealth, and military power of the two countries, the great superiority possessed by the Americans would render such a conquest, provided that the Dominion received no military aid from Great Britain, a
matter of little difficulty. How would this affect British commerce? Our trade with Canada was in 1910 valued at £45,269,675, being British manufactured goods exported to Canada and Canadian foodstuffs imported in exchange, but Canada under American rule would become a mere economic appendage of the United States, a protective tariff would bar out British goods, which at present receive preferential treatment, and the American manufacturer, at present shut out from the Canadian market by the tariff-line, would flood the Western market with manufactured goods, taking, of course, in exchange the Canadian foodstuffs. Result, a dead loss to British trade.”

A Rifleman: Struggle for Bread. (Page 131.)

“Now let us conceive of a decisive defeat of the British fleet, and that Great Britain be humbled from her proud position as mistress of the seas. How long would it be ere Japanese armies landed in Australia or seized the Indian seaports? (India, it is remarked, has once been conquered from the sea, and may be so a second time.) How long would it be ere Russia came down on India from the north? How long before Germany landed troops at Cape Town and Port Elizabeth? And how long before our American cousins discovered that it was the manifest destinies of Canada and the West India Isles to become parts of the American Union? From every quarter of the globe the rats would gather to devour the dying carcase, and how would this affect British industry? The capture of our Australian trade by Japan, the capture of our Indian trade by Russia, the capture of our South African trade by Germany, the capture of our Canadian trade by America, an enormous war indemnity to pay off, and the markets in confusion. Ruined capitalists, silent factories and unemployed—that is the answer.”

A Rifleman: Struggle for Bread. (Page 132.)

“We have lost command of every sea but one—the North Sea—and our supremacy over that sea is now a matter of dispute. In other words, whereas your forefathers traded as of right on every sea, now you only trade by the sufferance of other Powers.”

Lord Roberts, at Manchester.
Do you regard as sound the three assumptions here made: (1) That it is British armaments alone which prevent the United States attacking Canada, and (2) that a territory which is not under our political control is no use to us commercially? (3) That the stronger nation can suppress the trade of the weaker? If so, how do you reconcile these assumptions with (a) the fact that along the Canadian frontier there is not a fort or gun for protection against the United States? (b) That our overseas trade with territories which we do not control politically is very much larger than with that which we do? (c) That we have not been able to suppress German commercial competition in the past by virtue of our superior navy?

10. "Since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of Secession, a rival to England’s world-wide Empire has appeared on the other side of the Atlantic in the form of the United States of North America, which are a grave menace to England’s fortunes. The keenest competition conceivable now exists between the two countries. The annexation of the Philippines by America, and England’s treaty with Japan, have accentuated the conflict of interests between the two nations. The trade and industries of America can no longer be checked, and the absolutely inexhaustible and ever-growing resources of the Union are prodigious. . . ."

Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War. (Page 92.)

"How can Russia, Austria, Hungary remain unmoved, when the physical, material, and moral status of their Balkan neighbours is utterly transformed? Thus, to Russia the defence of Slavonian interests, the freedom of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, is what sea-power is to England. To the Germans of Austria, to the Magyars of Hungary, the predominance of the Slav races is their deposition as ascendant peoples. To Germany, to allow the Germans of Austria to be deposed from Empire is an intolerable blow to Pan-Germanic dreams. To Magyars, to have the despised Servians prospering and advancing, whilst they are pinned between Germans, Poles, Russians, and Roumanians, is a sorry prospect for a proud race. To England it is of vital importance that the Black Sea, the
Bosphorus, the Hellespont, and the Ægean coasts and islands, should not be in hostile hands. To France and to Italy this is nearly as vital. Could the Powers of Europe, great and small, be knotted up together in a more intricate entanglement—a series of vicious circles more insoluble?"


*Is it advantageous or otherwise to a nation that other States should prosper? Do you deem that a powerful America necessarily threatens Great Britain?*
PART III.

THE NEXT PRACTICAL STEP.

WE have seen in the first chapter that the underlying causes of this war are fear, each party of the other, and possibly unavowed ambitions for world-wide empires and political power. That such ambitions do exist very generally in the great European States, being, indeed, very often the form that the national pride of their people takes, is undoubted. Each people alleges that it would never allow this pride to betray it into aggression upon its neighbour; but the sentiment exists, and in any differences that arise must necessarily influence the idea which each party forms of its own rights and those of its neighbours, tending to make these ideas such that conflict is rendered very much more probable. Any plan, therefore, which aims at attaining a more secure and general peace in the future should have as its main object a satisfactory means of avoiding these two causes of war.

The Need for Understanding.

Whatever measures the governments may take, it is quite certain that they will not secure permanent peace unless the peoples of Europe make a much greater effort than they have done in the past to understand international relationships. Unfortunately there is always a possibility that nations will rush into war if they believe that their vital interests are threatened, or that they are bound in honour to try and settle some disputed question in this way. The first and most important thing, therefore, is for people to study
and try to understand the real facts of the case. When
the great mass of the people in each country realise
that no nation can gain anything of real value by
attacking or robbing its neighbour, and that war is
the very worst and most useless way of trying to settle
disputes—because of itself it never settles anything
permanently—their governments will not be able to
drag them into war even if they wished to do so. On
the other hand, so long as the people generally do not
clearly understand these points, there will always
be a danger that even wise and prudent statesmen may
have their hands forced by some foolish outbreak of
popular passion. It cannot be too often repeated that
"war is the failure of human wisdom," and that the
one certain way to avoid it is for men to try and make
themselves wiser.

Meantime, however, there are certain definite steps
which can be taken which, though they will not of
themselves remove all danger of war, will remove a
great many of the more likely sources of quarrel, and
will make it easier for people to realise that the nations
of the civilised world are not really rivals having
opposed interests, but partners who share in each
other's prosperity and cannot damage each other
without self-injury.

A Real Settlement.

It is very important that at the end of this war the
victorious party should not be animated by the old
principle of "woe to the vanquished." If, as we hope,
the Allies are victorious, we may hope that they will
be guided by the principles expressed by M. Cambon,
the French Ambassador to London, when he said, "We
do not seek to gratify any lust for conquest and
domination; we merely seek to save European civilisa-
tion"; and by Mr. A. J. Balfour in the words: "We
fight not for ourselves alone but for civilisation, for
the cause of all small States, for the cause of all those
countries which desire to develop their own civilisation in their own way, following their own ideals and without interference from any insolent and unauthorised aggressor."

If this is so, they will not think merely of what terms they can extort for themselves, but will call a general conference of the nations, not merely to decide the actual terms of peace, but to settle as far as possible all the open questions which have troubled the peace of Europe so long and have involved so heavy a burden of armaments. In this way it might be possible to get not a mere truce—an interval of peace after which the beaten side would again begin to fight for revenge—but a real settlement based on justice and agreement and having therefore a good chance of permanency. It is not, of course, possible to foretell just what the position will be, nor is this the place to make detailed suggestions as to the terms of such a settlement; but there are two or three general principles which seem to follow from a study of the considerations which we have been examining.

**Government by Consent.**

If the peoples are sincere in their readiness to renounce aggressive intentions against their neighbours, it should not be impossible to secure general support to the undertaking that in future no province shall be transferred from one government to another by an unwelcome ruler; or even retained save by the consent of its population. If this principle were really operative in Europe, it would, of itself, almost rid us of the danger of war; for no country would go to war for the purpose of conquering a province which it would later on be unable to annex, and if the province were in favour of such annexation in any case, and there was an agreement rendering this possible by the consent of those concerned, there would be no need to go to war to achieve this end.
In the newer Europe, therefore, which we hope may follow from this war a strong and definite attempt should be made to secure as large a recognition as possible of the principle of deciding all territorial changes or modifications simply and purely according to the desires of the people inhabiting the disputed territories, who might in most cases be asked to record their wishes by what is called a "plébiscite," a general poll of the community. The ultimate object should be to push home as far as possible the great democratic principle of government by consent.

It is very much to be hoped that not only will this principle be applied in the future, but that the conference which meets after the war will apply it at once to the case of some of those subject provinces which constitute a continual source of unquiet. It may not matter very much whether these provinces are made altogether independent or whether they are grouped together in a confederation of States having complete local autonomy. The important thing is that there should be no holding down of unwilling populations, and that people of the same race who wish to form one nation should not be forcibly kept apart. It is the feeling that people of the same race as your own are being ill-treated in a neighbouring State which has led to much of the race hatred of Europe, and if we can get rid of these causes of internal unrest we may well hope that much of the fear and hostility between States will disappear with it. The reasons which underlie this whole idea were very well expressed by Mr. Winston Churchill in his speech at the London Opera House, when he said:

"The more you study this question the more you will see that the use the Germans made of their three victorious wars, against Denmark, against Austria and against France, has been such as to make them the terror and the bully of Europe, the enemy and the menace of every small State upon their borders, and a
perpetual source of unrest and disquietude to their powerful neighbours. Now the war has come, and when it is over let us be careful not to make the same mistake or the same sort of mistake as Germany made when she had France prostrate at her feet in 1870. Let us, whatever we do, fight for and work towards great and sound principles for the European system. The first of these principles which we should keep before us is the principle of nationality—that is to say, not the conquest or subjugation of any great community, or of any strong race of men, but the setting free of those races which have been subjugated and conquered. And if doubt arises about disputed areas of country, we should try to settle their ultimate destination in the reconstruction of Europe which must follow from this war with a fair regard to the wishes and feelings of the people who live in them. That is the aim which, if it is achieved, will justify the exertions of the war, and will make some amend to the world for the loss and agony of suffering which it has wrought and entailed, and which will give to those who come after us not only the pride we hope they will feel in remembering the martial achievement of the present age of Britain, but which will give them also a better and a fairer world to live in and a Europe free from the causes of hatred and unrest which have poisoned the comity of nations and ruptured the peace of Christendom.”

Guarantees.

It will perhaps be desirable that the independence and neutrality of any small States thus created should be secured by being guaranteed by all the Great Powers, and we may hope that one result of this war will be to ensure a greater respect for such guarantees, since it has been shown that they cannot be violated with impunity. Only if this is to be the case, the States so guaranteed must be founded on just and natural principles and the guarantees must be given frankly
and without any suspicion of a lurking desire to gain some selfish advantage.

**Open and Public Diplomacy.**

The other great cause of war, the fear of powerful neighbours, would largely disappear if we had complete openness and publicity in all diplomatic and defensive arrangements. In a civilised society of individuals secret arrangements concerning the property or personal safety of a third party are in themselves regarded as penal, even though such intentions may not be carried into effect. Such secret arrangements between nations should be regarded as a violation of the social code of nations, and in the future Council of the Nations the deliberations and negotiations should be public, and any secret arrangements as between its several members regarded as an offence against civilisation.

**A Council of the Nations.**

The very existence of a Council of the Nations which had the smallest chance of life would itself condemn the system of "The Balance of Power," for the reasons which have been explained in the second part of this handbook. Any plan of securing peace by the mere competition in instruments of war between two parties is bound in the end to break down. The Balance of Power in reality means the struggle of one party to be stronger than the other, for the simple reason that it is impossible exactly to calculate the strength of the other party, and there will always be a tendency for each party to give itself the benefit of the doubt by tilting the balance in its favour; and as each cannot be stronger than the other, the system implies an attempt to achieve what is a physical impossibility. The real basis of European civilisation should be not a group of three or four Powers confronting another group of three or four, but the whole six or eight agreeing together that aggression or wrong-doing by any one of the units
would immediately range the whole forces of the remainder against that one troublesome member. This is the principle of civilised society within the frontier, and it must be the principle which shall guide the organisation of the future society of nations.

It is not at all probable that any very thorough organisation of international society can be brought into being all at once. But the existence of any permanent Council or Conference for the discussion of international affairs, and of any disputes that may arise, will have a very important effect. Not only do questions which arouse very bitter feelings so long as each party is looking only at its own side of the case often prove quite easy of adjustment when both sides of it come to be discussed calmly and reasonably in a general conference where each party is compelled to appeal to the general sense of justice and therefore to state his case in moderate and reasonable terms; but the mere fact of such a Council existing and such discussions taking place will go a long way towards making the nations realise that they do indeed form a community having common interests. The growth of respect for international law which is ably traced in the last volume of *The Cambridge Modern History* is evidence of the fact that even in the present unorganised condition of the world this feeling of common interests and a common conscience has been gradually gaining ground, and everything which tends to foster this consciousness has a value altogether beyond its immediate practical effects. Moreover, if the deliberations or discussions of such a Council are public, the interest of the peoples in international affairs will be greatly stimulated and they will make a greater effort to understand the questions raised.

*Three Essential Points.*

One gets, therefore, three main propositions as the framework of this future international society:

1. A real Council of all the Nations.
2. Publicity and openness in the deliberations of that Council.

3. The form of government of each nation, and of every part of each nation, to be decided by the people governed.

Having established these fundamental propositions, we should then be on the road to render possible an agreement as to the reduction of armaments, some means of enforcing the decisions of the international Council, and other rules for the civilised society so created. We shall in fact be within measurable distance of that change in the evolution of international affairs indicated by Mr. Asquith in a passage of his Dublin speech with which we may very fittingly close this handbook:

"I should like, if I might for a moment, beyond this enquiry into causes and motives, to ask your attention and that of my fellow-countrymen to the end which in this war we ought to keep in view. Forty-four years ago, at the time of the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone used these words. He said:

"'The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics.'"

"Nearly fifty years have passed; little progress, it seems, has yet been made towards that good and beneficent change; but it seems to me to be now, at this moment, as good a definition as we can have of our European policy.

"'The idea of public right.' What does it mean, when translated into concrete terms? It means, first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the relation of States and of the future moulding of the European world. It means, next, that room must be found and kept for the independent existence and free development of the smaller nationalities—each, for the life of history, a corporate consciousness of its
own. Belgium, Holland and Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries, Greece and the Balkan States. They must be recognised as having exactly as good a title as their more powerful neighbours—more powerful in strength and in wealth—exactly as good a title to a ‘place in the sun.’ It means, finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambitions, for groupings and alliances, the substitution for all these things of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by the common will.

"A year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. It is probably one that may not or will not be realised either to-day or to-morrow. If and when this war is decided in favour of the Allies, it will at once come within the range, and before long within the grasp, of European statesmanship."
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