PLATO'S REPUBLIC

THE GREEK TEXT

EDITED, WITH NOTES AND ESSAYS

BY THE LATE

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IN THREE VOLUMES

VOL. II. ESSAYS

Oxford
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1894
Oxford

PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

BY HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
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ESSAYS

BY

THE LATE PROFESSOR JOWETT

(UNFINISHED)
ESSAY I

ON THE TEXT OF GREEK AUTHORS, AND ESPECIALLY OF PLATO

I. That Greek MSS. are miswritten and misspelt in various degrees;—that glosses and marginal interpretations have crept into the text;—that particular letters or combinations of letters, as for example Α, Δ, Λ,—Γ, Τ,—€, Θ, Ο, Ζ,—are often interchanged;—that contractions are another source of confusion;—that forms of words or usages which were allowed by Thucydides or Plato have sometimes received a more Attic impress from the hand of grammarians, or have decayed insensibly into the forms and usages of the common or Macedonian language;—that the writing is more regular and uniform than can be supposed to have proceeded from authors who lived in the days when grammar was only beginning to be studied;—that the texts of the Classics have passed through changes sometimes in the uncial sometimes in the cursive [or minuscule] stage;—that the copyists of many MSS. like modern editors had a love of emendation, which led them to improve upon the meaning or grammar of their author:—that emendation is often needed, and that many emendations are probably, almost certainly, right;—these general facts would hardly be disputed by any one who has a critical acquaintance with Greek authors.

But such general considerations do not justify the indiscriminate use of conjectural emendation. We have to distinguish the kind of mistake before we can determine whether it can be corrected. That mistakes often happen
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is a safe text; the inference which is sometimes drawn that they are liable to happen equally in all authors and in all MSS., and that all therefore afford equal material for the conjectural art, is a very erroneous one. The kind of mistake may also vary from the interchange of T and T which is corrected at sight up to a degree of confusion in which grammar and sense are lost in anarchy. And where such mistakes are most numerous and complicated they are generally beyond the reach of human sagacity to amend. Unless new and better MSS. are discovered, the corruption must remain a corruption to the end of time. Nor can the most ingenious conjecture ever attain the certainty of a reading well supported by MS. authority. The verifying faculty is only the knowledge and moderation of the critic, who may indeed have acquired the power of seeing in the dark, or at least of seeing better than others, but who may also have found in lifelong studies only the material of his own self-deception. An art or kind of knowledge which is attractive and at the same time wanting in certain tests of truth is always liable to fall into the hands of projectors and inventors. It may be cultivated by many generations of scholars without their once making the discovery that they have been wasting their lives in a frivolous and unmeaning pursuit. From being subordinate and necessary it may come to be thought the crowning accomplishment of the scholar. But after all, to compare small things with great, ingenious conjectures are only like the hypotheses of physical science in the days when there were no experiments, which, while retaining their attractiveness, diverge further and further from the truth.

A sanguine temperament and sometimes even a good memory flush the mind and interfere with the exercise of the judgement. A little knowledge will furnish objections to an old reading or arguments in support of a new one. The inventor has a natural fondness for his own inven-
tions and is ready to offer his reputation as a guarantee of their truth. He has got into a region in which the common sense of the many is unable to control him, and in which no one can demonstrate that he is only a visionary. And as learning or imitative talent or even genius for scholarship are often unaccompanied by philosophical power, which is the natural corrective of a lively fancy, the sanction of great names has not been wanting to great mistakes. There have been Atticists in modern as well as in ancient times, who have regarded grammar as a science of rules without exceptions, and who have assumed a greater clearness and accuracy than ever existed in the text of ancient authors. Metrical canons which are not universally true have been applied with the rigour and severity of a law of nature. It has been forgotten that there was a transitional age of language in which syntax and prosody had not yet become separate studies, and that in every age the subtlety of language far exceeds the minuteness of grammatical rules. Writers like Sophocles or Thucydides or Plato have been even divested of the peculiarities of their own style, in order to satisfy some more general notion of sense and Greek. Not the value of the correction but the name and reputation of the critic have been regarded. The authority of Bentley, Porson, and Hermann has obtruded on the text of the Classics many unfounded emendations which have been allowed to remain, as a homage to their reputation.

A just estimate of the value of emendations requires a consideration, (1) of the limits of the human faculties in this sort of divination. No definite measure can be given of them; they must depend on the nature of the materials; but often the real limits are in inverse proportion to the ingenuity and facility of scholars in making emendations: (2) there must be a consideration of the nature of MSS. In textual as in historical criticism the invention or imagination which has no foundation of facts can only build castles in the air. The emendations which lie on the surface have
been generally made by previous editors, while the deeper corruptions are hardly ever remediable. And in proportion to the character of the MS., the necessity or possibility of emendation will greatly vary. No generalities about the frequency of mistakes, or the possibility of glosses, or the probability in favour of the more difficult reading can be set against the readings of MSS., which may be erroneous but cannot be corrected out of nothing. (3) There must be a consideration of authors as well as of MSS. The range of language in some is too wide or irregular or uncertain to admit even of a fair probability in the emendation of them. The Doric or Acolic dialect is not so well known to us as the Attic; and again, conjectures in prose and verse stand on a different footing. Nor will any one say that he is as certain of the use of language in Pindar and Theocritus as in Sophocles and Euripides, or of the metre in a line of a chorus as of an Iambic or Trochaic verse, or that a fragment is equally within the range of emendation with a passage that has a context. Yet the method of conjecture which was practised by the first editors seems to have continued as a habit of mind among scholars, who do not always remember that the field for new conjectures is ever narrowing, and that the 'woods and pastures new' of fragments, to which they return, are the least likely to afford passages which can be corrected with certainty. Nothing can be more improbable than some of the conjectures of Madvig on Thucydidès, when he discards a word because it is not found in later Greek and introduces a new word found in later Greek, but not in Thucydidès.

Some idea of the limits of human ingenuity in restoring a text or an inscription, may be formed in this way: let a person try the experiment of emending the text of an English passage previously unknown to him miswritten for the purpose. (You may vary the conditions of prose or metre, or give a fragment without the context, or select
from an author whose style is only known in short writings; or take some writing such as an epitaph which has regular lines and set forms of speech; the words too may be wrongly divided or written without stops and without accents or breathings as in the Uncial Greek MSS.) One person is quicker at guessing the riddle than another, but in any case the critic will soon be at fault, for the simple reason that he has no materials for conjecture. No divination or second sight or knowledge of style can supply one-half of a page from the other half, nor restore with certainty a single word or even letter unless absolutely required by the context, that is to say if any other word or letter would equally fit or make sense. The general meaning may in any of these cases be clear or probable; e.g. in the case of a torn letter, or of the Inscription of which Niebuhr attempts a restoration about the burning of the tribunes; but the precise words are really irrecoverable wherever more than one word or letter or combination of words and letters may amend the miswriting or bridge or fill up the vacant space. The problem is not of the nature of the discovery of a cipher, the secret of which is really contained in certain letters or symbols which have been artificially transposed, or of the interpretation of a hieroglyphic, the signs of which are known, although the mode of reading them or the language in which they were written has been lost. The case of an Inscription again is widely different from a MS., because an Inscription is formal and regular and may be compared with other Inscriptions which are sometimes verbatim or literatim the same. Hence a single letter in a particular place may sometimes restore a whole line, but why? because the letter is found in that place in a line which is preserved elsewhere. Nor, again, is the restoration of the text of an author analogous to the restoration of a ruined building or statue, the form or structure of which is simple and uniform, and the lost features of which may be restored from a very few
indications assisted by the analogy of buildings or statues of the times. Such illustrations are misleading because they are not in pari materia, and when applied to the restoration of words they tend to obscure the real difficulty which is the variety and flexibility of language. To take an example: between two points in a line of Shakespeare there is a lacuna or erasure or corruption of five letters which admits of being filled up in twenty or thirty different ways; who can decide between them? A truly Shakespearian word may be found by one of our critics whom we may suppose to be playing at the game of emendation; in referring to the text the expression actually used may turn out to be less Shakespearian or more common, or the reverse; possibly a word not elsewhere occurring in any extant play. Two very popular and familiar emendations of Shakespeare will illustrate the point which I am discussing:

(1) Henry V', act ii, scene 3—

‘His nose was as sharp as a pen
On a table of green fields’ (Ff.; om. in Qq.);

‘And a babbled of green fields’ (Cj. Theobald);

or altering the other word,

‘On a table of green frieze.’ (Collier MS.)

A third expedient, adopted by Pope, is to omit the whole phrase ‘And ... fields,’ with the Qq. Several other conjectures by scholars of repute, including Malone, have found acceptance in their time.

(2) Macbeth, act v, scene 3—

‘My way of life
Is fell’n into the sere and yellow leaf.’

‘My May of life.’ (Cj. Johnson.)

The change is slight and gives an attractive reading while avoiding an apparent incongruity. But similar incongruities arising from the condensation or crowding together of imagery abound in the Shakespearian text and are not always so easily got rid of:—e.g. ‘to take arms against a sea of troubles.’
The critic can only succeed when a particular word is absolutely demanded by the context, or where the error is reducible to some rule. He will more easily restore the terminations of words than their roots; mere misspellings in which the sound remains are found to occasion no difficulty to the practised eye. And much further we cannot go. The instance just given shows how in a very characteristic and remarkable passage it is impossible absolutely to decide about a single letter. Conjectural emendation is a kind of prophecy, and though there is a vast difference between the powers of one man and another while they remain within the legitimate field of knowledge, there is not much difference when they take to foretelling future events.

The argument from English to Greek and Latin scholarship is not really unfair, provided the difference be remembered between a language which has and which has not inflexions; the unfairness, however, is really in favour of English conjectural emendation. The practice of emending classical authors has come down from the revival of literature, and is fostered, at any rate in Englishmen, by the habit of Greek and Latin composition in early life. But every Englishman who applies his mind to the subject is a better judge of English than of Greek verse, for he is better acquainted with his native language than with a dead one. Even Bentley knew more of English than of Greek, and there is no paradox in saying that he was better qualified to edit Milton than to edit Homer—that is to say, not comparatively with others, but absolutely in reference to his own knowledge. In an evil hour he applied to an English poet the method or manner which he had acquired in editing the classics; and the result tends to detect his method and to raise a suspicion of his authority as an editor of the Greek and Latin classics. He finds a great deal of error in Milton; this he supposes to be due to the circumstance that Milton in his blindness dictated to his
daughters; a sort of general consideration introduced into the subject similar to the hypothesis of transposed leaves in Lucretius or Catullus. Bentley's Milton cannot be separated from Bentley's Horace; the multitude of emendations in the one tends to shake our faith in the multitude of emendations in the other. The many will hardly trust, in what they are unable to understand, a judgement which is so wild and fanciful in what is within their own range. The lesson is instructive, as showing what is indeed sufficiently apparent otherwise, that great powers may often coexist with extravagance and want of common sense.

The English parallel may throw a further light on the problem which has been started. The text of Shakespeare presents many points of similarity with the text of an ancient author. The richness and obscurity of the language, the complexity of the meaning, the variety of readings, and the uncertainty which hangs over their origin, give rise to doubts like those which have tried the text of the classics. A harvest of emendations has sprung up; Shakespeare has been treated in the same bold style by Warburton as Milton by Bentley. But the ingenuity of critics has not supplied a generally received version; only in a very few instances have conjectures found their way into the text.

Two other general facts may be adduced which are of weight in estimating the value of emendation in classical authors. 1. First the absence of *emendations* in the New Testament; there are 'old correctors' of the Gospels and Epistles, but they are not scholars of the present or last century; at least the important variations which occur in them are of an earlier date and spring from other causes; and the few emendations which have been suggested by scholars have not found their way into the text. Lachmann, when he made the attempt in the preface to the second volume of his New Testament, met with very little
success. [Of Cobett perhaps the same might have been said.] Nor does Bentley himself indulge in his bold 'meo periculo' style of criticism within the sacred precinct; it is from manuscript not from conjecture that he proposes to restore the text of the New Testament. Yet there are certainly a few passages in the New Testament which have as much apparent difficulty as the corruptions of classical authors. (It is true that in some respects the text of the New Testament is unlike that of other Greek writers, especially in the number of MSS. and versions.) The quotations in other writers are also numerous, but these create the new difficulty of an embarras de richesses. The circumstance that critical emendation has not been held a safe or certain path in the most important of all Greek writings is a proof that there is danger and uncertainty in the application of such a method to the text of Greek authors generally.

2. The tendency of criticism has of late years been adverse and not favourable to the use of conjecture. Manuscripts have been collated afresh and more precisely valued, and the result has rarely confirmed the previous conjectures of critics. There is no consensus of great critics in important emendations; those of Meineke and Ahrens are decried by Cobet; Porson has not generally been followed by Hermann in his corrections of the text. The ideas which inspired the last-named critic (Hermann) in his edition of Aeschylus are already out of date and certainly tend to undermine the authority of the great editor in Sophocles and Aristophanes. Madvig, the most prolific inventor of new emendations, who has laid down many sound principles which he fails to observe in practice, remarks that Bentley constantly violated the rules of his art, and that Hermann never had any; he also justly censures Dindorf in Ed. V of the Poetae Scenici for pretending to emend passages without regard to the MSS. Most persons will find that the need of conjecture diminishes as
their familiarity with an author increases; the peculiarities of his style become more apparent to them; they receive on the authority of MSS. expressions which their first thoughts would have set down as destitute of grammar and meaning; and the judgement and industry of Bekker have probably done more for the text of Greek writers than was effected by the vast powers of Bentley.

3. Lastly, some instruction may be gathered from observing the most palpable forms of delusion which prevail among conjectural critics. Their judgement is not equal to their invention; they are often deceived by parallel passages; any special knowledge which they possess of Greek dialects or metres or lexicographers tends unduly to form their opinion. They are apt to introduce a point which is not wanted, or to create a false emphasis, or to impair the due subordination of the word to the sentence or figure of speech. They are hasty in assuming that an author could not have used this or that expression or formation; and they think a regular and perfect phrase or figure or parallel better than an irregular one. They sometimes insist on uniformity of construction where uniformity is not required, or they miss the slight and subtle change from the 'oratio recta' to the 'oratio obliqua,' or conversely. A random statement of a lexicographer or grammarian or other ancient author is sometimes affirmed against the clearest evidence of the manuscript. Their perception of the context is often overpowered by their sense of some anomaly or obscurity. They do not always study an author from himself; the subtleties of which Plato and Sophocles are capable in the use of language or grammar are not made a separate matter of investigation. The transitional periods of grammar and language are confounded by them with those in which the uses of language are fixed. They do not fairly renounce impossible problems, but seem rather to find a stimulus to their imagination in hopeless corruptions of the text. They sometimes restore
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an author from himself and argue from the use of a word in one passage to the use of the same word or phrase in another. Their own self-confidence in the most slippery of all arts is a reason why they should suspect themselves, and may well raise a suspicion in the mind of others; 'meo periculo,' 'away with all this,' 'apage putidissimam interpolationem;' the disdain of objectors; the repeated promise to free a beautiful passage from deformities; the improvements and re-writings of the text; the 'nihil tam metuens quam ne de se diffidere videretur,' are not indeed inconsistent with a real knowledge and study of Greek, but they are doubtful proofs of the judgement or trustworthiness of the critic. The tendency appears to grow upon them with years; their last performances are often a caricature of their earlier ones. They speak of an intuition which is peculiar to themselves; which a person who is not similarly gifted might be more ready to acknowledge, if the intuition of one critic were not sometimes at variance with the intuition of another; the older editors, as for example Casaubon in Polybius, frequently introduce emendations without distinguishing them from the text of the MS., and many late emendations, as of Hermann in Sophocles, are fast becoming established in the printed books without brackets or other signs of uncertainty. Nor does there seem any reason why the self-confidence of a discoverer should be accepted as a warrant of the truth of a discovery in restoring the text of the classics any more than in science or life.

II. The general purport of what I have been saying is that the more we reflect upon the nature of conjectural emendation of the classics—the more we put it to the test, or try it by the analogy of English—the more we think of the follies into which great scholars have been betrayed by the love of it—the narrower are the limits which we are disposed to assign to it. The nature of the
manuscripts has now to be considered. At first sight the accurate preservation or transmission of the words or ideas of ancient writers during a period of 2000 years might be deemed impossible. Yet experience supplies many facts which make this credible. The text of the Vedas is known to have remained unaltered since the fourth century before Christ. Unlike the Greek Scholiasts, the Vedic commentaries of more than 2000 years ago have exactly the same readings which are found in Vedic MSS. at the present day. This is the more remarkable when the observation is also made that, owing to the material on which they are written, they must have been frequently copied: no Sanscrit MSS. have the antiquity of Greek ones: and more remarkable still when it is considered that the commentary is purely fanciful and stands in no relation to the original text. And there are many Greek MSS., such as the Paris A of the Republic of Plato, which are remarkably good and gain in authority in proportion as they are better known. There is no probability therefore of accuracy or inaccuracy in a Greek MS. prior to an examination of the contents. No general assumption that copyists were ignorant or that 'mistakes often happen' should be allowed antecedently to influence the mind.

Thus the question which we started returns from very general considerations to very minute ones. The greater part of the science of textual criticism is contained in the valuation of MSS. That corruptions, confusion, glosses, interchanges of letters, emendations of grammarians and copyists are to be found in Greek MSS. will be readily allowed; the point at issue is whether a particular interchange of letters or the insertion of a gloss or any other special corruption is incidental to the writing of a certain scribe or of the copy which he used. An editor may feel disposed to substitute ΟΞΙΟ€ for ΟΞΙΟ€; he has to ask himself the question whether this particular form of corruption occurs elsewhere in the MS.
Or he may feel a conviction that certain awkwardly introduced words are a gloss; again, he will have reason to doubt the correctness of his conviction should no similar example of a gloss occur elsewhere in the same MS. Once more, he may feel disposed to adopt the better or easier reading—say of a late manuscript: his hand will be held if he finds that the manuscript which is his authority offers in many other places better and easier readings where other good MSS. are perplexed or obscure. For then the intelligibility of the copy is possibly due to the corrector and not to the original text. The student or editor has to consider not all the possible errors which may be thought likely to occur in Greek MSS., but those which he discovers in the manuscript which he is perusing. There is no error of which some copyists are not capable in times and places when Greek was becoming barbarized; but the mass of Greek MSS. were written by moderately learned persons who were copying their own language. And the MSS. of the greater writers, with the exception of some passages of Aeschylus and Euripides, are as a fact extremely free from error, and would be thought still more so, if their correctness were measured by the style of the writer and not by an imaginary grammatical standard.

Some application of the doctrine of chances may serve as an illustration of the probabilities of error in MSS. (1) There is obviously a probability that the copyist will fail in difficult passages; the mind and eye require great discipline before they can write exactly words or forms of words which are unintelligible or unknown or imperfectly known to them. (2) But there is no greater probability that the copyist will err in the violation of a canon of grammar or of prosody, unless indeed in cases where the usage or grammar or metre has changed in later literature, than in any other way. (3) Thus, let us suppose the case of a manuscript which contains in all
a hundred errors or miswritings; and further that no less than twenty of these are found to consist in omissions of ἄρι, or uses of ἄρι with the present indicative, or of περικάκανος as a verb of existence, or of οὐ μὴν with the present or 1st Aor. Act, or of unions of dissimilar tenses, or of words of doubtful analogy, or of any other violations of supposed laws of grammar—the question arises whether the proportion of grammatical errors which has been described is not greater than can be accounted for on any rational principle. Why should as many as \( \frac{1}{100} \) of all the mistakes which occur be found to affect the rules of grammarians? Why, for example, should the copyists have been guilty of forty errors which are violations of the celebrated law of the Cretic in Tragic Iambic Verse? When it is remembered that the refusal to admit a spondee which is broken into two words in the fifth place is a sort of last refinement in the structure of the verse, the probability appears to be that such a law would be occasionally broken, rather than uniformly observed.

There is a further consideration which seems to strengthen this view of the subject. There are grammatical anomalies which are not found to exist equally in earlier and later Greek writers. The usages of Demosthenes are more regular than those of Thucydides or Plato. But this cannot be attributed to the greater care or skill of the transcribers; there is no reason why the words of Demosthenes should have been preserved to us with more accuracy than those of Plato. The only reason is that the MSS. exhibit a real difference of usage in earlier and later writers. Whether in historical or textual criticism, in the New Testament or in classical authors, those intimations which are opposed to the prevailing use or feeling of an age witness to their own truth. Many reasons may be given why the copyist should have altered the forms or usages of Thucydides into those of his own age; but there is no reason why he should have returned to older forms;
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why for example he should have used ει with the subjunctive or omitted αρ with the optative, except that such apparent anomalies existed in the original copies. That the traces of such anomalies in Plato or Thucydides or in the Greek tragedians are already becoming faint is a fact which agrees with the contemporary rise and progress of grammatical studies. The golden age of Attic tragedy was never completely purified of the remains of Epic irregularity; that the anomalous uses which are found in the MSS. retain this character is in some degree a proof of their genuineness.

Another consideration distinct from the mere correctness of a manuscript is antiquity. The superiority of the older MS. is traceable to the circumstance that the copy is not only nearer to the original but also to the Uncial MS. A manuscript like Paris A, which is supposed to have been written in the ninth century, or the Bodleian which bears the date A.D. 896, retains many Uncial forms, and has probably been transcribed from an Uncial MS. And the observation may be worth making that another interval of equal length would nearly reach back to the autograph of Plato. Many chances of error are thus excluded. The size of the character and the comparative absence of contractions prevents the letters from being minced into an illegible scrawl. On the other hand the indications which are afforded of the divisions of words by breathings and accents or of sentences by stops are generally wanting in the Uncial MSS. Nor in such matters can MSS. be held to be of any authority. It is unfortunate also that in minute questions of orthography an appeal has ever been made to them. For such questions (1) are of little importance; the correct writing of ἀπεπάνθη or of κατα adds nothing to our appreciation of Greek authors and scarcely anything to philology; (2) they can seldom be determined precisely; the MSS. are constantly at variance with one another and with the precepts of the grammarians:
uniformity and etymology are better principles of spelling than are supplied either by the MSS. or by the Atticist grammarians: (4) there is no reason to suppose that the classical authors of an earlier period could have known or conformed to exact rules of orthography. Such inquiries have certainly been carried far enough and need no longer be suffered to detain us from more important subjects. They would be thought ridiculous if applied to the printed text of English authors of two or three centuries ago.

Besides the estimate of a particular manuscript as distinct from manuscripts in general, there remains a further estimate to be formed of the value of manuscript authority in a particular passage or word. There are peculiar causes which may lead to error in certain places; an entanglement in the meaning of a passage will often confuse the copyist's head or hand; he will be apt either to miswrite or amend the words at which he stumbles; and as common words are often substituted for uncommon ones, common forms will also take the place of uncommon or curious ones. Similar letters at the end of one word and the beginning of another; repetitions of syllables; similar beginnings in two successive sentences, are also a frequent cause of error or omission: the omission of a word is far more usual than the insertion of one. The omission of a word may often lead to the insertion of the same word in another order or in a clause which has a common government. Again, words written at the side sometimes find their way into the text, or two passages which are really similar are absolutely identified. (Of this many examples occur in the Gospels.) Among various readings that one is preferable of which the origin may be explained on some one of these principles or which seems to be the centre or kernel of the rest. Above all the similarities of certain Greek letters both in the Uncial and the Cursive hand render particular words much more liable than others to be misspelt: which first misspelling by rendering the
passage unintelligible naturally introduces some further error. Two such lists, one of Uncial, the other of Cursive letters, should be present to the student's eye; the Uncial letters ΑΔΛ; ΓΤ; ΕΘΩΞ; ΗΝ; ΤΙ, Π, ΙΓΤ; Κ, ΙΣ; ΛΛ, ΑΑ, ΛΛ; ΝΙ, Μ; ΤΤ, ΙΤ, ΤΙ, ΙΓ; ΥΤ;—the Cursive letters which offer a second chance of error being λ, μ, ν; (β) υκ; ψ ϕ; α, ευ; τ ε. The use of Cursive [minuscule] letters together with Uncial letters is a stage of writing which must also be considered. A further source of error is the habit of contracting certain words both in Uncial and Cursive writing ΘΣ, ΠΡ, ΠΡΟΣ, ΑΝΩ, ΚΣ, ΠΙΔ, ΟΥΝΩ (θεός, πατήρ, πατρός, ἀνθρώπος, κύριος, Ἰσραήλ, ὄμορφο), and the abbreviation of terminations.

The famous rule 'potior lectio difficilior,' seems to require some limitation. For there is plainly a degree of difficulty or obscurity which may render the acceptance of a reading improbable; nonsense which is just construable is not to be regarded as preferable to sense when offered by a MS. Some correction or alteration must be made in the rule. (1) First of all, not the more difficult reading is to be preferred, but the more remote one or the one least likely to have been invented. (2) But the question which is the more difficult reading can never be confined to this one point; repetitions of letters or syllables may tend to substitute the more remote or difficult reading for the simpler one. (3) The rule presupposes a certain degree of knowledge and intelligence in the copyist who makes the substitution, which does not always exist. (4) The meaning and agreement with the context or style of the author cannot be left out of sight in the comparative estimate of MSS.; nor lastly the character of the MS. which in some cases may be discovered to be valueless by the uniform adoption or insertion of easier readings. (5) A large allowance must be made for accident; the greater number of mistakes do not arise from the principle of the adoption of the easier reading but on no principle
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at all. This famous rule seems to be chiefly suggestive and certainly cannot be allowed to supersede in particular passages the estimate of the value of MSS. taken as a whole. The canon of the more difficult reading really points to one element among many in the consideration of the text. It is not enough to say, 'this is the more difficult reading and therefore the true one.' But 'this is the more difficult reading, which at the same time makes good sense and is in harmony with the general style.'

Lastly—(a) the Scholia, (β) quotations in other Greek authors, especially lexicographers and grammarians, (γ) Latin versions, may be reckoned among the occasional subsidia.

(a) The Scholia may be regarded as a witness to the genuineness of the text of Greek authors; also as a living link with the past; moreover in a few passages they have preserved a reading which is lost in the MSS.; their language has also been tortured into the support of conjectural emendations, and the occurrence of a word in the explanation of the Scholiast has been an argument for the introduction of it into the text. It need scarcely be remarked that they are of every degree of antiquity and value and embrace observations of the most widely different kinds, learned and puerile, ethical and grammatical, according to the temper of the author. The value of each Scholiast, like that of each MS., must of course be judged alone, remembering, as is obvious in the Scholiasts on Homer, that he may often repeat or preserve the opinions of older or wiser writers than himself. Many of them, like the Scholiasts on Thucydides or on Aristotle, while deficient in grammatical knowledge and falling according to our standard into remarkable grammatical blunders, have a curious dialectical insight into the meaning of passages; they are not unfrequently chargeable with the objection 'Too much logic,' or illogical logic. That with all Greek literature lying open before them, themselves the students
of an art which, commencing with the Sophists and Alexandrian grammarians, lived and flourished for above 1500 years, they should have added so little to our knowledge either of the classics or of language generally, is a valuable warning of the tendency of such studies when pursued in a false and narrow spirit by those ὁσοὶ μὴ ἔχοντι φάμμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ αἰών ἐστι. A labour which is wholly disproportioned to the result is apt to infect the judgement and to pervert the wider comparison of the other branches of knowledge which is the safeguard against the errors of exclusive study. A man will hardly be persuaded to form a humble or uncertain estimate of the labour of many years of his life. Nor can any mere servile and unreflecting toil add much even to the stores of learning. No man who is a mere scholar can ever be a great scholar, because scholarship is not separable from other branches of knowledge, e.g. from history and philosophy. The school which is represented by Niebuhr and K. O. Muller in Germany were quite right in regarding antiquity as a whole; their error lay not there, but in the introduction of theories and conjectures in the place of facts and in not considering the nature of evidence.

(β) Quotations in old Greek writers can only be used with great hesitation as a means of correcting the text of an author. The pre-Alexandrian readings of Homer cannot with any certainty be restored from Plato or Aristotle. Quotations, in the strict sense of the term, are frequently altered to suit the context or structure of the sentence; moreover they often lose or change a word owing to a lapse of memory in the author who cites them. The citations of lexicographers, again, unless strongly supported by internal reasons, are rarely to be set against the evidence of the MSS. And although in the days of Suidas the familiar knowledge of Greek literature was beginning to be narrowed within the range of authors which have been preserved to us (any one who will be at the pains of counting
will find that the proportion of passages in Suidas which are from extant works or parts of works far exceeds the proportion which these works bear to the mass of Greek literature), yet the materials which were used by them were very large and the difficulty of accuracy proportionally increased. Nor can the testimony of grammarians about the uses of forms or words in particular authors be safely trusted when opposed to the evidence of the MSS., because (1) they have probably attempted to impress an Attic character on earlier writers; or (2) they may have drawn their precepts from copies in which the original forms had been altered.

III. One more general head remains to be considered; this is the different character of different authors or writings, under which the principal points for consideration seem to be the following:—First, the different ages of authors and our knowledge of contemporary literature. No one, for example, would attempt to restore the poems of Homer to the earliest or original form or indeed to any other but that of the Alexandrian period. Though there may be reason to think that the change which they have undergone is not great, there are no materials worth speaking of which would enable us to fix the text of the Iliad and Odyssey which was present to the eyes of Herodotus or of Plato. No critical ingenuity can penetrate the grammatical covering which the Alexandrian critics have interposed around them or distinguish the original from the restored forms of words. Again, of Attic literature alone there were at least three periods; first, the antiegrammatical or transitional, which includes Aeschylus and Sophocles, and in Attic prose may be admitted to descend as low as Plato. Secondly, the age of orators, in which the language attained the perfection of grammatical and rhetorical accuracy. Thirdly, the age of the Atticizers, who have an affectation of purism, and mix up with the imitation of an earlier age the uses and
forms of their own. The text of each of these classes of authors has some peculiar features. The grammar in the first period is less reducible to rule and the use of words more audacious and inventive than in that of the second; there is more uncertainty in limiting the freedom of language; the forms and constructions of the old Epic poetry are not altogether banished from the tragedians; in Thucydides, again, is felt the oppression of an age which is beginning to philosophize and sometimes loses hold of grammar in the attempt to arrange multifarious relations of thought. The Tragic dialect is tinged by Homericism, and the influence of Attic verse has not yet completely harmonized the language of prose. These causes interfere with the attainment of that perfect type of Attic regularity which the grammarians of later ages found or made and sought to impose upon earlier ones. And the greater the liberty the greater also the difficulty not only of fixing the limit of usage but of restoring by conjecture what has become corrupted. The second may be regarded as the normal period of Greek grammar. (2) These differences of ages or periods of literature run into other differences of individual style or character. One measure of language must be applied to Aeschylus or Pindar; another to Sophocles; a third to Euripides—one to Thucydides, another to Xenophon; one to narrative writings, another to speeches or philosophical reflections. It is not by a general knowledge of Greek, for example, that an idea can be formed of how a particular author would have written in certain passages, as far as such an idea can be formed at all, but from the attentive study of the usages of individual authors. The abruptness of Aeschylus, the fanciful and tortuous associations and order of words in Pindar, the novelties, subtleties, experiments, refinements of Sophocles, the freedom in the use of cases and the substitution of a logical for a grammatical connexion which characterizes the language of the two first extant tragedians.
On the Text of Greek Authors.

as well as of Thucydides, could not have been anticipated from any general knowledge of the principles of Greek grammar. Each writer is characteristic in some degree in his grammar as well as in his style. The uses of grammar like the meaning of words are (1) chronological in some degree and require to be considered in chronological order; (2) they are individual and vary (though in a less degree) with the character and subject matter of an author. And these considerations tend to impose a check on those who are ready to maintain with authority what an author may or may not have written.

Peculiarities of dialect and metre remain to be briefly considered. As to the first (1) we obviously possess no means of determining the forms or uses of the Doric and Aeolic with the precision of the Attic; the remains of their literature are small and the notices of the grammarians comparatively unfrequent. (2) It is difficult to decide the limits of that common Doric dialect which the Tragic writers retained in their choruses, and which in a still more Doricized form is the language of Pindar. (3) The dialects themselves were never subjected to the influence of grammarians; nor equally with the Attic to the influence of writing. (4) The Tragic dialect, again, always retained some degree of metrical licence and also of Epic usage, which are seen in the double forms—μόνος, μοῖνος: κῦρος, ἐκέρως, &c., and in the occasional omission of the augment. (5) General distinctions between the earlier and later Attic forms cannot be always determined with certainty on the debateable ground of Plato and Aristophanes. But the general rule may be laid down that, e.g. ἀπαλλακθῆς and not ἀπαλλαγεῖς would be commonly found in writers before 400 B.C. (6) That any distinction has been preserved is a testimony to the incorruptness of the MSS., which indeed contrasts with the changes in English books: no reprint of an English book of three centuries since, if not a professed facsimile, would retain the antiquated spelling of the original.
The other question of the extent of metrical licence has also an important bearing on the doctrine of emendation. Metre is a help to the emender's art, and whatever may be the uncertainty of emendations in metre it is less than of emendations in prose. For one datum which the metre gives is wanting in prose. Still the metre also introduces a new element of difficulty. For supposing the laws of the metre to be known the language must conform to those laws; and what are the laws of metre must be gathered partly from the writings of metricians and grammarians, partly from an induction of the facts. This subject may be divided for the sake of convenience into two heads: (1) the more exact metres of the dialogue, (2) the laxer metres of the choruses. It is remarkable that great precision has been attained in the conventional quantity of words and that in either kind of metre there is rarely a suspicion of difference or error.

1. The metres of the dialogue have general and inviolate rules about the admissibility of feet; they have also precepts which relate to the divisions and composition of feet. Whether these latter are of the same inviolable nature as the former is doubtful; they seem to be not so much metrical canons as unconscious refinements of the ear. The fact that some of them, as for example the rule that trisyllabic feet shall be included in single words, do not apply equally to all the tragedians, tends to show that they are not matters of rule but of ear. In the latter case they would be general rather than universal, and the lines which do not conform to them would not therefore be held to be corrupt. The probability of such rules being universal evidently depends partly on the nature of the rule, chiefly on the number of exceptions. The law of the Cretic, which has been already mentioned, may be cited as an example of a rule with several exceptions, while the rarity of the Anapaest in the third place of the Tragic Iambic would probably justify the inference that the
exception is only a corruption of the text. Again, is it not probable that some syllables may have had common or different quantities which have generally been held to be of a fixed or uniform one; if words such as φάρη, Ἰμᾶν and Ἰμᾶτι are admitted to have had two quantities, may not ῶραπόσ also have been common or uncertain? Such an inference seems a fair one where the exceptional quantity is strongly supported by the MSS. even in a single passage. It agrees generally with the fact that in the termination -τρόσ there are two quantities; we say χειμερίνος, but also ὁπήρωνος and διαφόρωνος.

2. The choruses of the Greek plays have a rhythmical rather than a metrical character; that is to say, the metre is hardly enough defined to be distinguishable from rhythm. Many of the metres used in them admit of such numerous exchanges of feet, and the transitions from one rhythm to another are so frequent, that there would generally be great uncertainty as to the corruption of a line in which the metre alone appeared to be at fault. There is more guidance however afforded by the correspondence of strophe and antistrophe. Still doubts will remain; (a) are the quantities of words absolutely certain? (b) has the beat of the verse no effect on them? (c) is no Homeric licence ever admitted? (d) are the corresponding feet exactly known? Such doubts are only suggested here; the tendency of them is to abate our confidence in the discovery of corruptions in the choruses of which the metre is taken as the proof.

In conclusion, let me observe that though I have endeavoured to show how small the power of divination is, and though I deeply lament that the lives of so many ingenious men should be thrown away in such a fruitless task, and though I think that the supposed corruptions of the text have been greatly exaggerated through this very 'cacoethes' or 'luces emendandi,' yet I am far from maintaining that the Greek classics are in general
free from corruption or that there can never be any place for conjectural criticism. But a passage must be proved corrupt first before it is made the subject of the emender's art; and the emendation must be the least possible (for no other has any chance of being true); it must follow the letters of the MSS., it must accord with the style and language of the author.

IV. The principles or suggestions offered for consideration in the preceding pages may now be illustrated from Plato. The text of the Republic will be conveniently treated under three heads, (1) the MSS. and recensions of the text. (2) the anomalies of language which affect the text, (3) the more remarkable conjectures, an examination of which will tend to illustrate the general principles which have been followed in this edition.

Of all the MSS. of Plato first and without a second is the Codex Parisiensis A. It contains the Cleitophon, Republic, Timaeus, Critias, Minos, Laws, Epinomis, Definitions, Epistles, the Dialogues 'De Justo' and 'De Virtute,' Demodocus, Sisyphus, Haleyon, Eryxias, Axiochus. It is written on parchment in double columns, the scholia being in small capitals, and has the annotation written at the end, ὄφθωθη ἦ βιβλιος αὕτη ὑπὸ Κωνσταντίνου μητροπολίτου ἰεραπόλεως τοῦ καὶ ἰνησαμένου. 'This book was corrected by Constantine, metropolitan of Hierapolis, who was the purchaser of the book.' About the precise antiquity of the M.S. there is some uncertainty; Bekker who is the highest authority on such subjects places the date as early as the ninth century on the ground that the writing is more ancient than that of the Bodleian or Clarkian MS. which has the date 896 written at the end. (In the latter which contains nearly every other dialogue the Republic and the Laws are wanting.) The Codex A is certainly one of the noblest of extant MSS. And considering the fate of other Greek authors we may congratulate ourselves
on having the whole writings of Plato preserved in two MSS. of the ninth century.

The authority of Paris A may be justly said to balance that of all other MSS. put together. The successive editors of Plato—Stallbaum, Schneider, Baiter, Hermann, seem to estimate more and more highly the value of this MS. The last-named scholar has made a closer approximation to its text than was ever exhibited before. Nor is this high estimate exaggerated, as may indeed be shown by a simple test. Any one who will take the very slight trouble of comparing the recension of the First Book at the beginning of the Zurich edition with the text will find that after making allowance for differences of orthography the real substantial errors are exceedingly few, being in all not more than two or three. There is considerable variation in minute points, as for example (1) the first person of the pluperfect tense which has been Atticized in the first hand of the MS. (ἐωρᾶκη, ἐπεπόνθη Α, ἐωρᾶκεν, ἐπε-πόνθεω Α²); (2) also in the forms of some substantives, e.g. ὁφελεία, ἐνθηθα; (3) in the use of the ι subscript which is most frequently ascribed; (4) most of all in the omission or addition of the aspirate, causing a frequent confusion of αὐτός and αὐτός, &c.; and (5) not unfrequent confusion in accentuation. Whether ὅταν δέω k.t.l. 333 D, which is found in several other MSS., including Vat. Θ. ὧν or οὐκοῦν followed by an optative without ἂν (ib. E) be a mistake is uncertain. But after making these deductions there remain only about three passages which must be admitted to be substantial errors; these are 327 Η ἡττων for ἡττουν, οἶνον τε σῶ probably for οἶνον γε σῶ 336 F; the interchange between Τ and Γ being of the commonest of MS. errors, and probably ἀποκρύψεσθαι for ἀποκρύψεσθαι 337 C. (These last variations are cited on the authority of the Zurich edition; none of them are to be discovered in the collation of the Paris MS. made by Dübrner for Didot, the various readings in which are almost confined to matters of orthography.)
On the other hand there are several probable corrections of the received text, e.g. ἐλλείπται for ἐν λείπται 327 c, probably the two examples of the omission of ἄν noted above (333 D, E), the explanatory ἀσύρτητον in which γάρ is wanting (ἐπειδὰν αἰ ἐπιθύμιαι for ἐπειδὰν γάρ αἰ ἐπιθύμιαι 329 c), the substitution of πιαίνει for ποιμαίνει, all of which are supported by the canon of the more difficult reading.

Nearly the same result follows from the examination of the Second Book, in which several erasures and a somewhat greater number of errors are found, e.g. there are six omissions: (1) ὄντως δ᾽ ἐπαινεῖται 358 Λ, (2) the words οὐ μέγα δόνασθαι after αἰ τελεσώ 366 Λ, (3) εἶναι after ὅσοι φατέ 366 E, (4) ἀλλὰ ὅ τὸ δοκεῖ 367 C which is inserted in the margin, (5) the words παρὰ τῶν βασιλεῶν 360 B which are also found in the margin, (6) καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν 373 Λ. The number of these omissions tends to weaken the authority of the MS. in other cases of omission; number (4) which is an antithetical clause and is added at the side also throws light on the character of the omission in number (1). The tendency to omission and especially to the omission of parallel clauses or words may be observed in several other passages of the MS., e.g. 400 D ἐν ἐνάρμοστον [καὶ ἀνάρμοστον]. Again there are errors of orthography, ὠφελίας for ὠφελείας 368 C, λύσεις for λύσιν 366 B, ἀμφοτέρων for ἀμφοτέρων 379 D, ἵμβλα 380 Λ, interchanges of ν for ι and of breathings and accents; also one or two of a more serious character, e.g. τῷ δικαῖῳ for τῷ ἀδικώ 363 Λ, τῷ Γύγγ τοῦ Λυδῶν 359 D where the error of the other MSS. is retained. On the other hand it is possible that in ἔν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ 365 B, ἀποσχοίμην 367 D, this MS. has preserved the true reading.

[Professor Jowett's MS. here ends abruptly: for further observations on the text of the Republic see Essay II, pp. 67 ff. of this volume.]
ESSAY II

THE KINGDOM OF EVIL

Book I. 352 d.

οἱ γε παμπόνηροι . . . πρώττευν ἀδύνατοι. Plato argues that there is no such thing as a kingdom of evil (compare Matthew xii. 25, 26—'Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand; and if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself: how shall then his kingdom stand?'); also that there is no unmixed evil in the individual. Cp. Lys. 220 ε, 221 Α πότερον, . . . εἰν τὸ κακὸν ἀπόληται, ὁδὲ πεινὴν ἥτις ἐσται οὐδὲ δυσῆς, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιοῦτων; . . . ἡ γελοιον τὸ ἐρωτήμα, ὅ τι ποτ' ἐσται τότε ἡ μὴ ἐσται; τὸς γὰρ οἴδερ; which raises the question of the connexion of evil with the desires; and Crat. 403 ε, where (as in the Timaeus) evil is attributed to the accidents of the bodily state. Evil is elsewhere referred to necessities in the nature of things (Theaet. 176 λ), or to pre-existing elements in the world (Polit. 273 c), or to the necessary imperfection of secondary causes (Tim. 48 λ), or to the bodily constitution (Tim. 86). The contradictory nature of evil is again discussed in the Laws (i. 626 c, d), where the argument that war is the natural condition of states is carried back to individuals. The connexion of virtue and power is also observed by Aristotle, Pol. i. 6, § 3 τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴν τυχχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιώσεθαι ὀδύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἐστιν ἀδια τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθὸν τιμών, ὡστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βλάχ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸν ὁμακών μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν. On the other hand in Rep. X. 610 E
evil is described as having an agonized and intensified existence—τὸν ὀ’ ἀβοτα καὶ μᾶλα ἡμικόν παρέχονταν.

It has been asked in later ages whether evil is negative or positive, to be represented under the figure of decomposition or of death. It may be replied: (1) that there is no ideal of evil; Milton or Goethe give consistency to their creations by the addition of intellect and of will; (2) all evil has some admixture of good. But again, no limit can be assigned either to the persistency, or to the consequences of evil. The difficulty of this, as of many other questions, seems to arise out of the attempt to realize in the abstract a state or nature which is essentially concrete. Cp. note on iv. 444 b.
ESSAY III

THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Book II. 369 a ff.

The favourite analogy of the state and the individual is a figure of speech which lends a sort of elevation and interest to politics, and yet is only true partially and has frequently led to practical errors. Man is a microcosm, and 'the world is set in his heart,' and new aspects of either arise when they are reflected on each other. But the life and organization of the state are far inferior to the life and organization of the individual, nor do the virtues or parts of the one answer, as Plato supposes, to the virtues or parts of the other. The nation never attains the unity of a person and has therefore a lower degree of freedom and responsibility; a national will means the excess of the majority of wills, which often balance each other or are lost in circumstances, and thus pass into a sort of imperfect necessity. The famous expression of a 'national' or 'state' conscience is poetical and figurative only, for that consciousness which is essential to the idea of conscience in the individual becomes in a state only the aggregation of many individual consciousnesses which from sympathy or some action or tendency of circumstances are led to form the same reflection on themselves. And in judging collectively, the sense of right and wrong is apt to be blunted. When, again, a nation is said to 'rise as one man,' the very form of expression seems to imply that this unanimity is an exceptional condition, and that a nearer approach is
made to the unity of an individual at one time than at another. On the other hand the nation lasts while 'the individuals wither': it gathers up and retains many more elements than are found in any single person: it has no natural term, and may have an endless growth. The citizen of a state presupposes the state into which he is born, the laws and institutions of which are the outward barriers and limits within which his life is set, being a more durable structure than that which he himself is. Lastly, the sphere of the state is co-extensive with law and politics, the sphere of the individual with morals and religion. The exceptions to this opposition arise where individuals act for nations, or where in the leaders of states the personal character takes the place of the official and representative, or where, as in the case of a treaty or agreement, there is a definite act binding on nations just as much as on individuals. Nor must nations any more than individuals be deemed incapable of acting from any higher motive than interest; nor are they mere organizations of individuals, but they have also a national life.

Grave errors may arise in practice from the neglect of these simple considerations. When politics are confounded with ethics or the state identified with the individual, the conditions of human society are ignored; legislation has a false aim: human law is superseded by a fiction of divine law: there are aspirations after the ideal which degenerate into feebleness and tyranny. The Utopias of ancient times often fall into the theoretical errors of which the confusions of spiritual and temporal, or erroneous theories of punishment in modern times are practical illustrations.

That the state was not a larger family or magnified individual was clearly understood by Aristotle (Pol. i. 1). In the political ideal of Plato the state and the individual are in closer union (ἐγγύτερον ἀνθρώπος ἐνός) than in fact and experience. In the same way, the lines which distinguish the Church and the members of the Church fade away in
such expressions as—'The kingdom of Heaven is within you.'

The idea of the individual as distinct from the state or family is not one of the earliest but one of the latest of human conceptions, not having yet emerged in ancient times from the unity of the family which expanded into the state.
ESSAY IV

VERACITY

Book II. 382 A ff.

Plato allows that a doctrine of economy or accommodation may be necessary for men in certain cases, but not for the Gods; the accommodations attributed to the Gods are really erroneous conceptions of the divine nature. Falsehood is permitted by him: (1) in dealing with enemies or madmen (I. 331 C); (2) for educational purposes, provided the falsehood be a moral one (II. 377 A ff.); (3) as an engine of state, to be used by the rulers only (III. 389 B, 414 B).

Moral philosophy in modern times has a stricter rule. Every one would agree that some points of divinity or philosophy are liable to be imperfectly apprehended; also that modes of thought vary in different ages and countries, or in different individuals, according to their education and natural powers. In the communication of one age with another, some degree of error or inaccuracy thus arises naturally. Nor would any one deny that instruction is often best conveyed through fiction, or that the rule of truth and falsehood is in a measure determined by the relations of men to one another, or that received opinions, however erroneous, cannot always be rudely and immediately set aside. But we refuse to admit that any man under any circumstances may tell or preach a lie; or that the rulers of states and churches are privileged to introduce artificial economies. Extreme cases, which are sometimes put, of justifiable, or more strictly speaking, excusable falsehood, may be fairly said to prove the rule.
ESSAYS

BY

PROFESSOR CAMPBELL
ESSAY I

ON THE STRUCTURE OF PLATO'S REPUBLIC
AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER DIALOGUES.

I

On the Composition of the Republic.

The Republic parts naturally into five sections, which § 1.
are marked off with elaborate forms of transition by Plato
himself.

1. Book i, in which the question concerning Justice is
propounded, and the views of Socrates and of the Sophist
are dramatically set in opposition.

2. Books ii, iii, iv, in which the question is put more
seriously, and partly answered through the institution of
the ideal State.

3. Books v, vi, vii, developing further the ideal of the
State, and expounding (a) the community of goods and of
marriage, (b) the supremacy of the philosopher, (c) the
education of the philosopher-kings, reaching up to Dialectic
and to the Idea of Good.

4. Books viii and ix, supplying the reverse picture of
the declension of States and Individuals from ideal perfect-
ness, and concluding with the ideal of evil, as embodied in
the tyrannical man. This is forcibly contrasted with the
kingdom of Righteousness, which each man may seek to
establish ‘within his own clear breast.’

VOL. II. B
5. The tenth Book forms an appendix or conclusion to the whole work, in which (1) the exclusion of the poets from education is reaffirmed, and (2) (as in the Gorgias) the rewards of another life are added to the blessedness of the just and misery of the wicked in this life as already set forth.

§ 2. Parts 1 and 2 are intimately connected.

1. (B. i.) In conversation with Cephalus, who bases happiness on a moral and religious ground, so implying that the just are happy, Socrates raises the question 'What is Justice?' Polemarchus vainly tries to answer him. Thrasymachus interposes, and in arguing with him Socrates employs, (1) the analogy of the arts, especially of medicine and navigation; (2) the comparison of the Ruler to a Shepherd, suggested by an objection of Thrasymachus; (3) the notion of ἐξυμφημίων, utility or expediency, which recurs afterwards in various forms and applications; while (4) the extreme opposition of the tyrant to the true ruler is ironically hinted by anticipation.

2. (Bb. ii, iii.) The remarks of Glaucon and Ademantus having shown that the question is not thus disposed of, Socrates undertakes to give his own account of the matter. Observing that the nature of Justice is first to be studied in the large letters, for this purpose he 'creates the State.' The principle of 'one member one function' is first laid down, then the state of primitive simplicity imagined,—then the introduction of luxury occasions the necessity for soldiers, who in accordance with the first principle must be trained and organized as a standing army. But the protectors of the State must not only be 'good haters' but true friends, and they must be chosen and educated accordingly.

The rules for their education, (1) in liberal culture, (2) in bodily exercises, are clearly set forth, with many pregnant observations scattered by the way; then the rulers are provisionally appointed, and the army is led out to its modest quarters, the whole people having been first imbued with the Phoenician 'lie.'

(B. iv.) The objection of Ademantus, that the highest class
Composition of the Dialogue.

is not thus made the happiest, leads to reflexions on the desirableness of unity, the dangers of wealth and poverty, and other incidental topics, concluding with the establishment of religion on a national basis. Thus the still impending task of defining Justice is further delayed. But the time for it arrives at last, and amidst various references to the opening of the inquiry, Socrates calls for a 'light.' He then suggests the method of residues, by which in the discussion of the four cardinal virtues Justice is held in reserve. When her turn arrives, the importance of the critical moment is marked by the new image of huntsmen clustering round an impenetrable thicket. And when Justice in the State has been discovered, much yet remains to do. The analogy of State and Individual (the 'large and small letters') must be verified by proving that the Soul has parts corresponding to the classes in the State. This psychological question cannot really be determined without a higher method, i.e. without going beyond psychology to find the metaphysical basis of its distinctions; but it is for the present settled provisionally in the affirmative, and the definition of Justice in the individual as the harmonious action of the three parts of the soul, is at length obtained.

The continuity of the work so far is obvious, and is § 3. assisted by many minute links, such as (1) the question of the profitableness of justice; (2) the allusion, in II. 357, to the description of medicine as a mode of money-making in I. 342, 346; (3) the power of doing good to friends (I. 334) and of pleasing the gods (I. 331) is claimed for Injustice in II. 362, 366; (4) Justice, according to Polemarchus (I. 333), is ϵεν της κοινωνείν,—this prepares for the suggestion (II. 372 λ) that it is εν χρείᾳ των της προς ἀλλήλων; (5) the noble 'lie' in III. 414 B recalls the εν τοῖς λόγοις ἕπεδος of II. 382, III. 389.

The end of the dialogue (Bb. viii–x) is also subtly joined to the beginning. The tyrant, set up by Thrasymachus as having the noblest life (B. i), is cast down to the depths of infamy in B. ix, and receives his final sentence in B. x, where the picture of the world below confirms the remark of
Cephalus in I. 330 d. The question of the profitableness of injustice, whether it escape or not the observation of gods and men, which had already become ridiculous at iv. 445 A, is finally dismissed in B. ix. B. viii resumes the conclusion of B. iv. The avoidance of poverty and wealth, hinted in B. ii. 372, and repeated in iv. 421, is elaborately enforced in Bb. viii-ix; where also the division of the soul into νοεις, δυναστεία, demonstrated in B. iv, is further developed and illustrated. This division is once more referred to in B. x, sub init., although not without a reservation in favour of the unity of the soul (x. 612).

§ 4. But many students of Plato¹ have been struck by the fact that the central and cardinal portion of the Republic—the third act in which the drama culminates—takes the form of a digression,—an ἔποπτη, as Plato himself describes it². And some have not been contented with the obvious solution that this break in the conversation belongs to Plato’s concealment of his art, like the palinode of the Phaedrus, the hiccup of Aristophanes in the Symposium, the casual inroad of Alcibiades in the same dialogue, the objections of Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo, and other similar expedients. They have proceeded to remark on the absence of allusions to v-vii in the concluding books, viii-x, as compared with the frequent and distinct allusions in viii-x to i-iv, and have further observed that the references to i-iv which occur in the central portion, v-vii, have more the appearance of deliberate quotation than of the subtle continuity which binds together i-iv, or viii-x, when taken separately. A. Krohn³ also dwells on the difference of tone and of philosophical content between v-vii on the one hand and i-iv and viii-x on the other.

According to Krohn, in those which he regards as the earlier books, i-iv, viii-x, the work of Socrates, as described in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, is continued on the same lines; the method is that of empirical psychology; the ruling

¹ See K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie, 1839, pp. 536 foll.
² viii. 543 ἐποπτην ἐπειδῆ ἐπετραπαμέθα;
³ Der Platonische Staat, &c
conception is that of φύσις, i.e. of Becoming; the word εἰῶν
is frequently employed, but (1) is applied only to the virtues
and the parts of the Soul, and (2) these εἰῶν are not transcen-
dent, but 'innocently immanent', and are merely modes of γένεσις. These books exhibit Plato in the light of a genial
optimist, who thinks by a simple effort of construction to
purify nature.

But in ν–vii Plato is carried off from the conception of
Nature, which still rules in the early part of B. ν, into a
transcendental, metaphysical region. This purely intellectual
act begins with contemplating the ideas of Justice, Beauty,
Goodness, &c., not now dynamically but statically, and dis-
tinguishing in each kind between the one and the many.
Thus a step is made beyond the old Socratic opposition of
knowledge and ignorance, and room is gained for δόξα, Opinion, as an intermediate faculty. From this point onward
Plato advances on his intellectualizing course by leaps and
bounds, until the Good is seen radiating from beyond the
realm of Being. At each new stage the foregoing position
is ignored. In the series νόησις διάνοια πίστις εἰκασία the
crudeness of ἐπιστήμη δόξα ἀγνωσία is silently corrected.
And in B. νι, according to this writer, who takes but slight
reckoning of the great allegory, even the ideas are lost in
the transcendent notion of the Absolute, as the supreme end
of Dialectic.

In trying to account for the subsequent addition of Bb. ν–vii,
Krohn avails himself of a suggestion made by F. A. Wolf and
repeated by Meineke, that Aristophanes in the Ecclesiazusae
(b.c. 391) aimed his ridicule at the communistic scheme of
Plato, of which some hint must therefore have been already
published. It is probable enough that, when the comedy was
brought out, some notion of 'the monstrous regiment of
women' was already in the air; but the only ground for
supposing a personal reference is by no means firm. The

1 'Harmlos immanent.'

2 The idea of a community of wives, such as Herodotus attributes to the
Agathyrsi, was already familiar to Euripides. See the fragment of his Pro-
tesilau 655 in Nauck καὶ οὐκ εἶπεν ἥρρη γνωστίων λέειν.
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name Aristyllos occurs in the play (I. 647, cp. Plutus, 314'), and is twisted by Meincke into a diminutive of Aristocles, which was Plato's birth-name according to Diogenes Laertius — though if it were so he had changed it before the death of Socrates, as we know from the Phaedo. On such premises Krohn builds the assumption that the 'Socratic' books (i-iv, viii-x) were written before B.C. 391, and that after this Plato re-edited the work with the addition of the ἐκτροπία (v-vii), at the opening of which he declares his defiance of τὰ τῶν χρεών ἕκτων σκόμματα. This whole process is supposed to have been completed before any other of the Platonic dialogues had been composed. All the greatest ones — 'which alone we need care to vindicate,' are viewed as more advanced even than B. vi, and the rest are discarded as unimportant, having little, if any, philosophical significance. Dr. E. Pfeiderer, who more recently reaffirmed Krohn's theory in a modified form, conceives on the other hand that the shorter dialogues came out in the interval between the composition of i-iv, viii-ix, and of v-vii, in which interval also, at some uncertain time, B. x was composed.

§ 5. Krohn's cavils have been answered in detail by Zeller in the last edition of his History of Philosophy, and in a Latin Monograph by B. Grimmelt (De Reipublicae Platonis compositione et unitate: Berlin, 1887). But although his reasonings are inconclusive, his book is noticable on several grounds.

1. It recalls attention to many coincidences between the earlier books of the Republic and the Memorabilia of Xenophon, and thus accentuates anew the supremacy of the ethical motive in Plato's life and work. With equal acuteness and candour this critic himself supplies the link which binds the metaphysics of Book vi to the 'innocent' psychology of Book iv. He looks on Plato as throughout continuing the endeavour of Socrates, who strove to

1 It also occurs in Attic inscriptions, C. I. 1. 298. n. 169. 38. This makes for the reality of the name. The jest in Ar. Eccl. would have no point unless Aristyllos were personally repulsive, which his enemies cannot have said of Plato as a young man.
counteract the disintegrating tendencies of the age. The Platonic ideas were at first merely the result of moral forces recognized by an empiric optimism. By and by, however, they assumed (a) a logical and (b) a transcendent aspect. In the former stage (a) moral conceptions are co-ordinated with mathematical, but in the sequel (b) it is found that Plato's main interest throughout has been to establish the inde-feasible regulative value of moral truth, and that his guiding principle is one of ethical teleology, which his imperfect knowledge of Nature led him to blend with a vague cosmology.

2. Krohn's thesis and the controversy to which it gave rise have brought into relief some inequalities in the structure of the Republic, which, whether accidental or intentional, are really there. But his argument proves too much for his case. For, if Plato had at any time regarded the education of Books xi and xii as adequate, or had ever been contented with the psychological method of Book iv, instead of setting out from the point reached by Socrates, he would have fallen behind it. No Socratic dialogue, even in Xenophon, is without an appeal to reason, which is conspicuously absent here. Socrates drew a sharp line of distinction between Knowledge and Ignorance, and aimed simply at basing life on an ideal of Knowledge. Plato in these books provides for that which the method of Socrates excludes;--a life grounded on true opinions, which are determined by a rational authority and moulded by education. If instead of taking the dialogue piece-meal after Krohn's fashion, the description of the 'first state' is regarded as an integral portion of a larger whole, it reveals a conception not only in advance of the purely Socratic point of view, but also passing beyond the paradoxical attitude which Plato himself assumed when he raised the question whether virtue could be imparted otherwise than scientifically. Such a positive conception is only rendered possible by the conception of the state considered as a complex whole,—a constructive notion not anticipated in 'Socratism.' This will appear more clearly by and by in studying the relation of the Republic to the Protagoras and Meno. See below, p. 23.
3. The idea of Nature is more pervasive in the Platonic writings than Krohn is willing to admit (see Essay on Diction). The fact is that while pure 'dialectic' remains to the last an unrealized ideal, a fresh appeal to experience is continually made. At the height of the intellectual argument (VI. 506 D, E, VII. 533 E) Socrates will only go where he can take Glaucon with him. That there is some disparity between the ethical and the metaphysical books of the Republic is undeniable; the attributes of the philosophic nature are not the four cardinal virtues, nor in the series νοΐς διάνοια πίστις εἰκασία is there any recognition of the other series νοΐς θυμὸς ἐπιθυμία. But this independent treatment of different aspects of the truth is quite in the manner of Plato, and it is best to take his own account of the matter, and to say that in the earlier books it was necessary to proceed provisionally, because the true philosophers had not yet been distinguished from the false, nor had the intellectual kingdom been revealed. In passing from the lower to the higher education, and from the mere guardian or soldier to the philosopher-king, he has entered on another region of thought, and is no more compelled to continue the same method than a poet feels bound to continue the same rhythm in passing from a dramatic to a lyrical strain. In Books VIII-X we descend again into the ethico-political region, and the emotional elements (which had no place in the intellectual argument) naturally reappear.

4. Krohn should be accepted as an independent and competent witness to the comparative lateness of the dialectical dialogues. His remarks on the Sophist and Philebus in their relation to the Republic are especially acceptable. For the coincidences between the Philebus and Rep. Book VI, on which Zeller lays so much stress, do not really bear out his conclusion that the Philebus is the earlier writing. It may be argued with at least equal probability, that the longer and more elaborate statement of Plato's theory of pleasure was subsequent to the cursory indication of it. See below, p. 22.

5. Plato himself has noticed the discrepancy between Bb. III and V, with regard to the appointment of the rulers and
had prepared for it by the qualifying expression (III. 414) ὅσ ἐν τῷ πῷ, μὴ δί' ἀκριβείας, εἰρήσθαι. In the original constitution of the State, before the higher education had been divulged, the elder guardians were made to rule the younger. But now that the rulers are to be trained for dialectic, it is necessary to make the selection while they are still young. It does not follow that they are to rule while very young, for the training is a long one, and they are not to be admitted, even to military commands, until thirty-five; still the first provisional order is superseded by the necessities arising out of the principle that kings shall be philosophers, which has been subsequently introduced.

Precisely the same difficulty is encountered by the founders of the colony from Cnossus in the Sixth Book of the Laws. The Athenian stranger explains to them that the first appointment of the νομοφύλακες and other magistrates cannot possibly conform to the regulations as to selection and training which are to be afterwards in force (Laws vi. 751 c, d). And one of the cautions imposed by this necessity is analogous to that enjoined in Republic, Book III. The men selected to nominate the rulers are to be the eldest as well as the best, so far as possible (ἐις διάμαυν Laws vi. 754 c). This comparison of the two writings places the superficiality of Krohn's objection in a strong light 1.

The unity of the Republic is not that of a syllogistic § 6.

1 The following passage is characteristic both of Krohn's acuteness and of his illogical logic. Der Plat. Staat, p. 107, ed. 1876 :—

'Hier wird der grosse Riss des Platonismus sichtbar. Der moralisirende Sokratiker hatte den ersten Entwurf geschrieben, der Metaphysiker fand eine wahrere Wesheit. Beide treffen jetzt kämpfend auf einander, beide verleugnen sich nicht. Der Reformer, der die Krankheit seines Volkes heilen will, muss glauben und vertraut der eigenen Kunst: aber mit der Substanz unter verflissenden Formen besieget der Denker seinen Verzicht. Instinktmaessig zieht der Eine die Idee auf die Erde, um sie zu gestalten, in bewusster Erkenntiss hebt sie der Andere in ein intelligibles Reich. Aber dieser Riss des Platonismus ist der Riss, der durch das Leben aller edlen Geister geht. Sie wirken hier mit ihrer besten Kraft und wissen, dass das Hier ein flüchtiges Etwas ist.'

This is really to say that Plato's philosophy has a body as well as a mind. But if such an antinomy is so deeply inherent in Platonism, why deny that a work in which it is found was written continuously ?
treatise, but partly the unity of a philosophical movement or development and partly of a piece of literary art. Students of the Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus, Theaetetus, should be aware that it is Plato’s way in the earlier stages of any exposition to hold much strictly in reserve. His method is ‘regressive,’ as it has been termed, continually passing from a partial or superficial view of the subject in hand, to another which he regards as more complete or more profound; ascending, as he himself would say, from hypothesis to hypothesis in the approach towards absolute truth. Whether the lower hypothesis is refuted, as in the Theaetetus, or discarded by a seemingly capricious impulse, as in the Phaedrus, is merely a question of form. The words of Socrates (Theaet. 187 ά) are equally applicable in both cases—ορα δὴ ἐν τὸ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρὸς θεῖν ἐξαλείψας, εἶ τι μᾶλλον καθορὶς, ἐπειδή ἐισαῦθα προελήφθας.

In the Republic, as in the Phaedo, the disciples suggest difficulties which provoke the master into disclosing what he has so far kept in the background. The gradual evolution of the thought by this means is not referable to the incoherence of an unformed thinker, but to the most deliberate literary and philosophical design. To imagine Plato as in any single dialogue himself groping tentatively along the path by which he conducts his reader, or like the guide across the ford (Theaet. 200 ε) taking his audience with him into depths which he has not explored, is an error no less grave than to suppose with Schleiermacher and others, that the whole body of the dialogues, the work of fifty years, was composed according to a preconcerted plan. It argues a strange insensibility both to the irony and the dialectical economy of Plato, that any one should take literally such expressions as ‘whither the argument like a breeze may carry us, on that course we must proceed.’ Such words express the spirit of the catechetical mode of exposition; but only a blind simplicity can believe the master serious when he professes not to know the way.

Another general feature of Plato’s discourse has not been sufficiently noticed, and it is this:--the most elaborate dis-
cussion of the higher aspects of metaphysical or psychological truth does not prevent the recurrence of crude statements essentially inconsistent with the results so gained. Observe, for example, how the mythical doctrine of pre-existence is resumed in the Politicus, notwithstanding the clear dialectic of the Theaetetus and Sophist which has avowedly come between.

The unity of the Republic as a literary masterpiece hardly needs defence. Each part has its own climax of interest, and, in spite of the intentional breaks and digressions, or rather with their aid, there is a continuous rise and fall,—as in a tragedy,—pervading the whole work.

The *peripeteia* of the drama is made by the revelation of the truth about the philosopher-king, which is disclosed, after being purposely held back by the digression on the laws of War, and by the 'coy excuses' of Socrates, precisely at the middle point of the dialogue. (The culmination of the earlier portion in the definition of Justice had been similarly heightened by ingenious delays.) The breaking of this 'third wave of the τρικυμία' of course overwhelms Glaucon with surprise. That is the rhetorical artifice. But the attentive reader of the preceding books should not be wholly unprepared for the discovery. What else is implied by the identification of ἀρχή with ἐπιστήμη in i. 342, iii. 389? or by the true ruler who is unwilling to rule, i. 346, cp. vii. 520? or by the few wise men through whose wisdom the State is wise (iv. 428)? The supremacy of reason is a Socratic principle which could not be absent from any part or aspect of Plato's Commonwealth. A similar outburst of astonishment marks the importance of the discovery that the education of the philosopher is to be carried up to the Idea of Good. That is the culminating point of this central portion, which develops the intellectual and philosophical ideal. But for this surprise also there had been some preparations in the earlier books. The 'Fables' for which rules are given in Bb. ii. iii. are characterized in 376 e as containing elements of truth. And although this remark is merely dropped by the way, the rules themselves are determined by the motive that when the age of reason
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comes, the truth may be accepted, because it harmonizes with the legends that were learned in childhood (402 A). The child so trained will have been made familiar with the elementary forms of goodness (σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνορείας καὶ ἐλένθερωτητὸς . . . καὶ ὀσα τούτων ἀδελφα)\(^1\), and may hope therefore to attain to true μονοικῆ. And while the τύποι θεολογίας are thus a reflexion of the Form of Good, the law of simplicity in education and even the division of labour are associated with the philosophical conception of Abstract Unity. Lastly, the psychology of B.iv is avowedly provisional—those who would discuss the Soul and virtue adequately must go round by the 'longer way.' (This thread is explicitly resumed in vi.503 A.) And the definition of courage, in particular, is limited by the term τοτική, thus reserving a place for the intellectual courage and fortitude of the philosopher, who regards human life as a little thing and is dauntless and indefatigable in the pursuit of truth.

§ 8. Those who would break up the Republic have not observed that Bb.v-vii are linked to the preceding book by the image of a 'sea of difficulty.' The first hint of this is given at iv. 435 c, by the word ἐμπεπτώκαμεν, which is followed up by ταῦτα μόγες διανενεύκαμεν ib. 441 c. This renders less abrupt the image in v. 453 b (ἀν τὲ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἄν τε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως γε νεὶ οὐδὲν ἤπτον), which gives distinct note of preparation for the continued metaphor (457 B ἐν ὁσπερ κῦμα φώμεν διαφεύγει—ὅστε μὴ παρτᾶσαι κατακλυσθήναι, 472 Α μόγες μοι τὸ ὄν κῦματε ἐκφυγόντει νῦν τὸ μέγιστον καὶ ἀλεπώτατον τῆς τρικυμίας ἐπάγεις. 473 C εἰρήσεται οὗ ὃν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτι τε ἀτεχνῶς ὁσπερ κῦμα ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξία κατακλύσεων). Socrates reverts to the figure implied in iv. 441 c, although the image of a 'swarm of arguments' (v. 450 b) had come between.

§ 9. One point affecting the structure of the Republic, which requires careful elucidation, is connected with the famous allegory of the cave at the opening of B.vii,—the passage

\(^1\) It has been observed that this enumeration comes nearer to the list of philosophic attributes in B. vi than to the Cardinal Virtues.
Allegory of the Cave.

which suggested the 'idola specus' to the mind of Bacon. At the end of B. vi, the Platonic Socrates had shadowed forth a hierarchy of pure ideas, constituting the supra-sensual kingdom of being and truth, presided over and vitalized by the supreme Form of Good. This is not only a turning point of the Republic, but may be regarded as marking a critical moment in the development of Platonism. The 'Reason of the Best' is said indeed in the Phaedo to be the Atlas of the World, and true causes to be more effectually approached through the examination of language and thought than through external nature; but in that dialogue there is no such clear vision of an ideal unity of knowledge as is here given. In the Phaedrus-myth the forms of Justice and Holiness appear to be raised on lofty pedestals above the rest. And it is shown that to be man at all one must understand general notions abstracted from sense. But there is no well-defined path of ascent from the first or primary generalization of experience to the height of moral vision. Now in the Republic, the conception of such an ascent is formulated in the concluding passage of B. vi, and carried further in B. vii. Plato here anticipates that gradation of mental stages, and that remotion of the Divine from Man, which, as will be presently shown, is increasingly characteristic of the later, or more constructive, phase of his philosophy.

But in passing onwards from the conclusion of B. vi to the allegory of B. vii, the ground is insensibly shifted, as the idealizing impulse gathers strength, so that not only the distinction between πλοτις and εἰκασία is dropped (since from the higher point of view the sensible world consists entirely of images)\(^1\), all ordinary experience being now merged in εἰκασία,

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\(^1\) Professor E. Caird writes as follows on this passage:—

'1. I do not think it need cause us any difficulty to find the whole visible world viewed as standing in the same relation to the whole intelligible world as the parts in each do to each other, after we have been told that the former is the "offspring and likeness" of the latter. In fact this gives us three pairs standing to each other as image to reality:

\[
\begin{align*}
1 : 2 :: 2 : 4 :: 3 : 6 \\
a : b :: c : d :: (a + b) : (c + d)
\end{align*}
\]

That is

\[
\text{εἰκασία} :: \text{πλοτις} :: \text{διάνοια} :: \text{νόησις} :: \text{τὸ ὑφάνεν} :: \text{τὸ νοούμενον}.
\]
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but the actual scientific processes which rank with διάτομα in B. vi are now degraded to the level of ordinary experience. The geometers, the astronomers, the 'empiric' harmonists, are all found guilty of the same error, that of not rising beyond and above sensible things and narrow everyday utilities. They are still tied and bound, still watching the fleeting shadows on the wall of the den.

§ 10. The passage now to be considered extends from vi. 504 to vii. 519. The difficulty of interpretation is increased by the fact that Plato's exposition here is awedly imperfect, being (1) relative to the immediate purpose of the dialogue, and (2) figurative from beginning to end.

Much turns on the significance of vi. 511 A, especially the words εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτώς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖτι. (Cp. vii. 532 c.) That αὐτῶς here designates not the ideas but merely sensible objects as distinguished from their shadows, is proved by comparing supr. 510 E αὕτα μὲν ταύτα,

2. I suppose the difficulty in the case of the artificial figures lies in this, that it is not real beings whose shadows are seen in the cave, but marionettes, and that therefore the process of rising to true knowledge involves two steps: first to turn from the shadows to the marionettes, and then to discover that they are merely artificial figures, and to turn from them to the realities they copy. What Plato would suggest by this is I think, that individual things are not seen as what they are, till we have turned away from their first appearance and tried to define them. Then we find, as Plato shows in the 5th book, that they cannot be defined. They are great or small, good or bad according to the reference in which they are viewed. We thus discover that they are συναφτά, combinations of elements which have no real unity, but are merely imitations of real things. We are therefore obliged to go up to the intelligible world in order to find real things, first in the sciences under their subordinate principles, and finally in dialectic which sees all things in the light of the highest principle of knowledge and reality ("sees all things in God").

3. The sciences are conceived by Plato as starting with principles, which are hypothetical in the sense that they have not been carried back to the first principle. He further adds that, when this is the case, science has to help its deductions by employing sensible images: in other words he thinks that, when we do not carry back knowledge to its first principle, we are obliged, in Kantian language, to use the Anschauung to supply the defects of the Begriff, and to make demonstration possible. This is illustrated by the mathematical use of diagrams, in which we prove universal truths by means of the particular image we set before us.

I think the principles in question are not merely the principles of mathematics, though it is the type of mathematical science that is present to Plato, and on which he conceives the other sciences to be constructed.'
Books VI and VII.

It follows that the ὑπόθεσις is a scientific proposition, the subject of which is not the sign but the thing signified; while the ἐλκὼν is a sensible object, employed as the symbol of the abstraction which is the subject of such a proposition. The visible square symbolizes the ideal square, whose properties are to be mathematically determined. Διάνοια, then, in B. vi, is the intellectual process, which, starting from hypotheses (of which mathematical assumptions are the clearest example) works out results through the mediation of sensible figures, plane (διαγράμματα) or solid (πλάσματα).

This general view is not forgotten in the discussion of the particular sciences. Astronomy, for example, ought to be a process of true διάνοια, but the actual astronomers, like the actual geometers, misunderstand the case so far that they think their science has for its object the visible revolutions of the stars, and not the laws of motion which these typify.

The higher aspect of διάνοια remains as a process intermediate between sense and knowledge, but in B. vii is represented by a new image, that of the upward path, rugged and steep, from the cave into the light of day. What meanwhile becomes of the σκευαστά and of the light of the fire? This part of the figure, involving as it does a dualism from which Plato was working himself free, is almost lost sight of in what follows, being only cursorily alluded to as a part of the circumstances of the cave. It is a provisional ‘hypothesis,’ which Plato discards (ἀναρέει) in pressing onwards and upwards. But in its place this feature also of the allegory must have its own significance, and Socrates himself gives a partial interpretation of it by saying that the light of the fire represents the power of the Sun. There is some confusion, however, even here; for the objects seen by the denizens of the cave are not lights but shadows. What, then, are the things of which our unenlightened consciousness perceives only the shadows? What are the ἀγάλματα σκευαστά, the ‘manufactured articles,’
which hands unseen exhibit between the prisoners and the artificial (i.e. created) Sun? What else but the realities of γένεσις. Nature as the embodiment of the ideas, the facts of human experience, as they really happen, and not as they seem?

1. Plato is engaged in bringing out a twofold distinction, (1) between Nature and the Ideas, (2) between Appearance and Reality in Nature. This, and not merely the requirement of a fourth term for his analogy, was his motive for separating πίστις from εἰκασία.

2. The ἀγάλματα are not themselves immediately perceived by sense at all. It is only when the individual mind has been freed by Socratic questioning, and turned about, and asked What is it? (τί ἐστιν;)—or, in more Platonic language, by a process of διαφέρεις and συναγωγή.—only, in more modern terminology, when some effort is made to distinguish, abstract, and generalize,—that the soul begins to have an inkling of the nature of that world, which was dimly represented to her in crude experience,—of a real finger, of a real square, of the Sun himself as an embodied god, &c. And she learns that these things, however perfect in their kinds (vii. 529 ε), have been created after some higher pattern,—in other words, that their being is determined by universal and eternal Laws, and ultimately by the Law of the Best,—τὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λόγο. While not absolute νοστό, they are νοστὰ μετὰ ἀρχῆς (vi. sub fin.). It is not improbable that in this part of the allegory there is still some reference to the διάνοια of B. vi as a process intermediate between sense and reason. But the 'manufactured articles' here exhibited by unseen powers correspond, not to the εἰκόνες of the geometers, for example, but to the realities typified by them. Those πλάσματα and διαγράμματα were only shadows and copies of these, which answer more nearly to the subjects of their ὑποθέσεις.

3. In the Timaeus, the true phenomena of nature are attributed to the created gods, who are said to make and set in order the living creatures in whom soul and body are temporarily combined (Tim. 43). Similarly, the παραφέροντες, who are clearly δαίμονες, exhibit the σκευαστά here.
4. The ἀγάλματα or εἴδωλα of the allegory constitute a lower stage of the ideal which in Plato’s language is alone the real, not the immediately visible, but the truth of phenomena, the ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἐκάστων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, the infima species, the first intention of the ἐν λογισμῷ Ἐνναυροῦμενον.

Now these realities of γένεσις, τὰ φύσει Ἐννεστῃκότα, of which the shadows or impressions are presented to the uneducated mind, are not really known until we get above and behind them. Then they are seen to be themselves the images or copies (εἴδωλα) of higher things, and the mind reaches beyond them and lays hold on the primal cause of being and of knowing, the ἑδέα τοῦ ἀγάθου.

May not this notion of a ‘lower stage’ help to remove the difficulty which is felt in seeking to reconcile the αὐτοκλίνη of B. x with the higher teaching of B. vi? For the purpose of degrading the poets it is not necessary to mount to the ἀνπόθετον or to the Form of Good. It is enough to have risen from shadows to objects, and from objects to their first abstraction—to the truth of γένεσις. The painted bed is the shadow of the actual bed, which is made after the pattern of the ideal bed. This we are ‘disposed’ (as Platonists) to say that God has made and set in nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει). But God made that, as he made the world, under the guidance of yet loftier ideals, the ideal of utility, of rest, of stability, of security, of permanence, of symmetry. However this may be, Plato’s views of ontology, as seriously held by him at the time of writing the Republic, are to be gathered rather from Bb. vi, vii, than from B. x, where the reference to the doctrine of ideas is merely illustrative.

And it is worth observing that while mathematical truths are put in the forefront amongst the objects of ‘hypo-
thetical science,’ because they are the most definite and distinct, moral notions are by implication co-ordinated with these. The fact is rendered manifest by the words in 517 E, where the disputants in the den are said to argue περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκίῶν ἡ ἀγαλμάτων ὃν αἱ σκια, i.e. ‘impressions about right, or rules of right,’ the latter (τὸ τόμμον) holding an intermediate place between abstract Justice (αὐτὸ
On the Structure of Plato's Republic.

τὸ δίκαιον and the actual constitutions of states in the world (τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις νόμιμα). This intermediate position of τὸ νόμιμον as ἀγαλμα τοῦ δικαίου may be compared to the function ascribed to Law in the Politicus. Compare also vi. 501 πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

§ II. Bb. viii-x, as already indicated, have less in common with vi-vii than with the earlier portion. It does not follow that they are unconnected with what immediately precedes them: still less that they could be read continuously after B. iv without leaving a deplorable gap. The 'number of the state' in viii. 546 is from a 'laboratory' of which Bb. i-iv afford no trace. And in contrasting the pleasures of the tyrant with the happiness of the philosopher-king, the account of the higher education is manifestly presupposed. The hope of conforming the individual life to the 'pattern in the sky' precisely answers to that which is left to the actual philosopher of B. vi, who lets the storm rage past him, and strives to imitate the regular courses of the stars. But the later books have also a special tone and quality of their own. If Bb. vi, vii carry us to a height of intellectual contemplation that is unsurpassed, Bb. viii, ix are even more impressive in the depth of ethical feeling which they convey. The growing intensity of earnestness, as state after state, man after man, discloses a lower circle or stage of evil, is incomparably grand, and it is expressed with extraordinary wealth and happiness of imagination. The effect is not less different from the serene and smiling optimism of Bb. iii, iv, than from the speculative abstraction of Bb. vi, vii. And when the return

1 See Eur. Fr. Inc. 902 N. 1:

ἀλβης διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας
ἐσχε μάθησιν,
μήτε πολιτῶν ἐπὶ πημοσύνην
μήτε εἰς ἀδίκους πράξεις ὄρμων,
ἀλλ' ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως
κόσμων ἀγήροις, πῇ τῇ συνέσει
cαὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὕπως.
τοὺς δὲ ταυτάτους οὐδέποτ' αἰσχρῶν
έργαν μελέτημα προσέχει.
is made, towards the end of B. ix, from the life of the tyrant to that of the king, the philosopher is invested with new majesty. The continuity of this portion (the fourth act of the drama) is assisted by the recurrence of a few great topics, each of which is gradually amplified: (1) Wealth and poverty; (2) the three principles of intellect, anger, desire, corresponding to the ruling, defending, and industrial classes in the State; (3) the necessary and unnecessary desires; (4) the image of the drones, stinging and stingless (i.e. rogues and paupers), leading up to the description of the tyrant’s master passion as a great winged drone; (5) the insurrection in the soul (an image which intensely vivifies the analogy between the individual and the State); (6) the relation of the tyrant to the Demos represented as that of son to father; (7) the image of the man and beasts within the man—the lion and the serpent and the many-headed brute. The management of these notions and successive images so as to characterize the evolution of ever fresh aspects of social and personal life, is most curious and instructive, even as a literary study 1.

At the beginning of B. x, Socrates reviews his creation § 12. and finds it good. The point immediately resumed is the exclusion of the poets—which occasioned Plato more compunction than the community of wives; but, in returning to the discussion, he, as usual, takes up new ground, and glances at the conversation which has intervened. Although the allegory of the cave is not distinctly referred to, yet in defining μῦθος it is now permissible to assume the existence of an ideal world, and to speak of the artist as the maker of shadows of images, thrice removed from reality and truth. And, as Socrates says explicitly, the psychological distinctions of Bb. iv, ix, enable us now to affirm that these unrealities appeal to the lower part of the soul, i.e. to emotion and not

1 When tested by statistical evidence, i.e. by the presence or frequency of particular modes of expression, the eighth and ninth Books are found to have as many features in common with Plato’s later writings as any other part of the Republic. See Constantin Ritter’s Untersuchungen. &c., pp. 33 47.
to reason, so rendering more difficult that control of the feelings and that abnegation of pleasure, which has been shown to be of the essence of virtue.

Thus Plato leads us back to the main question:—the intrinsic value of justice, independently of reputation and reward. Socrates claims to have established this; and now begs leave to restore what for the sake of argument had been taken away, the outward happiness attending a good life. And to crown all, he makes known the immortality of the Soul, and the future blessedness of the just: to which is added, as the natural counterpart, the punishment of the wicked — the tyrannical tyrant in chief.

§ 13. Accepting the Republic from the hand of Plato as an artistic whole, we refuse to examine curiously into the exact time when the several parts were written. That the central portion may have been written last is a possibility which we neither affirm nor deny. Such speculations lie beyond the scope of criticism. That on the Republic, with all its comprehensiveness and variety, the author has impressed an unmistakable unity of design, is a proposition which no mature and sober student is likely to dispute.

II

The Republic considered in relation to other dialogues of Plato.

§ 14. From the fulness and range of its contents, and especially from the combination of moral and political with purely intellectual elements in its composition, the Republic has more affinities with other writings of Plato than are to be found elsewhere in any single dialogue.

Gorgias. To the Gorgias it stands in a close and peculiar relation. For the longer writing is in fact an elaborate endeavour to substantiate that supremacy of right, which Socrates so

This has been thought inconsistent with 386 ff. What Plato there deprecates is the fear of death. Here he is enforcing the fear of sin. Cp. Laws v. 727 καὶ τὰ γὰρ ἐν "Λίθου πράγματα πίνακα κακά ἱγαμένης τῆς φυχῆς εἶναι ὑπείκει καὶ οὐκ ἀντιτίθενται, κ.τ.λ. The words in 387 εἴπως ἐν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλο τι possibly refer to the other aspect of the truth.
eloquently vindicates in refuting Gorgias and Polus. The Gorgias asserts the claims of justice. The Republic reiterates the claim and adds a definition. The counsel of perfection, 'Do right in scorn of consequences,' leaves the disciple of Socrates unsatisfied, until he finds an answer to the question 'What is right?' And this can only be obtained through the study of Man in Society. In the Republic, accordingly, the social environment of the higher life is elaborately set forth; and this constitutes a real and at first sight a very wide distinction between the two dialogues. But the difference appears less when it is considered that Plato's Commonwealth is an ideal projected into the future, and that the philosopher in the Republic, like Socrates in the Gorgias, takes no part in actual politics, but 'stands under the shelter of a wall' and lets the storm of unrighteousness rage past him.

In Bb. i–iv of the Republic, the most characteristic positions of the Gorgias are restated and developed further. Thrasymachus may be described as a magnified and more original Polus, and like Polus he is tongue-tied at last, through fear of opinion. Then, in place of the thorough-going cynicism of Callicles, who speaks openly what other men implicitly believe, the brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus give their clear philosophic exposition of the worldly principles from which their generous natures instinctively recoil. The theory, although put differently, is in both dialogues essentially the same,—that Might is Right, and that Justice (as Shakespeare's royal villain says of Conscience)

'is but a word that cowards use, Devised at first to keep the strong in awe.'

The sophistical paradox, is associated in both dialogues with admiration of the tyrant as the one strong man, who by trampling upon so-called rights secures his interest and asserts his power. Adeimantus, however, introduces a new element into the discussion, when he says that the praise of Justice, as commonly enforced, is no less immoral than the

1 I. 352 B ἐνα μὴ τῶς ἀπέχωμαι.
praise of Injustice,—that prudential morality encourages immorality.

The parallel between the Gorgias and the Republic,—not to touch on many minute coincidences, which are mentioned in the notes to this edition,—extends also to the vision of judgement with which both dialogues alike conclude, and which in the Gorgias, although briefer, is even more vivid and terror-striking than the tale of Er. The description of the tyrant's soul, naked before her judge, contains some hints of the conception of the last state of the tyrannical man, which is elaborated towards the end of the ninth book of the Republic.

The Gorgias also agrees with the Republic in assuming an intellectual or scientific basis for morality (Gorg. 508 A σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἰκεί δείν ἄσκειν γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἄμελεῖς), and in the rejection of Hedonism.

Which dialogue came first in order of composition? The question is perhaps an idle one, and in the absence of adequate external evidence the answer must necessarily be uncertain. But some grounds may be adduced for the opinion that the Republic was planned after the Gorgias was written. The shorter dialogue has, comparatively speaking, some of the crudeness and also of the freshness of a sketch contrasted with an elaborate picture. The impressive figure of 'Socrates against the world' is softened, in the more finished work, with a halo of ideal optimism. 'The world is not unreasonable, could it but hear reason,' is a note that would have sounded strange in the presence of Callicles. The companion portraits of the Just and Unjust Man are completed, in the Republic, by filling in their imaginary surroundings.

Taking either dialogue as a whole, it may be fairly argued that the assertion, 'A right will is all in all,' which is the upshot of the Gorgias, is naturally previous to the inquiry, 'What is essential rectitude? and how is righteous action possible?'

§ 15. It has been assumed by Schleiermacher and Zeller that the passages of B. vi, where the claims of Thought and
Pleasure are contrasted (505-509, see also ix. 581-587), presuppose the composition of the Philebus. The coincidence is obvious, but not less so is the comparative simplicity of the point of view advanced in the Republic. It is possible that the principles here briefly stated may have been previously elaborated. But it is by no means necessary to assume that it was so. And it is at least equally conceivable that Plato had arrived at this general conception of the relative worth of Pleasure, Thought, and the Good, before giving to it the full and complex expression which the Philebus contains. If the assertion of Justice is held to precede the definition of Justice, it may be similarly maintained that the solemn adumbration of the Idea of Good precedes the laboured attempt to seize this Supreme Form (and, as it were, 'confine the Interminable'1) through metaphysical determinations. But the position of the Philebus in the series of the Platonic writings is part of the larger question of the place to be assigned to the other dialectical dialogues, to which it is manifestly akin. Some observations pertinent to this subject will be made in the sequel.

The Republic provides an approximate solution of the difficulty paradoxically raised in the Protagoras, and imperfectly met in the Meno by the theory of 'inspiration,' viz. the question 'How is virtue possible without perfect knowledge?' In the Republic, Science is more strenuously than ever asserted to be the basis of well-ordered life, but in all except the Rulers it is unconsciously so. By selecting the right natures for the reception of Culture, by the reformation (1) of mental, and (2) of physical education, the predominance of Virtue is secured even in those not yet capable of Reason, so that they may ultimately embrace her the more readily, because they have nothing irrational to unlearn. Thus the conception of the State affords the means of reconciling an opposition, which, as we learn from the Protagoras, tended to hinder, by making it seem impossible, the application of Philosophy to the bettering of human life. Protagoras professed to benefit his pupils by promoting their attainment of

1 Milton.
that civic and social excellence which was shared in some
degree by all the citizens of a civilized community, and
which the primary education of Greek freemen was already
calculated to foster, in evolving those seeds of Justice and of
mutual respect which had been scattered broadcast at the
remote origin of human society. Socrates denies that such
a process deserves the name of teaching, or that the virtue
thus communicated is really virtue. He makes the seem-
ingly impossible requirement that a science of exact measu-
rement should be applied to human life and action. Now
the philosopher of the Republic is in possession of such
a science, and he is entrusted with the control of primary
education. Thus the unconscious, relative, approximate
virtue of the subordinate class, who again compel the obe-
dience of those beneath them, is essentially grounded in
philosophy. And the whole State is wise, although the wise
amongst its citizens are still the few. The work professed
by the Sophist is now undertaken by the Philosopher, with
far better assurance of a solid foundation.

§ 17. It is more difficult to find the angle (if the figure may
be allowed) at which the Republic stands towards those
dialogues which symbolize philosophic enthusiasm under
the form of Love. There are mystic passages in the Re-
public also, but in the work as a whole, what may be termed
the ecstatic phase of Platonism is greatly toned down and
subdued. Whether Plato is here addressing a wider audi-
ence, or has now entered on a further stage in the evolution
of his thought, is a question by no means easy to determine.
The points where some approximation to the spirit of the
Phaedrus and Symposium occurs are chiefly two.

Even the earlier culture is not completed without a
description of the modest loves of beautiful souls.

And in describing the philosophic nature, the love of
truth is characterized in words which might have been used
by Diotima:—οτι προς το ὅν πεφυκὼς εἰη ἅμιλλασθαι ὃ γε ὄντως
φιλομαθής, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένων ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁμοίωσιν ἔσται πολλοὶς
ἐκάστοις, ἀλλ' ἵναι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνατο οἷον ἀπολήγητο τοῖς ἑρωτοῖς,
πρὶν αὐτῶν ὃ ἐστιν ἐκάστοις τῆς φύσεως ἀψασθαι ὃ προσήκει.
Essentially cognate to the same aspect of Platonism are the account of education as a development from within, the rising scale of Being, through sense, opinion, thought, and reason, to the idea of Good, recalling the stages leading to the ocean of Beauty in the Symposium; the upper air and sunshine of the ἀνυπόθετον in Bb. vi, vii, compared with the outer rim of Heaven in the Phaedrus-myth; the enthusiastic account of Dialectic, and the wanderings of the soul in B. x. The prayer to Pan and the Nymphs with which the Phaedrus ends, has, of course, many echoes in the Republic. Constantin Ritter, who has examined all the Dialogues by the ‘statistical’ method introduced by Dittenberger (in Hermes xvi, 1881), regards the Phaedrus and Theaetetus as belonging to the same period with the Republic. He is disposed to think that both were written while the Republic was in course of composition, and that the Theaetetus is the earlier of the two. This last opinion may be disputed on the following grounds:—

1. Not to dwell upon the signs of immaturity which some critics (Usener amongst others) have discovered in the Phaedrus, it appears inconceivable that Plato should have expressed the paradoxical preference of oral to written speech, at a time when he was himself actively engaged in preparing a written work so large and important as the Republic.

2. Those who attach any weight to L. Spengel’s arguments—and some weight they certainly deserve—are bound to give the Phaedrus the earliest date which a comprehensive view of all the facts will admit. Whether the dialogue is earlier or later than Isocrates’ περὶ τῶν σοφίστῶν, there are strong grounds for supposing it to have been written not long after the opening of the Academy.

3. The Theaetetus presents a matured harmony of thought and expression. The gravity of Theodorus, which tempers
the irrepressible playfulness of Socrates, is evidently in keeping with Plato's own deeper mood.

4. The soaring idealism of the Phaedrus, which reappears in the Republic, is likewise modified in the Theaetetus by an approach towards a rational psychology. This point will be further developed by and by.

§ 18. The doctrine of immortality (incidentally recognized in the Meno) is expressly maintained in the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic. And while the line of proof is different in all three, the demonstration chosen in the Republic is closely allied to one of those in the Phaedo— that by which it is shown in answer to Simmias that the soul is not a harmony. The words of Socrates, ὅτι μὲν ἄθανατον ψυχή, κἂν ἄλλοι φαινέτω ἀποδείξεις. ὡς ἐμοι δοκεῖ, may or may not contain an allusion to the Phaedo, or to the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Symposium in one. But it is at least tolerably clear that the Republic and Phaedo both belong to a stage of Platonism in which the doctrine of ideas had been distinctly formulated, while the logical and metaphysical bearings of the theory had not yet been thought out so clearly as in the period of which the Parmenides marks the opening stage. Coincidences between the Phaedo and Republic are the more significant, as the meditation of death is a different subject-matter from the supreme realization of life in the world.

§ 19. There is a very close approximation both of style and substance between the most serious part of the Theaetetus (173–177) and Rep. vi, vii, although in the dialogue concerning knowledge, as in the Gorgias and Phædo, the philosopher is described as withdrawn from action and as knowing nothing of his neighbour. In this he corresponds not to the King-philosopher of the Republic, but to the actual philosopher who is 'useless to his State,' who in his contemplation of realities has no time to look down on human affairs (vi. 500), and who seeing mankind replete with lawlessness is content to live apart, if only he can keep his own life pure. The contrast between the philosopher and the lawyer resembles also the description of the awkward plight of him who descends again out of the daylight into the glimmering den (vii. 517).
more, the nature of retribution is similarly conceived by Socrates in Theaet. 177 and by Adeimantus, while the ideal pattern of the blessed life is similarly set forth in Theaet. 177, and in Rep. ix, sub fin. Such near agreement at once of matter and of tone as becomes perceptible on a repeated reading of these passages, albeit by no means a certain test, is more decisive than such chronological indications as the allusion to the battle of Megara (b.c. 394?), and the fact that Cleomenes, who was at that time king of Sparta, counted precisely twenty-five generations from Heracles (cp. Theaet. 175 A). These points, however clearly demonstrated, belong to the time assigned to the imaginary conversation. They cannot determine the date of its composition (except as giving a terminus a quo). On the other hand the dialectics of the Theaetetus evince a maturity of psychological reflexion, and a moderation and firmness of metaphysical handling, which had scarcely been attained by Plato when he wrote the Republic. This may of course be a deceptive appearance, attributable to the fact that in the larger dialogue the mind is taken off from abstract speculation, and plunged in politics and popular moralities. But there are considerations which point the other way, and which incline the balance in favour of placing the Theaetetus after rather than before the Republic.

1. The manner of approaching the subject through the criticism of earlier philosophies would seem to mark a distinct stage in the development of Plato's mind (cp. Soph. 246 ff.).

2. The allusion to the Parmenides seems to mark the Theaetetus as one of the same group with the Parmenides and Sophist. And in the statement of metaphysical \( \pi\sigma\omicron\iota\alpha \) the Theaetetus and Parmenides are companion dialogues.

3. The clear conception of Being, not-being, Unity, number, sameness, difference, similarity, diversity, as logical categories or ideas of relation, which comes out at Theaet. 184, 185, could hardly have been possible, while Plato held the doctrine of ideas in the crude and undeveloped form which is still implied in the Republic, and which the Parmenides for the first time showed to be unsatisfying.

4. The greater subtlety and accuracy of the psychological
distinction between ἐπιστήμης, ὁσία, αἰσθησίας, as compared with Rep. vi, sub fin., and still more with the end of B. v, is also apparent, though here, too, the difference of subject may have involved disparity of treatment.

§ 20. As was previously said (p. 22) with reference to the Philebus, the presumption thus raised can neither be substantiated nor set aside without taking into account the other dialectical dialogues, Parmenides, Sophistes, and Politicus. And for reasons which will presently become apparent, the consideration of these dialogues in their relation to the Republic must be postponed to some brief remarks on the great work which in subject-matter as well as in extent comes nearest to the Republic, viz. the Laws. As this dialogue, by those who acknowledge its genuineness, is admitted to be the last of Plato's writings, the contrast which it presents to the Republic is the more instructive, since difference may here be interpreted to imply some change. But the comparison must be made with caution. For two main points have to be borne in mind: (1) that Plato in the Laws is confessedly aiming only at the second best, and (2) that the work is doubly incomplete:—the composition of many portions is unfinished, and the question of Higher Education is expressly reserved, so that, to employ Plato's own metaphor (Laws vi. 752 A), the dialogue is without a head. The attempt to supply this latter defect in the Epinomis (according to a credible tradition, by Philip of Opus, the editor of the Laws) only shows how incapable Plato's immediate successors were of continuing what was most significant in his philosophy. The Platonism that survived the Master in the Old Academy was indeed

Ψυχή καὶ ἐθικόν, ἀτάρ φρείνες οἴκ ἐν πάμπαν.

It may be argued, however, that both these peculiarities are indicative of changes in the philosopher's own mental attitude.

The very notion of a second-best in politics, of an aim worth striving for which yet falls short of the highest, is alien to the spirit of the Republic. Before entertaining such a notion Plato must have come to think that the realization of the Divine ideal was even more distant than in the fifth and
Laws: Politicus or Statesman.

ninth books of the Republic he had declared it to be: that it was in fact impossible 'for such a creature as man in such a state as the present.'

Even in the Republic he had acknowledged that the State of primitive innocence could not last, and his ideal constitution presupposes the inevitableness of war. But in the Laws that constitution also, so far as it involved the principle of communism, is relegated to the reign of Cronos, and is declared to have been suited not for human government, but only for a theocracy. The Athenian Stranger finds it necessary to strike into the middle path between two extreme views: (1) that legislation is futile, seeing that 'time and chance happen unto all,' and (2) that God governs all things without the aid of man. The third or intermediate view is that human skill, taking advantage of opportunity, may imitate from afar off the principles of Divine action. And the opportunity now prayed for is one less unlikely than the union of philosophy and sovereignty in the same person. It is the conjunction of a 'temperate' sovereign with the wise legislator (Laws iv). Now such a change from 'optimism' to 'meliorism' cannot have taken place without a mental struggle. It must have cost Plato something, one would imagine, to discover that in his greatest work he had only been uttering a vain, though pious, aspiration,—ἀλλαὶ εἰς ὃμοια λέγων. And of such a struggle, with the bitterness naturally accompanying it, there is very distinct evidence in the Politicus; where there is also a foreshadowing of the very solution arrived at in the Laws.

Through a skilful process of generalization and division, § 21. Socrates Junior has been led by the Eleatic Stranger to define Statesmanship as 'the art of man-herding,'—according to the figure repeatedly used by Socrates in the Republic. But on reflexion the image is found unsuitable to the actual state of the world, in which the work of tending mankind is shared by many functionaries besides the statesman or ruler. Not the human governor, but the divine superintendent of the Golden Age, may be thought to have included all these functions in his own person. Our science of politics must
condescend to the actual present world and distinguish more definitely between the art of government and the other modes of managing mankind.

This position is illustrated by the wonderful myth, in which a more serious effort is made, than was attempted in the Republic, to face the problem of the existence of evil. 'God alternately guides the world and lets it go.' There can be no doubt under which dispensation we are living. Amidst this anarchy, of which Zeus is the reputed lord, the only hope of improvement lies in cherishing some faint remembrance of the Divine Order which was once a reality. Occasionally this remembrance comes with exceptional clearness to the mind of the philosopher, who is the only law-giver. Happy is that portion of the human race, that, when he appears, is willing to listen to him, and to obey his precepts. But his time upon the earth is brief, and when he departs, like a physician going into a far country, he leaves a prescription behind him. In his absence, the only feasible rule is the observance of Law, which is better than caprice, though far inferior to the immediate rule of Mind.

§ 22. It is sufficiently manifest how all this leads up to the point from which the Athenian Stranger makes his departure in counselling Cleinias and Megillus; although in the Politicus there is little as yet of the spirit of compromise, which appears in the Laws,—for example, in the partial adoption of election by lot, notwithstanding the often expressed scorn of Socrates.

Also in many isolated points the Statesman anticipates the Laws. (1) The distinction between oligarchy and democracy is regarded in both as non-essential. Either may be better or worse according as it is administered. And constitutional democracy is far better than unconstitutional oligarchy. (2) The weaving together of diverse elements in a State is a notion to which prominence is given in both dialogues; especially (3) in the provisions concerning marriage. And (4) as the name of Statesman is denied to the actual politicians in the Politicus, so the actual constitutions are contemptuously referred to in the Laws as the 'non-constitutions' (διὰ τὰς οὐ πολιτείας
They are not polites but parties. (5) The conception of an infinite past, by which Plato accounts for the growth of civilization, appears most distinctly in the Timaeus, Critias, Politicus and Laws (B. iii).

Although the philosopher's practical scope has thus shifted, § 23, and numberless minute provisions are expressly made of a kind which the τρόφυμαν of the Republic were meant to discover for themselves, the reader of the Laws is often reminded of the leading thoughts of the Republic. Each individual, as far as possible, is to be not many but one. The definition of Justice, obtained with so much difficulty, is silently discarded, but Plato still glances with disfavour on the heretical view that Justice is conventional, and he still dwells on the phenomenon that self-preservation is the basis of de facto governments upheld by statute. At the same time he points out that no government is overthrown but by itself. The law of Charondas, by which the money-lender was left to take the risk of loss, is spoken of with emphatic approval both in the Laws and the Republic. The avoidance of the extremes of wealth and poverty is equally a principle of both. General rules (τυποι, ἐκμαγεῖα) are laid down, as in the Republic, so also in the Laws, for the censor of the poets. Early education is again regarded as an anticipation of Reason. The importance of rhythm in education is more than ever insisted on. The music is still to be subordinated to the words¹. And although the paradoxical view that gymnastic also has a mental purpose does not expressly reappear (it had already been ignored in Rep. vii. 521 E), the merely utilitarian conception of physical training is not the less scornfully rejected. The neglect of education by Cyrus and Darius is held accountable for the vices of Cambyses and of Xerxes (cp. Prot., Gorg.). The supremacy of mind is vehemently asserted. The passions are in the individual what the populace are in a State. Yet here also the later phase of Plato's philosophy makes itself felt, and the conjunction of sense with intellect is introduced, not merely as the cause of error (Rep. viii), but 546 b.

¹. Laws II. 669.
6: e.g. as the condition of practical wisdom (compare the Philebus).
On the other hand the unity of Virtue (Justice and Temperance especially running up into a single principle), which is only hinted as a possibility in the Republic, is prescribed as a main dogma of the Higher Education, which is to be presided over by the Nocturnal Council.

§ 24. This Higher Education is spoken of in two passages of the Laws as a subject reserved for future consideration.

α'. B. vii. 818 (in speaking of the higher arithmetic, geometry and astronomy) ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα ὁχ ὅς ἀκριβεῖας ἐχόμενα δὲὶ διασπορέων τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀλλὰ τινος ὁλίγους· οὐς δὲ, προβάτεσ τῷ τῷ τέλει φράσωμεν... χαλεπῶν δὲ αὐτὰ προ-
tαξάμενοι τοῦτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ νομοθετεῖν ἀλλὰ εἷς ἄλλον, εἰ δοκεῖ, χρῶνον ἀκριβεστέρον ἄν γνωστησάμεθα.

β'. B. xii. 969 ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν συγκατανοεῖσθαι τῷ φράζειν τε καὶ
ἐξήγεισθαι τά γε δεδογμένα ἐμοὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς τῆς νῦν ἀντικειμένης τοῦς λόγους· τὸ μέντοι κινδύνευμα οὐ σμικρῶν οὐδ' ἐτέρου τις προσφερές ἄν εἰη.

The former passage (α') may be compared with Rep. iv. 435 c, where Socrates remarks that for the true account of the virtues it would be necessary to take the 'longer way' (which is afterwards identified with dialectic); the latter (β') is very similar to Rep. vi. 536, 537, where Socrates introduces the 'Idea of Good.' But, whereas in the Republic, Socrates at least partially satisfies expectation, the statement promised by the Athenian Stranger is deferred until a more convenient season.

The student of the Laws is consequently left in a position resembling that in which readers of the Republic would have been, had Books v, vi, vii of that dialogue remained unwritten. He is aware, indeed, that the Nocturnal Council were to comprehend the single underlying principle which gives unity to the Virtues, that they would acknowledge Wisdom to be the guide (cp. Rep. iv. 428) and Temperance the inseparable condition of them all; that their minds would have been cleared and strengthened by a sound training in the necessary truths of mathematics and astronomy; that the absolute priority of Mind to Body would be a principle deeply
infixed in their souls. But beyond this we are unable to judge how far the education and nurture which the Stranger advocates, resembled or differed from that developed in Rep. vii, or indeed whether he proposes that the members of the Nocturnal Council of this secondary State should be 'philosophers,' in what Plato at the time of writing conceived to be the highest sense of the word. Like the definition of the Philosopher projected by the Eleatic Stranger, the Athenian Stranger's account of the Highest Education seems never to have been written down by Plato.1

We can only dimly trace some fragments of his leading thoughts, in the directions for elementary study given in B. vii, the religious principles inculcated in B. x, and some detached sentences towards the end of B. xii.


The author of the Epinomis has gathered up these scattered threads, but the pattern into which he has woven them is not Plato's, still less are there to be found there the traces of the untrammelled thought and free intelligence, of a mind not enslaved to its own formulae, which are absent from no genuine Platonic writing.

A theory of knowledge and of the object of knowledge is, therefore, not to be looked for in the Laws. Yet the study of dialectic has left its trace, in the pedantic elaboration of method, which marks the earlier and more finished part of the dialogue, and is analogous to the tedious classifications which the Eleatic Stranger in the Politicus remarks on and defends.

1 'Of a supreme or master science which was to be the coping stone of the rest, few traces appear in the Laws. He seems to have lost faith in it, or perhaps to have realized that the time for such a science had not yet come, and that he was unable to fill up the outline which he had sketched.' Jowett's Plato. vol. v. Laws. Introduction, p. 130.
The position of the Politicus, as intermediate between the Republic and the Laws, is sufficiently evident after what has been said. Now the Politicus cannot be far removed from the Sophistes, and the Philebus in style and structure bears evidence of belonging to the same period. The Timaeus is avowedly later than the Republic.

We are therefore not left without data for the difficult inquiry:—Did Plato's theory of knowledge undergo any change after the composition of the Republic? In what direction were his thoughts moving with respect to this, which he himself regarded as the highest subject of study?

The inquiry is difficult. For each work of Plato's is a separate whole, in which the parts have reference, not to any previous statement, but to the particular aspect of the Truth to which for the time being the philosopher addressed himself, and in which his mind was wholly absorbed. Even such distinct references as those in the Timaeus and Laws to the Republic, or those in the Theaetetus and Sophistes to the Parmenides, do not involve any attempt to adjust the later dialogue to the earlier one. Yet, on a general survey of the group of dialogues above-named, from which the Parmenides and Theaetetus (perhaps even the Euthydemus) cannot altogether be separated, there is observable a greater amount of consistency, as well as of positive content, than, for example, appears in grouping together Protag., Apol., Symp., Phaedr., Phaedo, Gorg. And this general observation may be of use, if, instead of attempting a detailed harmony, or 'peering between the lines' of detached passages for the evidences of a system which is nowhere formulated, we content ourselves with marking the broad outlines, and so endeavouring to follow the main movement of Plato's thought.

The concluding passage of Rep. vi: contains a statement of the unity of knowledge, which may be summed up as

1 The reference to the Sophist in Polit. 284 b ὡς ἐν τῷ Σοφιστή (‘as in dealing with the Sophist’), is not in question here, as the Sophist and Statesman are to all intents and purposes one dialogue.

2 See above, p. 13.
follows:—'The investigation of Truth under the conditions of human life on earth must start from assumptions based on sensible perception. But that is only the starting point. The philosophic spirit cannot rest, until the mind's conceptions have been purified by the activity of thought from every sensible mean, and so rising from height to height of abstraction, the thinker may lay hold on the Absolute (τὸ ἀνυπόθετον), whence again descending, he may pass from Form to Form, and end with pure ideas.' Nowhere else had Plato hitherto so clearly asserted the connexion and gradation of the Forms of Being.

But if we ask, what is the nature of the connexion, or of the transition from the higher to the lower forms, the Republic yields no consistent answer.

1. In the fifth book the εἴδως is said to be related to its particulars, as the whole to the parts. Are the higher εἴδη of Book vi thus related to the lower? Do they form a series of which the extreme terms are Sumnum Genus and Infima Species?

2. The reader of B. x is at once presented with a different conception. The ideal Bed is not a whole of which the actual bed is part, but the Pattern after which it is made. Are the higher ideas related to the lower, as the Perfect to the Imperfect? The beginning of B. vii and the end of B. ix may lend some colour to this view; which, however, is inconsistent with the preceding.

3. Once more, in studying the educational discussions of B. vii, in which the general conception of Science is practically applied, we are led upwards from the mind's first perceptions of difference and identity, through the abstract study of number, form and motion, first to the common principles determining all such studies, then to universal principles worked out by Dialectic, and last of all to the primal, ultimate, creative, regulative, alone substantial Form of Good. Are the Ideas, then, Forms of Thought, and are the higher related to the lower as the ideas of the Reason to the categories of the Understanding, and those of the Understanding to those of pure intuition,—to use a Kantian figure?
§ 26. The truth is that Plato had not yet cleared his mind from some confusion on this subject. It may be doubted whether he ever did so completely. Three points of view, which to modern thinkers are obviously distinct, the logical, the cosmological, the psychological, repeatedly cross and recross each other in his writings.

The moment came, however, when he keenly felt the need of solving this and other metaphysical difficulties. It is generally acknowledged that the Parmenides reflects precisely such an intellectual crisis. He could no longer satisfy himself with making a vague metaphysic the imaginary basis of an empirical morality.

Plato’s thought in the Parmenides is directed towards (1) the theory of general forms and (2) the opposition of the one and many, not with barren contemplation, nor yet with scepticism, but with serious inquiry. At the same time Plato’s Dialectic for the first time consciously stands face to face with Eleaticism. Most of the objections afterwards brought by Aristotle against the εἰών are here raised in the form of ἀπορίας, which are discussed, but not finally answered. And a tentative effort is made towards a New ‘Kritik’ of pure truth, through a disjunctive method, which the aged Parmenides recommends as a necessary propaedeutic, but which nowhere recurs. The dialogue ends, after the Socratic manner of the Protagoras or the first book of the Republic, with contradiction and the confession of ignorance, but the reader has been carried into higher regions of speculation than in the purely ‘Socratic’ dialogues.

In the Theaetetus likewise the Socratic mask of irony is effectively resumed. There is much in it of the playfulness of the Phaedrus or Symposium, but without the wildness. That is sobered down through the presence of the grave Theodorus. We have again, as in the Parmenides, a chain of ἀπορίας, most subtly reasoned out, but not finally got rid of. Once more comes back the old familiar Socratic ending—‘What knowledge is, I do not know.’ But just as the Parmenides breathes the profound conviction, ‘No philosophy without ideas, whatever the ideas may prove to be,—nor
without the One, however our conception of Unity may have to be modified, so the Socrates of the Theaetetus will never discourse without assuming the reality of Knowledge, nor will Theaetetus hesitate to affirm that unity and diversity, sameness and difference, number and quantity, are not perceived through any bodily organ; but the perception of them, however manifestly evoked through sensible impressions, is in each case a direct intuition of the mind. Plato in the Theaetetus is again conscious of Eleatic influence, while he reckons with Heraclitus, Protagoras, and the Cyrenaics, perhaps also with Antisthenes.

In these two dialogues, then, the philosopher is directly grappling with the chief difficulties which surround his own as well as other theories of Knowing and Being: the Parmenides breaking ground which is afterwards to be renewed, and dealing mainly with questions of Being; the Theaetetus (in this approaching modern thought) treating the central questions of philosophy chiefly from the subjective side.

Taken together, these writings represent a time of strenuous mental effort, when Plato was resolutely bent on going by the ‘longer way,’ and on fulfilling, even ‘through hours of gloom,’ the ‘tasks in hours of insight willed.’ Whatever tedium it may cost him, whatever intellectual fatigue, he is determined to see more clearly and fix more definitely those lines and veins of truth ‘according to Nature’ of which he has spoken in the Phaedrus. No result of this endeavour is formulated. That is not Plato’s way. But as his Socrates says to Theaetetus, \( \beta \varepsilon \lambda \tau \iota \omicron \omicron \nu \nu \omega \ \epsilon \sigma \eta \ \pi \lambda \gamma \nu \varsigma \ \delta \iota \omega \ \tau \iota \omicron \nu \nu \ \epsilon \xi \epsilon \tau \alpha \sigma \omicron \upsilon \omega \), so the philosophy of this whole group of dialogues (Parm., Theaet., Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim.) has distinctive features which clearly separate them not only from the Phaedo or Symposium, but even from the Phaedrus and the Republic.

1. The first point to notice is the serious criticism of earlier and contemporary philosophies. As Socrates questioned with individuals, so Plato now cross-questions doctrines and methods. He had elsewhere glanced allusively at the Heracliteans, the Pythagoreans, the Cyrenaics the Mega-
rians and others,—he had perhaps satirized Antisthenes;—but it is now through the lengthened examination of whole schools of thought that he at once develops and tests his own conceptions. This is a new thing in philosophy, and argues a great advance in dialectical method.

2. Plato has had many a fling at the art of controversy (ἀντιλογική), with its love of cross distinctions (Rep. v. 454), its confusion of facts with principles (Phaedo 90b), and all the array of sophisms which are grouped together for ridicule in the Euthydemus. But he has now discovered that in a deeper sense a cognate error lies at the root of all the intellectual confusion of the time—that an illogical logic based on abstract contradictions has been responsible not only for the vain jangling of Dionysodorus and his fellows, but for the waste of serious thought over such problems as whether false opinion is possible, whether an element can be defined, whether all discussion is not unreal, and other cognate difficulties, which were threatening the very life of philosophy. This element of contemporary speculation he traces to the Zenonian logic, in which the profound speculative thought of Parmenides had been beaten out and misapplied.

3. Hence comes his endeavour to turn the weapons of the Megarians against themselves, and to evolve, at least approximately, a theory of predication both in thought and language which, instead of hindering, may stimulate and aid the healthy growth of eager minds. His interest in dialectic is at this stage more than ever educational. And this is especially true of that aspect of it which carries on the work commenced in the Phaedrus,—the use of Classification.

The 'dichotomies' of the Sophist and Politicus are not to be taken too seriously. They afford a method of approach to the main subject, by which the mind of the youthful hearer or reader is to be at the same time kept on the alert, and awakened to the difficulties with which the scientific treatment of any general question is surrounded. They remind us of the description in the Philebus of the charm which the logical 'one and many' had for young Athenians. They may even be regarded as bearing some analogy to the arithmetical
puzzles which the Egyptians had invented for the amusement of children. But there are turns and moments of the laborious game where some principle of method is illustrated. These are marked with special emphasis, and by attending to them we learn something of the direction of Plato's own thoughts.

In the Phaedrus the ideal of generalization and division had been left disappointingly vague. The spirit of dialectic seems there to be regarded as its own evidence in determining the outlines of Truth, as an organic whole. In generalizing, the dialectician recognizes the $eio_\alpha$ of which his soul had once the vision; in dividing, he will 'follow Nature,' hitting the joints, and not hacking the limbs. It is further indicated that 'Nature' has a 'right-hand' and a 'left-hand' segment, —which may be interpreted indifferently as positive and negative, or as good and evil. But in the Sophistes, and even more in the Politicus and the Philebus, while the dialectical method is still upheld, and still subordinated to the free activity of the philosophic mind, the difficulties and hindrances attending on it are more seriously felt. The process is accompanied with much labour, and leads through 'slippery' places. The several definitions of the Sophist, all based on observation and attained through successive excursions, at first seem to have little in common. The synoptic and selective faculty must be called in, to gather from all these the characteristic difference of the creature. And it is at this point (Soph. 233) that the investigation passes from the formal to the real.

In resuming the work of 'carving' to define the statesman the young respondent is warned that he must not cut off too much at once (for fear of 'hacking the limbs'), —whereupon he asks the difficult and important question, 'How is one to know an accidental segment ($\mu\epsilon_\rho_\omega$s) from a true form ($eio_\alpha$)?' He is further made aware that the process of residues is insufficient for the purposes of science, (since, as was shown in the Sophist, negation also has a positive content), and that before I can know the nature of this, I must know something also of what is not this but akin to this. Thus dialectic becomes more concrete, no longer turning on the mere perception or intuition of elementary forms, but endeavouring to recognize
them as actualized in the complexity of the world. Hence the great value of the argument from example. Nor should the hearer of dialectic ever complain of mere length as tedious, for length and brevity are relative not to each other merely, but to the requirements of investigation and discovery. Thus, as by a side wind, is introduced the principle of τὸ μέτρον, which plays such an important part in the Philebus.

The same increasing consciousness of the intricate developments of real science as opposed to mere logic appears in the well-known passage of the Philebus, 16 foll., where it is shown that the lover of truth must not rest in the mere discovery of a one and many, but pursue his investigation until he ascertains 'how many.' This is not a mere return to Pythagoreanism, but a real advance towards a fuller conception of scientific truth.

§ 29. There is another aspect of this part of the subject, on which Plato dwells in different ways, but with similar emphasis, in the Parmenides, Sophistes and Politicus. The Sun of Science, as Bacon says, shines equally on the palace and the dunghill. Socrates, replying to Parmenides, is doubtful whether he ought or ought not to assume ideas of dirt and refuse. But he is assured by the philosopher that when the love of knowledge has taken hold of him, as one day it will take hold, he will neglect none of these things. And in like manner his namesake, the Younger Socrates, raises no objection when the Eleatic Stranger affirms that in the eye of Science the vermin-killer is as much a huntsman as the general, or when he reminds him afterwards that, in classification, no preference should be given to what is not ridiculous. And Socrates himself tells Protarchus (Phil. 58 c) that the art of which we are in search is not that which produces the grandest effect, but that which discovers some particle of truth, however seemingly unimportant.

These hints of an ideal of science are in entire keeping with the curiously modern description of the intellectual life as 'an

1 Rep. iii. 402 B ὅτι ἐν σμικρῷ ὅτ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἡμιαξομεν αὐτά, may seem an anticipation of this, but should rather be compared with supr. ii. 369 B, infr. iv. 435 a.
interrogation of all natures with the view of learning from each what it has to contribute from its particular experience towards collective wisdom’ (Politicus, 272 b, c).

If in these dialogues Plato’s logical method assumes a more definitely scientific aspect, his metaphysical theory undergoes modifications of a corresponding kind.

Not only is each ‘natural kind’ to be regarded as a whole, but (as in the scheme foreshadowed in Rep. vi) the several wholes must be known in the light of higher conceptions, and as forming one vast totality. The primary forms or notions of unity, likeness, unlikeness, numerical difference, motion, rest, must be recognized as no less real than the attributes of each several kind. ‘Quality’ itself is a new abstraction which has to be named. Now this implies, what is not explicitly formulated, the admission of ‘ideas’ not only of existence, but of relation. Plato nowhere seems distinctly conscious of the difference between a genus and a category. The terms ēidos and γένος are used by him indifferently for both. But in the dialectical dialogues he dwells more and more on those universal conceptions which are inseparable from knowledge and being. These are the ‘birds that fly everywhere about the aviary,’ sameness and difference, unity and plurality, number, quantity, motion and rest. And it is in the effort to realize ideas of relation and to understand the relativity of thought that he takes in hand the central problem of Being and Not-Being, affirmation and negation. The reasoning of the Sophistes, based as it is on a critical review of previous philosophies, marks one of the most decisive moments in the history of thought, exploding the prime fallacy, which had its stronghold then in the misapplication of the great conception of Parmenides, and has since haunted many a polemical dispute, the confusion of the Dictum Simpliciter with the Dictum Secundum quid. When it is once recognized that omnis negatio est determinatio, a fatal obstacle is removed out of the way of science.

1 Theaet. 157 ἐκαστον ἱψων τε καὶ ἐιδος.
2 Ibid. 174 Α τῶν ὅταν ἐκαστον ὃλον.
3 See above, p. 35.
This great advance in Plato's central point of view has sometimes been represented as if Plato had now for the first time introduced Motion amongst the ideas. But the identity of thought and life is of the very essence of Platonism throughout,—witness the proof of immortality in the Phaedrus, and the description of the Idea of Good as the supreme efficient cause in the Republic. It was precisely because Eleaticism made this impossible, by assuming the incommunicability of Being and Becoming, One and Many, that Plato found it necessary to lay hands on 'Father Parmenides,' and to prove the maxim, Τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἔστιν ἀφινόμει τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ πάντων ἀποχωρίζειν. That 'love of the Whole' of which he speaks again and again never ceased to be his ruling passion. The more he becomes aware of the variety and intricacy of things, the more he is bent on binding them with the unity of knowledge. But in the speculative region, as in he practical, he loses something of the daring confidence of his earlier essays, and while his vision of mental phenomena becomes clearer, in speaking of the Universe he betakes himself again to Mythology.

§ 31. The preceding observations may serve to commend the view which is here maintained, viz. that the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Philebus, in the order named (with the doubtful insertion of the Euthydemus before or after the Theaetetus, as a πάθεργον), form a distinct group or series, and that this series, taken as a whole, is subsequent to the great literary effort which terminated with the Republic.

The dialogues thus grouped together have certain characteristics in common.

1. The thought expressed in them is far more condensed, and, except in the Theaetetus, is much less richly clothed with imagination and humour, than that expressed in the dialogues which are here supposed to have preceded them.

2. On grounds of style as well as of substance it has been shown that the Politicus holds an intermediate place between the Republic and the Laws¹, and also that the manner of

¹ See L. Campbell's edition of the Sophistes and Politicus, 1867. The position therein assigned to the Sophistes, Politicus and Philebus, has
the Sophistes and Philebus has marked affinities to that of the Politicus. It may be added that although the Theaetetus and Parmenides are not throughout written in this later vein, the dialectical passages in both of them indicate an approach to it.

3. In these dialogues there is an increasing clearness and minuteness of psychological analysis and definition. Compare for example the analysis of vision in the Theaetetus with Rep. vii. 525 c, or the description of αἰσθησις, φαντασία, μνήμη, ἀνάμνησις, &c. in the Philebus with the tabular view of νοῦς, διάνοια, πίστις, εἰκασία, in Rep. vi sub fin.

4. Plato is no longer contented with positing the existence of universals, nor even of such a hierarchy of pure ideas as he imagines at the end of Rep. vi. He is now seriously bent on discovering the nature of Knowledge and its object, and of determining the connexion and correlation of ideas.

5. From the recognition that every εἴδος is a τόμημα, through the account of Being, not-being, sameness, difference, &c. as pure categories of perception, and the admission of Otherness as a mode of Being, up to the description of Measure as the Supreme Law, we trace the tendency, which is certainly less perceptible elsewhere in Plato, to define conceptions, which, while still regarded as objective, are essentially forms or modes of mind. The Philebus is rich in such determinations, which sometimes cross each other inconveniently, and even the seven forms of civic life in the Politicus, 289 B (τὸ πρωτογενὲς εἴδος [= ὅλη], ὄργανον, ὄγγειον, ὀχύμα, πρόβαλλα, παίγνιον, θρήμα) may be quoted as illustrative of a similar effort after συναγωγή.

6. Without admitting that a metaphysical system or consistent body of doctrine ('Plato's later theory of ideas') can be gathered from these dialogues, it is possible to trace in them the development of a metaphysical attitude which differs since been given to these same dialogues on independent grounds by W. Dittenberger Hermes, xvi, M. Schanz Hermes, xxii, and Constantin Ritter (Untersuchungen 1888). The convergence of different lines of investigation towards the same result has now reached a point which must surely be acknowledged to be convincing. See Excursus, infra pp. 46 ff.
both from that of the Protagoras and of the Republic. The supposed incommunicableness of knowledge and sense, being and becoming, universal and particular, one and many, which had threatened to paralyze philosophy, is felt to have been practically overcome, and the unity and correlation of knowledge and of nature is re-established.

7. That speculative interest in \( \gamma \epsilon \rho \epsilon \sigma \tau \iota \sigma \iota \) — in the origin and growth of phenomena, — in what modern thinkers call the laws of evolution, — which had been the prime motive of the Ionian physiology, but had on different grounds been discarded both by Parmenides and Socrates, — is now, therefore, once more re-awakened in Plato’s mind, and is partially justified by a metaphysic, in which the absolute comprises and sustains the relative, and evil is but a necessary moment in the self-development of Good.

8. But this speculative advance involves what cannot but be felt as retrogression on the practical side. For by introducing the conception of infinite gradation, it defers, without destroying, the hope of perfectibility:

\[ \nu \tau \alpha \tau \alpha \tau \mu \omega \iota \rho \nu \tau \epsilon \lambda \sigma \phi \iota \rho \rho \sigma \kappa \alpha \nu \pi \epsilon \pi \rho \omega \tau \alpha \iota \]

is the tone to which the ear of philosophy is now attuned. The distance between Man and God is found to be greater than in the first bright vision of the Ideal it had been conceived to be.

9. And the spirit of the philosopher becomes less sanguine, but more profoundly religious than before.

10. This phase of Platonism is marked by some obscure but not uncertain indications of a controversial attitude towards Democritus 1.

§ 32. The Timaeus is linked on to the subject of the Republic, but although both dialogues are referred to a time of public festival, they can hardly be viewed as strictly continuous. Socrates had on the previous day expounded to Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates his conception of an ideal state, — not, apparently, in the form of a reported conversation.

1 The latter observations (7, 8, 9, 10) are supported by the following passages of Soph., Polit., Phileb.: viz. Soph. 216, 246-248, 265 (cp. Theact. 173, 185 d, e.; Polit. 269-275 (the myth), 278, 301, 302; Philoeb. 22, 28, 30, 54, 59 A, 62, 64.
The Higher Education seems to have been cursorily mentioned, and the institution of infanticide must have been suppressed. However this may be, the Timaeus reflects the later phase of Plato's philosophy which has been just described. There is no room here for an exposition of the most difficult, if not, as some still declare it to be, the most important of Plato’s dialogues. It must suffice to observe that metaphysical conceptions which are formulated in the Sophistes and Philebus are here applied, e.g. the ὑπὲρον φύσις, and the μικτὴ ὁμοσία; that the new conception of matter or extension as γενεσεως τιθήμη is of the same order with the πρωτογενῆ εἴδος of the Politicus, and that the mythological colouring more resembles the myth in that dialogue, than any other of the Platonic myths, although the relation of God to the world is more nobly conceived. Cosmological and Pythagorizing notions are not absent from other dialogues. The Phaedo and Republic are both influenced by them. But a comparison of passages makes it clear that the point of view implied in the Timaeus is different and more developed.

The Timaeus is only the opening page or prelude of the most magnificent prose-poem ever planned by a single mind; a complete Bible, had it been written, of philosophical imagination. The story of Creation was to have been followed up by the history of the Chosen People, of their wars with the Unbelievers, and of the final triumph of the Good. Here indeed would have been an account of Evolution. But it breaks off before the rebel armada had been set in array.

What stayed the hand of the veteran thinker and creator from this fair work? We can only conjecture. But the Laws afford a possible reply. His practical enthusiasm was inexhaustible. In ages far remote, it might be, the vision of that conflict of the Sons of Light with the material Power of Atlantis might operate for good. But ere then, the day of Hellas might be dim. The states for whose reform he had so cared might all have foundered. The years were closing

1 Compare for example the desperate notion of God relinquishing the helm, with the delegation of the lower works to the demiurgi: Tim. 42 ε ὁ μὲν πάστα ταύτα διατάξας ἐμεν ἐν τῷ θεατῶ κατὰ φύσιν ἔθει.
round him, the setting of his life was near at hand. He had no longer strength for both efforts. The speculative and imaginative powers, perhaps, were ebbing from him. But practical earnestness remained. He would attempt what still was possible. And perchance those who had turned a deaf ear to his ideal strains might listen to suggestions of reform if pitched in a somewhat lower key.

Some such reflections are naturally suggested by Plato's sudden descent from the Council Chamber of Zeus, where the Critias breaks off, to enter on the long and weary labour of the Laws.

EXCURSUS

On the position of the Sophistes, Politicus, and Philebus in the order of the Platonic Dialogues; and on some characteristics of Plato's latest writings.

§ 1. It had long since occurred to students of Plato that, while it appeared antecedently probable that all the shorter dialogues were previous to the Republic, the Sophistes in particular implied a philosophical point of view in advance of the definition of knowledge and opinion at the end of Republic, Book v. It seemed possible, however, that such an opinion might be coloured with some metaphysical preconception, and in editing the Sophistes I resolved to verify this observation without having recourse to 'metaphysical aid.' The objections which Socher had raised against the genuineness of this and the companion dialogue had been answered by W. H. Thompson, who had defended both writings as having the general characteristics of Plato's style. I felt, however, that the discrepancies to which attention had been called by Socher and Schaarschmidt could not be thus easily disposed of, and must have some significance.

1 Laws vi. 770 A ἡμεῖς δ' εἰν δυσμαί τοῦ βίου.
2 From a paper read to the Oxford Philological Society in June 1890, by L. Campbell.
3 In the Cambridge Philosophical Transactions.
4 Rheinisches Museum.
Now, as difficulties of a similar kind had been urged with reference to the Laws, it seemed a question worth raising, whether any affinity could be established between these several works, as belonging to one and the same period of Plato's literary activity. For if the Laws were assumed to be genuine on the authority of Aristotle, the genuineness of the other dialogues would be rendered more probable, if their peculiarities were found to approximate to those of a well-authenticated writing. And the difficulty about the Laws would at the same time be lessened. For the authorities which attest their genuineness (to lay no stress on the confessions of the Athenian Stranger) represent them as Plato's latest—or even posthumous—work, and any differences either of manner or of matter between this dialogue and the Republic would be made more intelligible by the discovery of an interval and a period of transition. A step would also have been made towards the solution of the problem stated by Schleiermacher, but not satisfactorily solved by him—nor by Hermann—the order of the dialogues.

The Timaeus and Critias are avowedly subsequent to the Republic. And the right method for testing my hypothesis was, therefore, to ascertain what elements of style and diction, as well as of opinion, were 'common and peculiar' to the Sophist and Statesman with the Timaeus, Critias and Laws: i.e. what special features are shared by the members of this group, which are absent from the other dialogues, or less apparent in them. It was a method of concomitant variations. The result of a somewhat tedious inquiry was to confirm my anticipation, and to include the Philebus also amongst the works which are intermediate between the Republic and the Laws. The only support for this view which I could find in any previous writer, was the opinion expressed by Ueberweg in his Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischen Schriften¹ (pp. 207–209), but afterwards abandoned by him in deference to the objections of Schaarschmidt.

The argument set forth in my Introductions to the § 2. Sophistes and Politicus, possibly through some fault of

¹ Wien, 1861.
excursion, seems to have escaped the attention of scholars. And yet, so far as it was sound, it tended to establish a fact of real significance, viz. that the Republic and Laws are separated by a period of great philosophical activity;—an activity which renders more conceivable the discrepancies which have troubled critics of the Laws, and accounts for the supposed anomalies in the intervening dialogues.

The same conclusion is now upheld in Germany on similar, but wholly independent grounds—viz. on a statistical estimate of variations in Plato’s use of particles and recurring formulae. In 1881 W. Dittenberger in Hermes (vol. xvi, pp. 321-345) called attention to the fact that the formula τί μην—so familiar to the Platonic student,—is entirely absent from two-thirds of the genuine dialogues. From this point onwards the statistics of Platonic formulae have been pursued by successive inquirers. Dr. Martin Schanz, for example, in vol. xxi of Hermes (1886), pointed out a striking variation in the comparative frequency of τῶ ὅντι and ὅντος, the latter being found only in a fraction of the dialogues, while in some of these it has completely ousted τῶ ὅντι. The avoidance of hiatus (noticed by Blass in 1874, Att. Ber. ii, p. 426) is another phenomenon of which the varying frequency points to the same result.

The accumulated outcome of seven years of this kind of inquiry is recapitulated by Constantin Ritter in his little book of Untersuchungen (Stuttgardt, 1888), in which he has recorded also valuable observations of his own.

Notwithstanding the tendency—which seems to be inseparable from such investigations—to aim at more precise results than the method justifies (of which Dittenberger’s inference from the use of τί μαν; in Epicharmus is an amusing example), yet, when minor uncertainties are discarded, there remains a strong concurrence of evidence in favour of

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1 I take this late opportunity of correcting a serious misprint. For 'Critias,' in the tabular view on p. xxxiii of the work in question, read 'Crito.'

2 Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der Platonischen Dialoge.


4 That Plato brought back τί μην from his journey to Sicily.
placing the Soph., Polit., Phileb., Tim., Critias, and Laws—nearly in this order—as latest in a separate group.

When it is considered that the facts thus collected unite in corroborating the observations published in 1867, it will probably be admitted that the inference is irresistible, and that the question of the order has to this extent been solved.

It is therefore worth some pains to examine the significance of the phenomenon, the reality of which is now abundantly demonstrated.

We are really considering an important movement in the development of Greek prose writing:—the gradual prevalence over Plato's style of the rhetorical artificiality, which in the earlier periods he had alternately ridiculed and coquettishly played with.

And we are met on the threshold by one of those observations by which the mere collection of instances has to be checked. Some of the features which we are now taught to identify with Plato's later manner are already present in the Phaedrus,—the balanced cadences, the vocabulary enriched from the poets and the earlier literature, the comparative rareness of hiatus, the use of ὄντως for τῷ ὄντι, of δῆλον ὡς for δῆλον ὅτι, even the Ionic dative plural, all are represented there. But the most casual reader cannot fail to see that in the Phaedrus these are but decorations of a sort of carnival dress that is worn for the occasion only. Plato is caught by a fascination at which he himself is laughing all the while. His Socrates is Ἑμφαληπτός and a strange fluency possesses him. For Phaedrus' sake he is compelled to phrase his thoughts poetically,—he speaks in dithyrambs. It would therefore be rash, as F. Blass long since observed, to argue from the avoidance of hiatus, for example, to the date of the Phaedrus. But this dialogue has, notwithstanding, a real bearing on the subject in hand. For in spite of all his

1 Observe the suggestion of lyrical cadences—

εἰς ὁμόνοιαν ἡμεθεῖον ἀγωγῆ

ιπατομαχεῖ ἔρως ἐκλήθη.
Excursus.

Persiflage it is evident that the tricks of style which Plato there parodied were exercising a powerful charm upon his mind. In the Politicus and Laws, where, under the grander name of ἡττορεία (Polit. 303), the once ridiculed ἡττορική is admitted to have a legitimate function, the ornate manner is employed not in humorous irony, but with solemn gravity. It is therefore reasonable to regard the rhetorical flowers of the Phaedrus as the early anticipation of a habit which long afterwards becomes fixed.

§ 4. The following are some of the peculiarities of language in which the Sophistes, Politicus and Philebus are found to approximate to the Laws, and which therefore mark the transition towards Plato’s later style. It may be well to take first the particles and formulae, to which Dittenberger and others have recently directed attention. For the purpose of the argument we may for the present neglect those which (like τί μὴν;) bear only on the relation of the Republic (with Phaedr., Theaet.) to the earlier dialogues.

γε μὴ occurs only twice in Rep., and once in each of the following:—Euthyd., Symp., Phaedr., Theaet.; but 6 times in Soph. (52 pp.), 8 times in Polit. (54 pp.), 7 times in Tim. (76 pp.), and 25 times in Laws (368 pp.).

περι, added to adverbs and pronominal words:—

μεξρηπερ only in Tim. (4), Critias (1), Laws (16).

ὃπηπερ " Soph., Tim., Laws.

ὃποσοπερ " Polit., Laws.

ὃσαχιπερ " Tim. 43 E.

τοξ ’ ἴσως (combined) only in Soph. (2), Polit. (3), Phil. (3), Tim. (1), Laws (11).

σχεδόν without τι, frequent in Aristotle,—a use which first appears in Euripides,—is rare in Plato except in Soph. (26), Polit. (13), Phil. (14), Tim. (9), Criti. (4), Laws (122).

The use of ὀντως is one of many coincidences between Plato’s later style and tragic Greek. According to Stephanus (Thesaurus) the word appears first in Euripides. It is used

1 The pages referred to are those of the edition of Stephanus, 1578.

2 In Soph. Trach. 43 with τι. μὴν following the omission of τι is accidental.
also by Aristophanes in burlesque of tragedy, and by Xenophon in the Banquet (which Dittenberger has shown to be not one of his earlier writings). In Plato—


In Rep. 42 times, In Theact. once.

In Soph. once, In Phaedr. 6 times.

and hardly ever in Polit., In Rep. 9 "

Phileb., Tim., Critias, Laws.

In Soph. 21 "

In Polit. 11 "

In Phileb. 15 "

In Tim. 8 "

In Laws 50 "

τὰ φῦν or τὸ φῦν for φῦν (clearly a tragic form) occurs singly in Charm., Prot., Phaedo, Theaet., Rep., not at all in Lach., Euthyd., Crat., Apol., Crit., Euthyphr., Gorg., Meno, Symp., Phaedr.,—but in Soph. 5 times, Polit. 5 times, Phileb. 9 times, Tim. 7 times, Critias 3 times, and Laws 79 times.

μῶν in questions (also tragic) occurs sporadically in Charm. (2), Euthyd. (3), Phaedo (1), Meno (3), Theaet. (4), Rep. (3): but frequently in Soph. (12), Polit. (8), Phileb. (10), Laws (29). (There are very few questions in Tim., Critias.)

χριάζω (ἐστὶ) for χρύσεως occurs only in Soph. (1), Polit. (1), Tim. (3), Critias (2), and Laws (57).

The suppression of δὲ ὑπὲρ &c. in antitheses, and the use of abstract plurals (especially of the dative pl.), as in ἄντωδησιάς συγγρύψεος (Laws), are also tragic uses which become more frequent in the same group of dialogues.

Another marked difference appears in the preference of the more concentrated εἷς (or κατὰ) δύναμιν for εἷς (or κατὰ) τὸ δύνατον. This occurs in

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A usage, not tragic but Ionic, which is continued in Aristotle, is the employment of καθάπερ as the equivalent of ὤφερ. See Bonitz’ Index Aristotelicus, s. v. καθάπερ. In the few instances in which καθάπερ appears in Lach., Euthyd., Crat., Gorg., Symp., Theact., Phaedr., Rep. (6 times), it may generally be distinguished from ὤφερ, which occurs in Rep. 212 times.

But in Soph., Polit., Phileb., Tim., Critias, Laws, it occurs more frequently, and with less discrimination.

ὁφερ appears in Soph. 9 times, Polit. 16, Phil. 9, Tim. 10, Critias 2, Laws 24.

καθάπερ appears in Soph. 14 times, Polit. 34, Phil. 27, Tim. 11, Critias 5, Laws 148.

Another Aristotelian use (see Bonitz, s. v. ὤδε) is that of ὤδε for ἀλλὰ, e. g. in Soph. 248 b, Laws 11. 666 e.

The Ionic dative plural form is a point of resemblance between the Politicus and the Laws,—although, according to the best MSS., it appears also in a few places of the Phaedrus and Republic.

The three such datives in the Phaedrus have an obvious rhythmical intention,—246 b ἢδοτοισιν εἰναι ὑπάρχει: 276 b ἐν ἡμέρασιν ὅκτω: 278 b ἄλλασιν ἄλλων ψυχαῖς (where this form prevents the concurrence of 3 spondees).

In the Republic there are only five genuine instances, for κενεαγοράσασιν in x, νωτοισιν in ν occur in poetical quotations: and of these five σμικροίσις and θεοίσι in B. 111 occur in a passage that is much coloured with poetical citation; μεγάλοίσι in B. ix, in a highly-wrought piece of declamation; αὐτοίσι (bis) is in both instances emphatic and not attributive.

But in the Laws—especially in the later books—the use of such forms has become a confirmed trick of style. It is extended to participles, and is by no means confined to words in common use. And of the four examples in the Politicus, while one (279 ε νωτοισι) is doubtful (Bekker reads τοντοισι), two at least are of the freer kind: 262 α διπλασίοισι, 304 ε ἐπομένοισιν. The less rhetorical vein of the Sophistes and

1 See Schneider’s Rep. vol. i, p. 222.
Philebus may account for the absence of such forms in them.

The periphrastic tendency (noted in the Introduction to Soph. and Polit., p. xxxiv), of which χρῄών, πρέπειν ἄν εἶναι, λέγων ἄν, δέον ἄν εἴη, διὰ τὸ μετέχον εἶναι (Tim. 47 B), ἢ τῶν θατέρων φύσις, τὸ τῆς ἀποπλανησεως. &c., are examples, belongs likewise to the same preference for earfilling and rhythmically balanced expression.

The peculiar diction of these later dialogues is next to § 5. be illustrated.

In tabulating the Platonic writings so as to bring out the fact that many words were 'common and peculiar' to a certain section of them, it was formerly observed that 'the position of the Phaedrus and Parmenides'—'and, it should have been added, 'of the Philebus'—was due to exceptional circumstances. This meant that from the nature of the subject matter, and from the mode of treatment intentionally adopted, the vocabulary of the Phaedrus was exceptionally rich, while that of the Parmenides and of the Philebus, in consequence of the dry abstractedness of the discussions in them, was exceptionally poor. It follows that in order to show the bearing of the Phaedrus or of the Philebus upon the present discussion (the Parmenides is not immediately in point), a somewhat closer analysis of either dialogue becomes advisable.

(a) The Phaedrus has more than 170 words which occur in no other dialogue—about three for every page in the edition of Stephanus. The Theaetetus, which may be taken as representing Plato's normal style, has 93 words not occurring in other dialogues—or 1 1/2 words for every page of Stephanus. The peculiar words of the Phaedrus are borrowed from all literature, especially poetic literature, whether Epic, Lyric, or Tragic. Such words as γάνναμα, γλαυκόμματος, γνάθος, ἤνωχέω, λυγρός, μελίγγυς, μετεωροπώρεω, μήμα, ὁμόξυς, τελεσιοφρόγος, ύποβρύχιος, ύψαύχη, and others which the beauty of Phaedrus draws from the full breast of

1 Cp. Laws ii. 661 B ὅθανατον εἶναι γενομένου ὅ τι ταχίστα.
Excursus.

Socrates, are foreign alike to the style of the Republic and the Laws. What then is the specific element of diction which the Phaedrus owns in common with Tim., Critias, Laws? It consists (1) of physiological words, (2) words borrowed from the dialect of tragedy, and (3) words having a religious or mystical significance.

(1) Not Isocrates only, but also 'Hippocrates the Asclepiad' is mentioned with commendation in the Phaedrus'. And whatever may be the significance attaching to that circumstance, the following words, connected with physical states or proceses, occur in the Phaedrus and Timaeus, and in no other Platonic dialogue: ἀβρέχω, γαργαλίζω, διωθεραμίνω, διαχωρίω, ἐπιμυγνυμ. ἑρείδω, ἰσχιόν, κατακορής, κολλάω, πτερόν, αὐτπράππω, φάτη.

If now we include Phaedr., Tim., Critias, Laws, the following words peculiar to this small group are of the same complexion: ἀκεφαλος (Phaedr., Laws), ἀπορρέω (Phaedr., Tim., Critias, Laws), ἀσίμπαρτως (Phaedr., Laws), διατρέχω (Phaedr., Laws), ἐκφωσ (Phaedr., Laws), ἐμπλέκω (Phaedr., Laws), εὕροια (Phaedr., Laws; cp. ἐὑρω, Tim., Laws), προσάντης (Phaedr., Laws), σπάω (Phaedr., Laws), ὑπεραιρω (Phaedr., Laws), ψφος (Phaedr., Tim., Critias, Laws).

(2) The Phaedrus borrows at least as much from Epic and Lyric sources as from tragedy; but the poetical words which it adopts in common with Tim., Critias, Laws, are mostly of the tragic, or old Attic, type. For example, ἀντία (Phaedr., Laws), αἰμυλος (Phaedr., Laws), ἀκαρπος (Phaedr., Tim.), ἀγος (Phaedr., Tim., Laws), ἀπας (Phaedr., Laws), ἀσίτως (Phaedr., Laws), ἐκασταχοδ (Phaedr., Critias, Laws), ἐμμανής (Phaedr., Tim., Laws), ἐμπεδόω (Phaedr., Laws), ἐπειθής (Phaedr., Laws), θ. ἀλλός (Phaedr., Laws), ἄφρειος (Phaedr., Tim.), νομή (Phaedr., Tim., Critias, Laws), παμμεγας (Phaedr., Tim.), παράνοια (Phaedr., Laws), πράνοια (Phaedr., Tim.), συμμυγής (Phaedr., Laws), ταπεινός (Phaedr., Laws), τίμβος (Phaedr., Laws), φόδος (Phaedr., Laws).

(3) Words having religious or mystical associations are...
Later Dialogues:—Diction.

The Phaedrus, like the Republic, has many words unknown to the earlier literature. The following are peculiar to the Phaedrus:—

δαμανίως (Phaedr., Tim.), ἑθονοησιακός (Phaedr., Tim.), ἐποπευω (Phaedr., Laws), ὄργείου (Phaedr., Laws), ὁρκομοσία (Phaedr., Critias), συνεύχομαι (Phaedr., Laws).

The anomaly is explained, as already said, by the restricted vocabulary of a dialogue which deals so exclusively as the Philebus does with metaphysical and psychological formulae. In 55 pp. (St.) the Philebus has only 55 peculiar words, i.e. only one for a page, or one-third of the proportion of the Phaedrus. Now of these 55, notwithstanding the prosaic cast of the dialogue, the following are tragic:— ἀναινομαι, ἀναπολέω, ἄνους, μητής, περιβόητος, προξαίρω, χαρμογι. ψευδός, while these are Epic— ἀπαστός, βέρομαι, μισγάγκεια (but cp. Ar. Pl. 953). A good many are late derivatives— ἀπόρημα, δυσχέρασμα, προσδόκημα, στοχασμός, ἀναχώρησις, θεώρησις, στοχασις, φάρμαξις, διδυμότης, δυσαπαλακτία (or -ξια), εὐδοκίμα, δοξοκαλία, αὐτάρκεια, παταιμωδής, περατειώδης, ὕβριστικός, ἀνοηταῖν. The rest are chiefly new compounds (with ἀνα, ἐν, ἐπι, προς, σω, ὑπεξ).

If we now examine the group consisting of Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim., Critias, Laws, we shall find that although the contribution of the Philebus to the special vocabulary of this group is not large, it is notwithstanding significant. It contains about
20 tragic words, including ἀμῆχανος, ἀμικτος, εὐδίκως, καίριος. λύων, πάθη, περιφανής, τέκτον, τέρψις.

50 new compounds, including ἀποσώζω, διαμερίζω, ἔξιόμαι, συγκεφαλαιώμαι.

10 late derivatives, including ἀναισθησία, δοξοσοφία, ἐπιχειρησίς, πήξις, σύστημα, σωμασκία.

And 13 physiological words, amongst others διάκρισις, σύγκρισις, σύγκρασις, ἀσμαίζεις, υπομίγγυμι, ὑποδοχή.

The Phaedrus affects ornateness, novelty, and copiousness of diction, and in doing so anticipates some of the peculiarities which became fixed in the later vocabulary. The Philebus on the other hand is below the average of copiousness; and yet, when its characteristic features are examined not by number but by kind, it is found to partake, even in its diction, of the special characteristics which mark the Timaeus, Critias, and Laws.

§ 6. (c) Every reader of the Laws must have been struck by the frequency of Old Attic and Ionic words and forms. Stallbaum, in reply to Zeller, tried to account for this by the nature of the subject and the gravity of phrase belonging naturally to a book on legislation. But the same features are present more or less in all the six dialogues now under review. Dionysius must have had these in mind, when he coupled Plato with Thucydides as having written in the earlier Attic. The familiar observation that the later prose runs more and more into Iambic and Paeonic rhythms might also be largely illustrated from these writings.

Such obvious facts as the use of τέκνον for παιδίον, βλάβος side by side with βλάβη, of κλαυθμονή for ὀλοφυρμός, of τέρψις and χαρμονή side by side with ἥρονη, the preference of full-sounding words like φράζεω, φλαύρος, the fondness shown for νάμα, ἐπιρροή, γεννητωρ, ἄμαθαι, and similar words, are apparent even to the cursory reader. ἡνυχαῖος is preferred to ἡνύχιος, εἰνεκα to ἐνεκα (if we may trust the MSS.), Ἀπόλλωνα to Ἀπόλλω. The mannerism of the style appears not only in the use of different forms, but in the frequency of

\[ V o l \ x. \ p p \ 57 \ f o l l. \]

\[ βλάβος = \text{damage}, \ βλάβη = \text{hurt}. \]
some which occur sparingly elsewhere. Thus manuscript evidence favours πτάσθαι (not πτέσθαι), φευξεῖσθαι (not φεύξεσθαι) in the Laws more than in other parts of Plato. Some inflexions, although true to analogy, are altogether new—such as ἰπιστῆθη (I aor. of ἐπισταμαι) Laws 686 ν. A noticeable peculiarity is the substitution of the common γυμναστής for the specially Attic παιδοτρίβης.

The following specimens are taken from a list of 150 tragic, Ionic and Old Attic words, which are found in the Laws and not elsewhere in Plato:—

άιντωρ, ἀκταῖος, ἀρτίπος, βασιλις. γαμετή, γέννα, δολιχός, ἐρείμα. θράσος, κλαυθμωή, κλύδων, λύσμος, νέμνος, οἰκισμός (Solon), ὁμίλημα, οίτα, παιδείος, παιδοφυία. παπαῖ, πέλαιος, πλησιόχωρος (Herodotus), ῥέζω, σφριγάω. τητάομαι, τόλμημα, φορβάς, χόρευμα, χρόνιος.

The following, on the other hand, are amongst the words which appear in the Laws for the first time. Some of these also have an Ionic flavour. Others are obviously recent derivatives and compounds:—

ἀναθόλωσις, ἀπηγόρημα, γυλυκθυμία, γοώδης, διαθετήρ, διαφωνία, δυσκληρέω, ἐνυθμος, ἐξείλης, ἐπιπηδεύτης, ἐτεροφωνία, εὐθημονέομαι, θρασυξεία, καλλίφωνος, κηπεία, κλεμμάδεως, κόσμημα, κοινόρημα, μακαριότης, μεγαλόνως, μετακόσμητις, μοναλία, ὀχεταγωγία, παιδοποίησις, πατρονομέομαι, σκάμμα, σωφρονιστύς, ταπείνωσις, τάφρευμα, φιλοστοργεύοι, φωνασκέω.

(d) There are marked differences of style between the Timaeus and the Laws. The high-wrought concentration, the sustained movement, the strong energy of the shorter dialogue might be effectively contrasted with the leisurely progress, the lengthy diatribes, even the tedious wordiness of a conversation, for which the longest day can hardly have sufficed. Yet the two writings have a large common element, and as compared with the Republic they both exhibit changes pointing the same way. At present we are concerned with the vocabulary. Of 81 words common and peculiar to the

1 Schanz' Plato, vol. xii, p. 18. 2 Qu. an vπησθῆναι.
Excursus.

Timaeus and Critias (considered as one dialogue) with the Laws (Tim. 68, Critias 13), about 40 are tragic, including—

\[\text{ἀδιάπλαστος, ἐγερσις, ἔγκαυμα, ἔμφωσις, θερμαντικός, ἱματώδης, κηροειδής, ὀξύκοος, ὀργανοποιία, παραφωρότης, φάντασις (side by side with φαντασία).}\

(c) It remains (under the head of diction) to show that the vocabulary of the Sophist and the Statesman, apart from the special subject matter of either dialogue, has much in common with that which has been found to belong to the Philebus, Timaeus, Critias and Laws.

The vocabulary of the Sophist (52 pp. St.) coincides in 54 instances with that of the Laws.

The Politicus (54 pp. St.) exhibits 72 such coincidences.

Between the Timaeus (with Critias) and Soph. there are 36 coincidences of diction. Between Tim., Critias, and Politicus, 42.

This estimate includes only words which are found in no Platonic dialogue, except those immediately in question.

The number of tragic words found in Soph., Polit. (taken together), and in none of the ‘earlier dialogues,’ is 116, of which the following are the most remarkable:—\[\text{ἀγήρως (Polit., Phileb., Tim., Laws), ἀντόποθος (Soph.), ἀπλετος (Soph.),}\]

\[\text{In the Laws: ἐυφυσία has the special sense of ‘good mental condition,’ but ἐυφυς — ἀνθρώπος.}\]
Style of Later Dialogues.


In adverting briefly to the less tangible subject of § 7. structure and rhythm, I may refer to the Introductions to the Sophist and Statesman, ed. 1867. A word of reply is due, however, to a friendly objector, who urges that the tone and colouring of these dialogues are dramatically suited to the presence of Timaeus, of the Eleatic friend, and of the Athenian Stranger.

(1) Why should the chief speakers in these six dialogues talk so nearly in the same curious manner?

Compare together, for example, the following places, taken almost at random:—

Soph. 258 D τίν γὰρ βατέρου φύσιν ... τὸ μὴ ὅρ.
Polit. 284 Ε, 288 Ε.

Phileb. 53 B,c συμκρὸν ὄρα καθαρὸν ... καλλίωρ γέγροιτ' ὅρ.
Ib. 67 ad fin. οίς πιστεύοντες ... ἐκάστοτε λόγων.

Tim. 53 B νῦν δ' αὖ τὴν διάταξιν ... ἔννεψεοσθε.
Laws i. 644 D θαύμα μὲν ... ἔννεψθηκός.
Ib. i. 648 D, E.

And (2) Why, within the limits of the same dialogue, should Socrates, Critias, and Hermogenes adopt the language of Timaeus, or why should Socrates, Theodorus, Theactetus and the younger Socrates adopt the fashion of their new acquaintance from Magna Graecia? Why should the young Protarchus ape the new-fangled affectations of his teacher? Or how is it that Kleinias and Megillus, although less instructed, have caught so readily the style of their Athenian companion for the day?
Excursus.

Compare once more—

Sophist. 217 c (Socrates).
   "    265 d (Theaetetus).
Polit. 257 b (Theodorus).
Phileb. 13 b, c (Protarchus).
Tim. 20 c (Hermocrates).
   "    23 c (Kritias).
   "    29 d (Socrates).
Laws iv. 713 b (Megillus).
   "   vi. 752 b (Kleinias).

Surely the resemblance of style between the Cretan and Spartan, and of both to their Athenian friend, is closer than that between the several Athenian speakers in the Symposium.

I have tried to show, not only that the six dialogues, Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim., Critias, Laws, are rightly grouped together as the latest, but I have also endeavoured to describe the nature of the change in Plato's manner of writing which this fact involves. The chief characteristics of his later style are the following:—

1. A measured and elaborately balanced gravity of utterance, in which the rhetorical artifices which he had once half affected and half despised are passing into a settled habit of ἀπορεία and conscious impressiveness.

2. The increasing prevalence of certain particles and formulæ, adopted partly for euphony, and partly to suit with an archaic and tragic colouring.

3. A range of diction passing far beyond the limits of 'Attic purity,' and reverting in a remarkable degree to the use of the Old Attic and Ionic words. Macaulay speaks of Milton's prose as 'stiff with cloth of gold.' Plato's later style is stiffened with a sort of τραγικὸς λῆρος, or antique embroidery, while the tendency to employ new compounds and derivatives, already active in the Republic, is present here in a more advanced stage.
4. The artificial balancing and interlacing of phrases is carried much further than even in the Phaedrus, Republic and Theaetetus.

If we turn from the form to the substance of these six dialogues, we find in them an increasing sense of the remoteness of the ideal, without any diminution of its importance. A deepening religious consciousness is associated with a clearer perception of the distance between man and God, and of the feebleness and dependence of mankind. But the feeling is accompanied with a firm determination to face and cope with the burden and the mystery of the actual world— to provide support for human weakness, alleviations of inevitable misery. The presence of Necessity in the universe and in life is acknowledged, in order that it may be partially overcome.

The change here implied is not one of creed, but of mental attitude, induced, as we may gather from indications that are not obscure, by a large acquaintance with the contemporary world, and by the writer's own experience in wrestling with intellectual and practical difficulties. The effect is traceable (1) in metaphysics, (2) in logic, (3) in psychology, (4) in physics, (5) in politics, (6) in ethics and religion, and (7) in the conception of history.

(1) Metaphysics.

In their metaphysical aspect, these dialogues turn chiefly on a few highly abstract notions, the essential forms of Being, not-being, sameness, difference, motion, rest, limit, finite, infinite:— and these are no longer merely contemplated in their isolated reality, but in their connexion with phenomena and with one another. The method becomes less ontological and more logical. 'The idea of good' is approached not merely through Socratic definitions or figurative adumbration, but through the direct analysis and manipulation of primary conceptions—for example those of measure and
symmetry. The five γένη of the Sophist, the description of the ideas in the Politicus as τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα, the metaphysical categories, as one may venture to term them, of the Philebus, belong to a more exact mode of philosophizing than had been thought of when the Phaedo was written, and one which was only vaguely anticipated in the Republic as 'the longer way.' The ὑπότερον φύσις and μεγίστη φύσις of the Sophist and Philebus are resumed and applied in the Timaeus.—The Laws contain but few references to metaphysical problems. But this is in entire keeping with the remotion of the actual from the ideal; and the attentive student is aware of an ever-growing conviction of the significance of measure and of number, and a fixed belief in the supremacy of Mind. 'Measure' is indeed the first and last word of Plato's metaphysic—the μέτρητική of the Protagoras anticipates the μέτρον of the Philebus.

(2) Logic.

The dialectical achievement in the Sophistes is the pivot of the logical movement. Plato had found that thought was being sacrificed to the instrument of thought, or rather that the instrument was itself endangered. Zeno had 'jammed' the weapon of Parmenides. The Sophist-dialogue brings for the first time into a clear light the nature of predication, of classification, and of proof, and places the science of Logic on a rational footing. The effects of the discussion, which is continued in the Politicus, are apparent in the method of that dialogue, and even in the elaborate distinctions of the Laws. As Mr. Paul Shorey observes in his able papers on the Timaeus, the practical aim of the whole business is 'to obtain a working logic.'

(3) Psychology.

The dialectical advance accompanies, and indeed occasions, a corresponding progress in psychological analysis—which is especially apparent in the Philebus. It is needless to illustrate this familiar fact. See especially Tim. 42 A, 69 D;
Laws iii. 644–646, iv. 770 d (comparing this last passage with Rep. vi sub init.).

(4) Physics.

In all these dialogues, and not in the Timaeus only, there is an unceasing interest in production (γένεσις), and a tendency to look upon things from the point of view of the Universe rather than of Man. See especially the myth in the Politicus, and the mention of prehistoric cataclysms in the Laws:—also Soph. 265 c and Phileb. 59 a, compared with Tim. 59 c, d. The physical conditions of mental states, especially of Sensation, Pleasure and Pain, and of moral evil are more insisted on. The importance of health, and of the care of the body generally, is more fully recognized. The allusions to medicine and gymnastic in the Republic are in strong contrast to those in the Timaeus and Laws. And a great advance in clearness of cosmological conception is implied in the discussion of ἀνώ and κάτω in the Timaeus, as compared with the employment of the same notion in the Phaedo and Republic.

(5) Politics.

In Rep. B.v Plato already acknowledges that it is hard to realize the ideal. Notwithstanding, he is absolutely bent on realizing it. He will not swerve aside in deference to opinion or circumstances, but will wait until circumstances favour, and till opinion shall come round. He is sure that mankind are not unreasonable, could they but hear the truth. Before he wrote the Laws, a varied intercourse with man had dashed his confidence and lessened his hope, but had not impaired his zeal for the improvement of mankind. He is now ready to adapt himself to human weakness and, the higher road having proved impracticable, to seek a modus vivendi that may embody as much of righteousness and wisdom as the race will bear. The work is full of the gentleness and consideration of one who lives on

Till old experience do attain
To something like prophetic strain.
Now the crisis of this tradition from Optimism to Meliorism is reflected in a very interesting manner in the Statesman-dialogue. Plato has been brought to feel that in his ideal Republic he had been grasping at the moon. He had legislated for the age of Cronos during the reverse cycle which is said to be under the government of Zeus. The dialogue is instinct with a suppressed bitterness, which time had mellowed when he wrote the Laws. But the author of the Politicus is not less keenly bent on finding a practicable way. The problem he sets before himself is how to bring scientific thought to bear upon the actual world. Despairing of spontaneous obedience to a perfect will, he has recourse to legislative enactment, as a second best course, by which men may be led or driven to imitate from afar off the free movement of Divine Reason. The art of legislation is compared to that of weaving (a metaphor which is repeated in the Laws). And the same stress is laid, as in many passages of the later dialogue, on the importance of combining, through breeding and education, the energetic with the gentler elements of human nature. The provision of a ἄνδρον in Laws vi to supplement the work of the legislator, is in accordance with the hint given in the Politicus, and may be contrasted with the contempt that is showered on ἔπανορθωσις in Rep. iv. 426.

The Timaeus, Critias and Hermocrates, had the trilogy been completed, would have been the outcome of another mood, but of one also differing from the spirit of the Republic. In the Republic Plato contents himself with laying down great principles. He is confident that, if these are preserved, the citizens may be trusted to discover the rest. The opening of the Timaeus makes a deeper plunge into actuality by raising the almost impossible demand:—How did the citizens of the ideal state comport themselves in that far-off time beyond our ken (Rep. vi. 499 d)? This question belongs to the firm resolution to be practical, to realize abstractions in the concrete, to make the step from νόσίω to γένεσις, which finds a less confident application in the Politicus and Laws. The same motive appears in the admission of approximate
knowledge in the Philebus as requisite 'if a man is to be able to find his way home.'

(6) Ethics and Religion.

In these last dialogues, more than elsewhere in Plato, we are made conscious, as has been already said, of the distance between Man and God. The imitation of the Divine is still the highest duty, but it is an imitation from very far away. Although the doctrine of metempsychosis is retained, and the belief in immortality is more than once very finely expressed, yet the proud claim to ἀπαθανατικός the life which is a meditation of death, and even the formation of the inward man after the pattern in the Heavens, are no longer the leading notes of the new strain. The philosopher is less than ever simply bent on saving his own soul. The speakers rather strive after the partial overcoming of evil with good, the infusion of a spirit of generosity, which may leaven the inherent selfishness of men;—the institution of a rule of life which may prevent society from foundering amid the weltering sea of politics. Sympathy with Orphic observances, especially in the abstention from animal food (ἀλλὰ ἐδωδή) is common to the Politicus and Laws.

The human and divine τοῦτο are kept apart in the Philebus more emphatically than in Rep. vi; and in the Timaeus the elements of soul which the Creator dispenses to the δημιουργοὶ for the creation of man are not of pristine purity ἀλλὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα. The faintness which now attends 'the larger hope' is strikingly apparent in the Politicus-myth.

(7) History.

Lastly, in these six dialogues (to which the Menexenus may perhaps be added) we find a more distinct anticipation than elsewhere in Plato of two essentially modern ideas, the conception, namely, of a History of Philosophy and of a Philosophy of History.

(a) In the Sophistes, philosophical method is for the first
time expressly based on criticism (although the step had been partly anticipated in the Parmenides and Thcactetus). The same plan is carried out in parts of the Philebus.

(b) The Hermocrates, on the other hand, was to have been an ideal history of human good and evil. And in speculating on the nature and origin of legislation, the Athenian Stranger Laws in finds it advisable to preface his remarks with a recapitulation of the earlier History of Hellas.
ESSAY II

ON THE TEXT OF THIS EDITION OF PLATO'S REPUBLIC.

Bekker's text of the Republic (1817 to 1823) rests on § I, twelve MSS., which he quotes as A Θ Ξ Π Φ Δ K q τ Ṽ m₂ r, all collated by himself; he also mentions the Venetian Codex i³, of which Schanz in editing the smaller dialogues has since made valuable use.

Stallbaum added the Florentine MSS. a b c n x a' β' γ',—and Schneider, besides re-collating q exhaustively, collated Lobcov., Vind. D, Vind. E, Vind. F iv. To these twenty-four MSS. is now to be added a twenty-fifth, Codex 4, Plutei xxviii, in the Malatestian Library at Cesena, which in the present edition will be quoted as M (Malatestianus). Subsequent editors, especially K. F. Hermann, have relied more exclusively than Bekker did upon the chief MS., Paris A.; and Baiter in his preface to the fifth Zurich edition particularizes no other MS. authority.

1 Collated only to p. 441 St.
2 'Primo libro caret,' Bekker.
3 Schneider, Praef. p. xxxi 'Ibidem [Morellius] quartum commemorat non magis a quoquam collatum, absque numero post impressum indicem bibliothecae Marcianae additum, forma maxima sec. xii scriptum, inter alia Platonica civitatem cum scholiis continentem, sed inde a libro terto usque ad ultimum manu sec. xv exaratum.' It is now numbered App. 4. i. Schanz has proved that the earlier portion is derived from Paris A.
4 Schneider's habit of marking all his MSS. anew is a drawback to the otherwise exceptional usefulness of his edition. Bekker's and Stallbaum's marks are here retained, those of Schneider being adopted only for his own MSS. He made little use of Vind. 54, in which the Republic is by a recent hand and copied from Lobcov.
§ 2. The present text was originally founded on Baiter's edition of 1881, but in the course of revision has assumed a form more nearly approaching to that of Hermann. The select list of various readings at the bottom of each page has been for the most part taken from three MSS., A II M, with occasional reference to others of those mentioned above.

Paris. A, of the ninth century, has been re-examined several times since Bekker's edition, notably by K. F. Hermann, Dübner, and Cobet: also by Baiter, who, however, in his preface to his edition of 1881 still marked a few readings as uncertain. In order to clear up these remaining uncertainties I visited the Paris National Library in June, 1890, and found that several readings which are quite clear and unmistakable in Paris. A are still misquoted in the editions. I have therefore now made a fresh collation of this MS. with the present text, which had unfortunately been partly printed off before the opportunity for this collation occurred, and a list of the corrections which are thus rendered necessary will be found in the Appendix to this Essay (Appendix I).

Bekker's quotations of Venn. Π Ξ are also not free from inaccuracy, and Professor C. Castellani, Prefect of the Library of St. Mark at Venice, has done good service by providing a complete new collation of these MSS. with Bekker's text for the purposes of the present edition. A list of Bekker's errors and omissions will be found below, Appendix III.

M. Schanz considers Ven. II and the MSS. derived from it (D K q β' Vind. D), as bearing traces in the Republic of a tradition independent of Par. A. And it may be observed in confirmation of this opinion, that the erroneous reading λυρα (for αυρα) in III. 401 C, now shown to be peculiar to Π, must have arisen from the misreading of a copy in uncial characters and therefore anterior to A.

A third set of MSS., having some probable readings not

1 I refer especially to Baiter's Zurich editions since 1881.
distinctly referable to A or Π, are regarded by many recent editors as merely interpolated. To this class of 'bad' MSS. Schanz has consigned the Cesena MS., our M. A full description of this MS., written by Professor Enrico Rostagno, who has collated it for this edition, is given below (Appendix IV).

In Mucchioli's catalogue of the Malatestian Library it is described as of the twelfth century, and Signor Rostagno, whose judgement is of weight, speaks of it as for the most part written towards the end of that century. The absence of iota subscript from the portion written in the earlier hand, and the constant accentuation of the enclitic τέ, after unaccented syllables, afford some slight confirmation of this view. The portion of the MS. which is by a later hand, is referred to as M (italic) in the critical notes to this edition (pp. 308–319).

Other MSS. occasionally referred to in the critical notes are:

- b Laurentianus, 85, 6, containing Books I and II:
  - but from II. 358 E πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων in a fifteenth century hand. The earlier part, ending with περὶ γάρ τίνος ἀν μᾶλλον was formerly quoted as of the twelfth century, but according to E. Rostagno belongs to the thirteenth.
- x Laurentianus, 85, 7, thirteenth century (?).
- a Laurentianus, 80, 7, fifteenth century.
- γ Laurentianus, 42, thirteenth century (?).
- D Parisiensis, 1810, thirteenth century.
- K Parisiensis, 1642, fifteenth century.
- m Vaticanus, 61, 'bombyc. aut chart.' Bekker.
- r Vaticanus, 1029 a b, 'membr. f. max. foliis bipartitis,' 2 vols.

Vind. E Vindobonensis, 1, 'chart.'

1 Studien, p. 67.
§ 3. Some further observations on the more important MSS. are here subjoined:

A Parisiensis A: Paris National Library MS. Gr. 1807: ninth century. On the left-hand margin, at the end of the volume, the following note has been written with contractions in reddish ink, and in a cursive hand:—ὁρθὸν ἕβδομον αὕτη ὑπὸ κωνσταντίνου μητροπολίτου ἱεραπόλεως τοῦ καὶ ὑμησαμένου. If this Hierapolis might be assumed to be the Metropolis of Phrygia, the question raised by Mr. T. W. Allen in the Journal of Philology, vol. xxi, as to the provenance of the group of MSS. to which A belongs, would be partly answered. But the Bishop is not to be held responsible for the more serious corrections, which were probably made by the copyist of the Scholia before the book was exposed for sale. Indeed, some of the most trivial annotations, ignorant emendations, and impossible various readings, bear a suspicious resemblance to the metropolitan's writing. The question whether the first diorthotes, who seems to have been a careful person, had before him any other MS. than that from which the first hand had copied, is important, but can hardly be resolved. In point of authority there is in fact hardly any difference between the first and second hand. It will be observed that there are several cases in which words omitted in the text are supplied in the margin, to all appearance by the second hand. The first hand corrected many slips in the

1 For a complete catalogue of the MSS. of Plato, see Martin Wohlrab's Die Platonhandschriften und ihre gegenseitigen Beziehungen, Leipzig, 1887. Those left out of account in the present essay are Venetus 187 (closely related to Ξ); Vindobonensis 54, collated in part by Schneider; Mon. C. = Monacensis 490 collated by Schneider in B. vii and part of B. x); Monacensis 514, Venetus 150, and the fragments θ (Bekker) and Palatinus (Schneider in the Libraries of Darmstadt and Heidelberg. (On Lobcov., Φ. 6, see below.)
course of writing, and has frequently covered the blank made by erasure with ∆ ∆ ∆ instead of writing again over the same space. Many slight omissions are supplied either by the first or second hand between the lines. Adsript iota is often added by the second hand, sometimes a little above the line (ᾶδης) which appears to have been a mode intermediate between adscription and subscription (αι and ζ). Many, if not most of the accents have been added after writing,—perhaps by the diorthotes. They are in a different ink, as Cobet observed.

Habits of the MS. to be noticed once for all are:

1. Spelling:—
   ποιώ not ποιω, νόσ or νός more often than νός, πορρωτέρω, ἐγγρατέρω, &c., σῶς, θυμισκω, &c. Paragogic ν retained before consonants: οὐτος and οὐτω interchanged.

2. Accentuation:—
   a. τε, ποι, τίς (sic):—enclitics are constantly thus accented—especially after unaccented syllables.
   b. ἀλλό τι, ἤπερ ἔστω, &c.
   c. γ'ον (not γον).
   d. ὅστωσ ὁν, &c. (generally corrected to ὅστωσοι, &c., by a recent hand).
   e. μὴ δὲ μία, &c.
   f. ἐπαυτοφώρω, καθαυτό, αὐτοδιαφωνή, &c.
   g. ἄφη, παρή, ξυνή (retained in the text).
   h. The accent on μέν, δέ, &c., in antitheses often doubled,—the second accent often added by another hand.
   i. A singular practice of distinguishing ἄν=ἐάν, by omitting the accent and writing ἄν. In many cases the accent originally written has been erased.
   k. ἔστω and ἔστιν constantly confused.
   l. τᾶλλα, not τάλλα:—also τῆνδε, τοιώνδε, &c.

3. Breathings:—
   a. Confusion of αυτοῦ and αὐτοῦ, αἰτή and αὐτή, &c.
   b. ὣς αὐτῶς.
   c. ἀθρόος, ἀνομενος, ἀττα, ἵκταρ.
4. Abbreviations are very infrequent: the commonest is \( \text{v} \) for \( r \). Possibly, however, some errors, such as \( \epsilon\nu\tau\epsilon \) for \( \zeta\epsilon \) in IV. 440 C may be due to early compendia.

5. The persons are distinguished with : between the words and a line — in the margin. The punctuation is careful on the whole.

Later hands have busied themselves in various ways:—

1. In changing \( \omega \) to \( o \), \( i \) to \( \eta \) and vice versa, not always rightly;—\( \omega\phi\epsilon\lambda\alpha \) to \( \omega\phi\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\alpha \).—\( \epsilon\lambda\lambda\iota\iota\pi\eta \) remains unchanged.

2. In constantly changing \( \epsilon\iota \) of the 2nd per. sing. middle and passive to \( \eta \), \( \eta \) of the plup. 1st per. sing. to \( \epsilon\nu \), and placing the mark of elision 'over \( \epsilon\gamma\phi\mu\alpha \), \( \varpi\chi \)', &c.

3. In changing the division of syllables between lines by erasing a letter at the end of one line and inserting it at the beginning of the next, or vice versa.

4. Marking interrogation by subjoining a comma to the colon between the speeches, thus :.

5. Adding marginal glosses, various readings and initial letters of respondents' names, inserted where a doubt seemed possible.

\( \Pi \) Venetus \( \Pi \): St. Mark's Library, Venice; MS. Gr. 185: twelfth century. It contains the Republic, with the loss of about four leaves, from VI. 507 E to VII. 515 D, and from X. 612 E \( \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota \tau\alpha\tau\alpha \) to the end.

The first hand has been but slightly corrected while the MS. was new, but a hand of the fifteenth century has altered many readings, generally in accordance with the tradition which is now represented by Ven. \( \Xi \). Ven. \( \Pi \) supplies some words that are omitted in Par. A, though it agrees with A in other places, where both have to be corrected from a different source.

The following brief description of the MS. is from the hand of Professor Castellani, Prefect of St. Mark's Library at Venice:

\('\) Cod. 185, membr. Saec. XII \( ^{1} \), 348 x 260 millim., ff. 349,

\( ^{1} \) Morelli, \textit{Bibl. manuscriptsa}, p. 109.
of Plato's Republic.


Cesenas M: 28. 4, in the Malatestian Library at Cesena: M twelfth to thirteenth century. This MS. is here selected as a sufficient representative of the third or inferior class of MSS. which retain some readings independently of A and II. It is older than any of the Florentine MSS.¹, and it has a close and indisputable affinity to Vaticanus m, the last of Bekker's MSS. which M. Schanz eliminated in his process of reducing the apparatus to A and II. The age of m is not given, but Bekker's description of it as 'bombyc. aut chartac.' shows that it has no high claim to antiquity. This MS., while agreeing in very many points with M, is much more seriously interpolated, and may be assumed to represent a later stage of corruption². M therefore holds a high place in the sub-family m Ξ v t, to which the Florentine MSS. a c γ' may be confidently added. Of this class Schanz writes as follows:

'So liegt die Schlussfolgerung nahe, dass die Mutterhandschrift von m Ξ v t aus dem Parisinus A stammt. Nicht zu verwundern ist, dass bei der grossen zeitlichen Entfernung von A die Handschriften m Ξ v t Interpolationen und Ergänzungen der Lücken, welche A bietet,'

¹ The older hand of Flor, b, was formerly attributed to the twelfth century. But E. Rostagno, who has examined both MSS. (M and b) places nearly a century between them.

² See this fact brought out below, pp. 87 ff.
§ 4. Whether or not the Cesena MS. is the 'Mutterhandschrift' in question, it will be presently shown to belong to the same sub-family, and to be much purer than \( \text{m} \), while it is older by two centuries than \( \Xi v t. \) and little younger, if at all, than \( \Pi \), the head MS. of the 'second class,' above referred to. Schanz's reasoning in the passage quoted is thus invalidated in so far as changes are accounted for by long lapse of time, and while every assumption in a matter of this kind may be regarded as provisional, we are in the meantime justified in regarding \( \text{M} \) as a third witness agreeing in some things with \( \text{A} \), in others supporting \( \Pi \), and also giving independent testimony for some readings which have hitherto depended on the inferior evidence of Ven. \( \Xi \), Mon. \( q \), Vind. \( E \), or Flor. a c x a' γ'. This opinion rests upon the following grounds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A M</th>
<th>II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>328 D ὀᾶλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς—ἵναι</td>
<td>om.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; D ὑπενίαυς</td>
<td>νεανύσκους</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; D ἡχαῖρω</td>
<td>χαῖρω γε</td>
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<tr>
<td>330 A ὀπάνυ τι—ἐπιεικῆς</td>
<td>om.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>342 B ὀη οὔτε αὐτῆς</td>
<td>om.</td>
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<tr>
<td>343 A χρὴν</td>
<td>χρὴ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>346 E ὀᾶλλ', ὅπερ—παρασκευάζει</td>
<td>om.</td>
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I.

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<td>328 D ὀᾶλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς—ἵναι</td>
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<td>om.</td>
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II.

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<th>A M</th>
<th>II</th>
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<tr>
<td>358 E ἄτι ὄν τε</td>
<td>τί οἴον τε</td>
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<tr>
<td>358 C ὀᾶλάθειαν</td>
<td>ἄλθειαν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>356 A ἄτομ.</td>
<td>ἀῦ μέγα δύνανται</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>357 A ἡξυνοκόσ ἡ</td>
<td>ἐννοικόη</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>372 C ὀσύκων</td>
<td>συκών</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>373 A om.</td>
<td>καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Hermes xii. p. 181 (Berlin, 1877).
of Plato's Republic.

II. 377 E ὁ κακῶς τῶ
379 A om.
381 A om.
382 E om.
383 B ὁ παιῶν

III. 389 D ἧκολάσεως Α: κολά-

σαι ὡς Μ
394 D ὁ ἐγὼ—γάρ δὴ
401 C ὁ αὐρα
402 C οἱ ὁμεθα
403 B ὁ δόξη
404 D ὁ ἐν τῷ
405 C ὁ λυγιζόμενος
407 B ὁ μὲν
408 C ὁ ὅθότατα
411 D ἡ γενομένον
414 E ὁ δημοιουγομένη
416 C παρασκευάσσαθαι

IV. 421 A ὁ ἐχουσιν
423 B αὐξομένη
425 C τὰ ἀγοραία
427 E μὴ οὐ βοηθέων
429 A ὁ ἑιρήσθαι
437 C ἡ ἐρωτήστων (corr. from ἐρωτώντως Α)
438 C ὁ οὐ δεῖ (corr.): ὁ οὐ Μ
443 B ἡ τελευταῖοι

V. 451 B ὁ φόνου καὶ καθαρῶν
460 D τιτθαίς
461 C τοῦτων
462 C ὁ κομιδῇ μὲν οὐν—
κατὰ ταύτα (M om. ὁ πόλει)
463 B ὁ οἴ δή
### On the Text of this Edition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AM</th>
<th>II</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>V. 464 E</strong> οὐαγάγην</td>
<td>ἀγάγης</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>465 C</strong> οἴπαιντροφίαν Α</td>
<td>παιδοτρόφος</td>
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<td></td>
<td>παιδοτροφία Μ</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>466 B</strong> ἐφαμέν</td>
<td>ἐφαμέν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>468 C</strong> και ἡδεῖν</td>
<td>και ηδεῖν</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>469 A</strong> ἀνθρώπων—θεοῦ</td>
<td>ομ.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>470 A</strong> φοβηθησόμεθα</td>
<td>φοβηθησόμεθα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>472 B</strong> τάδε χρῆ</td>
<td>χρῆ τάδε</td>
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<td>ομ.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>478 B</strong> ἐφαμέν</td>
<td>ἐφαμέν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>„</td>
<td>ομ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>479 C</strong> οὐ (ὡς Μ)</td>
<td>ὡς</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>479 C D</strong> οὐδ' εἴναι—μάλλον</td>
<td>ομ.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| VI. 487 C | ταύτην |
| **488 A** χαλεπὸν πάθος | χαλεπὸν τὸ πάθος |
| **490 D** τῶν | τῶν μὲν |
| „ | τής διαβολῆς |
| **504 B** ἀλλη | ἀλλ' ἡ |
| „ | ἀπολείπων |
| **505 A** ἡ | ἡ καὶ |
| **506 B** τελέως | παντελῶς |
| **507 B** οὗτι ταυτα | ομ. |

| VII. 522 C | τὸ ποῖον |
| **529 C** ἐκ ὑπτίας μὲν | ἐκ ὑπτίας νέων |
| **533 A** μοι | ἐμοὶ |
| „ | ἦ πρὸς θεραπεῖαν |
| **536 A** τὰ τοιοῦτα σκοπεῖν | τὰ τοιοῦτα σκοπεῖν |
| **538 C** πρὸς τοὺς ἀποτομέονος | προσαποτομέονος |
| **540 B** κατακοσμεῖν | κατακοσμεῖν |
| „ | δεξ' ἐτῶν |

| VIII. 543 B | ὡς |
| „ | διεληλυθας |
| **544 C** καὶ ἡ πασῶν | καὶ πασῶν |
A M

VIII. 547 E τοιούτους
554 B ὁτοῦ χρόνου
556 A οὔτε γ'
559 C ὁτὸν τῶν
560 B ὑποστρεφόμεναι
„ E ὑπαιδευσίαν
561 A τὴν τῶν
„ A ὡμάλα
562 B προφθείτο
„ B ἀπώλλυν
„ D αὐτῆς
564 A καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις
„ E σμικρὰ
569 C ὑπίρ δούλων
IX. 571 C καὶ τίνας
572 A ἐὰν
„ A ἐλθὼν
„ D ἐκάστων
573 A ὅταν
„ A αἱ ἄλλαι
„ D διακυβερνᾶ ὑπέρ τοῦ πλείον γε
574 C ὄπως εἰς τὴν τίς παντύλα προφθείτο καὶ τίνας ὁδεῖν
578 E ὑπέρ τοῦ πλείον καὶ ἀνήρ
579 C καὶ ἔξω τῆς παντύλας ὁδεῖν
581 A ὁδεῖν
584 B τούτο
X. 597 B ἐν τῇ φύσει
598 B ὑπορρῳ ἀρα πον ὑπεράνθους τῆς παντύλας τήσαν
600 D ἐπιστατήσωσι τῆς παντύλας ὑπεράνθους τήσαν
601 A ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις
„ E ὑπηρετήσει
602 A ὁπώς εἰς τῆς παντύλας
„ D καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι
603 E τῆς τύχης

of Plato's Republic. 77
The fifty-five places which are marked with ° in the foregoing list afford ample evidence that the main text of M is independent of II. But for the purpose of testing the relationship between M and A, these passages may be neglected, for they merely show that both MSS. agree so far in a sound tradition. What is correct in both comes from the archetype and does not prove any closer affinity.

In one place, IV. 437 D, M is free from the suspicion of error which attends the reading of A. In another, III. 389 D, the reading of M is intermediate, and accounts for the corruption of II. It remains then to consider those places in which A and M agree in readings (1) erroneous or (2) doubtful.

(1) In the twelve places, which are here marked with an obelus †, the two MSS. are clearly following the same mistaken original. But it is still an open question whether the later is derived from the earlier, or whether they are both derivatives from an older copy in which these errors were already to be found. Such changes as those in III. 411 D (from γενομένου to γενομένου), VI. 487 C (from ταύτης to τάυτης), X. 603 E (from ψυχῆς to τύχης), may have occurred at an early stage of the tradition.

In IV. 437 C A hesitates between two readings, the first hand having written ἐρωτῶντος, and the diorthotes having corrected this to ἐρῶντος, which is the reading of M. This being so, it is not a little remarkable that in II. 383 B, M gives ἐνωτείσθαι, the reading of A¹, but not of the diorthotes, who has changed it to ἐνωτείσθαι. The reading μὲν for µέν (529 C) is so widely spread that it may be assumed
of Plato's Republic. 79

to be an early corruption, and réōv is by no means certain.

There remains τι ὡν τε (Π. 358 E), a mistaken reading, but one into which an early copyist might easily have fallen, and ἐν τοῖς for ἑρέποις (Χ. 601 Α), which forms part of a phrase supplied in the margin by the diorthotes of Α, and therefore not with certainty attributable to the MS. from which Α was copied.

(2) So much for the erroneous agreement of Μ with Α. There remain fifty-one places which may be considered doubtful. In most of these the reading of Π has been rejected by recent editors in deference to the authority of Α. If they are right in this, the same argument recurs:—Α and Μ agree in following the archetype, which proves nothing as to their special affinity. Where all three MSS. are in error, as in Χ. 604 Α, Π shows a further stage of corruption, and the error is not one which commenced with Α. For it is presupposed in Π, which ex hypothesi is independent of the Α tradition. In IV. 437 Α there is a reading which appears significant. Α seems originally to have read πον, the reading of Π. An early corrector changed this to η ὡν, and wrote πον in the margin. Μ has η ὡν, and η ὡν is the true reading. In IX. 576 Α, on the other hand, the true reading ἀπερησ is absent from Α Π Μ, but is given as a variant by Α² in the margin. If Μ were copied from Α, the scribe would surely have availed himself of this. With regard to the omissions not marked with ο, viz. Π. 373 Α, 379 Α, 381 Α, 382 Ε, it may be reasonably argued that Π is right, although not demonstrably so, for the words supplied are not necessary to the sense. But the error, if so be, is one which may have occurred at any period. Even in the few cases, such as ΗΗ. 408 Ε, Σ. 451 Β, VI. 488 Α, VIII. 564 Α, where it may be thought that the advantage is on the side of Π, this would indicate affinity between Α and Μ, but would not prove the derivation of the later from the earlier MS.

When all is said, the amount of agreement here exhibited
proves a close relationship between A and M, but does not necessitate the inference of direct derivation.

### § 5. II. What then is to be inferred from the places in which M agrees with II while differing from A?

In the following list $A = A + A^\circ$, that is the places are discounted in which the reading of II M is anticipated by an early corrector of A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>II M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>330 C</td>
<td>ἵπερ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>332 C</td>
<td>ἐφη ὄ προς</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>339 B</td>
<td>καὶ δίκαιον φῆς</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>342 A</td>
<td>δεῖ αἰεὶ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>344 E</td>
<td>οὐδὲ τι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>345 C?</td>
<td>πιαίνεις c. γρ. ποι-μαίνεις</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347 C</td>
<td>δεῖ δὲ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>349 B</td>
<td>πλέων</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>352 D</td>
<td>ὄστ' ἐμοὶ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. 358 A</td>
<td>om.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; E</td>
<td>πλέον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>359 C</td>
<td>ἐπαντοφόρῳ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; C</td>
<td>νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; D</td>
<td>μυθολογοῦσι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; D</td>
<td>ἄλλο μὲν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360 E</td>
<td>τί οὖν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>364 D</td>
<td>λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοὶ τε ὅστρεπτοι δὲ τε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; D</td>
<td>om.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>366 A</td>
<td>ἀξίμιοι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>374 B</td>
<td>οἰκοδόμον, ἵνα—γίγνοιτο</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; C</td>
<td>σκυτοτόμων</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>378 D</td>
<td>τοιαύτα μᾶλλον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. 387 C</td>
<td>ὑπὸ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>390 A</td>
<td>νεανικεύματα</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of Plato's Republic. 81

III. 392 A περιορίζομεν οίς
       395 C ἵνα ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως
       396 D ἑαυτοῦ
       398 A τε εἰς
       399 C ἀποβαίνοντα
       401 C ἀνεμόμενοι
       402 D διότι
       404 A τε καὶ ἀνάγκη

IV. 421 D διαφέρει
       431 A τοῦ
       432 C φράσεως
       433 E τούτο
       434 C ὥστε λέγομεν
       435 B ἑαυτῇ
       439 D ἑτερον
       440 E εἴδος
       443 A μὲν καὶ
       „ D ομί.

V. 450 A ταῦτα
       „ C πειρῶ ἂν
       451 B λέγειν δὲ
       453 E ὁμολογοῦμεν
       466 A φύλακας ποιοῦμεν
       469 E βαλλόντος

VI. 491 C πάντως
       496 C τῷ δικαίῳ
       „ D ἀποστάς
       497 B ἐκπέπτειν
       498 B φιλοσοφία
       502 B ἐσθ’ ὡστις
       504 D ομί.

VII. 516 E οὗτος
       518 D δεῖ, μηχανήσασθαι

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A

VII. 521 B ὃι περὶ
526 D προστών
527 C καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς
528 D μετὰ ταῦτης
534 D πάντα ταῦτα
537 E καλόν

VIII. 552 D τί οὖν;
558 B ἀπαινῆ ἀυτὰ
561 A τὸ μὲν
567 B ὑπεξαίρειν

IX. 582 D οὖσος
584 D ἀλλ' ὡς
585 C ἀληθέως καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ
597 E τριγυροστιούς

X. 601 D ἦν ἁν
602 B τὸ δὲ δὴ

II M

ὁι περὶ
προστῶν (Μ)
καὶ δη πρὸς
μετ' αυτη (so Bekker)
ταῦτα πάντα
κακῶν
ὁδηλον ἐφη: τί οὖν;
ἀπαινε ταυτα
ὅτοι τε μὲν
ὑπεξαίρειν
οὐτος
ἀλλως
ἀληθιασ και αυτο
tragydiosioiμος
ὁρο ἁν
τὸ δη

§ 6. Schanz's theory would assume that in these places M has been emended from a MS. of the family of II. Is this assumption probable? Let us first consider the places where omissions are supplied or words added:—

II. 358 A, 359 C, D (bis), 364 D, 366 A, 374 B, 378 D; III. 395 C, 398 A; IV. 443 D; V. 504 D; VIII. 552 A.

Of these II. 358 A, 359 D bis, 378 D, 395 C; IV. 443 D; VI. 504 D; VIII. 552 A (eight in all) are probably genuine readings, and in that case need not be accounted for by derivation from II, while they certainly point to a source independent of A. But if they are not genuine, the supposition that they are borrowed by M from II is weakened by the fact that the not less plausible additions in II. 366 A, 373 A, 379 A, 381 A, 382 E, have not been similarly borrowed. (See above, pp. 74, 75.)

The interpolations in II. 366 A μονον and 374 B ἀλλα σκυτοσαμων must indeed be due either to II or to an ancestor of II, it is impossible to say how far removed. But the
different position of the words ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον in the two MSS., makes against the supposition that they came directly from Π to Μ. And it is not impossible that they are genuine: see below, p. 112.

Two passages, v. 453 E and vi. 485 Α ὁμολογήσθω, in which the reading of Μ is offered as an alternative in Π, ὁμολογεῖσθω Μ, ὁμολογήσθω Π, rather point to the conclusion that Μ's text, here differing from Α, is independent also of Π, since Π is here corrected from the archetype of Μ. The omission of λυστοὶ δὲ in Π. 364 D is clearly right, and is not likely to have been derived from Π, supposing Μ to have been copied from a derivative of Α. The interpolation of μόνον (perhaps corrupted from an earlier μὲν) in Π. 366 λ, and the insertion of ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον at different points in 374 B, are wholly insufficient grounds on which to establish any connexion between Μ and Π. They rather point to a source anterior to both, which may or may not be earlier than Α. If the forty-seven readings marked with ο in the foregoing list, or any of them, are genuine, the common source of Π and Μ represents a tradition independent of Α. Besides retaining the words which Α omits, in particular the forty letters in vi. 504 D, that source in all probability gave ποιμαίνειν (Ι. 345 C), πλέων (349 B), στρεπτοὶ δὲ τε (Π. 364 D), ἀξίμιοι ἡμῶν (366 A), ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον in mg. (374 B), μὴν (ΙV. 443 λ), ὁμολογοῖμεν (V. 453 E), ὁμολογεῖσθο (VI. 485 λ), παινός (491 D), τῶν δικαιῶν (496 C), ὑπερεύθων ἡμῖν ὑποθεσίων (498 B), ἐσθ' ὑπ' ἑαυτήν (502 B), μετ' αὐτήν (VII. 528 D).

The amount of variation and corruption which is here implied, may easily have come into existence long before the ninth century. The certainty of corruption after all is limited to the three places here marked with †.

III. So far a presumption has been raised, (1) that Μ, ΑΠ versus Μ while closely related to Α, is not necessarily derived from it; (2) that where Α and Μ differ, the difference need not be accounted for by the correction of Μ through Π. This
view has still to be confirmed by considering the passages in which M differs from A and II.

§ 7. M upholds the following sixteen correct readings which have hitherto rested on weak MS. authority, as they are ignored both by A and II:

I. 330 B πω ποιέων Μ Κ χ υ Vind. F πω ποιέων Α Π
347 A δ ον Μ β ον α' γ' τ ω' Α υ' Π
" Ε πότερον ἀληθεστέρως Μ χ υ Vind. F πότερον ός ἀληθεστέρως Α Π

III. 402 B καλ εἰκόνας Μ Ξ q χ υ β' καλ εἰκόνας Α Π
406 D μακράν Μ Ξ x μακράν Α Π

IV. 425 D δικῶν λήδερος Μ q K q ς α' β' δικῶν λήδερος Α Π
" D το παράπαν Μ Κ α c το πάμπαν Α Π
441 C είτος εκάστον Μ Ξ q x είτι εκάστον Α Π

V. 462 B ξυνδό Μ Ξ x q γ Κ κ κ Κ ινδό Α Π
472 A λόγον λέγεων τε Μ Ξ a c x λέγεων λόγον τε Α Π

VI. 492 E εξαιρώμεν M Fic. εξαιρώμεν Α Π

VIII. 564 E βλάσεε Μ M α c x γ' βλάσσεεν Α βλάσσεεν Π pr.
IX. 574 D επιλίπη Μ Ξ a c x επιλείπη Α επιλείπη Π

X. 607 B ἀπολελειγηθέν M Ξ q c ἀπολελειγήθέν Α Π
611 C θεατέων Μ M α c c ς ά γ' διαθεατέον Ξ διαθεατέον Α Π

N.B.—The reading ά το καλ εφ' υν, v. 479 C, in which M agrees with a c x a' γ' m υ Vind. D, E, F, Athen., now proves to be the reading of Par. A.

And in X. 606 E άξιος, for which Π used to be the single early witness, is now supported by Α Π M.

2. In the following places, M, while differing from A Π, is anticipated by a corrector of A, though not in every case by the diorthotes:

A Π

III. 411 C γεγένηται
415 C σίδηρος φύλαξ

IV. 424 B ἐπιφρονεότατιν
430 E φαίνονται

V. 471 A ού πολέμιοι
474 D ἐπαινεθέσται
of Plato's Republic.

A Π

VI. 486 C ἀνόητα
505 B εἶδέναι
VII. 525 D δύο ὁς
537 E ἐμπίπλαται

VIII. 548 B οὗ φανερῶς
549 A τις
557 A φόβων
IX. 582 C σοφὸς
584 B ἐφην δ' ὁ
X. 613 E ὅρα

It will perhaps be said that in these passages the copyist of M or its original had before him the emended text of A; but if so, why in other instances should he have preferred the first hand to the corrector? See Book I. 351 C, II. 383 B, VII. 524 D (M), X. 612 B. The argument is not a strong one, but it at least suggests the alternative possibility, that, in the preceding instances, A may have been corrected from an ancestor of M. And it is observable in this connexion, that while alternative readings occur frequently on the margin of M, in the places here referred to the readings of A¹ do not appear at all.

3. The following readings, for which M is the oldest witness, are improbable or doubtful:

A Π

I. 332 E ἐν τῷ
340 A αὐτὸς γὰρ Ὑπασύμαχος
II. 365 B παρασκευασμένῳ
370 B πρᾶξει
III. 403 B αὐτῇ ἡ ἡδονή
V. 475 B τιμῶσθαι
VI. 495 A ὅταν
496 A πάντως μικρὸν, Α, πᾶν
σμικρὸν Π

M A°

ἀνόητα
eἶναι
ὅς (M)
ἐμπίπλαται Α°
ἐμπίπλαται Μ

φανερῶς
tis
φόβων
ὁ σοφὸς
ἐφην
ὁρα ei

οτ.
αὐτὸς Ὑπασύμαχος
παρασκευασμένῳ
πρᾶξει
αὐτήν ἡδονή (η and v confused)
tιμῶσθαι
ὅς ἂν
πάντως μικρὸν
§ 8. 4. The evidence so far has tended to show (1) that M in a few passages confirms the genuineness of a text which is otherwise supported only by late MSS. (2) That while thus to some extent independent both of A and Π, it agrees very closely with A and still more closely with the text from which A has been corrected. (3) That it notwithstanding diverges from that text in more than seventy places, where it stands in agreement with Π. (4) That it is not sufficiently removed from Π in point of time to make it probable that in these places it has been altered through contamination with derivatives of Π.

It remains to support the position that, of the inferior MSS., M may be safely taken as the most competent witness. Schanz, in the article already referred to, Hermes XII. p. 181, concludes a careful examination of the MSS. which he regards as derivatives of A by stating that Vat. m is the only one about which for some time he hesitated in forming this conclusion; or rather, he takes Ξ m v t as a sub-family of which m is the oldest representative. The relation of M to m (whose age is uncertain) is therefore now to be exemplified.

M and m M is (1) closely related to m, and (2) it is far more free from corruption. Both points may be illustrated from a passage taken almost at random, viz. III. 390 B—v. 465 A.

(1) Close agreement of M m:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>496 C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>499 E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>546 C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X.</td>
<td>598 D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>607 C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>612 A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of Plato’s Republic.

M &c.

III. 390 B η βία
392 A οἶς οὖνος
394 D ισός δὲ καὶ
398 C ποιά ἄττα δοκεῖ
403 A ὑβρις
415 C σιδηροῦς (et A)

IV. 420 E ἐπικλίναντες
425 D περὶ συμβολαίων
428 C ἐφι

V. 457 B ἐπὶ γυμναῖς ταῖς γυναιξὶ (so quoted by Eusebius and Theodoret)

461 A θύσας
465 A πρὸς πρεσβύτερον

In particular these MSS. show coincidences of a minute kind in the elision of final vowels, and this although M frequently avoids elision (e. g. II. 361 C ἀλλὰ η’τω, III. 408 C εἶ δὲ αἰσχροκερδῆς, X. 614 B κομισθεῖς δὲ αἰκαδε). The following are a few out of many such coincidences:

II. 357 C τί δ’ ὑπὲρ τέ
374 E οἴμαι ἐγγού’, ἦ δ’ ὅς
III. 390 C οὐ μᾶ τῶν Δ’, ἦ δ’ ὅς
399 D τί δ’ ἀλλοποιοῦς

(2) The following list of corruptions of M and m within the same limits, viz. in V. 466–480, may serve to substantiate the second assertion, that M is considerably less corrupt than m:

M

466 A εὐδαίμων om. pr. (perhaps rightly?)

A καὶ ἀμείωνων om. pr.

B ποι for πη (Ξ)

B μη’ ἀρκέσῃ

1 The agreement of M m in this place with the quotations of the Fathers, affords an additional argument for the independence of the M tradition.
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M

466

467

468

C διαφέρειν

469

C οὖν after ἄν erased

E μέλη for μέλη (Ξ)

E διακωλύσεις

470 A καὶ τμήσεως for τμήσεως

E καὶ (before σφόδρα) om.

471 A ὡς οὐ for οὔ

D μάχοιτο τὸ

D στρατεύοιτο pr. for συστρατεύοιτο

mi

C τῷ ὄντι om.

D εἰ for ἢ

E τῶν om.

B δὲ οὖν for εἰ οὖν (Ξ)

C οὐκ for καὶ οὐκ Π

C διαφέρειν

A αὐτῶν for αὐτῶν (τ Ξ)

A γεωργῶν for γεωργῶν

C τὰριστεῖον (τὸ ἀρ. Ξ)

D διηνεκέσαι (Ξ)

A εὐδαιμόνων (τ)

C οὖν after ἄν om. (Ξ)

C ἢ οὐκ ἢ for ἢ οὐ (Ξ)

D δὲ δὴ for δὲ

skulêušeis

E διακωλύσεις

A καὶ τμήσεως for τμήσεως

B μὲν om.

B οὖν om. (Ξ)

B οὐδὲ for οὐδὲν

D ὁμολογομένη for ὁμολο-

γομένη

E καὶ (before σφόδρα) om.

A ὡς οὐ for οὐ

B ἐθέλουσι for ἐθελήσουσι

C ταῦτα γε (Ξ)

C μουσθήσεται

D μάχοιτο τὸ

D στρατεύοιτο for συστρα-

τεύοιτο

E ἡ (before πολιτεία) om.
of Plato's Republic. 89

472 A συγγυγώσκει

A λέγεις for λέγης (sic
 A¹)
B γίγνεται for γίγνεσθαι
C οί νῦν for ἡμῖν
D ἐκεῖνης
D ἰκανῶς misplaced
E δυνατῶν τ' ἄν sed in
rasura for δυνατότατ'
473 A οὕτως om. pr.
B ἄν before ἀγαπών om.
(τ Ξ)
E λέγεινom. pr.(probably
right?)
E εὐδοκιμήσειν for εὐδαι-
μονήσειν (but mg.
yp. εὐδαιμονήσειν)

474

D ἐπαινεῖται for ἐπαινεθῆ-
σεται (given as an
alternative by Α²)
475 A φιλοτίμως
B τούτων om. pr.
D πολὺ pr. for πολλοὶ

III

A συγγυγώσκει
A καὶ ἵσωσ for ἵσως (Ξ)
B γίγνεται for γίγνεσθαι(Ξ)
B ζητοῦντε for ζητοῦντες
D ἦ for εὑ (Ξ)

E εὐδοκιμήσειν (Ξ pr.)

E οὖ om.
A γυμνοῦν for γυμνοὺς
A τὸ for τῷ
B σοι for σὺ (before οὕτω)
B λέγοντας for λέγοντες
D ἐπαινεῖται for ἐπαινε-
θῆσεται

A φιλοτίμως
D πολὺ for πολλοὶ
D ὃς ὃ for ὃς γ'
E τοὺς for τούτο
E αὑτῷ for αὐτῷ
It will be seen at once that the errors of M are not only more numerous, but more grave. And it is also noticeable that of the variants which belong to the M tradition one, λέγεις 472 A, agrees with the first hand of A, another, ἐπανείσται 474 D, was acknowledged by the diorthotes (or an early corrector) of A, while some of the variants in which M stands alone, e.g. the omissions in 466 A, 468 B, 473 E, and χαλέπην (476 D) in which Ξ agrees, are defensible readings. There remain thirty-six errors in M to fifty-seven in m.

m The character of Vat. m sufficiently appears from what has been already said. Vat. m is referred to in this edition only where in consequence of the lacuna in VI and VII the direct evidence of M is not available.

§ 9. Vat. Θ (Vaticanus 266), which was highly valued by Stallbaum, is shown by M. Schanz to be derived from Ven. t as far as III. 389 D, and in the remainder of the
Republic from II. It is said to be the second volume of Vat. Δ, which is in close agreement with the Bodleian MS. It has now and then a peculiar reading, but where it has any pretentions to independence it generally agrees with Vat. r, which on the whole seems to have a higher claim. The Raudnitz MS. (Schneider’s Lobcovicianus), is of the same family, which with rare exceptions comes into use only where there is a lacuna in II. It may be mentioned incidentally, though it is a matter of slight consequence, that the corrector of M and the writers of the supplementary leaves (M) are frequently in agreement with r. This MS. (with Lob. Θ Vind. E) supplies at least one indisputable reading I. 354 B ἐγὼ μοι (Α Π ἐγὼμαι).

Here and elsewhere it is uncertain whether an obviously correct reading, appearing only in a comparatively late MS., is derived from earlier tradition or from Byzantine conjecture. Critics have been fond of adopting this last supposition; the rashness of which, however, becomes evident, when it is considered that the reading ἐπανεἰλθαι V. 474 D, formerly supposed peculiar to some of the later MSS., has now been found in a text of the twelfth century, and is given as an alternative by the diorthotes of Par. A. Be that as it may, no text of the Republic can be constituted aright without placing some reliance on late MSS. Par. K for example, like Par. D, is in the main a derivative K from Π: but, besides agreeing in special points with q, it has here and there a singular reading, which it would be unwise to neglect, and one at least, which although clearly interpolated is demonstrably early, and cannot possibly be due to conjecture (Schneider vainly argues against this position). In IX. 580 D, the reading of K (fifteenth century) λογιστικὸν ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμικὸν is manifestly anterior to the readings of Α τὸ λογιστικὸν, and Π λογιστικὸν, and helps to account for them. This being so, it deserves consideration whether the reading πολλοὶς in X. 615 B, though only a correction of πολλοὶ in Par. D, may not be D
the original of the impossible reading πολλοὶ in Par. A, for which Ξ gives πολλῶρ, the received reading. It is on the whole most probable that the copyists or correctors of the fifteenth century MSS. from which the first printed editions were chiefly taken, paid more respect to earlier MSS. than to the conjectures of their contemporaries. Conjecture has of course played a certain part in the interpolation of texts, but MS. conjecture is generally traceable to some mis-writing having introduced obscurity which the scribe has instinctively sought to remove. This process began early and was never discontinued. It has aggravated corruption, but, except in the removal of the simplest clerical errors, can seldom be credited with the restoration of an original text.

§ 10. Æ The MS. Venetus Ξ, 184, of the M family (closely related to A), was written in the fifteenth century by a scholar, Johannes Rhosus, for the learned Cardinal Bessarion, who like the Bishop of Hierapolis, amused himself with corrections of the text. The following is Signor Castellani’s description of it.


Venetus Ξ is of some historical interest, as it appears to
have been a chief source of the editio princeps, the Aldine Plato of 1513. In more than thirty-six places where Ξ differs from ΑΠΜ, the Aldine follows this MS.:—even in some passages where the Basle editions and Stephanus give a different reading. These coincidences include two lacunae:

VII. 533 Ε ἄλλ' . . . εν ψυχῇ om. Ξ Ald. Steph. (where the reading of Ξ is unnoticed by Bekker);

X. 604 D ἱστρικῇ τῇν om. Ξ Ald. Steph. :

and such distinctive readings as

Π. 359 Ε δακτύλιον φέρειν ὄν

367 D δικίαν δ ἐβλάπτει

VIII. 544 E βεβάσατα

562 Β ἀπόλλυσιν (again unnoticed by Bekker).

Places where Aldus agrees with Ξ against Steph. are:

Π. 360 Ε διαισθάνεσθαι Ξ (διεσθάνεσθαι Ald.): διαισθάνεται Steph.

IV. 433 C ὑποληφθὲν Ξ Ald. (and Λ1): ὑπολειφθὲν Steph.

IX. 587 Ε ἤδιαστον Ξ (not quoted by Bekker) Ald.: ἤδιον Steph.

X. 607 D ἀπολογησαμένη Ξ Ald. (and Λ1): ἀπολογησομένη Steph.

620 C περιοῦσαν Ξ Ald.: περιοῦσαν Steph.

These facts are enough to raise a strong presumption. But Aldus was not tied to one MS. For in Π. 358 Ε he read τί τε ὃν τυγχάνει with Flor. b, in 377 Ε κακῶς ύπνίας with the same MS., and in VIII. 560 Λ ἐπιστρεφόμεναι with q ΔΚ (a correction of ὑποστρεφόμεναι the reading of Π).

In Π. 363 Β he may have corrected δικίας, the reading of Ξ, to εἰδικίας by referring to the Odyssey.

Ξ still remains the chief or sole authority for the reading of several places which have gone wrong in ΑΠΜ. It is enough to point to—

I. 331 D ἔφη ἦγ' . . . ἔφη ἦγ' ΑΠΜ

III. 407 C τινὰς . . . τινὸς Α Π Μ

IV. 434 E ἐκεῖνο . . . ἐκεῖ Α Π Μ

440 Ε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ . . . το λογιστικοῦ Α Π Μ
IV. 440 E καὶ τοῦτον . . . καὶ τοῦτο Α II Μ
442 C ύπο τοί λόγου . . . ύπο τον λόγων Α Π Μ
,, Ε τοῦτο αὐτὸν . . . τοῦτον αὐτῶν Α II Μ (τοῦτον αὐτὸ σεj.
Schneider)
444 B τῷ τοῦ . . . τοῦ ὅ' αὖ δουλεύειν Α Π Μ
V. 495 Α ἄλλως . . . ἄλλος Α Π Μ
VII. 534 Α ὅσων . . . ὅσων Α Π Μ
VIII. 544 C διαφέρουσα . . . διαφεύγουσα Α II Μ
557 E ἀρχεῖν καὶ δικάζειν . . . ἀρχῆς καὶ δικάζης Α Π Μ
(δικάζεις Π pr.)
IX. 590 E βουλεύται ξς (x v lamb. Stob.) . . . βουλεύεται ΑΠΜ
X. 604 C αἵρετ (ξ q) . . . ἐρεῖ Α Μ (ἐρrei Π)
611 C διαθετέων . . . διαθετέων Α Π : θεατέων Μ
614 A ἐκάτερον ξ corr. . . . ἐκάτερον Α Μ (lacuna in Π)
615 B πολλῷ πολλοί Α Μ (πολλοῖς D corr.)

See also VII. 532 D διάλογον, now supported by M.

On the important fact of the occasional agreement of ξ with the papyrus fragment of the Phaedo, see below, p. 98.

x Flor. x is another MS. without which the apparatus criticus would be imperfect. It is of the M family, but has been corrected from other sources. See especially VIII. 549 A δουλεῖς τίς αὖ.

§ II. q Flor. β' is also a ‘learned’ MS. (Laurent. 80. 19) with which q (Munich 237, fifteenth century) constantly agrees. The date of β' being uncertain, it is hard to say which is derived from its fellow, but as q has been collated not only by Bekker, but after him by Schneider in the most complete manner, it has been thought safer to refer to q. Bekker's high estimate of this MS. is on the whole justified, although Hermann has rightly rejected many of its readings in deference to the authority of Par. A. The two MSS. q β' represent a recension based on the Π tradition, partly preserved also in Paris. D K, in which the defects of that tradition have been somewhat boldly supplemented with interpolations which the examination of other MSS. enables us to detect.
For example:

| I. | 333 E φιλάξασθαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν |
| II. | 358 E τί οίνοτα | 360 B περιθεῖτο om. |
|    | 364 E μετά των ἐορτῶν τε καὶ θυσιῶν (for διὰ θυσιῶν) |
|    | 365 C πρόθυρα μὲν γὰρ |
|    | 366 D ὁμοιῆθη (et Par. K pr.) |
|    | „ E αὐτὸ δ’ ἐκάτερον om. pr. |
|    | 368 C φαύλου |
|    | 381 D βίων δόροις (supplying an object for ἀγείρονσαν) |
| IV. | 437 D ἦ ποτοῦ (conflatum ex ἦ oὐ et ποῦ) |
| V. | 450 D καλῶς εἰχε παραμυθεῖσθαι |
|    | „ E οὔ φαύλων (for φίλων) |
|    | 459 B δεῖ ἄκραν (for δεῖ ἄκραν εἶναι) |
|    | 475 B οὐ ἄν τινα (for ἄν ἄν τινος) |
|    | „ D ἐπιθέουσι (for περιθέουσι) |
|    | 476 B ὑπ’ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν |
| VI. | 501 C οτε (for ὅτι) |
|    | 502 B καὶ πῶς and γενόμενος om. |
| VII. | 529 C ἐν θαλάττη ἦ ἐν γῇ (for ἐν γῇ ἦ ἐν θαλάττῃ) |
| VIII. | 544 E βίβαντα q corr. (βίβαντα q pr.) |
|    | 545 E μὴ τραγικῶς q, μὴ inter versus (with ὡς δὲ σπουδῆι following) |
|    | 548 A περὶ ταῦτα ὅς ἐν περὶ ταῦτα |
|    | 553 C μετὰ for κατὰ |
| IX. | 575 A τῶν αὐτοῦ ὅς τῶν αὐτῶν |
|     | 595 C τούτων om. |
| X. | 519 C σκέψατο |

This recension, however, remains responsible for some true readings which it would be unsafe to assume to be conjectural.

See for example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>q</th>
<th>A Π Μ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>365 D οὐθ’ ἡμῖν μελητέον</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<pre><code>| 370 A ῥάδιον |
</code></pre>
<p>| III. | 397 A μᾶλλον μιμήσεται | μᾶλλον διηγήσεται |</p>
The interpolations, or would-be emendations, of \( q \) and \( q \) corr., so far weaken the authority of this MS. as to render it an unsafe guide (for which reason several possible readings adopted by Bekker and Stallbaum have been rejected). And in accepting the readings above-mentioned, it may remain an open question whether they are conjectural or not. This question, which has been already touched upon, will be more fully considered below.

The principal MSS. of the Republic may accordingly be classified as follows:

1. \( A \ b \ a' \ y' \)
2. (1) \( \Pi \ D q^* \beta^* K^* \): (2) \( r \Phi \Theta \): (3) Vind. \( D \ E \ F \)
3. \( M \ E^* m a c x^* t v \)

Vcn. \( t \) and Flor. \( n \) are not referred to.

* Those marked with the asterisk are emended MSS., i.e. they admit readings derived from various sources and sometimes conjectural.
Textual Errors and Emendations.

The discovery of fragments of classical texts in Egypt § 12. on papyrus rolls, some of which are known to have been written before the Christian era, has brought out some unexpected results. 1. The texts so far deciphered, where they differ from our MSS. of the ninth and tenth centuries, differ almost always for the worse. 2. For the most part they confirm the received tradition. 3. Very rarely, and then only in minute particulars, have they confirmed the conjectural emendations of modern scholars. 4. On the other hand, they do occasionally support the authority of readings which have hitherto rested on the evidence of some late MS.

These remarks may be illustrated from the long fragment of the Phaedo discovered by Mr. Flinders Petrie and published by Professor Mahaffy. See an article by the present writer in the Classical Review for October and December, 1891, pp. 363–365, and 454–457.

1. The papyrus, besides several patent errors of slight importance, exhibits at least two striking variants, ἀνδραπο-δών for εὐήδη in 68 E, and ὡς ὅ ἐστὶν ὑπερέχει for ὅ ὃ ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ in 83 B. In the former case the scribe being familiar with the text has awkwardly anticipated a point which is presently to be made (viz. in 69 B); cp. Theaet. 158 c where for ὅ τι ξρέι the Bodleian MS. gives ὅ τι ξρόνω ξρέι, anticipating the mention of the time which occurs eight lines lower down. See also in the same dialogue 149 c where ἀτόποις is written in the Bodleian MS. for ἀτόκωις with ἀτοπώτατος half a page higher up. A somewhat similar instance occurs in Rep. v. 469 E in the v. r. διασκυλεύσεις for διακωλύσεις with σκυλεύσει occurring, as a prominent notion, in the same passage. In the latter of the two cases in the Phaedo, 83 B, a prosaic and somewhat late mode of expression is substituted for the simple and vivid language of Plato.
2. The only matter of any consequence in which the papyrus tends to invalidate the existing text is in §1 D, the passage about apparitions. Here our MSS. appear to have omitted a phrase which in the papyrus is unfortunately illegible. This *lacuna* has never been suspected by any scholar.

3. In the space which the papyrus covers there are nineteen places where modern scholars have proposed emendations, all of which have appeared to Schanz deserving of mention in his critical notes. Only one of these is confirmed by the papyrus. This is the rejection of the words ἐνεκά φασώ in §3 E, which was proposed at one time by K. F. Hermann but afterwards withdrawn by him.

4. On comparing the readings of the papyrus with the existing *apparatus criticus*, they are found, in eight instances at least, to be in agreement with Ε and the corrector of Π, both of the fifteenth century, and with no other MS. of Plato. These readings, then, which have hitherto been referred to the fifteenth century A.D., are found to have existed already in the third century B.C.

The same lessons, of caution in conjecture, and of trust in the persistence of tradition, have been taught by other similar discoveries. Among the papyri published in Mr. Kenyon’s *Classical Texts* (1891) is one containing a great part of the third ‘Letter of Demosthenes,’ on which F. Blass has written an instructive monograph in Fleckeisen’s *Jahrbuch für Klassischen Philologie* for 1892, pp. 33–44. He observes:

(1) That in eleven pages of Reiske’s edition, the papyrus gives sixty new readings which are clearly right.

(2) That twelve of these had been anticipated by conjecture, but except the proper name Εὐθόδικον for Εὐδίκον (Blass’ own emendation) only in matters of light moment (such as ἁγιώμοι for ἁγιών, τῷ for τῷ, γενέσθαι for γενήσεσθαι).

(3) Out of nineteen places in which Blass had admitted
conjectures into the text, nine only agree with the papyrus.

(4) On the other hand the papyrus supports the principle of not relying exclusively on one MS. in constituting a text. The readings of the later MSS. are in some instances confirmed.

Blass remarks that in another part of Demosthenes the proportion of successful conjecture might prove larger; but he adds that the reverse might be the case, as in the passage of the Phaedo.—(The emendation of an 'Epistle' is easier, because the language is less highly wrought; the orations would be copied with greater care, and they exist in more MSS. of the highest class.)

The observation of such facts is the best corrective for § 13. the extravagances to which textual criticism has been always liable; proceeding, as it does, at one time by the wholesale excision of supposed 'accretions,' at another by the detection of 'lacunae,' now relying on close resemblances of written characters, now on the hypothesis of the frequent substitution of glosses for the words which they explain. Each of these methods has a show of scientific precision, but, when indiscriminately applied, involves rash and unwarranted generalization from scattered instances. Palaeography, in particular, has supplied the textual critic with an armoury of weapons, in which as Bacon would have said 'opinio copiae causa est inopiae'; the *ductus literarum* often drawing the mind away insensibly from the context, which is the principal thing. The other main requirement, familiarity with the individual author, is also apt to be forgotten, and an attempt is made to emend Plato on the same principles which have proved applicable to Demosthenes or Isocrates. No MS. is without errors: but the most recent discoveries have tended to show that the preservation of ancient texts of the greatest authors has on the whole been extraordinarily successful. It is hardly paradoxical to say that all interpolation comes by way of
emendation, and that to ‘emend’ is mostly to interpolate. The various modes of so-called ‘scientific’ emendation are liable to one and the same fallacy, that of assuming, because a thing is known to have happened sometimes, that it must have happened indefinitely often. Whereas the available evidence tends to show, that the changes in MSS. between the tenth and fifteenth centuries were greater in the most important texts than in the ten centuries preceding.

§ 14. In the multiplication of MSS. at the revival of learning, all copies must have diverged from very few centres; since the remnants of the Classics which had found their way from Constantinople to Western Europe were enshrined in the comparatively small number of MSS. which had been rescued by the men who prized them. But in the earlier periods, those who (whether at Alexandria or at Constantinople) were preparing a copy that should be valued as authentic, had a choice of almost countless apographa of high repute at their disposal; and if the scribe followed too closely his immediate archetype, or himself fell prone into some error, the diorthotes who revised his work, in many cases the same person who wrote out the scholia, was able to correct the first hand and add alternative readings by the comparison of other texts, thus increasing the solid value of the recension. Under such conditions corruption would not proceed in an increasing ratio. At the same time this process has aggravated the difficulty of tracing the affiliation of MSS., readings belonging to different families having continually crossed each other, thus causing a mixture of traditions. The question remains, whether amongst the manifold corruptions of the fifteenth century, some grains of genuine tradition may not be preserved, having descended by some fortunate accident from the text or margin of some MS. which was then extant and has since been lost. There is a balance of probabilities here. On the one hand such MSS. must have been few and far between, but on the other hand the feebleness of conjecture
at best, and especially in the infancy of criticism, makes it antecedently improbable that Rhosus or Cardinal Bessarion, for example, should have hit, by mere intuition, on readings which had been lost for sixteen centuries. Between the time of the occupation of Constantinople by the Latins and its destruction by the Turks, notwithstanding the decline of learning, many copies even of classical works must have still existed which perished in the final conflagration. The example of Vat. r shows that Plato was sometimes written in two volumes. Is it likely that Arethas, the deacon of Patrae, would procure, or that Constantine, the Metropolitan of Hierapolis, would purchase, an incomplete book? If otherwise, there must have existed, perhaps for centuries, a second volume of Α (the Bodleian MS.) and a first volume corresponding to A, and on the margin of these correctors of the tenth century probably wrote many various readings from other recensions. This belief is justified by the instances in which the Petrie papyrus supports Ξ and the corrector of Π against the Bodleian. And the inference here indicated bears a striking analogy to Messrs. Hort and Westcott's conclusion respecting certain 'cursive' MSS. of the New Testament, which together with variations due 'to ordinary degeneracy of transmission,' contain others which 'supply important documentary evidence. They are virtually copies of minute fragments of lost MSS.' Introduction, pp. 144, 145; § 197.

Textual Errors.

1. Simple Clerical Errors.

(a) The mere mistaking between forms of letters is a less frequent cause of error than is often supposed, and almost always the mistaken letter has suggested some familiar word. For example:—

\[
\text{a for ο: \circ\text{πελειας for \circ\text{πελειας Π, III. 398 B.}}}
\]

\[
\text{o for e: προσήκου for προσήκεν (?) A (προσήκεν is the reading of Stobaeus), IV. 442 B.}
\]
\( \eta \) for \( \nu \): Confusion of \( \eta \) and \( \nu \). 

\( \zeta \nu \) for \( \zeta \nu \ \text{A}^1 \), I. 344 E: 

\( \text{kakouia} \) for \( \text{kakouieia} \) II, III. 401 A: \( \text{aiv} \) for \( \text{avth} \) II, III. 403 B.

\( \nu \) for \( \iota \): \( \tau \nu \ \text{dikaiow} \) for \( \tau \nu \ \text{dikaios} \) II, VI. 496 C.

\( \nu \) and \( \iota \): \( \text{yevoumenoi} \) for \( \text{gevoumenoi} \) M, VI. 496 C.

\( \lambda \) for \( \alpha \): \( \lambda \text{ipa} \) for \( \alpha \text{ipa} \) II, III. 401 C: \( \text{apo} \lambda \text{aein} \) for \( \text{apo} \lambda \text{aein} \ \text{A}^2 \), X. 606 B.

\( \delta \) for \( \lambda \): \( \text{apetutameba} \) for \( \text{apetutameba} \) M, X. 612 A.

\( \tau \) for \( \gamma \): Confusion of \( \tau \) and \( \gamma \). \( \text{plhtontos} \) for \( \text{plhgyntos} \) A, X. 604 C (this confirms the correction of V. 472 A): \( \text{hteisde} \) for \( \text{hgefitsde} \) A, X. 612 C.

\( \tau \) and \( \psi \): \( \tau \text{chys} \) and \( \psi \text{vys} \), II. 366 C, X. 603 E.

Compendia—The signs for \( \kappa \alpha \) and \( \omega \) have perhaps been confused in V. 471 A, where the v. r. \( \omega \) ov \( \text{polemioi} \) (A mg. M) perhaps stands for \( \kappa \alpha \ ov \text{polimioi} \)^1.

(b) More frequently the sound has been mistaken, as between \( \sigma \), \( \omega \) and \( \text{ov} \); between \( \eta \) and \( \varepsilon \); between \( \varepsilon \) and \( \alpha \); between \( \eta \) and \( \omega \); between \( \varepsilon \) and \( \eta \) and \( \iota \); between \( \nu \) and \( \omega \); \( \pi \) for \( \phi \): \( \text{pav} \) for \( \text{pavai} \) M pr., X. 610 C; \( \text{ab} \) for \( \text{av} \): \( \text{apola} \text{baw} \) for \( \text{apola} \text{aw} \) IX. 572 D (A M); \( \text{apola} \text{bein} \) for \( \text{apola} \text{bein} \) X. 606 B, an error shared by A PI M; cp. VIII. 544 C, where \( \text{diafe} \text{vyousa} \) for \( \text{diafe} \text{vyousa} \) (A PI M) is attributed by Schneider to a similar cause, the burring pronunciation of \( \gamma \); and lastly, but only in late MSS., between \( \text{e} \) and \( \text{e} \), e.g. \( \text{pevaavra} \) for \( \text{pi} \text{avra} \) VIII. 544 E. (Similarly \( \text{of} \) for \( \text{av} \): \( \text{ekko} \text{thistesai} \) for \( \text{ekkathistesai} \) M, II. 361 E.)

(c) Letters added or omitted.

a. Letters added: \( \text{anemoyme} \) for \( \text{neume} \) A, III. 401 C: 

\( \text{diasastaseis} \) for \( \text{diasastaseis} \) A, III. 407 C: \( \text{etet} \) for \( \text{zet} \) A PI M, 

IV. 440 C: \( \text{diasate} \text{ameneus} \) for \( \text{diasate} \text{ameneus} \) A pr., V. 474 A 

(\( \text{diasate} \text{ameneus} \ A^1 \), VI. 499 A): \( \text{parageneyme} \) for \( \text{paragyme} \) A,

---

^1 It is less apparent what \( \gamma \) the sign for \( \eta \)l\( \nu \), first written, then marked with dots and then erased, in II after \( \tau \text{im} \nu \nu \) in II. 359 C can have meant. Perhaps it originated in dittography of \( \eta \nu \).
of Plato's Republic.

VI. 487 B: ὑποστρεφόμεναι for ὑποστρεφόμεναι Π (corr. to ἐπιστρ. in q D K), VIII. 560 A: προσετῶς for προσετῶς Α, VIII. 565 E: so perhaps ἐπηνύγκαμεν Α¹, X. 612 B: ἴδια λαβόντες (ἵδια Λ) Λ² Ξ, X. 615 E.

Dittographia or repetition. Not only single letters but words and even whole phrases are accidentally repeated, and in a MS. like Π, which has been little emended, this fault is more perceptible. Thus in IX. 561 B the words μέρη . . . ἐκπεσόντων were written over again in this MS., and there are many other examples of the same mistake.

β. More commonly letters and syllables are omitted, where the word thus formed is in some way possible: cp. Theaet. 185 D ὀργανίδιον for ὀργανον ἵδιον Bodleian MS.: IV. 421 D διαφέρει for διαφθείρει Α: V. 461 B φήσομεν for ἀφήσομεν Α: IX. 574 D ὄδικα for ὄδικαι Π Μ: X. 611 C διαθετέον for διαθετέον Α Π.

Many such errors have been corrected by the first or second hand in Par. Α; for example, in VIII. 548 D, the first hand wrote οἶμεν, which is corrected by the second hand to οἴμαι μὲν. A similar mistake remained uncorrected in all MSS. and editions in VIII. 554 B καὶ ἔτι(μα) μάλιστα until Schneider's conjecture. See also corrections of the third epistle of Demosthenes mentioned above (p. 98) as confirmed by Mr. Kenyon's papyrus.

A single letter is often put for the double, and vice versa, especially in the case of λ, ρ, ν: thus μέλει and μέλλει are often confused; Π. 37,5 B ἐνενόηκα Π for ἐννενόηκα: III. 401 A ἄφωθια is written for ἀφρωθία, and there is a doubt between βαλλάντιον and βαλλάντιον Α, VIII. 552 D: μελιτουργύς and μελιτουργύς A, VIII. 564 C.

One of two similar syllables is very apt to be lost; e.g. ὅν after the neuter adjective. See especially VIII. 564 C ἐκτέτμησθον for ἐκτετμήσεσθον Α: X. 600 D ὄνειναι for ὄνυνάναι Α.

Homoeoteleuton. In the MSS. of the Republic there are many instances of omission due to the recurrence of the same word or syllable, the eye of the scribe having reverted
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to the wrong place. Venetus II, which had not the benefit of correction until three centuries after it was written, supplies seventeen examples of this fault, of which the following seven occur in Book I:—328 D δεύρω ένειαν [άλλ' έμειν ... δεύρω ένειαν]: 330 A ὃ ἐπεικηκάς [πάντω τί ῥάδιοις ... ὃ μή ἐπεικηκάς]: 335 B εἰς τήν τῶν ἵππων [εῖς τήν τῶν ἵππων ... εἰς τήν τῶν ἵππων]. A clear example in A is III. 400 Α εἰπομί [ποία ᾧ ποιόν βιόν μ.]. See also II. 379 B, 380 E. So in M, II. 377 C ὃν ὃν μή, ἀποκριτέον is omitted after ἐγκριτέον 1. And in Lobcov. VIII. 550 Α καὶ αὖ ... ὅρων ὅτι.

Another cause of such omission is the dropping of a line or more than one line. Thus, in I. 335 C ἀρμούσως ... ἱππική (forty-two letters) om. II: II. 307 C φρονεῖ ... γόνιμα τῇ (forty-three letters) om. II: III. 400 B ἄλλων τυχαίων ... βραχύτητας (thirty-nine letters) om. II: 410 C ὅσοι ἄν ... σκληρύνητας, καὶ (seventy-five letters or two lines) om. II. Two very striking examples occur in X. 607 Α ἢ[μοιοὶ θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκόμια τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παράδειγμα]τέον (forty-five letters) om. II, leaving the vox nihili θάτερον, which is changed in q D K to ἐκτέον: and 616 C εἰ[ναὶ ... ὕπολόγμα]τα om. (forty-eight letters) D K in absence of II, which has a lacuna here: εἰτα remained unsuspected, as a good Greek word.

For similar omissions in A1 see II. 376 D, IV. 443 D, VI. 493 D, VII. 528 B, X. 601 Α, B, 609 B.

(d) Division of words.

a. As the words were not divided in the earliest MSS., some confusion has arisen in consequence, e.g. in IV. 442 B, where the best MSS. give φυλάττων τὴν for φυλαττοίτην (corrupted to φυλάττων τῷ in Ξ St.), III. 403 B, where A wrote νομοθετής εἰς for νομοθετήσεις and X. 620 Β ὀφάστως εἰκός. τὴν MSS. for ὀφαστώς. εἰκοστήν.

b. Conversely, words are unduly run together; as in III. 415 C φυλάξῃ for φύλαξ ἥ Ξ: VI. 496 B ἀνέλθοι for ἀν ἐλθοί Α: IX. 577 Β ἀνοφθείη for ἀν ὀφθείη Α.

1 The termination of γέφυνται in VIII. 563 C possibly hides such an omission, e.g. (στιγμόνονται).
of Plato’s Republic.

(e) Transposition of words or letters; often corrected by the scribe:—

a. Of letters, as in VII. 538 D καταλάβη (for καταβάλη) A: IV. 437 D ἐν ὀλίγῳ (for ἐνί λόγῳ) MSS.: IX. 571 D ἐν ὀλίγῳ (for ἐνί λόγῳ) seems to have been the reading of A¹.

β. A new word is made by transposition of two letters in III. 400 A where for εἰπομένι Π reads ἐπίομεν. Cp. VII. 530 C ἀρχής του (for ἀχρήστου) Α¹. Words are transposed in III. 412 D ἐκείνη ἔδε M. For inversion without such marks see III. 404 D δοκεῖ ταῦτα (for ταῦτα δοκεῖ) M.

It may be remarked generally with reference to the preceding examples that the scribe often misunderstood the meaning, but he generally knew a Greek word when he saw it or fancied that he saw it.

2. Errors due to mental association.

(a) False construction. By a kind of spurious attraction § 16.

the case of a noun or pronoun is altered to what the immediate context suggests. This is most frequent in late MSS., but occurs even in A, e.g. III. 391 D ἄλλον θεόν παιδά for ἄλλον θ. π.: VII. 529 E διαφέροντος (sc. γραφέως) for διαφερόντως. (The similar mistakes in I. 338 E τίθεται . . τοὺς νόμους ἐκάστη ἢ ἀρχή, for ἐκάστη ἢ ἄ. and VII. 521 E γυμναστικὴ . . μουσική for γυμναστική, &c., have not been transmitted, having probably been obliterated through the disuse of the ι adscript in the twelfth century.) VIII. 530 E γυναῖκες αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ νόμῳ) for γυναῖκες αὐτῶν A: VIII. 561 B ἐκατόφ εὐδοκή for ἐκατόφ εὐδοκὴ A. Prepositions are also confused, c. g. ὑπὸ for ἀπό, ὑπὸ for ὑπέρ, περί for παρά.

(b) Confusion of tenses and moods. There is often a doubt between the perfect and aorist, I. 330 E ἥδικηκεν Α², present and aor. subj. VII. 538 D ἐξελέγχῳ Α, aor. and future middle V. 474 A ἐργασαμένους for ἐργασομένους Α pr. Π; X. 607 D ἀπολογησαμένη changed to ἀπολογησομένη (Α); As the feeling for the moods grew weaker, subjunctive and
optative were confused through itacism: I. 333 B ὑπὲρ (A) for ὑπὲρ. Also indicative with optative or subjunctive, e.g.

II. 376 A πεπώνθηι for πεπώνθη Μ: V. 450 D ὄκοι Ε, ὄκεῖ Π, for ὄκεῖ. The omission of ὃ, when favoured by other causes of error, may often be thus accounted for, e.g.

I. 353 A ἄμπτέλων, for ἄν ἄμπτέλων, Α Π Μ.

(c) A word of frequent recurrence is apt to be substituted for the word in the text, I. 352 C δικαίως Α¹ for δῆ καὶ οὐς: II. 365 A ἐπιστόμενοι for ἐπιστόμενοι η Ε Κ; IX. 579 C τῶντο Α¹ for ἔαντ᾽. In IV. 437 Α where ἑρωτόντος is wrongly changed to ἑρωτότος, some Platonic ἑρως must have been haunting the mind of the corrector. By a converse error in II. 375 Β ἄλλοτροιος is written for ἄλλοιος. So in Theact. 148 C ἀκροβύων for ἀκρῶν Bodl. pr., IV. 440 Σ ζητέται for ζήτεται, VIII. 568 Ε συμπολίται for συμπόλιται.

(d) Again, the context suggests the wrong word in place of the right one: e.g. V. 469 Ε where an early corrector of Μ proposes διασκεδάσεις for διακαλύψεις. In VI. 510 D Μ reads εἰρημένους for ὑφανένους which seemed to contradict εἰ-δεστι; VI. 510 B confusion of μυθεῖσαν Α and τριμεῖσαν Μ and VI. 511 A τριμηθεῖσας Α¹ for τριμηθηθέντος Α²; X. 606 C μνήμης for μή μνήμης Π, where μνήμης is in question. So in Polit. 279 A παράδειγματεῖαν for πραγματείαν, where παράδειγμα is the subject under discussion. Other associations, possibly from the reminiscence of a different part of Plato, give rise to various readings, for example V. 458 Ε γυμνοῦσθαι for μάγνυσθαι Α Μ, cp. Laws VI. 772 Α.

§ 17. (c) Logical confusions, especially between affirmative and negative, positive and privative, are peculiarly frequent in the text of Plato. There are more than fifty instances of this form of error in the Republic; mostly, however, amongst the later MSS.

a. The following examples of the omission of the negative are the most important, and in some of these the earliest MSS. are involved. II. 365 D οὐδ᾽ ἡμῖν μελητέον η, καὶ ἡμῖν
of Plato's Republic.

mēlētēōn A; III. 395 C ἵνα μὴ Π Μ, ἵνα Λ; IV. 429 C ἦ
οὐ τοῦτο ἄδρεῖαν καλεῖς; οὐ omitted by Π and ten other
MSS.; V. 454 B τὸ μὴ τῷν αὐτῷς Ξ, τὸ τῷν αὐτῷς Π Μ;
455 Ε γυμναστικὴ δ' ἀρα οὐ Α, καὶ γυμναστικὴ, ἦ δ' ἀρα οὐ Ξ;
VI. 511 C ἰκάρως μὲν οὐ Ξ, ἰκ. μ. οὖν Λ; VII. 537 Ε καλὸν Α,
kakōn Π Μ; VIII. 548 B οὐ φανερῶς Α πρ. Π. οὐ erasèd
in Α and omitted in Μ; 559 B ἦ τε πᾶσαι most MSS., for ἦ τε
μὴ πᾶσαι ἦ q; IX. 574 C οὐ πάνω Π, πάνω Λ.

β. In the following cases a negative is wrongly added:
I. 330 B οὐ τοῦ ἐνεκα Π Μ (οὔτοι Π), οὔτοι Α Μ; 336 E οὖν, μὴ
οὖν q K; IV. 437 D ἦ οὐ, ἦ οὐ Α; V. 451 λῶστε εὑ μὲ παραμυθεὶς
Α Π Μ, ὦστε οὐκ εὑ q; VII. 526 E ὁ δεῖ, οὐ δεῖ Α.

It is doubtful whether the following belongs to α or β:—
VI. 500 Α ἦ καὶ ἐὰν οὐτω Α Π Μ, ἦ οὐκ ἐὰν οὐτω q. See note.
γ. Positive and privative are confused in Π. 363 Α τῷ
dikaiω most MSS. for τῷ ἀδίκῳ q; 363 B ἀδικίας for εὐδικίας
Ξ; VIII. 560 Ε ἀπαιδευσίαν for εὐπαιδευσίαν Π.

The following list of similar errors in inferior MSS.
might possibly be augmented.

(1) Negative omitted:
I. 352 C οὐ γὰρ ἀν ἀπείχοντο ἦ γὰρ ἀν M (ἤ t)
II. 373 E οὖν σμικρῷ ὧν σμικρῷ t
III. 388 D καὶ μὴ καταγελάω Π καὶ δὴ καταγελάω t
398 D τοῦ μὴ ἀδομένου τοῦ ἡμῖν ἀδομένου q
IV. 421 E πῶς δ' οὐ πῶς δὴ Φ
428 C οὐκ ἄρα καὶ ἄρα q
429 Η οὐ τοῦτο ἦ τοῦτο Π t
V. 462 C τὸ τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ τὸ τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ ἐμὸν Π
ἐμὸν εμὸν ἐμὸν
479 E ᾧ' οὐ γιγανώσκειν ᾧ' οὐν q corr.
„ E ἀλλ' οὐ δοξάζειν ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν Μ
VI. 484 B πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλό-
σοφοι πλανώμενοι οἱ φιλόσοφοι t

489 A οἱ φιλόσοφοι οὐ ὑποδύται
τιμῶται
VI. 500 C μὴ μιμεύσθαι μιμεύσθαι Μ
504 E μὴ μεγίστας μεγίστας Μ
511 D ἀλλ' οὐ νῦν άλλ' οὐν Ξ
VII. 521 A πλούσιοι, οὐ χρυσίου πλούσιοι χρυσίου Π τ
527 E οὐ χ' ὄρισαν οὐ χρ' ὄρισαν
" η οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέροις η πρὸς οὐδετέροις Μ
530 A τί δ' οὐ μέλλει τί δ' οὐ μέλλει τ
IX. 583 D πῶς γὰρ οὖ; πῶς γὰρ οὖ; q Vind. E F
X. 608 A ὡς οὐ σπουδαστέον D K ὡς σπουδαστέον Π καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν τν
(2) Negative added:
I. 330 C καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν τν
II. 377 A πρῶτερον δ' ἐν τοῖς πρῶτερον δ' οὐ τοῖς Π
III. 388 C εἰ δ' οὖν θεοὺς εἰ δ' οὐ θεοὺς τ
393 C φήσωμεν τί γὰρ; φήσωμεν τί γὰρ οὖ; Ξ
398 E οὐ γὰρ μονικός οὐ γὰρ μονικός τ
416 C εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ μέ- μη μέλλουσι τὸ μέγιστον Μ
γιστον
" D εἰ τοιοῦτε των τρόπον οὐ τοιοῦτε των τρόπον τ
IV. 426 A καὶ μὴν οὕτω γε καὶ μὴν οὐ τοί γε q corr.
" E χαριέστατοι τοῖς χαριέστατοι τοῖς τοῖς Μ
431 B καὶ ἀκόλαστοι καὶ οὐκ ἀκόλαστον τ
435 B γενὼν ἄλλα' ἀττα πάθη γενὼν καὶ οὐ κατ' ἄλλα' ἀττα πάθη Ξ corr.
438 A ἄλλα χρηστὸν σιτόν καὶ οὐ χρηστὸν σιτόν Φ
V. 452 E καὶ καλοῦ αὐ σπου- καὶ οὐ καλοῦ αὐ σπουδάζει q β'
δάζει
478 B ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μή ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ δοξάζει Μ
δοξάζει
VI. 484 C ἢ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι ἢ οὖν οὐ δοκοῦσί τι q β'
492 C οἰχήσεσθαι οἰχήσεσθαι Τ
503 C ἄλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι άλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι τ
VIII. 562 D ἄρ' οὖκ ἀνάγκη οὐκ ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη Π
564 E χρηματιζομένων ποι χρηματιζομένων ποι οὐ πάντων q
πάντων
of Plato's Republic. 109

IX. 581 D νομίζειν πρὸς
νομίζειν οὐδὲν πρὸς Ξ Μ

corr.

" 585 E καὶ βεβαιῶς
καὶ ὁ βεβαιῶς Ξ Μ corr.

In several of the above instances, other causes may be assigned; but it is manifest that in most of them 'logical confusion' has been at work. In some also we may perhaps trace the effect of bias; a sort of pedantic euphemism having stolen into the mind of the scribe.

3. Complex errors.

§ 18.

In several of the preceding examples, two or more of the causes specified are combined. For example in μιμήσης for μὴ μιμήσης there is itacism and false association assisting the wrong division of words; but still more confusion arises where an initial error of the simpler kind leads to the interpolation of a letter or syllable on the part of a corrector, who in the attempt to retrieve matters goes far to make them irretrievable. For example, in III. 403 B, where for νομοθέτησεις following ἔοικε the first hand of Α wrote νομοθέτης εἰς, an early corrector supposing the ν to belong to ἔοικεν, and 0 to be the article, supplied the apparently missing syllable νο (ἔοικεν ὁ νομοθέτης εἰς) 1. Similarly the reading of the Bodleian MS. in Theaet. 152 E ἔξαἰσοι σοφοὶ for ἔξης οἱ σοφοὶ may be thus accounted for: an early hand wrote ε for η; this was again changed through similarity of sound to α, making ἔξαἰσοι, which a later scribe assumed to be miss-written for ἔξαίσιοι.

In X. 604 C ἐρεῖ (Α) having been written for αἰρεῖ was again changed to ἐρρεῖ (Π), δπη ὁ λόγος ἐρρεῖ = 'which way reason moves.' In X. 610 E several MSS. including Μ have expanded ἰωτίκῳ to ἰωίτῳ κακῷ by some similar process. In V. 468 B τί δὲ; ἐξιωθήναι, the second δὲ has been regarded as dittography, and ἐξιωθήναι has con-

1 See also III. 401 c, where νεμώμενοι was changed first to ἀνεμώμενοι then to ἀνεμώμενοι ('drawing up'), and III. 391 E οἱ ζητῶς ἐγγίζετ, άνν where οἱ having been dropped ἐπίθες ἐγγίζετ ἄνν became the reading of Α: vi. 499 A προσώπου for τρόπου ΑΜ (this may be due to a compendium).
sequently been changed to ἔξωθήμα. In VI. 498 B ὑπηρε-
σίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ Α, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίαν π, ὑπηρεσία φιλο-
σοφίαν Μ. In VIII. 536 D παραχθεῖς having been
accidentally written for παραταχθεῖς in some MSS. of the
Π tradition (D K q) (supr. 1 (e)), the scribe of β' has changed
this to παραχθεῖς. See also the curious variant I. 342 B M mg.
ἡ ὡς ἡ σφαίρα for ἐκοστρέφων. In VIII. 568 D πωλομένων, having
been written πωλομένων, was altered first to πωλομένων then
to ἀπολομένων, with supposed reference to the proscription
of the tyrant's enemies, and was further changed, with
a view to the nearer context, into ἀπολομένων, by a corrector
who was aware of the frequent interchange between λ and δ.

§ 19. 4. Accretions.

Few errors of this description can be detected with any
confidence in the older MSS. The supposed redundancies
which recent scholars have excised on the ground of their
omission in Par. Α (Π. 358 Α, &c., see above), more probably
belong to the class of omissions through homooteleuton.

Now that the words in Π. 366 Α ἀν μέγα δύναμαι prove to be
extant in the first hand of Π, the argument in favour of
this view is considerably strengthened. In the Byzantine
period scholars contented themselves with adding here and
there a single word such as (I. 329 C) γὰρ and (Π. 359 C) καὶ.
But towards the fifteenth century, as it became fashionable
to discourse on Plato, attempts were made here and there to
supply real or apparent defects in the tradition by explana-
tory phrases, which in several instances found their way
into the text of that period. In I. 341 D, γ adds, after ἄλλα,
οὐ προσδέται, ἦ ἐξαιρεῖ ἐκάστῃ αὐτῇ ἐντῇ; in Π. 371 Α for ὅτα
καὶ ὅσα ἐκεῖνος ὃν ἄν δέονται, γ reads ὃτα καὶ ὅσα ἐκεῖνος
ἀξόνωσ, οἱ μεταδότοι ὃν ἄν δέονται. In III. 407 E for
ὁ παῖδες αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τουοῦτος ὃπο the correctors of Π M introduce
ὁμοιόμοιον with or without ἄν before ὅτι, and in this they are
followed by most of the later MSS., one of which, however,
ν, has πωλοῦντων (to be construed with θηλοῦ) instead. In
VII. 529 B (after συμμεμφικῶς) γ adds τούτων τι μανθάνῃ ἐὰν
of Plato's Republic.

δ' ἀνω τοῦ κεχωρὸς ὅτιον—a conflation of interpolated texts. VII. 532 C Ξ adds ἑνταῦθα δὲ πρὸς φαινόμενα after φ. θεία. In x. 616 Α the case appears more complicated. Here Α reads δὲ ἐνεκά τε καὶ εἰς ὄ τι τῶν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσοῦμεν ἀγῶντα. A sense may be obtained by excising τῶν Τάρταρον as a gloss—‘the causes wherefore and the place whereinto they were to be thrown.’ But it has been more commonly assumed that εἰς .ordinal has arisen by simple transposition from ὅτι εἰς. Adopting this view, and feeling still unsatisfied, the correctors of Μ Ξ and the scribe of X supplied the phrase ταῦτα ὑπομένουσιν before καὶ. In the passage immediately succeeding this, there is a cognate difficulty. The words τῶν φῶλαω which seem genuine but are dropped in Α have been preserved by Μ and Ξ, while the words μὴ γένοιτο ἐκάστῳ τὸ ἄφέμα appear to have been lost in the archetype of Μ, which gives for them the inferior substitute εἰ μυκήσατο (legendum μυκήσοιτο) τὸ ἑτὸμον. Here a marginal gloss or scholium seems to have taken the place of the original text.

See also II. 368 Ε where ν and Vind. F read πρῶτον ἐν τῷ μείζονι ζητήσωμεν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσί. A similar process may be traced at a somewhat earlier stage in III. 388 Ε, where, the verb having been lost through the simple error of writing ἐφῄν for ἐφῄ, a recent hand in Par. Α adds κατέχοιτο after ἑσωρφ, while the r subfamily and q adopt the different expedient of reading γέλωτι ἦλθε, following the suggestion of a scholar whose note has been preserved on the margin of Vind. D, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἀλλὰ προσθείναι.

The only manifest accretions in Par. Α besides IX. 580 Ω to λογιστικῶν, spoken of elsewhere, are (1) VII. 525 Ε the addition of ὅνο το ἰεωνῶς:—it is an early interpolation, for it is shared by Π, and is difficult to account for;—possibly the scribe of some early MS. had begun to write ἰεωνῶς over again, and on discovering his mistake had proceeded without erasing the superfluous letters: and (2) Π. 364 Ω λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοὶ τε a gloss in the text. In IX. 581 Ε a gloss
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ἡδονής has supplanted ἀληθινής, which would seem to have been the original reading. In Π, at 11. 377 E, a singular reading κακῶν ὄντων (sic) for κακῶς has obtained a place. A cognate reading κακῶς ὄντως was adopted by Aldus from some other MS., probably Flor. b. This interpolation may have arisen from an early dittographia of the letters os. Some doubtful cases remain to be considered. In v. 459 E the word ἐσονται Ξ Fic. proves to be absent from all the chief MSS. including A. It is harmless but can well be spared. In the Cesena MS., M, some words are omitted, which could be dispensed with, but for the authority of A. In 11. 335 D βλάπτειν ἔργον, ἔργον om. M pr. (Some MSS. read ἔργον βλάπτειν, changing the order.)

In 11. 346 D ἠ τοῦ μισθοῦ λήψις om. M pr.: λήψις is marked as doubtful in A.

In v. 466 A τοῦτο εἶδαμον πλάττομεν, εἶδαμον om. M.

In v. 468 B δοκεῖ σοι χρῆμα, χρῆμα om. M.

In v. 475 B παντὸς τοῦ εἶδους τούτον, τούτον om. M pr.

Of the phrases omitted by A which recent editors have bracketed or cancelled, only three are really open to suspicion, 11. 382 E οὕτε κατὰ φαντασία: 378 C καλ ποικιλτέον and 379 A εάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν: and considering the grounds on which the other phrases are retained it would be illogical to reject them 1.

The confusing interpolation in IV. 444 B τοῦ δ’ αὖ δου-λεοῦν (A Π M) has probably arisen from dittographia. Some other words which have been rejected as accretions may possibly be right after all. Thus in 11. 374 Α ἰκανὸν διαμάχεσθαι is the reading of Π, and ib. B the words ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον occur in the text both of Π and M, although

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1 The slightest external evidence would justify the rejection of vi. 504 E ἄξιον τοῦ διάνόμα, suspected by Schleiermacher. But with the testimony of all the MSS. in its favour, it would be rash to cancel either this, or the troublesome εἰς βραχὺ... γυγώμενον in iii. 400 b. The word ἄξιον in vi. 496 Α is inconvenient, but the reading of Π /άξιον ὡς suggests that, instead of cancelling it, we should read ἄξιον. In 11. 376 D the words ἵνα μὴ ἔρμη... διεξώμεν om. A pr. could be dispensed with.
of Plato's Republic.

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differently placed (in Π before, in Μ after the clause ἵνα ...
... γιγνομον). They probably existed as a various reading on the margin of some copy from which Μ is derived, and may therefore be due to earlier tradition. As an explanatory gloss they seem unnecessary, and they may have been originally dropped after οἰκοδόμον through homocoteleuton. If genuine they might be accounted for by the wish of Socrates emphatically to impress the principle of the division of labour on Glaucon's mind. In IX. 572 Α καὶ αἰσθᾶνεσθαι could well be spared, and confuses the sense. A troublesome obscurity, perhaps due to an accretion, occurs in VII. 533 Ε ἀλλ' ὁ ἀν μόνον δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἔξιν σαφηνεία ὁ λέγει (λέγειν Μ, λέγεις Α²) ἐν ψυχῇ. It might be justifiable to follow Ξ Steph. in omitting these words altogether.1 Of single words which have been suspected, in v. 468 ΚΑΙ ηφαίνει, καὶ proves to be absent in Α, and now rests on the sole authority of Π. The progressive corruption of the later MSS. may be illustrated from the Darmstadt Fragment τ, in which several passages, instead of being copied, are briefly paraphrased, as if from memory. The interpolations in Theaet. 156 Κ, 190 Κ may be compared with some of the above.

Textual Emendations.

Mistakes occurred in the earliest MSS.; and the attempt § 20. to rectify them immediately followed, not always with success. In one of the oldest and best papyrus fragments, that of Iliad XXIII and XXIV, lately published by Mr. Kenyon, the habit of correction, by writing between the lines, and putting a dot over a superfluous letter, is already begun. If nothing but Π in its original condition had come down to us, or even if we depended solely on Α as at first written, before it was revised, whether by the first or second hand, not to mention other early correctors, no human ingenuity

1 Perhaps also in v. 477 Β the words κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἐκατέρα τὴν ἀβτῆς, which are likewise omitted in Ξ, and are variously read in other MSS.

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could have brought the text of Plato to its present state. Even if the lacunae were suspected, they could not have been filled. Modern criticism could at best have provided some such stop-gaps as were adopted by scribes and diorthotae of the Renaissance, in the absence of the best tradition. On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that in every case where the text of A has been preferred, a contrary decision might not be justified by the discovery of some earlier authority. In several instances, where the evidence of A had been misinterpreted through the silence of Bekker, it now proves that its witness goes the other way, and turns the scale in favour of a rejected reading; e.g. in III. 391 C ἀφιήσαν not ἀπήρσεν: in VI. 496 C τῶν δικαίων not τῶν δικαίων: X. 666 E ἄξιος not ἄξιον is the reading of A. The later MSS. exhibit an increase both of corruption and of attempted emendation; but we have seen reason to believe that in the few instances in which the readings of these MSS. are alone to be relied on, it is quite possible that by some happy accident they have preserved an earlier tradition.

The simplification of the *apparatus criticus* by the supposed affiliation of all the MSS. to one, is sometimes alleged to justify the license of conjecture. But the argument is fallacious. For the comparison of independent traditions is a firmer ground on which to base conjecture than a breakdown in the evidence of a single document. There are few places in the Republic, however, about which any serious doubt remains. Those most intimately acquainted with the text are the least inclined to emend it conjecturally. Schneider, the most accurate of critical editors, and the author of the certain emendation in VIII. 554 B ἐτίμα μάλιστα for ἐτι μάλιστα, was even extreme in his conservatism. He defended places which are indefensible, and where the remedy when once suggested cannot admit of doubt. For example, in Book I. 352 E he maintains φαμέν with the MSS. against φάεμεν, the reading of
of Plato's Republic.

Stephanus, Ast, Bekker and Stallbaum. In IV. 445 B he defends ἀποκνητέων, in VI. 494 B ἐν πᾶσιν against ἐν παισιν, and in VI. 497 D argues with great subtlety, but doubtful success, against Bekker's emendation, οὐ πάντως ῥᾴστον for οὐ πάντως ῥᾴστον. He only adopted στραγγευομένῳ (V. 472 A) on finding it anticipated by an early corrector of Vind F., and to the last refused to treat τῷ λογιστικῷ (IX. 580 D) as a gloss in the text, on the insufficient ground that Par. K is manifestly derived from Ven. II. He was also willing to retain δικὸν λήξεις in IV. 425 D, with the transposition of the words into a different order which he found in Vat. Θ.

Passages still open to suspicion, where no convincing § 21. remedy seems to be attainable are:—

II. 358 E οἶνον τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε. The reading of Aldus and the editions before Bekker τί τε ὅν τυγχάνει καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε has very weak manuscript authority; being confined so far as we know to Flor. b, which in this passage and what follows it, is in a very late hand. The expression is therefore probably a conjectural expansion of the same kind with the addition of δεικνύοντον ὅν in III. 407 E. τί ὅν τε is the reading of A M Ξ; but gives a poor sense, requiring τί ὅν γέγονε to be joined. The reading of II τί οἶνον τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε, taking οἶνον τε in two words, may be explained 'what, and of what nature, and from whence, justice has arisen.' The choice lies between this and the simpler reading of Flor. x οἰνον τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε, 'The nature and origin of justice.' The slight obscurity of this may be defended by supposing Plato to remember that he is speaking of the γένεσις not of the οὐσία of justice. But after all it is quite possible that τί ὅντε is a mis-writing for τί ἐστι. Bekker adopted τί οἴνονταi and wrote γεγονέναι.

II. 359 C τῷ [Γάγον] τοῦ Ἀνδοῦ προγάνῳ. There is clearly something wrong here; but the emendation is doubtful: see note in loco.

III. 387 C φρίττειν ὅθη παεί ὡς οίεται (ὡς οἴνον τε q). Neither of these readings is satisfactory, and conjecture is at fault.
IV. 439 E ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τοῦτο. For various suggested interpretations of this passage, see note in loco. Perhaps it is one of those in which a negative has been omitted (see above p. 107). π. ἀ. τι οὐ πιστεύω τ., 'I once heard a story told which prevents me from accepting that.' But the emendation remains uncertain.

VII. 533 E ὅ ἄν μόνον ἡμαῖν πρὸς τῆς ἔξω σαφηνείᾳ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ. The whole is omitted in Ε and may possibly be an accretion. For an attempt to treat the text as it stands in the MSS., see note in loco.

VIII. 562 B τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὑπέρπλοντος. The compound substantive is anomalous, and the attempts at emendation are hitherto unsuccessful. For the grounds of the conjecture τοῦτο δ' ἦν *που πλοίτος, see the notes.

VIII. 567 E τί δὲ; (or τίς δὲ) αὐτὸθεν (τῶς δὲ Steph.).

VIII. 568 D ἀποδομένων. Reasons are given above, p. 110, for the conjecture *πωλουμένων.

IX. 581 E τῆς ἡδωνῆς οὐ πάνω πόρρω. See above (pp. 111, 112) for the conjecture τῆς ἀληθινῆς: but certainty is unattainable in a passage which has to be emended in more places than one. The difficulty in IX. 585 C εἰ δὲ ἀληθεῖας κ.τ.λ. may be due to some want of logical precision in Plato, but Madvig's theory of a lacuna must also be considered.

IX. 590 D οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος. Here again the grammatical inaccuracy may be due to Plato, but one cannot exclude the supposition that there is some corruption in the text arising from the words ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ preceding. Madvig's οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος may be right.

X. 603 C μὴ τι ἄλλο ἦ. Ast very probably conjectured μὴ τι ἄλλο ἦν.

X. 615 C for αὐτόχειρας Ast conjectured αὐτόχειρος or αὐτοχειρίας. Once more, in X. 616 A. the passage considered above, p. 111, it is difficult to arrive at a perfectly definite conclusion.
The following are the places, twenty-nine in all, in which § 22. the present text relies on conjecture:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Steph.</th>
<th>MSS.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>330 B τοῦτοι Bekker</td>
<td>τοῦτοισιν</td>
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<td>336 E οὐν γε σὺ Bekker</td>
<td>οὐν τε σὺ</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>341 B ὅν νῦν Benedictus</td>
<td>νῦν (ο in erasure Λ)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>352 E φαύμεν Stephanus</td>
<td>φαμέν</td>
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<td>II.</td>
<td>361 C ἦτω Neukirch</td>
<td>ἦτω (but η from ι ? Α)</td>
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<td>III.</td>
<td>392 B ἡτοιμεν Hermann</td>
<td>ἡτοιμεν</td>
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<td>401 E χαῖρων καὶ δυσχεραίων</td>
<td>δυσχεραίων τὰ μὲν καλὰ</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ἐπαινοὶ καὶ χαῖρων καὶ</td>
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<td>καὶ Vermehren</td>
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<td>410 C ἀμφοτέρα Schneider</td>
<td>ἀμφότερα</td>
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<td>IV.</td>
<td>431 E ἐν πασὶ H. Wolf</td>
<td>ἐν πᾶσι</td>
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<td>437 B ἄν ἀλλήλοις Baiter</td>
<td>ἀλλήλοις</td>
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<td>440 C διὰ τοῦ (bis) L. Camp-bell</td>
<td>διὰ τὸ</td>
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<td>443 B ἄλλο . Ἐτὶ τι Hermann</td>
<td>ἄλλο ἔτι . Τί</td>
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<td>V.</td>
<td>445 B ἀποκμητέον Bekker</td>
<td>ἀποκμητέον</td>
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<td>VI.</td>
<td>465 B δέος δὲ τοῦ Madvig</td>
<td>δέος δὲ τὸ</td>
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<td>492 C ποιὰν Cobet</td>
<td>ποιὰν ἂν</td>
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<td>493 B ἐκάστας G. van Prin-sterer</td>
<td>ἐκαστος (ἐκάστοι, ἐκάστοτε)</td>
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<td>494 B παυσὶν Geer</td>
<td>παυσιν</td>
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<td>497 D πάντων Bekker</td>
<td>πάντως</td>
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<td>499 B κατηκόφ Schleiermacher</td>
<td>κατηκοϕ</td>
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<td>505 B κεκτήμεθα Bekker</td>
<td>κεκτήμεθα</td>
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<td>VIII.</td>
<td>551 C ἵπτυος Ast</td>
<td>ἵ τυος</td>
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<td>554 B ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτίμα</td>
<td>ἐστήσατο . Καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα . Εὖ</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Schneider</td>
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<td>556 E παρ' οὐδὲν Baiter</td>
<td>(γάρ) οὐδὲν</td>
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The most important conjectures on the text of the Republic in recent years have been those of Cobet, Madvig, W. H. Thompson, and Ingram Bywater (see Baiter's Preface). Still more recently Mr. Herbert Richards has contributed many ingenious suggestions in the *C. R.* for 1893. It may be not unprofitable to examine at some length the most considerable of the fifty-seven emendations of the Republic proposed by Cobet in *Variae Lectiones*, ed. II, pp. 526–535. We shall best obey his favorite precept νάφε καί μέμνασ’ ἀπιστεῖν by not yielding blindly to his authority.

To begin, then, with those passages in which he appeals to the authority of the chief MS.

Χ. 612 B ἐπηρέκαμεν for ἐπηρέγκαμεν. The former is really the reading intended in Paris, A, where the η has ς adscript and there is a dot over the ί (sic ἐπηρέγκαμεν), which is thus marked by the diorthotes as superfluous. In *Politicus* 307 A, where ἐπηρέκαμεν is the best reading, the Bodleian gives ἐπηρέγκαμεν, and in both passages there is a variant ἐπηρέσαμεν. And although ἐπηρέγκαμεν in the Republic
admits of a possible meaning, the pointed reference in ἐπηρέκαμεν (or ἐπηρήσαμεν?) to II. 367 ὁ τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαινεσον δικαιοσύνης . . . μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρεις ἀλλοις ἐπαινεῖν—is the more probable, as the context shows that Plato has that passage distinctly before him. Cobet failed to remark, however, that, if ἐπηρέκαμεν is right the perfect is used together with the aorist ἰπαλωσάμεθα. So that ἐπηρήσαμεν, the reading of Par. K, should perhaps in strictness be preferred; and it may be still argued in favour of ἐπηρέγκαμεν that notwithstanding the reference to II. 367 ὁ this need not involve the repetition of the same words.

VI. 503 θ diewpropmēνα for diewpropmēnη. Here the critic has been less fortunate: diewpropmēνη is the reading of Paris. A (not diewpropmēνα as he supposed). It is also (subaudiendo ἡ φύσις) the more idiomatic reading. The variant diewpropmēνα is due to the tendency, noted elsewhere by Cobet himself, to adapt terminations to the nearest word. See above, p. 105.

The remaining passages may be taken in their order of sequence.

I. 343 θ *διακεῖσθαι for διανοεῖσθαι (so Faesi). If there were any evidence for διακεῖσθαι the word might be accepted. But the familiar truth that κεῖσθαι is an equivalent for the perfect passive of τίθημι is not a sufficient proof that δια- νοεῖσθαι πῶς πρὸς τινα is bad Greek.

II. 362 θ ἐνμβάλλειν for ἐνμβάλλειν, κομονεῖν. The exact equivalence of these two words is not proved by the fact that Socrates in I. 333 θ leads Polemarchus by gentle transition from contracts to partnerships. The use of both words here recalls the preceding conversation more effectually.

II. 376 θ oυδὲ ἐν for οὐδὲν δὲ. Cobet's suggestion is very ingenious, and may be right, but the reading of the inferior MSS. οὐδὲν δὴ is at least equally plausible.

III. 411 θ *καταντλεῖν (so Van Heusde) for καταναλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν. καταναλεῖν sc. αὐτοῦ or τῆς ψυχῆς. Cobet's assumption that the construction must be καταναλεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς
On the Text of this Edition

ἀρμονίας is wholly gratuitous. The words καὶ καταχεῖν κ.τ.λ. are an expansion of the notion of καταναλεῖν. The idea underlying many of these suggestions, that Attic Greek loves parsimony in expression, is peculiarly inapplicable to the language of Plato.

III. 412 Ε ἐπιλανθανόμενοι to be omitted? There is some awkwardness in the introduction of the word in this place, considering what follows in 413 Β κλαπέρτας . . . τῶν ἐπιλανθανόμενως, but Plato has elsewhere admitted similar tautology and verbal inconsistency.

V. 452 Ε ἄλλον τινά σκοπὸν προστηθάμενος for πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στηθάμενος. An ingenious but doubtful way of correcting a doubtful text. Ib. ἡ φύσις ἡ θῆλεια for φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἡ θῆλεια. Cobet seems to have forgotten the reference to the lower animals in 451 D, E.

V. 477 Ε θήραμεν for οὐκομεν. This seems to be a genuine conjecture, although anticipated by ΘΦε (see Bekker and Schneider) and also by the corrector of M. Cobet's logic sometimes coincides with that of the later scribes. οὐκομεν is really unobjectionable. Ficinus has dicennus (φήσομεν?).

VI. 491 Β [εἰ τελεώς μέλλου φιλόσοφος γενέσθαι], 'verba soloce concepta sententiam onerant et impedient.' The imputed solecism is really a Platonic idiom. To get rid of all such impedimenta, many pages would have to be re-written.

VI. 496 Ε ἡ γὰρ τοῦ τινι [Ἀλλάφ] ἡ οὐδενί. 'Attic parsimony' is again assumed; but the passages quoted are not exactly in point, and it is Plato's manner in employing an idiom to adapt it to the immediate context.

VII. 521 Κ οὐσίαν ἐπάνωδος for οὐσίαν ἐπάνωδον. Cobet's emendation, εἰς ἀληθινὴν τοῦ ὄντος οὐσίαν ἐπάνωδος still leaves the expression cumbrous, and περιαγώγη . . . εἰς . . . ἐπάνωδον is in close agreement with the description in 515 Α-Ε.

VII. 527 Ε οὖδέ πρὸς ἐτέρους for οὗ πρὸς οὖθετέρους. Neat, but not certain.

VII. 528 Κ *μεγάλαυχούμενοι for μεγαλοφρονούμενοι. Cobet
objects to μεγαλοφοροεῖν as a late Greek word and to the
use of the middle, but many compounds and singular uses
of the middle voice occur for the first time in Plato.

VII. 538c προσποιουμένων for ποιουμένων. For similar
uses of ποιείσθαι see note in loco.

VIII. 555 A and IX. 576c [ὅμουτητί]. The argument from
parsimony is again misplaced, and the same gloss is not
very likely to have crept into the text in both places. In
the latter passage the word had been previously cancelled
by Ast and Badham.

X. 615c ἀπογευμένων for γευμένων. The suggestion is
ingenious but unnecessary. Not birth, but death, is the
pervading notion of the passage, and is therefore more
casily understood. Not ‘those who died immediately’ (on
birth) but those (whose death occurred) as soon as they
were born.’

X. 618 A διὰ τέλον for διατελεῖσ. The adverbial phrase
διὰ τέλον would require a participle such as κατεχομένας,
which the adjective dispenses with. Cobet proceeds on the
assumption that the Athenians always expressed the same
thing in the same way. The same fallacy underlies his
emendation in VIII. 565 C of ἐνα γέ τινα for ἐνα τινά.

Some of Madvig’s suggestions, in spite of their acuteness, § 24.
are decidedly wanting in good taste. For example, his
proposal to change φαντάσματα θεία VII. 532 C to φαντάσματα
δέως is almost ludicrous, and reminds one of modern Greek.
Not much happier is his suggestion of ξωλαί for πολλαί in
v. 473 D supported by referring to VII. 535 D. The two
passages stand in no relation to each other, and the abrupt
introduction of the metaphorical word is foreign to the
manner of Plato. Such hariolations as these tend to dis-
able a critic’s judgement, and to cast suspicion on other
proposals of his which are at first sight more plausible.
The most ingenious of Madvig’s suggestions are in VIII. 546 D
δεύτερα τε for δεύτερον δὲ τά, and X. 608 A ἀσφαλεῖα for αἰσθό-
μεθα, but in the latter case it appears more probable that
the corrupt αἰσθάζομεθα has taken the place of some expression answering to the ὁσπερ clause, such as ἀφεξόμεθα. In x. 666 c there is much to be said for his conjecture ἀν κατείχες for ἀν κατείχες.

W. H. Thompson, in IX. 585 A, with great plausibility conjectured πρὸς λαύπην οὖτω τὸ ἄλυτων for πρὸς τὸ ἄλυτων οὖτω λαύπην, but see note in loco. Another very probable suggestion which he does not seem to have communicated to Baiter, is in VIII. 545 E ἄλλα ἢ for ἄλλοι᾽ ἢ. For other conjectures of the same critic, see notes on VIII. 563 D, 567 D, and IX. 573 C.

Charles Badham is responsible for a conjecture which Cobet approved, and Baiter received into his text, VIII. 560 D ὑπ᾽ ὦτον for ὑπωτον. Reasons against adopting this and in support of ἴδιωτῶν are given in the commentary to this edition. He also proposed to cancel μυθωτοί in IV. 419 A.

Prof. Bywater's chief suggestion is V. 476 A ἄλλα ἄλλων for ἄλληλων in a passage where needless difficulty has been felt. See note in loco. In VI. 504 A Orelli's ἄλλοις for ἄλλοις would be convincing, if ἄλλοις had been a usual word in Plato, but he uses it only in the Timaeus and Laws.

In VII. 532 B, C Nægelsbach's ἐτι ἀδύναμία for ἐτι ἀδύναμία is exceedingly plausible and is supported by the quotation of Iamblichus. But it hardly bears examination; see note in loco. Even if the absence of ἢ may be excused, the construction with the infinitive, instead of ἢ ἀδύναμία τοῦ βλέπειν, is hardly Greek. In Theaet. 156 A, where ἀδύναμων ἔχουν is construed with the infinitive, probably the closest parallel, the case is altered by the presence of the participle. For ἀδύναμων ἔχειν = ἀδύνασθαι.

Of Mr. Richards' conjectures on I–V, the most persuasive are:

III. 407 E Δήλον, ἐφη, ὅτι τοιούτος ἢν καὶ οἱ παιδεῖς αὐτοῦ οὐχ ὀρᾶσ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. It would be quite as easy, however, to
cancel ὁ ή... ἰν as an 'accretion'; and in either case the received reading gives a preferable rhythm.

IV. 430 E κρείττω δή αὐτῶ *ἀποφαίνοντες κ.τ.λ.
   433 D καὶ δούλῳ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ (καὶ γεωργῷ) καὶ ὁμο-
   ουργῷ.
   444 C *αὐτὰ μὲν ὄνω ταῦτα (so Stob.). Probably right.
V. 457 C *ἀγε δή, ἵδω for λέγε δή, ἵδω. This is better than
   Cobet's *φέρε δή. But neither is required.
   See Goodwin, M. and T. 257.
   462 C ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ for ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό. This is possibly
   right.
   468 Λ λέγ', ἔφη, ποῖα δή for λέγ', ἔφη, ποῖ' ἰν. If the
   text is corrupt, this is the most likely way of
   emending it.

On Muretus' conjecture in II. 364 C, ὄδοντες for διδόντες,
see note in loco.

The present editor has suggested the following con-
jectural changes, which he has not, however, ventured to
introduce into the text:—

II. 358 E τί *ἐστι καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε

III. 387 C φύττεων δή ποιεῖ δύς *ἐτέα

IV. 439 E ἀκούσας τί *οὗ πιστεύω
   442 E τοῦτον *αὐτό for τούτῳ αὐτῶν (τοῦτον Λ Π Μ)
V. 471 A ὄντες, *καὶ οὐ πολέμιοι (ὡς οὐ π. Λ mg. Μ)
   479 D *ἀμολογήσαμεν (for ἀμολογήκαμεν)
VI. 496 Λ φρονίσεως *άξιως ἀληθινῆς ἐκόμενον (άξιων Λ: ἀξιῶν
   δώς Π)
   500 A ἢ οὐκ (sic q) ... ἀλλοιαν *τε φήσεις . . . ;
VII. 518 D ἐγγύς τί *τείνει τῶν τοῦ σῶματος
VIII. 562 B τούτῳ δ' ἦν *ποὺ πλοῦτος for τούτῳ δ' ἦν ὑπέρπλουτος
   563 C οἶαιπερ αἱ δέσποιναι γίγνονται, (σεμιώνονται) τε δή
   καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὄνοι
   568 D τὰ τῶν *πωλουμένων for τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων
IX. 581 E τῆς *ἀληθινῆς οὐ πάνεν πόρρω: for τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐ π. π.
IX. 585 C καὶ *ἀληθοῦς for καὶ ἀληθείας
X. 610 Α ὁ ὄρθοτατά γ' for ὁ ὄρθοτατα
And the following readings, mostly of inferior authority, are recommended for further consideration:—
I. 333 E. δευτὸς φυλάξασθαι [καὶ] μὴ παθεῖν q
335 D. βλάπτειν (omitting ἔργον) M
340 A. αὐτὸς θρασύμαχος (omitting γάρ) M
346 D. ἦ τοῦ μυσθοῦ λύψις om. M
II. 358 E. πλέων δὲ κακῷ II M
367 A. ἐκαστὸς ἀριστος φύλαξ Π
370 B. επ' ἄλλου ἔργου πράξει M
374 B. μήτε οἰκοδόμοι, ἀλλὰ σκυτατόμοι Π
III. 409 D. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων M
IV. 435 D. ἄλλη γάρ a Galen.
436 A. τούτων ἐκαστὰ q corr.
442 B. προσήκεν q Stobaeus
444 C. αὐτὰ μὲν ὄνων Stob. et ej. H. Richards 1893
V. 459 E. ἐσονται om. A II M
468 B. χρήσαι om. M
VI. 489 B. τάληθη λέγει D
497 B. ἀλλότριον εἶδος Ξ
499 B. παραβαλή Ξ
509 D. οὐρανοῦ Ξ
510 B. μυριήθεσιν A Proclus
VII. 522 A. πρὸς τοιοῦτον τι ἁγιον (γρ.) Π mg.
525 A. ταῦτον πεπονθε τούτο Π
528 C. κωλυμένα Ξ pr.
532 E. τίνες οἱ οὗοι τ
VIII. 554 D. ἐνευρήσεις Λ² Π M
IX. 587 E. καταπεφώρακας ρ Ξ corr. v
X. 601 B. αὐτὰ ἔφ' αὐτῶν γενόμενα Λ²
C. ἔφ' ἡμίστειος q
603 B. καὶ ἦ κατὰ τὴν ἁκοῖν q
607 D. ἀπολογηθαμένη τ (et forsitan A pr)
612 C. ἦτεύσθε A
615 B. πολλοὶς D corr.
It may not be out of place to quote an example of the § 26. manner in which a scholar of the sixteenth century approached the task of emendation:—

'Enimvero quum in plerisque locis sicut eorundem librorum a me frustra implorari viderem, alii autem non suppeterent, ad coniecturas, tanquam ad δευτερον πλοῦν, me convertere necessa habui. Sed quum intelligerem quâm periculose sint coniecturae, et quâm fallaciter plerunque suis coniecturis adblendantur, ex ingenio meo profectas emendationes non in ipsum receptus contextum (ut anteia etiam cum vulgo appellavi) sed partim margini adscripsi, partim Annotationibus reservavi, ubi earum rationem etiam red dere daretur. . . .

'Quinetiam contingebat interdum ut quantumvis pectus concuterem (non focundum illud quidem, sed nec omnino, quorundam iudicio, infocundum) nihil quicquam ex eo egredeteretur, antequam loci in quibus haerebam excusi essent: simulatque autem iam excusos relegerem, ex eo illorum emendatio velut sponte sua prodire videretur. Ex eorum numero duos mihi nunc suggerit memoria: quorum unus habet, ἵνα μη μεμφης, alter δ' ἐξεσθα: horum enim emendationem assequi coniectura non potueram antequam paginae in quibus erant, excusae essent: at quum opera meae penso suo manum extremam imponerent, ego superveniens, perinde ac si longè quâm anteia perspicacior factus essem, pro [μη] μεμφής quidem [μη] με φθής ¹ [Polit. 266 E]: pro δ' ἐξεσθα autem, δὲ ἐξεσθα scribendum esse, primo ferè aspectu animadverti.'

'Henricus Stephanus lectori:' Preface to Plato ed. 1578.

Plato is one of a select number of Greek authors whose text is known to us as it existed in the ninth century A.D. The Byzantine MSS. of that period were not only carefully written, but carefully revised; with the aid, as there is good

¹ This conjecture is partly confirmed by Bodl. Vat. Δ reading μητ' ἐφθης.
reason to think, of other MSS. besides the one immediately in hand. Some of the errors in these early copies have still to be corrected by the help of later ones, into which, as it now appears, some grains from a yet earlier tradition have in some way filtered down. There remains little scope for conjecture. Such achievements of intuition as Schneider's ἐτίμα μᾶλιστα and Orelli's ἀτραγγευμένοι remain isolated instances of success. Plato's language is so highly wrought, so various, and so full of unexpected turns, that the task of emending him is like that of emending poetry. In a so-called epistle of Demosthenes there is more room for 'certain conjecture' than in a whole tragedy of Aeschylus or Sophocles, where the most brilliant suggestions, such as Conington's λέοντος ἐνν or Jebb's λυτήρων λόφημα, are still open to doubt; or in one of those plays of Euripides, where the judgement is sufficiently perplexed by the discrepancies of thirteenth century MSS. without having recourse to vain hariolatio. The thesis might be maintained, however, that the more a text requires emendation (either from bad copying, or from the use of technical terms, as in the musical or mathematical writers, or from obscurity or singularity of style), the less possible it is to emend it. Take, for example, the portion of the Orestes which is lost in the Medicean MS., or again the Supplices of Aeschylus, which is manifestly corrupt in the Medicean MS. without having any other independent MS. authority. Conjecture has been active, with but little of agreement in the result. In the case of Pindar, although we have no MS. earlier than the twelfth century, those we have seem to give evidence of a constant and authentic tradition. The difficulty is at its height in the later part of the Bacchae, 755 ff., where there is only one MS. and that of an inferior description: or again in the case of such an author as Marcus Aurelius, where the critic has to choose between late MSS. and a printed text founded on an earlier MS. now lost.

It would be unsafe to argue from the analogy of Latin
of Plato’s Republic.

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authors; the great variety of style and dialect in Greek of all periods involving ever fresh uncertainty. Lucretius or Catullus may be emended with more probability than Aeschylus or the fragments of Alcman. Different literatures admit of different treatment. Bentley in his proposals for a text of the New Testament says expressly that he is well aware that conjecture can have no place in the sacred text. This may have been intended to soothe orthodox apprehensions, but it at least involves an admission of the precariousness of conjecture.

The invention of so-called Canons of Criticism introduces § 27, an appearance of scientific precision, which is really fallacious. The rule of the more difficult reading, ‘Potior lectio difficilior,’ may often prove misleading. The balance is in favour of the less common word, if equally in point: e. g. ψεγέτε for λέγετε. But when an absurd reading has once found its way into an approved text, the conservatism of tradition will often maintain it for centuries against common sense. The true reading meanwhile may have passed down through weaker channels, and may be supported, though less authoritatively, by independent evidence. For example, in IV. 442 B ὅν προσήκον αὐτῷ γένετ, προσήκον is the harder reading, and is supported by the better MSS.; but the change from ε to ο might be made early, and once made would remain in one line of tradition, and the easier reading προσήκερ, having the support of Stobaeus, would

1 Yet it is not to be overlooked that here also the unwise of employing one manuscript authority exclusively has been clearly shown. See Prof. Ellis’ ‘Praefatio’ to his Notae Manilianae (Clarendon Press. 1891):—‘Gemblaecensis Codex . . . uterrimus ille quidem, utpote saec. xi scriptum, et integrerrimus est omnium; ita tamen, ut si absit Vossianus is secundus Iacobi, cui scriba suus annum 1470 in fine addidit, ulla manus poetac relicta sit in incerto, idque plurifariam.’ The same scholar adds his testimony to the general fact—‘antiquos codices ita praestare recentibus ut his tamen supersedere nequeat.’

2 It is also a strong instance of the general fact that the more reverently an author is handled the fewer are the conjectures which find their way into his text.
On the Text of this Edition

seem to be traditional in \( q \). It should be remarked, however, that the best MS. of Stobaeus is, according to Gaisford, of the fourteenth century.

Nor is the ‘ductus literarum' in every instance a safe guide. Many other causes beside the forms of letters have been at work, as we have seen above; and the only effect of an apparently simple change may be to ‘skin and film the ulcerous place.' Who could have supposed that between the syllables of \( \epsilon ν \tau \rho ο \tau \) the reading of \( D K \) in x. 607 \( \alpha \). there lurked a lacuna of forty-three letters? Or what palaeographer could have corrected \( \chi ριμι\omega ν \lambda \gamma υντας \) in Solon fr. 36, l. 9, to \( \chi ρεινυς \phi ρυυντας \), which the Ath. Pol. now proves to be the true reading? What critic could have guessed it? Or, if he had, who could have assured us that he was right?—The errors of printed books present only a distant analogy to those of classical MSS., which in the great authors, have often been more carefully revised. Yet even here conjecture has proved of little avail. Of innumerable emendations of Shakespeare by far the greater number have been rejected by recent editors, and very few have the certainty of Johnson’s ‘no more, but e'en a woman, —(Foll. ‘in')—Ant. and Cleo. iv. 15, l. 73. Who shall emend with certainty 1 Henry IV, Act iv. 1, lL 98, 99 ‘All plumed like estridges that with the wind | Baited like eagles having lately bathed,' or supply the ‘missing word' in Sonnet 146 ‘Poor soul, the centre of my sinful earth,... by these rebel powers that thee array'? or in Hamlet iv. 1, ll. 40, 41 ‘And what's untimely done... | Whose whisper o'er the world's diameter,' &c. Or, to take a more modern instance, what but documentary evidence can determine between ‘an unbodied joy' and ‘an embodied joy' in Shelley's Skylark?

Yet it must be admitted that Shelley's text affords some examples of conjectural emendation subsequently corroborated by documentary evidence. The subtle criticism of W. M. Rossetti suggested several corrections of the printed text which examination of the MSS. has since
confirmed. *Julian and Maddalo* (vol. ii. p. 324, l. 18) 'and even at this hour:' *ever* cj. Rossetti and so Shelley's MS. *Letter to Maria Gisborne* (vol. iii. p. 48, l. 1) 'or those in *philosophic* councils met:' *philanthropic* cj. Rossetti and so Shelley's MS. *Hellas* (vol. ii. p. 145, l. 20) 'The caves of the Icarian isles Hold each to the other in loud mockery:' *Told* cj. Rossetti and so the MS., and also a list of errata in Shelley's handwriting.

I understand also that in Chaucer five conjectural readings of Tyrwhitt's have been found in the Ellesmere MS. which is supposed to have been unknown to him. But his examination of MSS. may have been more minute than appears on the surface of his edition. Have all the twenty-four MSS. mentioned by him been identified and thoroughly collated?

The history of classical texts presents few such examples. In Soph. Philoctetes 29 Lambinus suggested *κτύπος* for *τύπος*, and this was afterwards found in the Laurentian MS., and as a marginal variant in Π. In Phil. 689 Auratus suggested *κλυων* for *κλυζων*, and this has also received some MS. confirmation. The correction of errors in the third epistle of Demosthenes, confirmed by the British Museum Papyrus as noted above, is perhaps the most striking example hitherto of such success.

Of Platonic editors probably Heindorf and Schneider have come nearest—Schleiermacher and K. F. Hermann being not far behind. Two conjectures of Schleiermacher though turning on a very slight change of letters are of distinguished merit:—in Rep. VI. 499 Β *κατηκός* for *κατηκοόι* and Protag. 328 Κ *νοήσαι* for *νοήσαι*. C. Orelli's *στραγγευομένω* for *στρατευομένω* (V. 472 Α) confirmed by Vind. F corr. is the best example in the Republic.

It is also rather a striking

1 I quote the earlier readings from ed. 1847 reprint of Mrs. Shelley's edition).

2 'The epithet "philosophic" does not appear specially apposite; should it be "theosophic" or "philanthropic"?' W. M. Rossetti, note to vol. ii. p. 245 of his edition, 1870.

3 For several instances in which conjecture has coincided with MS.
fact that τὴν τῷ δίκαιῳ βοήθειαν, which Schneider adopted from Vind. F pr. in place of τ. τῶν δίκαιων β. in vi. 496 D, now proves to be the reading of Par. A.

In some cases, where all the MSS. are at fault, the true reading has been found in a quotation by some ancient writer, as Galen, Athenaeus, Stobaeus, and the Fathers Eusebius and Theodoretus. A doubt may arise, where the consent of the oldest MSS. is opposed to the reading of some inferior MS. supported by such quotation. When the author who gives the quotation is preserved in MSS. say of the tenth century, the evidence is nearly balanced,—the only remaining uncertainty being that which attends upon all quotations. The commentary of Proclus also supplies some evidence; but the Scholia to Plato, for the most part, throw but little light upon his text. They are full of Neo-platonic fancies, and few of them can be referred to the Alexandrian time. This is the more unfortunate, because, as a general rule, the best emendations have been those to which scholars have been led by some discrepancy between the explanation of a scholiast and the traditional text. The best emendation of a Sophoclean passage is Boeckh's φονώσατων for φονίασιν in Ant. 117, founded on the scholion ταῖς τῶν φονών ἐρώσαις λόγχαις. Another, almost equally good, without such help, is ἀνή (Auratus and Pierson), in Phil. 639, confirmed by the gloss in L, παρη.

Were the corruptions and interpolations of the text of the Republic as numerous as recent scholars have imagined, the difference of meaning involved would be still infinitesimal. Some feature of an image might be obscured, or some idiomatic phrase enfeebled, but Plato's philosophy would remain uninjured. That is not a reason for careless treatment, but it is a consideration deserving to be set against the natural bias which minute and long-continued attention to the details of criticism is apt to produce.

evidence in Euthyphr. Apol. see Wohlrab Platonhandschriften, &c., p. 651.
The fashion of Greek orthography has changed somewhat since this text was printed. Exact scholars, whose eyes are accustomed to recent classical editions, will miss θησκει, σφων, ποευ, μελζας, νευς, and other forms, which inscriptions show to have been usual in Attica from about 400 B.C. The new-old spelling is hardly yet finally established, and a text which is arrière in this respect may perhaps have some compensating advantages for those who in their school days were familiar with the former practice; to whom ὄς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλασπήρας (Theact. 149 A) still presents an awkward ambiguity, and who are for the moment puzzled when, in perusing a Latin treatise on Greek races, they come across the familiar patronymic, 'Jones.' The retention of φιλόνεικος, φιλονεικεῦ, φιλονεικία (against φιλόνεικος, &c.) deserves a more serious defence. (See an elaborate note on the point in Leopold Schmidt's Ethik der alten Griechen1.) There is no doubt that Greeks in Plato's time and afterwards associated the word with νίκη. But Greek etymological fancies are hardly solid ground to rest upon; and the derivation from νείκος appears more probable: cp. φιλαπεχθήμων. The accentuation of ἀφίη (VII. 520 A) is indefensible. But I have followed the MSS. and editions. No scholar has yet suggested the adoption of the ı adscript in our ordinary texts. But this, together with the abolition of capitals and the recasting of our type in imitation of the earliest uncials, may follow in time.

1 Vol. i. p. 386.


**APPENDIX I.**

**COLLATION OF THE PRESENT TEXT WITH PARIS A (1807).**

The purpose of these pages is to supplement and partly to correct the list of various readings subjoined to the Text of this edition. Where my collation agrees substantially with Baiter’s report, I give my own observation without any distinctive mark. An asterisk is placed against items believed to be new. And where these tend either to confirm or to alter the text as it stands, the reading of A is printed in larger type. It will be observed that in six places the new collation turns the scale against readings formerly adopted: III. 391 ὠμητησαν not ὠμητησεν: IV. 428 δ τελεως not τελεως; VI. 496 c τῷ δικαίῳ not τῶν δικαίων: 503 η διεσπαρμένη not διεσπαρμένα; X. 606 c διος not διον: 607 άπολογησαμένη not άπολογησαμένη.

L. C.

For the List of Errata in Text, see the last page of this volume. And for general peculiarities of Paris A, neglected here, see above, p. 70.

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<td>6 2</td>
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**Correction:**

- 49: Βερεδείας, Corrected to ἀνοιγότατος
- 55: ητω: but η from i. p. m.
- 56: ἄν' ἀυτῆς pr.
- 59: ἀνάντη added in mg. by Λ²
- 60: Changed to ἐπιπτόμενοι by m. rec. with καὶ ἐπιπτόμενοι in mg.
- 62: ὦς δὲ (sic) Λ¹ or Λ²?
- 63: εἴπειν corr. to εἴπειν by Λ¹ or Λ²
- 63: om.: supplied in mg. by Λ²
- 63: om.: inserted above the line by Λ²
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* Rep. V.

** om. add. in mg. A²

---

Delete (?): μαθητικοῦ A²

ποι

φ (ὁι, sic, not ὁν)

ἐξῆς: ἐξ ἀρχῆς A² mg.

πώλεως? pr.

γρ. ἀνώνητα A² mg.

μὴ (not μὴ)

παραγόμενοι A² mg.

ἀποκτινώντας (ἲν ο in era-

sured): κτεινό A² mg.

γρ. πλῆθος A² mg.

φησιν pr.

om. pr. add. in mg. A²

ἐξαιρεῖν

κτάει pr.

εἰργμῶν A²

ἔφη ἤν δ’ ἐγώ

ἀνέλθοι

τῷ δικαίῳ

δῇ pr.

λαὶ

πολύ A²

γρ. τοιαυτὶ ῥῆματα A² mg.

ἐπήκοι (sic)

ξυντεταγμένως pr.(γ erased)

πρόσωπον γρ. τρόπου A² mg.
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5 ξειδελέγχυ γρ. μεμησεται A² mg. 

απείγασαι pr.: απείγασαι 

om. pr.: add. A² Rep. VIII. ἀλλὰ γ' (not ἀλλὰ γ) 

τοῦ ἡθῶν pr.: ἡθῶν A² 

ἡ pr.: ἡ A² 

ἐκατον (bis) pr. 

παρέχεται (not παρέχηται) 

is the reading of A φήσομεν 

tὸ γένει pr.: τὸ γένει ἀργύρεον: ἄργυρεον A² 

πενεμένῳ . . . πλουσίῳ pr. 

(ν erased, bis) 

οὐ ὅτοι pr.: οὐ ὅτοι A² 

οἰμεν pr.: οἰ μὲν A² 

tίς . . . with space for two letters, but what was first written is uncertain 

καὶ αὐτῶν rec. (not A) 

om. pr.: add. in mg. A² 

γυναῖκες αὑτῷ ἡ οὐσία 

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ pr.: καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ | τόδε corr. rec. 

(οὐδὲ being written in the right-hand margin)
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<td>ἵκταρ</td>
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<td>8 &amp; 31</td>
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<td>582 C</td>
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<td>ὄν pr.: βιον (sic)</td>
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<td>πην pr.: πην Α²</td>
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<td>584 E</td>
<td>κάτω</td>
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<td>νόθαιν</td>
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<td>ἐκείνω pr.: ἐκείνω Α²</td>
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<td>ἐν αὐτῷ Α²</td>
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<td>ἐν αὐτῷ Α²</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>ἐν αὐτοῖς</td>
<td>ἐν αὐτοῖς</td>
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## Appendix I: Collation of

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<td>add. 'but the accent is by a recent hand' (κλίναι infr. 597 b)</td>
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<td>τάχα (the accent and χ in erasure)</td>
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<td>16–18 &amp; 30</td>
<td>E οἶκων...ὀμήνων</td>
<td>The mark for the change of persons (—;) is before οἶκων, not before ἀλλὰ (Not 'praescriptum est τω;)</td>
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<td>600 D ὄνομαναι</td>
<td>ὄνομαι Λ²</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>601 A αὐτὸν... ἐτέρως</td>
<td>om. pr. : add. in mg. Λ², with ἐν τοῖς for ἐτέρως</td>
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<td>B ἐν μέτρῳ... λέγεσθαι</td>
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<td>602 C τῶν</td>
<td>τῶ Λ²</td>
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<td>D αὐτῇ</td>
<td>αὐτῇ</td>
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<td>ὅτι δεῖ</td>
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<td>11 &amp; 31</td>
<td>605 A τε</td>
<td>γε (γ in erasure)</td>
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<td>*440</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>ei έκείνη (ei not omitted)</td>
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<td>ἀπολαίεν Λ²</td>
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<td>om. pr. : add. in mg. Λ²</td>
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<td>ἔγωγ' τοιτό γ' ἔβη Λ²</td>
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<td>609 B ψυχῇ ἄρα... ἐν</td>
<td>om. pr. : add. in mg. Λ²</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>( \text{φανείται} ) is given as an alternative by ( \text{A1 or A2} )</td>
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<td>( \dot{\alpha} )</td>
<td>Inserted after ( \text{κτωμένη} ) by ( \text{A2} )</td>
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<td>( \text{αἰτή} ) (sic)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>γε</td>
<td></td>
<td>( \text{γε} \</td>
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<td>454</td>
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<td>613 E</td>
<td>λέγων</td>
<td>( \text{γρ. λέγων} \text{A2 mg.} )</td>
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<td>25 &amp; 32</td>
<td>614 B</td>
<td>( \text{ἐπειδῆ ὦ} \text{A: ἐπειδῆ ὦν A2} )</td>
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<td>455</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>θεάοθαι</td>
<td>( \text{θε} \cdot \text{ά} \cdot \text{οθα} \text{ (ά in space of three letters)} )</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>ἀπούσας</td>
<td>( \text{ἀπούσας A2} )</td>
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<tr>
<td>456</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>615 A</td>
<td>ἀσους</td>
<td>( \text{... ὦς (two letters erased)} )</td>
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| 457   | 14    | 616 A      | τοῦτον | \( \text{τοῦτον A2 (ο in erasure)—primitus scriptum τοῦ-} \\
|       |       |            |       | \( \text{τον} \) |
| *     | 24    | B          | προσφερῆ | \( \text{προσφερῆ A2} \) |
| 460   | 7     | 617 E      | συνέσται | \( \text{συνεστε pr.?} \) |
|       | 11    |            | ἐ δὲ  | \( \text{ἐδει A2} \) |
|       | 27    | 618 B      | ὑγείαις | \( \text{ἵγειας pr.} \) |
| 462   | 6     | 619 B      | νῷ     | \( \text{om. pr.: supra lineam add. A2} \) |
| 465   | 5     | 621 B      | ἐωθεν  | \( \text{γρ. ἐνωθεν A2 mg.} \) |
|       | 6     |            | ήθη    | \( \text{om. pr., then add. at end of line} \) |
|       | 17    | D          | χιλιέτει | \( \text{χιλιέται pr.: χιλιέτι A2} \) |
APPENDIX II.

Errors of the First Hand in Par. A.

N.B. — To avoid undue length some slight clerical errors such as οὐ τοι for οὐ τα (l. 330 b), ἧπερ for ἦπερ ibid. c, ἦ πῶς for ἦ πῶς (ib. 337 c), ἐγείραι for ἐγείραι (v. 479 A), πίντως for παντὸς (vi. 491 c)— although sometimes confusing enough—are omitted in the following list.

A', for the sake of simplicity, is here made to include, together with readings of the Diorthotes, some corrections by A¹, and some by other early hands, and only manifest errors are admitted.

It will be observed that only thirty-three out of 170 errors of the first hand about 1/4 are corrected by A²; 2: that the correction in forty-one places is due to Π as the earliest witness, in fourteen places to Μ pr. m., in twenty-five places to Ε and in twenty-four places to Θ. Of the remainder x is responsible for three corrections, Vind. D for one, Vind. F for three, and r for one; three rest on the testimonies of ancient writers¹, and nineteen are conjectural.

<table>
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<td>Εφην ἐγώ</td>
<td>Ε</td>
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<td>333 D δέοι</td>
<td>δέη</td>
<td>Π Μ</td>
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<td>335 E οἶκων</td>
<td>οἶκ ἠν οὖν</td>
<td>Α² mg.</td>
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<td>336 E οὖν τὲ σὺ</td>
<td>οὖν γὲ σὺ</td>
<td>Bekker (οὐν γὲ Ε)</td>
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<tr>
<td>339 B καὶ ἦτος</td>
<td>καὶ ἦτο</td>
<td>Α²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>342 A δεὶ αἰτεί</td>
<td>δεὶ</td>
<td>Π Μ</td>
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<td>345 C παίνειν</td>
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<td>Α² mg.</td>
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<tr>
<td>346 A οἶν</td>
<td>οἶν</td>
<td>Α²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347 A οῦ</td>
<td>οὖ</td>
<td>q</td>
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<td>348 E μᾶς</td>
<td>μᾶς</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
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<td>351 A ἐφη</td>
<td>ἐφην</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>352 C σκα</td>
<td>σκα</td>
<td>Π Μ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>353 D ἐσφέρωμεν</td>
<td>ἐσφέρωμα</td>
<td>Α²</td>
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To these perhaps two more should be added:—

iv. 442 Β προσάκεν Stobaeus.
444 C οὕτα πέν οὖν Stobaeus.
**Appendix II.**

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<td>ἑαυτῷ</td>
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<td>Εusebius</td>
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<td>363 A τῷ δικαῖῳ</td>
<td>τῷ δικαῖῳ</td>
<td>q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>364 D μαστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοῖτε</td>
<td>στρεπτοὶ δὲ τε</td>
<td>Π M</td>
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<td>Π</td>
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<td>οἱ ξυνὸς ἐγγύς, ὅν</td>
<td>Bekker (ὡν some MSS.)</td>
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<td>395 A μμύματα τε</td>
<td>μμύματα</td>
<td>q</td>
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<td>, , C ὑν</td>
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<td>397 B σμικρὰ</td>
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<td>εἰπομενοί ποιά δὲ ποιούν</td>
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<td>τε ἀνάγκη</td>
<td>Π M</td>
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Appendix II.

Errors of A p.m. | Corrected to | By
---|---|---
III. 400 D μικράν | μακράν | M
407 C κεφαλῆς τινός | κεφαλῆς τινός | ξ q
411 D γενόμενον | γενόμενον | q
. . . E εἴπερ εργόν | ei πάρεργον | Π
414 E δῆ | δῆ | Π Μ
IV. 421 D διαφέρει | | M
425 B λήξεις | λήξεως | Λ² mg.
430 E φαίνονται | φαίνονται | H. Wolf
431 C εν πάσι | εν πασί | ξ q
434 D ἕκατον | ἕκατον | Cornarius
436 A τὸ περὶ | τὸ περὶ | Π Μ
437 D εν ὅλῳφ | εἰν λόγῳ | ξ
439 B δισπέρ θηρίον | δισπέρ θηρίον | ξ
. . . D ἦδον ἐτέρων | ἦδον ἐταιρών | Π Μ
440 C ζητεῖ | ζητεῖ | ξ
. . . E τὸ λογιστικὸν | τὸ λογιστικὸν | Π
441 C εν εἰς ἐκάστων | εν ἐν ἐκάστων | Π
. . . D καὶ ἄνδρειαν | καὶ ἄνδρειαν | Π
442 C τῶν λόγων | τοῦ λόγου | Π
. . . E τοῦτον αὐτὸν | τοῖς πρεσβύτεροι | Π Μ
443 A ἐκτὸς ἄν | ἐκτὸς ἄν | Λ²
. . . B τελευταίον | τελευταίον | A² mg.
. . . D περὶ ἑαυτῶν | περὶ ἑαυτῶν | Π M
. . . D αὐτῶν καὶ | αὐτῶν καὶ | Π M
444 B τοῦ ὧν διάβολον ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντα | τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντα | ξ
. . . C τὰ δίκαια | τὰ δίκαια | ξ
. . . B ἀποκριτέων | ἀποκριτέων | Beker
V. 450 C πειρῶ ἄν | πειρῶ ὁ πειρῶν | Π M (πειρῶ δῆ)
451 B ἂ ποτε | ἂ τότε | ξ
454 B τῆν αὐτῆν | μὴ τῆν αὐτῆν | ξ
. . . D ἵστρικον μὲν καὶ ἵστρικήν | ἵστρικον μὲν καὶ ἵστρικήν | η
### Appendix II.

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<th>Errors of A p.m.</th>
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<td>V. 455 B τὸ μὲν</td>
<td>τὸν μὲν</td>
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<td>458 D γυμνοσθαί</td>
<td>μεγνυσθαί</td>
<td>Γ</td>
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<td>460 D προδημομεθα</td>
<td>προδημεθα</td>
<td>Ξ (τρ. ἐφʼ ἓ, A²)</td>
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<td>461 A φύσας 'άς έκάστως</td>
<td>φός, ἢ ἐφʼ έκάστως</td>
<td>Eusebius</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; B φύσαμεν</td>
<td>ἀφθαρσίμεν</td>
<td>Ξ</td>
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<td>&quot; D έκεῖνον</td>
<td>διδαξαμένον</td>
<td>q (corr.)</td>
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<td>Vind. F (corr.)</td>
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<td>Μ Ξ (corr.)</td>
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<td>Hermann (οὐκοίν επεὶ ἐπὶ)</td>
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<td>Vind. F</td>
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<tr>
<td>495 A ἀρα</td>
<td>ἀρα</td>
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<td>499 B κατήκουν</td>
<td>κατηκόρ</td>
<td>Π</td>
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<td>αὐτή ἡ Μοῖσα</td>
<td>Prinsterer (αὐτή ἡ Μοῖσα ἡνέγκοικι)</td>
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<td>add.</td>
<td>Geer</td>
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<td>511 A τετημηένοις</td>
<td>τετημηένοις</td>
<td>Π Μ</td>
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<td>ὁ τουιότος</td>
<td>Schleierm.</td>
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<td>νοῆσει</td>
<td>q</td>
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<td>&quot; C μὲν</td>
<td>νέων</td>
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<td>σαφηνεία ὅ λέγει</td>
<td>Π Μ</td>
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<td>(corr.) Ξ</td>
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### Appendix II.

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<td>551 C ή τινος</td>
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<td>οὐδεὶς τόθε καλόν</td>
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<td>τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν</td>
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<td>Schneider</td>
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<td>Π</td>
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<td>τά τῶν πολομεέων</td>
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<td>`` E ἐτέρους</td>
<td>ἐταίρους</td>
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<td>569 A ἐπό</td>
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<td><strong>ix.</strong> 571 B ἐγκαλώ</td>
<td>ἐν καλώ</td>
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<td>`` E κάτα</td>
<td>ψυχῆς</td>
<td>x (Ξ corr.)</td>
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### Appendix II.

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<td>x. 603 B ἡ κατὰ</td>
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<td>τύχης</td>
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<td>604 C ἀρεί</td>
<td>ἀρεί</td>
<td>Ξ</td>
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<td>πληγέστος</td>
<td>Π</td>
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<td>ιατρικὴ δρηνσίων</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>εἰσέμεθα</td>
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<td>609 B ψυχὴ ἁρᾶ ... ἀ νῦν</td>
<td>add.</td>
<td>A²</td>
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<td>610 A ὁβδότατ' ἄν</td>
<td>ὁβδότατα γ'</td>
<td>L. Campbell</td>
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<td>61 C διαθετέον</td>
<td>διαθετεόν</td>
<td>Ξ (θεατέον Μ)</td>
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<td>612 B ἐπιμνήκαμεν</td>
<td>ἐπιμνήκαμεν (sic)</td>
<td>A²</td>
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<td>,, D ἐπειδὴ ἦν τοῖνυν</td>
<td>ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν, ἦν δ'</td>
<td>A² mg.</td>
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<td>κεκριμέναι εἰςίν,</td>
<td>κεκριμέναι εἰςί</td>
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<td>613 E ὅρα</td>
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<td>ἐκάτερος</td>
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<td>ὅτι εἰς τὸν τάρταρον</td>
<td>q</td>
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<td>617 B τὸν τρίτον</td>
<td>τρίτον</td>
<td>Vind. F Plutarch</td>
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<td>620 B ὡσαύτως εἰκός. τὴν</td>
<td>ὡσαύτως· εἰκοστὴν</td>
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APPENDIX III.

Correction of Errors and Omissions in Bekker's Collation of Π and Ε. By C. Castellani.

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<th>Bekker 1823</th>
<th>Venetus Π</th>
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<td>330 B</td>
<td>9. 7</td>
<td>ἀλλ' οὗ ἦ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἀρετὴν; (omitting εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων. ἃρ' οὖν ... εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων)</td>
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<tr>
<td>335 B</td>
<td>19. 6-8</td>
<td>eι γὰρ τι</td>
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<td>336 E</td>
<td>22. 6</td>
<td>αἰκριβολογεῖ</td>
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<td>„ E</td>
<td>„ „</td>
<td>καὶ δ' ἄρχων ἠμαρτε ότι</td>
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<tr>
<td>342 A</td>
<td>33. 1-3</td>
<td>καὶ τῇ ... σκέψεται (not omitted)</td>
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<tr>
<td>„ B</td>
<td>„ 3</td>
<td>ἡ οὔτε αὐτῆς ότι</td>
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<tr>
<td>343 B</td>
<td>35. 6</td>
<td>ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς</td>
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<td>„ E</td>
<td>36. 10</td>
<td>τοῖς τε οἰκείοις</td>
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<td>350 D</td>
<td>49. 9</td>
<td>ἡμῖν placed after κείσθω</td>
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<tr>
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<td>50. 9</td>
<td>τῇ δ' ἑπισκέψεσθαι</td>
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<td>„ D</td>
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<td>καὶ μίση</td>
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<td>352 D</td>
<td>53. 4</td>
<td>ότι ότι</td>
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<td>353 B</td>
<td>54. 9-11</td>
<td>ἔστων ἔργον; Ναι. (omitting ἔστων. ἃρ' οὖν ... ἢ τι ἐργον;)</td>
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N.B.—Some of the above corrections have been anticipated by Stallbaum and others; see Schneider's Preface, p. xxxi. The general result is to raise somewhat the character of Π and also to establish more clearly its affinity to the later MSS. D K η β'.

L. C.
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APPENDIX IV.
[By E. Rostagno.]

DE COD. 4 PLUTEI XXVIII, QUI CAESENAE IN
BIBL. MALATESTIANA ASSERVATUR.

Codex est bombycinus, exeunte saeculo xii maiore ex parte, ut videtur, exaratus, foliis 418, versibus plerumque quadragenisis, aut singulis et quadragenisis. Ad formam voluminis quod attinet, hanc ita sum mensus: o, 228-40 x 0, 339-41. Complectitur autem 52 quaterniones, qui octonis foliis constant, praeter quaternionem 40 [µ'], cui unum deficit: in textu tamen nulla lacuna hic reprehenditur. Singulorum quaternionum seriem numeri, graecis literis exarati, atque in infimo ultimae paginae margine rubro charactere depicti, repraesentant. Postremo quaternio 49 [µθ'], quamquam unus paginae lacuna laborat (vide sis Πολεμίων 5', p. 510 n) nihil minus octo foliis et ipse constat.

Notandum interim est, in hisce 52 quaternionibus haud contineri tria ff., quibus volumen incipit, quaeque seorsim ab illis in vol. colocata sunt.

Insunt praeterea in ipso voluminis ingressu duo ff. membranacea, interioris integumenti locum obtinentia (ut vulgo dicunt 'fogli di guardia'), binis columnis exarata, saeculoque circiter xiv conscripta. De re theologica in illis agitur, ut textus quidem docere nos videtur. Hinc, specteminis ergo, quae sequuntur exscripsi:

'Quia [?] in superioribus consideramus qualiter deus sit secundum ipsum, restat considerandum qualiter sit in cogitatione nostra, id est, quomodo cogitetur a creaturis. Circa hoc quaeruntur xiii. Primo utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit essentiam dei videre. Secundo utrum dei essentia videatur ab intellectu per animi [?] speciem creatam. Tertio utrum oculo corporeo dei essentia possit videri.' Et q. s.

Provenisse haec duae paginae videntur ex eodem libro atque opere, e quo nonnulla alia folia avuls a sunt, ut interioris integumenti locum.
ut ita dicam. obtinerent in cod. qui sunt 3 Plut. xxviii¹, Cod. 2 Plut. xxviii²; Cod. 5 Plut. xxviii³; Cod. 3 Plut. xxvii⁴.

In fine autem codicis una pagina bombycina locum interioris integumenti obtinet.

Primo aspectu codex bifariam dividi posse videtur: altera enim pars voluminis e charta dente, ut dicunt, polita constat, altera (4r–171v) e charta obsoleta, minus levigata, ut bibulam cam prope dicas. Ex quo fit, ut in hac priore parte folia 12r–43v et 113r–171v, cum atramentu sucum, ut ita dicam, charta eliciisset, nigrescentem speciem prae se ferant. Alterius autem partis paginae charactere ad rubrum vergente plerumque sunt exaratae.

Quod ad manus, ut dicunt, attinet, duas in primis scripturas codex, de quo agitur, exhibet: altera, satis quidem elegans atque nitida, qua maior operis pars exarata est, minutis characteribus constat, nitidis atque subrubentibus; altera autem incompta, deflexis characteribus, saepius nigrantibus, impolitis crassioribus que constans, duorum scriptorum imperitiorem manum redolet. Ut de duobus hisce scriptoribus, seu mavis, duabus hisce manibus nonnulla subiciam, hoc arbitror animadversione dignum in primis esse, duas scilicet has scripturas per alternas vices saepius ita continuari, ut altera alteram vel in mediis paginis plerumque subsequatur: quod nimimum ut in promptu esset, paginas descriendas curavi, incompta—ut in superioribus dixi—scriptura crassioreque charactere exaratas, et duas manus illas redolentes. Hinc luculentor patebit dimidiam ferme paginam saepius altera manu conscriptam esse, quam paulo sequioris aevi esse merito dicas.

Altera manuigitur haec ff. exarata sunt:

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<td>121v.</td>
<td>130r.</td>
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¹ Cod. 3 Plut. xxviii duo ff. exhibet, ut in voluminis principio, ita in fine: alterum folium autem cum codicis ligneo integumento compactum est.
² Cod. 2 Plut. xxviii duo ff. exhibet in principio, quorum alterum cum ligneo codicis integumento compactum est.
³ Cod. 5 Plut. xxviii duo ff. exhibet in fine.
⁴ Cod. 3 Plut. xxvii duo ff. exhibet in principio.
### Appendix IV.

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<th>Folium</th>
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Alter autem manu haec ff. sunt concripta:

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<td>293v.</td>
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Folium 379: inde e verbis τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίων πόλεως κ.τ.λ."


Πολιτ. α', p. 343 E sqq.).

Folium 393 (sc. 393: 393: erectionibus litteris atque rotundis exaratum est. In hac autem parte τῆς Πολιτείας literam ι subscriptam reperimus, quam nusquam in decem libros codex exhibet.

Folium 392 (sc. 392: 392:) deflexo maiorequa charactere est exaratum, codem nimium atque folia 1. 2, quae εἰσαγωγὴν τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου completeuntur. F. 392 autem ceteris glutino connexum est.


Ad scholia quod attinet, quibus marginalibus codex est adspersus, duabus diversis manibus conscripta ea esse constat; pars enim scriptura nitidissima, alia contra inelegante ac recentiore exarata sunt. Quod autem ad Politeias decem libros spectat, tres manus deprehendi hic possunt: nonnulla enim multo recentioris manus notavit, characteribus minus nexitibusque plerumque implicitis.

Horum schol. speciminis loco quae sequuntur ita exscripsi, ut signum quod est * recentioribus apposuerim.

Πολιτ. α', 328 D extr. ὡς εἴ ἵσθι ὅτι ἐμοικε κ.τ.λ.] σημεῖοι λόγοι ἡδοναί...

... 329 A. παλαιών παραφιλών" περὶ "ἀεὶ κολοιδεις ποτὶ κολοιδευ "

... 330 D. σημ. τού ἢνακτοῦ τῶν λόγων

... 337 A. ἢπὸ Ἵμων τῶν δεινῶν] δεινῶν*

... 359 D. ἱστορία τοῦ γίγνου

... 372 B. κρηθον ἀλλήλων / πέφαινες

... 372 C extr. καὶ τραγῆματα ποὺ] τραγῆματα

... E. τρυφώσαν πόλει

... E extr. ἀληθινῇ καὶ ἐγγύῃ πόλειs
Πολίτ. 8', 372 ε έξω. φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις

" 378 B. θεοὶ οἱ πρῶτοι τι καὶ μέγιστοι μήμη τίμων πρῶτους καὶ μεγίστους θεοὶ λέγει*

.. D έξω. ἐπόνια*

" 379 B. πρῶτος τύπος θεολογίας, ὅτι οὐκ ἦταν τῶν κακῶν ὁ θεός*

.. C. πολὺ έλάστω τάγαθά τῶν κακῶν

" 380 D. δεύτερος τύπος θεολογίας, ὅτι ο θεός ἀμετάβλητος ο

.. 382 ιη. τρίτων τύπων θεολογίας, ὅτι ἀληθὺς ὁ θεός*

" 388 B. ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἁγνωσίᾳ τῶ θεοὺς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πρώτων*

καὶ ἦν τῇ ψυχῇ ἁγνωσίᾳ τῶ θεοὺς*

γ', 388 C. μέγιστος θεὸς ὁ Ζεὺς*

" 392 C. τὰ μὲν δή λάγων κ.τ.λ. λάγων, λείσως*

.. 394 D. ἐπιστάθα σαφέως δηλοῖται τί τό "λάγων" τί τὸ "λείσως" σημαίνει*

" 398 E. μεξελευδιστὶ καὶ συντακτολευδιστὶ} βηρώδεις*

.. E έξω. ιαστὶ καὶ λειμακαί*

399 A. δωριστὶ καὶ φρονιμισθη* ανδρώδεις*

.. D. σημα. ὀνόματα ὀργαίνων κακουρίων*

" 400 B. οἶμαι δὲ μὲ ἄκρηκενι, κ.τ.λ.] κύθους ὀνόματα*

.. E. τί εὐθεία*

" 402 E. περὶ τῶν ἀγάνων κακουρίων*

" 403 E. τῶν ἀσκητῶν ἀσκήτης*

404 A. κομψοφέρας δὴ τῶν κ.τ.λ.] τίς στρατιωτῶν ἀσκήτης*

.. B. ἀκροσφάλης εἰς ὑγίειαν*

.. B. ἔσται*

.. E. ἀπεικάζοντες*

" 405 D. φύσας τε καὶ κατάρρους] φύση | κατάρρος*

406 A. ἐπισύνειντα*

.. A. ὅτι τῇ παιδαγωγικῇ κ.τ.λ.] ἣν νῦν λατρεικῇ, παιδαγωγικῇ τῶν νοσημάτων

Et alia multa id genus.

416 D. κοινῶν βίων καὶ εὐτελῆ τοῖς φίλαξι βιωτεών

δ', 421 D. πλοῦτος καὶ πενία διαβεβείρει τοῖς δημοιογούσιν

.. Ε έξω. βιλαφραί τῇ πόλει πλοῦτος καὶ πενία*

436 B. Δήλου ὃτι ταυτῶν τάναττα κ.τ.λ.] σημ. τὴν πρό-

τασιν ταύτην*

.. ε', 470 έξω. σημ. τι διαφέρει πόλεμος στάσεωσ

VOL. II.
De scholiis hactenus.

Iam vero paucis absolvam de iis quae codex complectitur: in quibus recensendis editione Lipsiensi usus sum Hermanni mdccc.lxiv (voll. 6).

F. 1r. Rubris literis et maioribus legitur: "εἰς τὴν τῶν Πλάτωνος βιβλίων υλίσιν πρόλογος."

Incipit "ὅτι τῷ μέλλοντι εντείξεσθαι τοῖς Пλάτωνος διαλόγοις, προσηκεῖ πρότερον ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῷ τούτῳ τί ποτε ἑστιν ὁ διαλόγος."

Desinit (f. 2r): "καὶ ύπος αυτοῖς καὶ δοῦνα τρόπον προσφέρεσθαι κακωρυγοῦσα περὶ τῶν λόγων."

2v. vacuum est sciptura. Tum occurrit tabula, rubris literis exarata, quae titulos ac seriem scriptorum repraesentat. Hacce est inscriptio eius:

3r. διαλόγοι Πλάτωνος ἀκριβῶς πίναξ.

4r. Sequitur deinde: "βίως Πλάτωνος συγγραφεῖς παρά λαερτίων Διογένους (hacce autem rubris literis leguntur)."

Incipit "Πλάτων ἀρίστωνος καὶ περικτώνης ἡ ποιήσεως ὑθημάτω κ.τ.λ."

Desinit (f. 11v): "τὰ μὲν περὶ πλάτωνος τοπικῶν ἢ ἐς τὸ δυνατὸν ἢμῶν συνεργαζόμενοι φιλοσόφους διειλίσθη τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ τῶν ὄρος. | τέλος τοῦ πλάτωνος βίου."
A pag. 12r incipit Platonis opera, et quidem hoc ordine:

F. 12r. εἰδόθρων ἡ περὶ ὀσιῶν:
16v. σωκράτους ἀπολογία.
24v. κριτῶν ἡ περὶ πρακτοῖ.
28v. φαίδων ἡ περὶ πυρῆς.
49v. κρατίλος ἡ περὶ ὑμνάτων ὀρθύτητος.
63v. θεατήτων ἡ περὶ ἐπιστήμης.
82v. σοφίτης ἡ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος.
97v. πολιτικὸς ἡ περὶ βασιλείας.
114v. παρμενίδης ἡ περὶ ἱδεῶν.
126v. φιλοθέος ἡ περὶ ἠδονῆς.
143v. συμπόσιων ἡ περὶ ἔρωτος.
158v. φαιδρός ἡ περὶ καλοῦ.
174v. ἀλκιβιάδης ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπων.
183v. ἀλκιβιάδης θ ἡ περὶ προσεύχης.
187v. ἰππαρχός ἡ φιλοκερδῆς.
189v. ἔρασταὶ ἡ περὶ φιλοσοφίας.
191v. θεάγη ἡ περὶ σοφίας.
194v. χαμιδῆς ἡ περὶ σοφροσύνης.
202v. λάχης ἡ περὶ ἀνθρώπων.
209v. λύσις ἡ περὶ φιλίας.
215v. εὐθύδημος ἡ ἐριστικός.
216v. πρωταγόρας ἡ σοφιστάι.
242v. γοργάς ἡ περὶ μητορικής.
266v. μέκων ἡ περὶ ἀρετῆς.
274v. ἰππίας μείζων ἡ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ.
282v. ἰππίας ἐλιττῶν ἡ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ.
286v. ἱὼν ἡ περὶ άλκιδος.
289v. μενεξενός ἡ ἐπιστάμων.
294v. περὶ δικαίου. πλάτωνος νοθευόμενοι ἵ.
295v. περὶ ἀρετῆς.
296v. δημόδοκος ἡ περὶ τοῦ ἐνυμβολεύσας.
298v. σίναφος ἡ περὶ τοῦ βουλεύεσας.
300v. ἀλκυνὸν ἡ περὶ μεταμορφώσεως.
301v. ἐρμίδωσ ἡ περὶ πλοῦτων ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐρμίδωσετος.
306v. ἀδίκως ἡ περὶ θανάτου.
308v. τέλος τῶν νοθευόμενων.
" " κλεισθεῖν ἡ προτρεπτικός.
310v. τίμαιος ὁ μυκρός (Incipit: "Τίμαιος ὁ Λοκρὸς τὰδ' ἐφα")

1 Tituli omnes rubris maioribusque literis constant.
F. 313r. τιμίων ἡ περὶ φύσεων.
.. 313r. κριτικὴ ἡ ἀτλαντικὸς.
.. 316r. μῖνων.
.. 318v. προθαγόρου σφιμίου ἔτη ταῦτα ἐνεστὶ τὰ χριστὰ; (cf. Cod. 9 Plut. 85. Bibl. Laurentianae, pag. 3r).

Incipit num haec carmina:
ἀθωνίας μὲν πρῶτα θεοῖς, νόμω ὡς διάκειται
tοὺς τε καταχειδῶς σέξι δαίμονας ἐννομα κέκων κ. τ. λ.

Desinit ibid.: "ἐσσεαυ ἀθωνίας θεοῖς ἄμματοι αὐτοῦτε θεοὶ ὅτε κ. τ. λ."

Demum f. 339r. "πλατώνος πολεμίαν;"
Reliquum vol. hic dialogos complectitur, qui f. 418v desinit.

In infimo margine pag. 418v literis evanidis legitur: 'ορὰ Platonis. dialogi nro 50.'

In dialogis huiusce codicis nomina τῶν προσώπων desunt: locus vero est relictus ad literas saltem corum initialia ponendas.

Codex demum. de quo hactenus actum est, elegantiorem perpoliti operis speciem quondam prae se tulisse videtur. Oblita enim auro folia circum iam fuere: ad hoc linea integumenta, corio contexta cundentis ferri stigmate perbelle impresso, clavis vel bullis aeneis etiamnune sunt transfixa.
ESSAY III.

ON PLATO'S USE OF LANGUAGE.

PART I.

On Style and Syntax.

The purpose of the following pages is to bring into a general view some forms of expression and tendencies of grammatical construction, which, although not confined to Plato, more frequently occur in him than in other Greek writers. In treating of his writings, principally from a grammatical point of view, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to separate absolutely between questions of syntax and questions of style; since in the Platonic dialogue, syntactical peculiarities have often a rhetorical motive. Whilst the subject is treated generally, the Republic, as the work immediately in hand, will furnish most of the examples; but reference will occasionally be made to other parts of Plato, and, now and again, to various Greek writers. A distinction will be maintained between those dialogues which represent the earlier or middle style of Plato (e.g. the Symposium, Phaedrus, &c.) and those which reflect his later manner (e.g. the Politicus, Philebus, Laws, &c.)¹.

§ 1. Plato has not one style but several. No great prose writer has command of an instrument so varied, or an equal power of adapting modes of expression to moods of thought and imagination. Without breaking harmony, he passes often from extreme simplicity to the extreme of complexity, according to the subject handled and the spirit in which he is approaching it.

The ground may be cleared by distinguishing between, (1) simple narration, (2) ornate narration, (3) passages of moral elevation, (4) question and answer, and (5) continuous dialectic.

(1) Simple statement or narration.—The narrative passages which introduce the dialogues or are interspersed in them are in many places perfectly limpid and clear. Hardly less so is the language in which Plato often clothes his fictitious tales (Egyptian or Phoenician), using a series of short sentences connected with the ingenuous naïveté of the λέξεως εύγεμενη. The simplicity of the language often strikingly contrasts with the incredibility of the myth, as, for example, where Protagoras describes the creation of man, or where the Judgement of the Dead is reported by Socrates in the Gorgias, or in Republic x. Plato's simpler style, as Littre has remarked, bears some affinity to that of the genuine writings of Hippocrates.

(2) Ornate narration.—But there are other mythical discourses in which the language becomes more elevated and at the same time more complex, such as the account of the Soul's Migrations in the Phaedrus, the description of subterranean and supramundane regions in the Phaedo, or of the allegorical cavern in the seventh book of the Republic. Here the sentences are longer, and are complicated with explanations, illustrations, maxims, reflexions, and incidental statements, free play being given to fancy,

1 See Phaedr. 277 ε παραμονίους λόγους.
while the effort to surround the marvellous with an air of naturalness and credibility is still maintained.

(3) Passages of moral elevation.—Distinct from both these narrative modes is the sustained eloquence of such passages as the discourse of Diotima (Symp. 211 D ff.), the reflections of Socrates addressed to Theodorus on the happiness of the philosophic life (Theaet. 172 D–177 C), or the description of the misery of the tyrant in Rep. IX (579 and 591–592); also, to notice some of Plato's later works, the creation of the world in the Timaeus (29–30); the summing up of religious duties in the Laws (v. 726 ff.); or again, in the same dialogue the remarks on the commerce of the sexes (vIII. 835 D ff.), and on the sin of Atheism (x. 887 c–888 d). In these notwithstanding occasional exuberances, there is uninterrupted harmony and continuity. But there is an entire absence of formality, and only an approach to that rhetorical smoothness and concinnity which Plato well knew how to assume, as is shown by the speech of Agathon in the Symposium.

(4) Question and answer.—As in tragedy στίχομυθία is followed by ρησ, so in Plato the pervading dialectic is at one time broken up, at another continuous and concentrated. Socrates everywhere begins with questions, but often (as is explicitly stated in the Gorgias and the Protagoras) he finds it necessary to take the argument into his own hands. In the questioning stage the logical steps are sometimes so numerous and so minute as to seem little more than verbal; sometimes, as in the conversation with Polemarchus (Rep. I. 331 D–336 A), they have a sophistical effect, and, as Adeimantus complains (Rep. VI. 487 B, C), lead the respondent unawares to a paradoxical conclusion. In the Republic, while dramatic effect is nowhere relinquished, the use of question and answer, after the contention with Thrasymachus in Book I. is retained more in form than in substance. But in laying afresh the foundations of the doctrine of Ideas, Socrates
again becomes minutely dialectical (Rep. v. 476 ff., VII. 523 ff.—cp. x. 6e8 f).

(5) Continuous dialectic.—In departing from the strictly catechetical method, the style becomes in one way more condensed, and in another more expansive; more condensed, because Socrates does not wait so often for the respondent to come up with him, more expansive, because, as he flows along in talk, illustrations multiply. It is to be observed also that the more constructive method of the Republic is assisted by the choice of the respondents, Adeimantus and Glaucon, who, although they are more life-like than the Aristoteles of the Parmenides and have many picturesque differences of character which are dramatically maintained, are, on the whole, predisposed to follow the lead of Socrates (v. 474 A), and are carried for the most part unresistingly by the full stream of Platonic discourse. And, as they are made to stand for the objectors, the adversary is often found more amenable to reason than would be the case if he were present in person (VI. 502 E, cp. Soph. 217 D, 246 D, Parm. 136 B, Theaet. 146 B, 162 B).

§ 2. These remarks lead up to the general question: What relation is there between Plato's use of language and the form in which his works are cast?

Consisting of argument embodied in fiction, his writings fall under conditions both of exactness and inexactness which are peculiar to them. His style is consequently distinguished on the one hand (1) by conversational liveliness and freedom, and on the other (2) by dialectical precision.

The following passage from Antony Trollope's autobiography shows the consciousness of a modern writer as to the conditions of written dialogue:—'The novel-writer in constructing his dialogue must so steer between absolute accuracy of language—which would give to his conversation an air of pedantry—and the slovenly inaccuracy of ordinary talkers, which, if closely followed, would offend by an appearance of grimace,—as to produce upon the ear of his readers a sense of reality. If he be quite real, he will seem to attempt to be funny. If he be quite correct, he will seem to be unreal.'
(1) Thought and expression in Plato are in continual movement. Inchoate conceptions grow while being put into words. Illustrations are amplified until they threaten to supplant the original statement, on which they also react. Qualifications are perpetually inserted: abstractions are unexpectedly personified. The more vivid of two possible constructions is constantly preferred. Attention is kept on the alert by small dramatic surprises, as when Adeimantus suddenly remembers the ideal state in connexion with the philosopher who is in need of a city, VI. 497 c, or when Glauccon, who thinks that in the tyrannical man he has discovered the most miserable of human beings, is told of one who is yet more miserable, IX. 578 B. Interrogations, adjurations, apostrophes, are abruptly interposed. Crises of the argument are marked by increased liveliness, as when Socrates turns to his respondent with ὅθαυμάσει, or when he delights in exaggerating the audacious image of the laughing wave, v. 473 c. At one time, that which is imagined is treated as real, at another, Socrates returns to sad realities, with an outburst of emotion, VII. 536 C. From irony, he sometimes passes to direct seriousness, or with humorous gravity calls attention to some familiar fact, IX. 578 D. And beneath the ebb and flow of outward inconsistencies there is produced a deep impression of advance and growth. (See esp. III. 412 C, VII. 535 ff.)

Closely connected with this ever-fresh vivacity, indeed another aspect of it, is the obvious freedom from restraint. Plato's sentences are less tied down than those of other writers, even in Greek, to a predetermined form. Constructions are often found to shift through the interposition of some afterthought. Corrections, explanations, restrictions, digressions, break the regularity of grammar and occasion either a new construction or a pleonastic resumption of the previous statement, very often both. One protasis has more than one apodosis and vice versa. The
meaning is followed at the expense of concord (as in the agreement of neuter with feminine, or singular with plural) or, conversely, the nearer construction is chosen at the expense of the meaning. The grammatical order of words is modified by emphasis and by the desire of euphony. Verbs and participles are absorbed by the neighbourhood of kindred words. Not only cases but tenses and moods are employed κατὰ συνεσθή. The language is at one time more explicit, at another more elliptical than would be allowable in a treatise or set speech. Lastly, the tendency which is common in Greek, wherever there are long sentences, to make the construction of the later clauses independent of the main construction, is peculiarly common in the long sentences of Plato.

But through all this licence, which the grammarian is apt to censure for irregularity, the hand of the creative artist is clearly discernible. Plato is not, like Thucydides, continually struggling with a medium of expression which he has imperfectly mastered; but the medium itself is one which has not yet attained to perfect lucidity. He moulds contemporary language to his purpose with the greatest skill. But the formal correctness of Isocrates would ill have suited him. It would be unnatural in 'dear Glaucon' though it is natural enough in Polus to 'speak like a book.' When this is once acknowledged, the meaning is almost always clear, although the combination of subtlety with laxity does sometimes lead to ambiguity. The conversational tone, however, is sometimes fused with rhetoric, and invites comparison with the orators. For sustained force, directness, and rapidity, no style is equal to that of Demosthenes. But the oratorical style of Plato contrasts favourably with the monotonous equability of Isocrates, the plain seriousness of Andocides, and the simple passionateness of Lysias. In ornate passages, Plato often betrays familiarity with poetry; but in his middle period, to which the Republic belongs, epic and lyric elements are more distinctly present
Part I: Style—Syntax.

than echoes of tragedy. His language coincides, in some points, with that of comedy, but this will become more apparent in considering his vocabulary. (See Part II: Platonic Diction.) Tragic phrases become more frequent in his later writings, especially the Laws.

(2) While the dialogue of Plato has a conversational, and § 3, sometimes a rhetorical, it also has a dialectical cast. This gives rise to some refinements of construction, and also to an occasional complexity appearing chiefly in two specific ways, (a) coordination, (b) remote connexion.

(a) Coordination.—The disjunctive question, or negation, in which two statements are bound together under a single negative, or interrogative—signifying that they cannot or should not both be true at once—a form of sentence peculiarly Greek, attains a high degree of complexity in Plato. See below, VIII.

(b) Remote connexion.—In Plato, as sometimes in tragedy, the formula of assent or dissent, instead of referring merely to the concluding words of the question, often reverts to the very beginning of a long speech, implying in the respondent a remarkable power of continuous attention (below, X). Similarly, the whole work is bound together with links of allusion to what has preceded, and preparations for what is to come, demanding a sustained interest far surpassing that of ordinary conversation.

2. Syntax.

A Chapter in Grammar.

It follows from what has been said that the sentence in § 4, Plato, when looked at from a grammatical point of view, presents exceptional features both of irregularity and also of regularity, the ordinary structure being modified at once by conversational freedom, and by the effort to be precise and clear. This general statement will now be illustrated
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by a series of quotations from the Republic and other dialogues under the following heads:

I. Tenses, Moods, and Voices of the Verb.
II. Cases and numbers of Nouns.
III. Article and Pronoun.
IV. Adverbs and Prepositions.
V. Particles and Conjunctions.
VI. Ellipse and Pleonasm.
VII. Apposition.
VIII. Coordination of Sentences.
IX. Deferred apodosis: (Digression and Resumption).
X. Remote Reference.
XI. Imperfect Constructions.
XII. Changes of Construction.
XIII. Rhetorical figures.
XIV. Order of words.
XV. Grammatical irregularities considered in relation to the text.

I. The Verb.

§ 5.

1. Tenses.

(a) The 'aorist of the immediate past,' referring to what has just been said or felt, though less common than in tragedy, is not infrequent in Plato.

I. 348 E ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐθαύμασα, κ.τ.λ. 'But this surprises me' (in what has just been said).

(b) The 'gnomic aorist,' stating a general fact, often occurs, especially in describing mental phenomena.

VII. 523 ὁ ὁδαμοῦ γὰρ ἡ ὁφίς αὐτῇ ἄμα ἐσῆμηνε τὸν δάκτυλον τοῦναντιον ἡ δάκτυλον εἶναι. 'Sight nowhere tells her that the finger is the opposite of a finger.'

Obs. 1. In general statements Plato often passes from the present to the aorist and vice versa.

I. 338 ἐ τίθεται δὲ γε τοὺς νόμους ἐκάστη ἡ ἄρχῃ ... θέμεναι δὲ ἀπέφηναι, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 551 Λ ἰδουχρήματοι ... ἐγέρνοντο, καὶ τὸν μὲν πλούσιον ἐπαινοῦσι ... τότε δὴ νόμον τίθενται, κ.τ.λ.

Obs. 2. — The imperfect is used in correlation with this as with the ordinary (preterite) aorist.
Part I: Syntax—Verbs.

VII. 524 C μέγα μή καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρῶν ἕως ... δότω τὴν τοῦτον σαφήνειαν μέγα αὖ καὶ σμικρῶν ἡ νόησις ἡμαγακάσθη ἵδειν.

VIII. 547 8 εἰκάστην ... ἤγετήν ... ὡμολόγησαν.

IX. 572 0 κατέστη εἰς μέσου ἀμφοῖν τῶν πρῶτων, καὶ μετρίως δη, ὃς ἔστο, ἐκάστων ἀπολαύων ὀπτε ἄνελευθερον ὀπτε παράνομον βίον ξη.

Obs. 3.—The aorist infinitive without ἄν is used in assured anticipation.

v. 457 ὃς ... πλείστην ἐμφασίζησιν γενέσθαι. (So the MSS.) See Goodwin, M. and T., § 127.

Of course ἄν might easily drop out before ἄμφ.

(c) The imperfect tense of εἰμί has two special uses in Plato and in other philosophical writers:

a. In reference to what has been previously said or assumed—

III. 406 0τὶ ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον. 'Because as we suggested (405 C) he has something to do.'

IX. 587 0 εν μέσῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁ ἀδιμοτικὸς ἦν.

So (according to Ast's conjecture) in X. 603 0 ἦν τι ἄλλῳ *ἐν* (MSS. ἦ) παρὰ ταῦτα. Cp. ib. 1 ἐπτασίας ... ἐφεβ.

b. In stating the result of an enquiry, because what a thing is found to be at the end of search, that it was before the search began.

IV. 428 0 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἦτα ἦν το ὑπολευθέν. 'It was all along nothing else.'

IV. 436 B, C εἰν ποιοι εὐρήκουμεν εἰν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γεγραμμένα, εἰσόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταῦτόν ἦν ἄλλα πλείον. 'They were all the while more than one.'

VI. 497 C τοῦτο δηλώσει ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὅρτι θείον ἦν. 'This was from the beginning undoubtedly divine.'

(d) The perfect sometimes signifies a fixed habit (cp. Monro's Homeric Grammar, p. 28).

VII. 521 0 γυμναστικὴ μὲν ποι ἔργῳ γεγραμμένον καὶ ἀπολλάλ-

μενον τετεύτακε—'is constantly employed.'

VII. 533 B αἰ μὲν ἄλλων πᾶσαν τέχναι ... πρὸς θεραπείαν

... ἄπασαι τετράφασαι—'apply themselves continually.'

So in VI. 511 0 εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμάτων αὐτῶν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κατω
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απεικοσθείσι καὶ ἑκεῖνοι πρὸς ἑκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετημημένοις—‘usually esteemed and held in honour.’


(a) Conjunctive.—The familiar combination of the ‘de-liberative subjunctive’ with βούλει, βούλεσθε, occurs in

Π. 372 E ei δ’ αὐ βούλεσθε . . . δερήσωμεν, οὐδέν ἀποκρώ-λιει. This was misunderstood by the diorthotes of Paris. A. See E. on Text, p. 135.

IX. 577 B βούλει . . . προσποιησόμεθα, κ.τ.λ., and elsewhere.

Obs.—In such expressions as τί λέγομεν; πῶς λέγομεν; the MSS. often leave it doubtful whether τί λέγομεν; &c. should not be read.

(b) Optative.—Plato’s optatives are sometimes a little difficult to explain, depending rather on the drift of the sentence than on grammatical rule. The following are the chief places in the Republic requiring special treatment.

I. 337 E. πῶς . . . ἄν τις ἀποκρώνατο πρῶτον μὲν μή εἰδῶς . . . ἐπείτα, ei τι καὶ οἶται περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρημένοιν αὐτῷ εἴη . . .

The condition implied in the participial clause μή εἰδώς becomes explicit as the sentence proceeds, and is expressed as if ei μή εἴδει had followed πῶς ἄν τις ἀποκρώνατο. Cp. Protag. 327 1) ei δέων αὐτῶν κράνεσθαι πρὸς ἄνθρωπον, οἷς μὴτε παύεσθαι ἐστὶ μὴτε δικαστήρια, . . . ἀλλ’ εἴεν ἄγριοι τινες.

Here the condition introduced in ei δέων regains its force towards the end of the sentence, which is continued as if the whole from οἷς downwards were a single relative clause (e.g. οἷς μή ἔχωσαν or ἔχωσαν, κ.τ.λ.). See Xen. Symp. VIII. 17.

I. 352 E τι δέ; ἀκόουσαις ἀλλὶ ἐὰν ὕπτε: Π. 360 B οὐδείς ἄν γένοιτο, ὡς δοξεῖν, οὐτῶς ἀδιαμάδενος, ὡς ἄν μείνειν, κ.τ.λ.

The clause ὡς δοξεῖν, although not conditional, seems to fall under Goodwin’s law of assimilation (M. and T., §§ 558, 531). But it is to be observed also that the whole of Glauccon’s speech proceeds on the assumption that he is putting the case of another (359 B ὡς ὁ λόγος: 361 E μή ἐμὲ
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III. 361 C ἀδηλον ὧν εἴτε τοῦ ἀικαίου εἴτε τῶν ὁμολωγῶν . . . ἐνεκα τοιούτος εἴη.

Glaucőn's reasoning is hypothetical, though he tries to treat his supposition as a matter of fact. The language therefore wavers between the indicative and optative: i.e. ἐνεκα . . . ἐν τῷ ἀδηλον had been ἐν δοκοί . . . ἐν ἂν . . . ἀδηλον ἂν εἴη.

III. 382 D, E ἄλλα δεδώσ τοὺς ἐχθρῶς πρεσβευτα; In both these cases the construction is continued from a preceding sentence having the optative with ἂν. In the former some editors insert ἂν, and it may possibly have dropped out before ἄλλος.

III. 403 B νομοθετήσεις . . . σύνες ὑμελεῖν πρὸς ἂν τις σπουδάζω. 'In Attic Greek an optative in the relative clause sometimes depends on a verb of obligation . . . with an infinitive. . . . E.g.

'Ἀλλ' ἂν τόλις στήσεις, τόθε χρή κλέων,

III. 410 B, C οἱ καθιστάντες μονωτική καὶ γυμναστική παιδεύειν ὦν ὦν ἐνέκα τινές οἴονται καθιστάσω, ἦν τῇ μὲν τὸ σῶμα θεραπεύουσι τῇ δὲ τὴν ψυχήν.

Madvig would read καθιστάσω. But this accords ill with κυδωνείσωσιν following. And for the tense cp. VIII. 566 B ἐξετρίσκουσιν. The indirect discourse here depends on a general statement, which, as Riddell would say, 'belongs to all time' (Digest, § 74), or as Goodwin puts it (M. and T., § 323) 'implies a reference to the past as well as the present.' He quotes Dem. XII. 11 τοῦτον ἔστε τῶν τρόπων ὁ νόμος, ἤν μηδὲ πεισθήσανα μηδ' ἐξαπατηθήσαν γένοιτ' ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ.

IV. 428 C, D ἐστὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐν τῇ ἄρτι ύπ' ἡμῶν οἰκισθείσῃ . . . ὡς . . . βουλεύεται . . . ὑμνια τρόπων . . . πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ὑμιστα ὑμλοί.

Here 'a reference to the past' is implied in the words ἐν τῇ ἄρτι οἰκισθείσῃ. Or the reference to time is altogether vague. Hence in the indirect discourse ὑμιστα ὑμλοί, not ὑμιστα.
VI. 490 A ἃ ἵνα οὖν ὅτι οὗ τετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα ὅτι πρὸς τὸ δὲ ἐπεφυκός εἰ ἀμφιλλαθεῖ ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν φιλομαθῶν, κ.τ.λ. \textquoteleft Shall we not make a reasonable defence in saying (what we have already indicated).\textquoteleft \&c. There is an implied reference to the definition of the philosopher in Bk. V sub fin. This is Professor Goodwin’s ingenious explanation of the difficulty, which others have met by conjecturing ἀπελογησόμεθα or ἀπελογογράμεθα.— neither of which is justified by the context: for V. 474 B ff. is neither, strictly speaking, an ‘apology’ nor a ‘reckoning.’ (M. and T., § 676.)

(c) The imperfect indicative in the apodosis of an unreal supposition is made more vivid by the absence of ἀν (M. and T., § 431).

V. 450 D. Ε. πιστεύουσθε μὲν γὰρ ἐμον ἐμοὶ εἶδέναι ὑλέγω, καλῶς εἶχεν ἦ παραμυθία. \textquoteleft Had I been confident in my knowledge of the things I say, your comfort were indeed welcome.'

(d) Imperative. The third person imperative has a special use in dialectic. viz. in stating or admitting a postulate or assumption.

VIII. 553 A ἀπειργάσθω δή, κ.τ.λ. \textquoteleft I may assume that our description of oligarchy is complete.'

§ 7. (c) Infinitive. The construction of an infinitive can sometimes be gathered only imperfectly from the context:—

V. 467 C τοῦτο μὲν ἀρα ὑπαρκτέων, θεωροῦν πολέμου τοὺς παῖδας ποιεῖν, προσμηνήκασθαι ὃ δύνασθαι ἀπαφάλειαν, καὶ καλῶς ἐξεῖν ἦ γὰρ;

προσμηνήκασθαι is governed by the notion of obligation (ὅει or χρή) implied in ὑπαρκτέων, and the construction is assisted by the inf. ποιεῖν coming between. This point will be further illustrated in considering imperfect constructions (below, XI).

Epexegetetic uses of the infinitive: a. following an adjective:—

I. 330 C χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ ἔγγειοθαί εἰσίν. \textquoteleft Troublesome to converse with.'
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VII. 537 Β ἀδύνατος τι ἄλλο πράξαι. ‘Incapable of (admitting) any other employment.’

Obs.—In the difficult place I. 333 ἦ καὶ λαθεῖν συνέτοιος δεινότατος ἐμποίησαι, unless something is wrong with the text, there is a double construction of this kind:—most clever to implant,' 'most clever to escape notice (in implanting).’ Schneider’s emendation ἐμποίησαι saves the grammar at the expense of natural emphasis.

β. In apposition with a noun:

VII. 531 Ε ἀλλ’ οὖν εἰς προβλήματα ἀνίασιν, ἐπισκοπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 566 Γ τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἰτήμα ... ἐξευρήσκονυιν, αἰτεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

The infinitive, instead of the participle as elsewhere, sometimes follows φαίνεσθαι:

IV. 432 ὁ φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῖν εἶ ἄρχης κυλινδεῖσθαι. ‘It has manifestly been rolling (ἐκυλινδεῖτο) at our feet all the while.’

(τ) The participle. In expanding his sentences Plato § 8. makes continual use of participial expressions.

1. For pleonastic (or epexegetical) uses see especially III. 397 ἐν τῷ ἐπέρῳ τούτων ἐπιτυχακόουν ... ἐν τῷ ἐπέρῳ ἦ ἐς ἀμφοτέρων τινὶ δύνασθεῖν. ‘They hit on one or other of these modes, or on a third, which they compound out of both.’

VII. 527 Α ὡς γὰρ ... πράξεως ἐνεκα πάντας τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμεν ἐλέγουσι τετραγωνιζέχειν τε καὶ παρατείνειν καὶ προστηθέναι καὶ πάντα οὐτω φθεγγόμενοι.

A more doubtful instance is VI. 496 ὢ ὧν ἵνα τινὶς καὶ διδεῖ φρονήσεως ἄξιον ἀληθινὴ ἐχώμενο, where the awkwardness may be obviated by reading ἄξιον ὡς Ven. Π).

2. Alternation of participle with infinitive. In Plato’s long sentences the participle sometimes alternates with the infinitive:

VI. 488 β ff. (in the allegory of the mutinous crew)
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The infinitive περικεχύσθαι may have been occasioned, but is not grammatically accounted for, by κατατέμνειν coming between. This point will be more fully illustrated below, under Changes of Construction.

Obs.—As the use of the participle with the article after the preposition instead of the infinitive is doubtfully admitted by some editors in several passages of Thucydides (I. 2, § 5; IV. 63, § 1; V. 7, § 2; VI. 84, § 10: VIII. 105, § 2), it may be worth observing that in Rep. I. 316 β διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρειν the best MSS. have διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρον. Cp. Philob. 58 c, Laws VIII. 831 e.

3. The participle passive, mostly neuter, denoting a mode of action or existence, occurs in VIII. 391 λ ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίως ἑπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου: X. 396 (τρόπος) ταχὺ δημιουργοῦμενος, 'a manner in which it is easy to produce the effect'; cp. Theact. 184 c τὸ δὲ εὐχέρεις . . . καὶ μὴ . . . εξεταζόμενον, 'an easy-going method, without strict examination.'

4. The accusative and participle, with or without ὡς, have the effect of a reported statement. With ὡς: I. 345 ε ὡς οὐκ ἀποτίσων ὅφελίαν ἑσομένη, 'implying that they would not profit thereby.' II. 383 λ ὡς μὴτε ἀποτίσων γόνης δύνατας κ.τ.λ., 'conveying the impression that the Gods themselves are not impostors.' III. 340 λ. B τί δὲ; ποιεῖν . . . δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι . . . ἀκούειν νῦν . . . ἤ Δία . . . ὡς . . . ἐπιλανθανόμενον, 'do you think it fitting that a young man should hear such a poetical description, or that he should hear Zeus described as forgetting,' &c. VI. 511 δ ὡς . . . τὴν ὀνάρων ὀδύσαν. VIII. 561 δ ὡς ἀγροκαίων . . . ὀδύσαν. Cp. Phaedrus 245 λ πενθεῖς ὡς . . . ἐσομένος. Without ὡς: VI. 511 λ νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἰδὸς ἐλεγον. ὑποθέσει τὸ ἀναγκαζομένης ψυχῆν χρήσαι περὶ τὴν ὁπήτως αὐτὸς, 'I spoke of this kind as intellectual, but (said) that the mind was compelled to use hypothesis in investigating it.'

Obs. 1.—In x. 604 the transition from the genitive to the
accusative ὡς οὔτε δῆλον ὄντος ... οὔτε ... προσάων is occasioned by the impersonal verb.

Obs. 2.—The subject of an infinitive or participle following a verb is accusative even when the same with the main subject, if this happens to be considered in two aspects. X. 621 Β ἰδεῖν ... ἀντίων ... κείμενον ἔπι τῇ πυρᾷ. 'He saw that he himself was lying.' The previous narrative referred to the disembodied soul.

Obs. 3.—The idiomatic use of the aorist participle with γε in a reply, = 'Let me first,' &c. (Phaedr. 228 δ δείξας γε πρῶτον, ὁ φιλό-της, κ.τ.λ.) occurs in vi. 507 κ διόμωλογησαμένος γ', ἕφυν, κ.τ.λ. 'Not until I have come to a clear understanding.' Cp. i. 338 c εἰν μίαδο γε πρῶτον with similar ellipse.

For a slightly different idiom with the present participle, see viii. 554 κ ὑπὲρ ρόδο γε τις ... ἄν, 'Ay, because he is a shabby fellow,' and the note in loco.

Obs. 4.—The gerundive in -τέω is construed with the accusative: III. 400 δ ταῦτα γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθήτων.

So also in v. 467 ε διδαξαμένους ... ἀκτέων, 'we must have them taught and bring them,' where see note, and cp. Tim. 88 b, c τῶν δὴ μαθηματικῶν ... καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀποδοτέων κίνησι, 'the hard student must give his body corresponding exercise.'

Obs. 5.—The subordination of participle to participle is very frequent:

viii. 555 Ε ἐνίνετες ἀργύριον τιτρωσκοντες. 'Stinging by inserting money.'

N.B.—A little-noticed idiom, occurring also in Herodotus and Thucydides, is the use of the aorist participle referring to a time subsequent to that of the principal verb. Parm. 127 δ τῶν ... γενῷ-μενον (= ὃς ὑπερστην τῶν ἐγένετο). Goodwin, M. and T., § 152.

3. Voices.

§ 9.

(a) Active.

a. Impersonal. X. 604 Β ὡς οὔτε δῆλον ὄντος ... οὔτε εἰς τὸ προσάθεν οὔδεν προβαίνει τῷ χαλεπῶς φέροντι.

IX. 580 δ δείξαι, sc. το πράγμα (Theact. 200 Ε δείξειν αυτό. Phaedo 73 Β σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ).

b. With a neuter subject, which signifies some condition, aspect, or attitude of mind.

IV. 442 Ε εἰ τῷ ἡμῶν ἔτε εἰ τῇ νηψε ἀμφισβητεῖ. 'If there be
any objection lurking in our mind.' More often in the participle (cp. Thucydides).

IV. 439 B τοῦ διψῶτος καὶ ἄγωντος ... ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν. 'The appetite of thirst, that drags him to the act of drinking.'

γ. Intransitive with cognate subject.

V. 463 D αὐταὶ ... ἡ ἄλλαι φῆμαι ... ὁμήσουσιν ... ; 'are not these and none but these the strains that will resound in song?'

(b) Passive.—Verbs not strictly transitive acquire a passive voice.

a. With the cognate accusative of the active for implied subject.

VI. 490 Λ τοὺς νῦν δοκονμένους. Cp. X. 612 τὸ δοκεῖσθαι.

β. With the remote object of the active for subject.

I. 336 E, 337 ήμᾶσ ... ύπὸ ύμῶν ... χαλεπαίνεσθαι (= ἡμᾶς χαλεπαίνειν ἡμῖν).

X. 602 Λ συνειναὶ τῷ εἰδὸτι καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι (sc. ύπὸ τοῦ εἰδότος, i.e. τὸν εἰδότα ἐπιτάττειν αὐτῷ).

This use, of which πιεῖσθαι τί, 'to be entrusted with anything,' is the most familiar example, is extended in the later dialogues to ἐπιχεῖσθαι (Tim. 53 B ότε ... ἐπιχεῖσθο τὸ πάντο), διακοινέσθαι (Laws VI. 76, 3 Λ), διωτυχεῖσθαι, ἀσεβεῖσθαι (Laws IX. 877 E ὅταν οὖν τις ἁμα δυστυχήθη καὶ ἀσεβήθη τῶν οἴκων, 'when some habitation has received the taint of misfortune and of crime'), νομοθεῖσθαι, 'to be legislated for' (Laws XI. 925 E, 926 Λ, where the passive ἐπιτάττεσθαι again occurs).


γ. Passive impersonal.

VII. 530 C ός νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται, 'as Astronomy is now pursued.'

§ 10. (c) Middle.

a. The Middle Voice in Plato has still frequently a subtle force—accentuating some relation in which the action stands to the agent.
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I. 344 E βίον διαγωγήν, ἢ ἄν διαγόμενος, 'conducting his own life.'

I. 349 E ἀρμοστόμενος λύραν, 'tuning a lyre for himself to play upon.'

III. 405 B τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βίον... κατατρίβηται, 'wastes the greater part of his life.'

Obs.—The distinction of ἀντεῖνα and τίθεσθαι, 'to institute and to adopt a law,' is well discussed by Mr. Postgate in Journ. of Phil. xv. 29 (1886). See a good example of this in Laws vii. 820 E τοὺς θέντας ἡμᾶς ἢ καὶ τοὺς θεμένους ἡμᾶς.

β. On the other hand, the voice is sometimes varied almost capriciously.

VI. 484 D μηδὲν... ἐλλείποντας... μὴ ἐλλείπουτο: cp. Laws IX. 853 C νομοθετοῦμεν... ἐνομοθέτουν: XI. 913 B ἄνελών... ἄνελόμενος.

γ. A vague reference to self is implied in what has been called the subjective middle voice, of which παρέχομαι, ἀποδείκνυμαι, περιφέρομαι are instances. παρέχεσθαι, for example, is 'to furnish from one's own resources,' or 'to produce by one's own inherent power.'

IV. 421 D ὄργανα γε μὴ ἔχων παρέχεσθαι, IV. 443 B ταῦτα τὴν δύναμαν, ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας τε παρέχεται καὶ πόλεις: cp. Phaedr. 240 C ἢ... ἱερότητας... φιλίαν παρέχεται.

δ. The reciprocal use appears most prominently in ὁμολογεῖσθαι, 'to agree together.'

IV. 436 C ἐτί τοῖνυν ἀκριβέστερον ὁμολογησόμεθα: VIII. 544 A ὁμολογησάμενοι τὸν ἀριστον καὶ τὸν κάκιστον ἄνδρα.

This is sometimes emphasized with reference to λόγος by the addition of the reflexive pronoun.

V. 457 C τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖσθαι: cp. Phaedr. 265 D τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ὁμολογοῦμεν.

ε. A special use of the middle voice, combined with the construction noted above (the accusative as subject of the verbal in -τέοι), gives the most probable solution of the difficulty in V. 467 E καὶ διδαξαμένους ἵππευεν, 'and when
they (the guardians) have had them (the young people) taught to ride.' See above. p. 179, Obs. 4.

Obs.—When the above cases are considered such an isolated use of the middle voice as μεγαλοφιλουσίνειν in vii. 528 c appears less remarkable. Another rare use of the middle, vii. 535 b τοιά δή διωστάλει; 'what distinction do you propose to yourself?' is supported by Aristotle, Pol. ii. 8. § 17 μερά περί αυτοῦ δια- στειλασθαι βίλιαν. For a similar use of the middle voice in connexion with the dialectical process cp. Phædo 101 ε ἀμα δὲ οἰκ ἀν φύροι ... περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ἄφειμινον.

II. The Noun Substantive.

§ ii. 1. Cases.

(a) Nominative and Accusative.

a. The preference for the nominative, where the subject is identical with that of the principal verb, extends to instances where the clause is headed by ὡστε, πρῶ, or even by a preposition. This is quite regular, but the point is sometimes overlooked.

I. 345 D ἐπεί τά γε αὐτῆς ὡστε εἶναι βελτίστη, ἱκανῶς δὴ προ ἐκπεπόρωσαι (βελτίστη agrees with the subject of ἐκπεπόρωσαι, which is perfect middle = 'she has provided for herself').

III. 402 Α πρῶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν: VI. 501 Α πρῶ ... αὐτοὶ πονῆσαι.

III. 416 C ei μέλλοντι τὸ μέγιστον ἑκεῖν πρῶς τὸ ἡμεροί εἶναι.

V. 454 Α διὰ τὸ μὴ ὑποστὴρ ... διαμορφῶμεν, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 526 Β εἰς γε τὸ δέοτερον αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι.

Laws X. 885 D βελτίως ἡ ... παρατρέπεσθαι κηλούμενοι.

(Cp. Xen. Hell. VII. 5, § 5 ei τινες δὴ τόλεως διὰ τὸ σμικραὶ τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν μέσαις παῦταις οἴκειν ἰμαγκόζωτο.)

Obs.—The accusative occurs in a similar connexion v. 457 Β φῶμεν ... λέγοιτε, ὡστε ... τιθέντες.

β. In the absence of a definite construction, the accusative is the case usually preferred, and the case sometimes reverts to the accusative, although the construction has been previously in the dative (as in the familiar instance,
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Sophocles, Electra 479 ὑπεστὶ μοι θράσος | ἀδυπρόων κλῆσαι | ἄρτιος ὄνειράτων). See note on VIII. 559 b.

γ. It has sometimes been assumed (Digest, § 11) that all substantives apparently out of construction are accusatives in apposition. This point will be treated more fully below under Changes of Construction. Meanwhile, it is enough to adduce as an instance of the nominativus pendens VII. 532 B ἢ δέ γε ... λύσις τε ... καὶ μεταστροφή, κ.τ.λ., where, as the sentence proceeds, the nominative is changed to an accusative in C ταύτην ... τὴν δύναμιν.

A good example of the accusative in apposition is II. 365 C πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα, κ.τ.λ.

This idiom is peculiarly frequent in the Timaeus. A common form of it in most dialogues is ἄλλο τι ἢ ... (Gorg. 470 B, &c.), a special case of the familiar idiom of which Theaet. 195 E ἢ μὴ δέν ἄλλο ἢ διανοεῖται τις is an example. Cp. Rep. IV. 420 A οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ φρονοροῦντες. For ἄλλο τι without ἢ following sec below, under Apposition.

Under this heading, whether as nominative or accusative, may be brought the abrupt exclamations in VIII. 557 E τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην ... εἰναι ἄρχειν, κ.τ.λ.: VIII. 563 B τὸ δὲ γε ... ἔσχατον ... τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ πλῆθους.

δ. An adverbial accusative is sometimes abruptly introduced.

IV. 436 D ὡς οὐ ... τὰ τοιαῦτα τότε μενώντων.
V. 460 B εἰπὲ ἀνθρῶν εἴπε γυναικῶν εἶπε ἀμφότερα.
VI. 492 B ὑπερβαλλόντως ἐκάτερα.

So in such expressions as Symp. 204 C τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστίν ὁ Ἐρως;

ε. The cognate accusative (or accusative of the internal object,—too common to be noticed here) has its correlative in the cognate subject of the passive voice. This use is especially frequent in the participial form (see above, p. 178, 3), and in the adverbial accusative of the verbal noun; VI. 510 B τοῖς τότε τριθείσῳ (if the reading is sound).

ζ. The accusative, equally with the dative, accompanies
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the verbal in -τέων, IV. 421 B, 424 C: for dative see III. 413 C, V. 468 ά πώς ἐκτέων σοι τοὺς ἀγαθωτοὺς, where the accusative would have given another (i.e. an active) meaning to ἐκτέων. Cp. Tim. 88 C τὸν ὅν μαθηματικῶν ... τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀποδοτέων κίνησιν. So in V. 467 E, see above, p. 179, Obs. 4.

§ 12. (β) Genitive.—The genitive, like the accusative, sometimes stands in a loose construction with what follows, the construction being afterwards, in some cases, made more definite.

V. 463 B ἕχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων, κ.τ.λ.
V. 470 A τί δὲ; γῆς τε τιμήσεως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ οἰκίων ἐμπρήσεως ποιόν τί σου ὑπάσκειν οί στρατιώται πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους;
Cp. Symp. 221 C τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιτηθευμάτων τάχι ἂν τις ... εἶπον when περί follows, but in construction with another word.

See also—

Π. 375 E οὐσθα γάρ ποι τῶν γενναίων κυνών, ὅτι τούτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἱθὺ (where αὐτῶν supplies the link).
IX. 571 B εἰνὼν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἣ ... ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἡ ὀλίγαι λειπεσθαι ... τῶν ὄ ... καὶ πλείους. ‘In the case of some men,’ &c., where ἐνών might be construed with ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, but the context shows this not to be the construction.

Special uses of the genitive are—
a. ‘Consisting in’ (Digest, § 24).
IV. 433 D ἡ τοῦ ... τά αὐτῶν πρᾶττειν ὄνωμις.
β. Objective = πρὸς with acc.
Π. 359 Ά ἐννθῆκας αὐτῶν. ‘Contracts with one another.’
ΠΙ. 391 C ὑπερηφανίαν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων. ‘Haughtiness towards gods and men.’

VIII. 566 E ἡνυχία ἐκείνων, ‘he has tranquillity in regard to them.’

A doubtful instance is VIII. 558 ά ἡ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων, κ.τ.λ. (see note in loc.). See also IX. 573 D ὃν ἂν Ἐρως, κ.τ.λ. ‘Whatever things are the objects of the passion,’ &c. (Prof. Jowett construed the genitive with τά τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαιτα, ‘of whatsoever men love masters the whole soul.’)
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γ. Partitive.

X. 615 D ἐδρασάμεθα ... καὶ τούτῳ τῶν δεινῶν θεαμάτων, 'this was amongst the terrible sights we beheld.'

VI. 496 C τούτων δή τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι. Cp. Laws vi. 7.54 D οἱ δὲ δὴ γενόμενοι τῶν ἐπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα.

d. 'Requiring.'

III. 414 C πείσαι δὲ συχνῆς πειθοῦς, 'but much persuasion is required to convince men of its truth.'

X. 613 A πολλοὶ χρόνου διηγήσασθαι.

Cp. Phaedr. 2.46 A οἷον μὲν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρὰς διηγήσεως, ὥς ἐν εἰκεν, ἀνθρώπινης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος: Parm. 1.35 B ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνητομένου μαθεῖν: Laws v. 7.30 A πολλῆς οὖν εὐλαβείας, κ.τ.λ.

c. 'In respect of.'

II. 365 A ὡς ... ἔχουσι τιμῆς, 'how they are disposed to regard them.'

VII. 518 B εὑδαμονίσειεν ἄν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου: VII. 531 D τοῦ προσμίου.

IX. 571 D ὡς τῶν ... ὑγειεώς τις ἔχῃ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ('in comparison with himself') καὶ σωφρόνως.

This does not occur with other adverbs than those in ὡς.


The genitive in ejaculations is closely allied to this:—

VI. 509 C Ἀπολλών, ἐφη, δαμονίας ὑπερβολῆς.

So perhaps IX. 576 D εὐδαμονίας ... καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὄσα ἄτως ...

κρίνεις: cp. Laws i. 646 D τῆς ... διατριβῆς ... διανοητέων.

Phaedo 99 B πολλὴ ἄν καὶ μακρὰ μαθηματικὰ εἰ τοῦ λόγου.

Obs.—Double and even triple genitives are not uncommon, the second being sometimes exepexegetic of the first, as in VII. 534 B τῶν λόγων ἐκάστου ... τῆς οὖσιας.

For other examples see—

VII. 525 C μπρατών τε μεταστροφῆς, κ.τ.λ.

" 537 C εἰς σύνοψιν ἀκεφαλίτως ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως. (Cp. Soph. 254 C κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων πῶς ἔχει δυναμεῖς.)

VIII. 544 D ἀνθρώπων εἰδὴ ... τρόπων,

" 560 B δὲ ἀναπεισημοσύνην τροφῆς πατρός.
§ 13. c. Dative.

a. The dative of the person interested has an extended use in Plato.

I. 334 E πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσίν. ‘For their friends are bad.’
I. 335 E τοῖτο ὅτι ὡς νοεῖ αὐτῷ. ‘And this expression means, as employed by him.’
I. 343 ά εἰς γε αὐτὴν οὐδὲ πράβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γιγνώσκεις. ‘Since she leaves you in ignorance of the difference between shepherd and sheep.’

III. 394 C εἰς μοι μαρτάνεις. ‘If I take you with me’ (where some would read εἰς μον μ.);

III. 415 B ὅ τι αὐτῶς τούτων ἐν τοῖς ψυχαῖς παραμέμικται. ‘What alloy they find in the souls of their young charges.’

V. 451 D εἰς ἡμῖν πρέπει ἢ οὖ. ‘Whether we find it suitable or not, for our purpose.’

V. 462 ά ἀρα . . . εἰς μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἄγαθος ἔχοις ἡμῖν ἀρμόττει. ‘Whether we find that our proposals fit into the lines of good.’

VIII. 549 C, D ἀχθομένης, ὅτι οὐ τῶν ἄρχοντων αὐτή ὁ ἀγήρ ἐστιν. ‘Aggrieved to find that her husband is not in the government.’

In X. 602 E, with a participle (τοῦτῳ δὲ . . . μετρήσαντι, κ.τ.λ.), it has nearly the force of an absolute clause, i.e. ‘when this faculty of measurement has done its work, it finds after all,’ &c. See note in loco.

Obs. 1.—It may be worth observing that the dative so used (except when amplified as in the last instance) is seldom or never emphatic.

Obs. 2.—The dative of reference, in combination with a participle, often introduces a concomitant circumstance or condition, as in the familiar phrase εἰν δεξίᾳ εἰσιώταται &c.—

v. 451 C κατ’ ἐκείνην τὴν ὄρμην ἱούσιν.
vi. 484 A μελλόντε.
ix. 589 C σκοπούμενως.

b. The dative of manner may be added to another dative without any feeling of confusion.
1. "two C. νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ἵσον τιμῆν. 'But is forcibly diverted by law and custom into a respect for equality.'

VIII. 552 E οὖσ ἐπιμελεία βία κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί. It is added pleonastically in VIII. 555 A, IX. 576 C ὁμοίωτητι, and it is sometimes expanded by an additional word.

IX. 575 C πονηρία τε καὶ ἄδειότητι πόλεως. It has the effect of an absolute clause in IX. 578 C τῷ τωντῷ λόγῳ, also perhaps in IX. 579 C τοῦς τωντοῖς κακοῖς. The reading has been questioned in both passages, see notes in locis, but cp. X. 598 D ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τωντῷ, κ.τ.λ.

γ. In VI. 490 A παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκομένοις, the dative follows a prepositional phrase as if it were an adjective, e.g. ἐναρτίον, and in 496 C τῷ νῦν τῷ μικρῷ βοηθειαν it is construed with a verbal noun. So in later dialogues, Tim. 23 C φθορὰν ὑδάσων, Laws III. 698 B Ἡ Περσῶν ἐπίθεσις τοῖς Ἐλλησιν.

δ. The dative of the measure of excess occurs in the remarkable expression in VI. 507 E οὖν σμικρὰ . . . ιδέα, 'by the measure of no unimportant nature,' and has been applied to the interpretation of IX. 579 C cited above.

Obs.—The Ionic form of the dative plural in στρεφόμενοι according to the best MSS. occurs only in Phaedr. Rep. Polit. Tim. Laws. In the Phaedrus and Republic, however, it is merely an occasional ornament, whereas in the Laws it is of constant recurrence. (F. Blass finds examples in the earlier orators.) Of the five examples occurring in the Republic (i. 345 E; III. 388 D, 389 B; VIII. 560 E, 564 C), two are of the definitive pronoun i. 345 E, VIII. 564 C αὐτοῖς (very emphatic in both cases); two of familiar adjectives III. 388 D σμικροῖς, VIII. 560 E μεγάλουσι and one of θεός, III. 389 B, in a passage coloured by frequent quotations from Homer. All these are of the second declension (κεναγορίασι in X. 607 B, like νάστωσιν in v. 468 D, is in a poetical quotation, and should not be counted). In the Laws according to C. Ritter, op. cit., there are eighty-five instances of the form, which here extends, although more sparingly, to feminines of the first declension. The four instances in the Politicus include the participle ἐπιμένοντιν (304 E).

1 C. Ritter "Untersuchungen, &c." mentions six; but he seems to include the quotation in X. 607 B.
§ 14. 2. NUMBER OF NOUNS.

(a) The plural of an abstract word is often used to express its exemplification in the concrete. This happens especially when other words in the sentence are in the plural.

II. 364 C κακίας περὶ εὐπετείας διδόντες. ‘Offering easy occasions for vice.’

II. 377 D ιατρῶν ἐν χρείαις. ‘In frequent need of the physician.’

V. 449 A περὶ τὲ πόλεων διοικήσεις.

VIII. 547 B γεωργίων ἀπέχεισθαι τὸ προπολεμοῦν αὐτὴς. ‘That its military class abstains from agricultural employments.’

X. 611 C δικαιοσύνας τὲ καὶ ἀδικίας. ‘Its various modes of justice and injustice.’

(b) In X. 618 Α, Β πενίας ... πτωχείας ... πλούτων καὶ πενίας the plurals serve to emphasize the variety and complexity of human conditions. Cp. Tim. 65 C τραχύτησι τε καὶ λειτύρησιν : Laws Β. 733 Β σφοδρότησιν ἴσότησι τε, 734 Α πυκνότησιν.

(c) The plural is used with the meaning of the singular to express either admiration or scorn. Cp. Symp. 218 Β, Theact. 169 Β.

Rep. ΙΙΙ. 387 Β Κωκυτοῦς, κ.τ.λ.

ΙΙΙ. 391 Β ἔλξεις ... σφαγάς ... (Δ) ἀρπαγάς.

VI. 495 Α πλοῦτοι τε καὶ πάσα ἡ τοιαύτη παρασκευή.

VIII. 553 Β τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτῶς καὶ ἀκμάκας.

(d) The plural of abstract verbals and other adjectives is often preferred to the singular.

II. 377 D ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτους ἐοικε.

ΙΙΙ. 387 Β ἀποβλητέα.

VI. 498 Α μεγάλα ἦγοῦνται.

(c) The singular neuter is often used in a collective sense.

IV. 442 Β τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν.

IX. 577 C σμικρὸν γέ τι τούτο.

For the combination of neuter with masculine or feminine see below, Imperfect Constructions.
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III. Article and Pronoun.

1. The Article is sometimes—

(a) Correlative, i.e. it marks each of two correlative words.

I. 338 D, ἐὰν τίθηται ... τοὺς νόμους ἐκάστη ἢ ἄρχῃ (where it may also be regarded as distributive (b)).

V. 455 I ἐπανεῖλατ ἐν ἄπασιν ... τὸ γένος τοῦ γένους. 'The one sex is beaten by the other.'

(b) Sometimes distributive —

VII. 540 B ὅταν δὲ τὸ μέρος ἡκῇ. 'When the turn of each arrives.'

(c) The article of reference in οἱ ἄλλοι, οἱ πολλοί, is to be distinguished from the common use of these phrases.

V. 453 ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλος φύσεως. 'These natures which have been described as different.'

X. 596 Λ θάμευ ... ὅ τι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν. 'Let us put the case of any one you will of things which exist in plurality.'

(d) In the idiomatic use with a future participle the article often resumes an indefinite pronoun —

I. 342 B δεῖ τινός τέχνης τῆς ... σκεφτόμενης.

I. 348 B δικαστῶν τινῶν τῶν διακρίνοντων.

(e) For the 'deictic' use with a personal or reflexive pronoun, see Theaet. 166 Α τῶν ἐμέ, Phaedr. 258 Α.  

Obs. i.—The article is sometimes repeated merely for emphasis—

I. 334 Α τῶν δοκοῦστα τε ... καὶ τῶν ἄντα χρηστῶν.

Obs. 2.—The article is omitted—

(1) With common nouns used as proper names, as λιμήν, ἀγορά, &c. (for the harbour, market-place, &c. of the town where the scene is laid).

Theaet. 142 Α οὗ γὰρ ἡ κατὰ πόλιν (i.e. in Megara).

Theaet. 142 Α εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων. 'As I went down to the harbour' (of Megara).

Rep. II. 371 C καθήμενος ἐν ἀγορᾷ.

(2) With a noun used in a general sense, but without pointed reference to others from which it is distinguished—

I. 332 E ὦ τρόπῳ ... κυβερνήτης.
II. 399 B γέρνεται ... πόλις.

vi. 499 c ἄκρος εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ... πόλεως ... ἐπιμελήθησαν.

viii. 562 Υ τυραννίς τε καὶ τύραννος.

χ. 011 B ὅτε μὲν τοῖν αὐτῶν ἀδάνατον ψωξίς.

And sometimes arbitrarily to avoid cumbrous repetition (in many cases it may have accidentally been dropped, yet it is needless to restore it as H. Richards proposes in iv. 434 λ (τῶν) τιμᾶς)—

iv. 438 c καὶ αὕρωτα ἐφίστημι αὐτῷ καὶ βάπτω πρὸς τί βραδύτερα.

v. 475 c καὶ μὴν φιλοτιμοῖς, κ.τ.λ.

viii. 545 c καὶ ὀλγορηχικόν αὐτὸ καὶ δημοκρατικόν καὶ τῶν τυραννών (supra Obs. 1).

Phaedr. 254 c τῷ σύκευτι τε καὶ ἥραχος.

Obs. 3.—The substantival use of the neut. adj. does not always necessitate the article.

v. 478 c μὴν ὅτι μὴν ἄργουν εἰς ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὅτι δὲ γρῶσιν.

vii. 518 c, b εἰς φανώτερον ἰσότα ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται (where, even if διον is to be supplied with φανώτερον, λαμπροτέρου at least is neuter).

Symp. 218 c ὑπὸ ὄλγεωστέρου.

Obs. 4.—The omission of the article with ἀνήρ so constant in MSS. is proved by the examples in tragedy, where the a is long (e.g. Soph. Aj. 9, 324, 783, &c. all in senarii), to be often due to the scribes; but it is uncertain whether in such instances as

ix. 573 c γέρνεται ... οὗτο καὶ τοὐοῦτοι ἀνήρ the Platonic idiom requires us to write ἀνήρ or not. Cp. Phaedr. 266 c ἰδόρες, 267 c δεινός ἀνήρ γέονε (this Thompson leaves unaltered), 268 c μαίνεται ἀνθρώπος.

§ 16. 2. THE PRONOUNS.

The pronouns, especially the demonstratives (with their adverbs οὕτως, ὅδε, ὅσαυτος, &c.) have a widespread use in the Platonic dialogues, in which resumption, reference, antithesis, are necessarily so frequent.

(a) Demonstratives.

a. The demonstratives and the oblique cases of αὐτός, as in Thucydides, often refer to an antecedent which although implied in the preceding context has not been fully expressed. The same thing happens in the case of the adverb αὐτόθι.
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I. 334 A καὶ δυνεῖν εἰς παρ' Ὄμηρον μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό.
I. 339 A, B πρώτεστι δὲ ὅφε αὐτόθι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος.
II. 371 C τὴν διακοιναίαν ... ταύτην.
II. 371 E τὴν τιμήν ταύτην.
II. 373 C τοῦτο γὰρ ('the care of swine') ἤμων ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει οὐκ ἐνήν.

III. 399 D ἢ οὐ τοῦτο (ἀπὸσ from αὐλοποιούσ) πολυχορδότατον.
IV. 424 D ἢ ... παραγομία ... αὕτη (sc. ἢ ἐν μουσικῇ).
VI. 491 C λαβοῦ ... ὅλον αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς.
VI. 507 D παροῦντος δὲ χρῶσ τοῦ αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς ὁρωμένοις).
X. 597 B τῶν μαμητῶν τοῦτον.

β. οὖτος is sometimes simply the thing or person in question.

VII. 523 C μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον. Cr. Theaet. 180 Λ κἂν τοῦτου ὑπητὶ λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εὑρηκεν, ἐτέρῳ πεπλήξει, κ.τ.λ.

Theaet. 199 B μὴ γὰρ ἐκεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦτοι οἴον τε, ἀλλʼ ἐτέρας ἀντί ἐκείνης. Hence in Rep. IV. 436 Λ if we read with most MSS. εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐκαστα πράττομεν, τούτῳ means the thing in question—having no distinct antecedent.

γ. δὲ and οὖτος are less markedly distinguishable in § 17.

Plato than, for example, in Xenophon. The familiar rule that δὲ points to what is present in perception, οὖτος to what is present in thought, applies to the Platonic instances, but with modifications arising from the liveliness of the discourse and sudden changes of the aspect in which a thing is regarded.

Both pronouns are used to indicate what is familiar in daily experience, as distinguished from what is imaginary or remote.

III. 403 Ε τῶν ὅρων ἄσκητῶν.

VIII. 544 C ἢ Κρητικῇ τε καὶ Ἀναυκικῇ αὕτη (πολιτείᾳ).
Gorg. 470 D τὰ ... ἐκθέει καὶ πρώην γεγονότα ταύτα. So probably οὖτω in II. 377 B ἄρ’ οὖν μοιῶν οὖτω ('as is usually done') παρήσομεν, although this may be merely idiomatic like ἓν οὖτω, &c. (VI. 490 Λ σφόδρα οὔτω).
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δ. In the same spirit the antithesis of ὁτος and ἐκεῖνος does not necessarily correspond to what is 'latter' and 'former' in the sentence. But whichever term is imagined as in some way nearer to the mind is marked with ὁτος, and that which in the same aspect is more remote, with ἐκεῖνος. Thus, in the opening of the Euthydemus (p. 271), it is a mistake to suppose, because Critobulus is last mentioned, that he is meant by ὁτος. Crito modestly speaks of his own son as 'gawky' (σκληφρός), and admiringly of the stranger who is more immediately in question.

II. 370 οὗτω ἱὸν ἢ 'ἐκεῖνος,' 'the familiar way is easier than the novel plan proposed,' i.e. ὁτος and ἐκεῖνος do not refer to the order in which they have been mentioned but to the order in which they occur to the mind or which is more familiar in use and experience.

III. 416 ἃ πῶς, ἐφη, αὖ τοῦτο λέγεις ὄνωφρειν ἐκεῖνον; 'How does the plan you now prefer differ from that which you condemn?'

IV. 421 οἷς τὴν πόλιν ὅλην βλέποντας θεατέον εἴ ἐκεῖνη ἐγγίγνεται.

In VI. 511 ἐκεῖνος πρὸς ἐκεῖνα both terms are remote, because they are the segments of τὸ ὄματῶν, and τὸ νοητῶν is immediately in question. See note in loco.

e. The vividness of Plato's style sometimes anticipates, as already present to the mind, something to which attention is for the first time directed. Hence ὁτος (ἐνταῦθα, &c.) are sometimes used where ὥς (ἐνθάδε, &c.) might rather have been expected.

IV. 430 ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν, 'from the point of view at which I am standing.'

VI. 510 τοῦτων προειρημένων, 'when I have stated what I have now to state.'

VII. 514 ἂ τολούθω πάθει, 'to a condition such as I am now imagining.'

So probably VI. 488 ὡς...τολούθῳ γενόμενον, 'conceive
the occurrence of such a situation as I (have in mind and) am about to describe.'

ζ. ὁδός is used vaguely for ὁ τοιοῦτος.

III. 395 C τὰ τοιοῦτα προσήκοντα.

Obs. 1.—ὁδός occurs twice in the same sentence with different references in vii. 532 c πᾶσα αὐτὴ ἡ πραγματεία . . . ταῦτην ἔχει τὴν δινάμη, where αὐτὴ refers to the sciences, ταῦτην to their educational effect.

Obs. 2.—ἔκλεινο in the progress of a sentence often refers to what has previously been denoted by an oblique case of αἰτῶ or αὐτῶ.

See especially iii. 405 C, vi. 511 A, viii. 533 A.

η. τοιοῦτος (especially in ἔτερα τοιοῦτα) and ὁ τοιοῦτος are § 18, often used to avoid the repetition of an adjective.

IV. 424 A φύσεως χρηστάλ τοιοῦτος (sc. χρηστῆς) παιδείας ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι.

Ib. ἐ παραγόμων γιγνομένης αἰτής καὶ παῖδων τοιοῦτων (sc. παραγόμων).

IV. 429 A ὅλον τοιοῦτον (sc. ἀνθρώπω) κληρεά ἡ πόλις.

VIII. 560 C κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοιοῦτου (sc. τῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ γιγνομένου).

Similarly in VIII. 546 C ἐκατὸν τοσούτακις probably means ἐκατὸν ἐκατοτάκις.

Obs. 1.—τοιοῦτος is used euphemistically in v. 452 ὑπάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα: and in iii. 390 C ὅλον ἔτερα τοιαῦτα the euphemism conveys also contempt.

Obs. 2.—ὁδός, τοιοῦτος, &c., as in other Greek, gain a peculiar force from the context or intonation.

IX. 588 B ὅιν ἐλεγεν, 'what a preposterous statement he was guilty of.'

Obs. 3.—The derisive use of ποῖος (Theaet. 180 B ποῖοις μαθηταῖς, ὅ διαμόω;;) is applied in Rep. 1. 330 B ποῖ ἐπεκτυπάμεν; to express the gentle amusement of Cephalus at the suggestion that he may have augmented his ancestral fortune.

θ. The deictic form τοιοῦτοι is rightly restored by Bekker in i. 330 B. Crp. τοιοτοι απ. vi. 488 A.

(The deictic use of pronominal adverbs may be vol. ii.)
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illustrated from IV. 430 E ἐντείθεν. 445 B θεῖρο, V. 477 D. VII. 527 E. αἰτῶθεν. This adds vividness to the style.)

(b) Indefinite Pronoun.

§ 19. a. Τίς added to the predicate with the force of πού or πώς as in Soph. Ajax 1265 τοῦ θειώτου δός ταξεώτα τίς βροτοίς χάρις διαπρεπεῖ.

II. 358 Α ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ τίς, ὡς ἐοικε, διαμαθής, ‘but I am a slow sort of person it would seem.’

VIII. 348 E δούλους μέν τίς ἄν ἄγριος εἶπ. β. Combined with other pronouns:

I. 346 Τυι τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρόμενοι.

III. 412 Α τοῦ τοιούτου τυός.

VIII. 562 Α τρόπον των τῶν αὐτῶν.

γ. With indirect allusion to a person:

Phaedr. 242 Ε οὐά τοις ἀνεπενν,' one's arguments,' i.e. mine.

Phaedo 63 Α ἀνων τυός ἀνεπεννα, ‘one's arguments,’ i.e. mine.

II. 372 Ε ταῖτα γὰρ ὅι τισον ... οὐκ ἐξαρκέσει (‘Glaucos and fine gentlemen like him’).

δ. Πότερος indefinite.

VI. 499 Τούτων ὃς πότερα γενέσθαι ἦ ἁμφότερα, Κ.Τ.Α.

This is rare in other writers but not infrequent in Plato.

Sec IV. 439 E, Theact. 145 Α, 178 C.

ὁπότερον in IX. 589 Α seems only to be a more emphatic πότερον.

(c) Reflexive.

§ 20. a. Ἐντυὸδ has sometimes an indefinite antecedent.

IV. 434 Τῆς ἔντυοδ πόλεως, ib. 443 D.

The authority of the MSS. about breathings is very slight, and it is sometimes difficult to decide whether to read αὐτοῦ or αὑτοῦ, &c., e.g. I. 344 Α, II. 359 Α. 367 C.

β. The personal is sometimes used for the reflexive pronoun, giving special point to a relation or antithesis.

(d) The Relative Pronoun ὅς is sometimes used where an indefinite antecedent is implied.

I. 352 C ὁος φαμεν. κ.τ.λ. 'any persons of whom we say,' &c.

This differs from ὁος ἀν φῶμεν in assuming that we do thus speak.

(e) Indirect Interrogatives.

When an interrogative is repeated, if there is any ground for using the indirect form, this is usually done.

IX. 578 E ἐν ποιῳ ἀν τις καὶ ὅποσῳ φῶμι οἶει, κ.τ.λ. Even without repetition the indirect form is sometimes preferred—with the ellipse of εἰπέ or the like.

I. 348 B ὁπότερος οὖν σοι... ἀμέσκει. Cp Euthyd. 271 Α ὁπότερος καὶ ἐρωτᾶς.

(f) Personal Pronouns.

a. The explicit use of the nominative in such phrases as εὖ γε σῦ, ποιῶν (I. 351 C), ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω (III. 382 B), where the sentence and not the subject of it is really emphasized, deserves a passing notice: also the idiomatic use of ἡμεῖς for ἐγὼ (sometimes a cause of ambiguity).

β. One usage (though again rather rhetorical than grammatical) seems to claim notice as characteristic of the Platonic dialogue,—what may be termed the condescending use of the first person plural for the second person singular or plural, the speaker identifying himself with the person or persons addressed. It belongs to the 'maieutic' manner of Socrates, who deals gently with his patient and asks at intervals ‘How are we now?’ A clear example occurs in Theaet. 210 Β ἦ οὖν ἐτι κυνημέν τι καὶ ὄδυνομεν, ὦ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἦ πάντα ἐκτετάκαμεν;

Somewhat similar to this are such places in the Republic as

II. 368 D ἐπείδη οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δευτόροι, κ.τ.λ.

II. 373 E πολεμήσομεν (i. e. πολεμήσοτων ἡμῖν οἱ τρόφιμοι), and the more distinctly ironical use in

I. 337 C ἔλαν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἕλαν τε μή.
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In the mouth of the respondent this use becomes a mere tâton de parler. II. 377 E πῶς ... λέγομεν:

(g) Pronominal phrases. i.e. phrases which take the place of nouns.

It is sufficient to glance at such expressions as ἀνήρ, οὗτος ἄνήρ, τοιναντίων, τὸ εἰρημένον, τὸ πολλάκις ἕνη ἑγὼμενον and other such phrases which avoid the repetition of a noun. See especially II. 368 άκεινον τοῦ ἀνδρός: VIII. 560 C τῶν αὐτῶν τόπον τοῦ τοιοῦτων (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν), and cp. Symp. 212 A ὁ δὲ ἢ... ὁ ὑμᾶς τὸ καλὸν.

This habit increases in the later dialogues and is especially frequent in the Philebus, when it has an effect of mannerism. Something like it occurs already in Thuc. VIII. 92, § 3 where the phrase ἐφ’ οὖσαν καὶ αὐτῶν ἢ ἐκατηγορεῖ is used to avoid repeating what Theramenes has been represented as saying twice before.

IV. Adverbs and Prepositions.

§ 22. 1. Adverbs.

(a) The predicative use of adverbs (cp. Thuc. I. 21, § 1 ἄπιστως) though not frequent is noticeable.

I. 332 A μὴ σωφρόνως (= μὴ σωφρόνω ὁν) ἀπατοῖ expressing the condition of the agent rather than the mode of the action

III. 466 C ὁ ἡμεῖς γελοῖως (= γελοῖων ὅπερ).

(b) The adverb also takes the place of an epithet.

VII. 537 C τά τε χυθην μαθήματα (with γενόμενα following by an afterthought)—‘the subjects indiscriminately taught.’

VIII. 564 η... ἀγαν ἐλευθερία... εἰς ἀγαν δουλείαν.

§ 23. 2. Prepositions.

(a) διά.

a. A questionable use of διά with the accusative occurs in IV. 440 C, D ἐξερµαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι ὅλκαλφ καὶ διά τὸ πειρήν καὶ διά τὸ μεγάλην... ὑποµένων καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὗ λήγει... (so the MSS. and edd.), a place which Madvig has rewritten. See
notes and v. rr. On the whole it seems necessary to obviate the difficulty by reading διὰ τοῦ in both places as is done in this edition. The use of διὰ will then be the same as in VI. 494 D ἄρ' ἐντετέθει οἷς εἶναι εἰσακούσαι διὰ τοσοῦτον κακῶν;

The notion of persistence and of obstacles overcome is common to both passages.

N.B. — To take διὰ = 'on account of' and the whole phrase as equivalent to ἐνέκα τοῦ πεινῆν... οὗ λύγει, κ.τ.λ. (καὶ νικῆ being διὰ μέσου) is hardly a tenable view.

(b) ἐπί.

a. With gen. after λέγειν, = 'in the case of.' This seems a slight extension of the use after αἰσθάνεσθαι, ποεῖν, &c.

V. 475 Α ἐπί ἐμοῦ λέγειν.

VII. 524 E ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν.

b. With accusative = 'extending to.'

VI. 491 Α ἐπὶ πάντας, cp. Prot. 322 C. Tim. 23 B ἐπὶ ἀνθρώ-πους.

(c) μετά. A frequent and characteristic use is that of § 24, conjoining correlated attributes.

IX. 591 B σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως κτωμένην. ἣ σῶμα ἴπτιχύν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ ὑγιείας λαμβάνον.

Theaet. 176 B, Phaedr. 249 A, 253 D.

Similarly with article prefixed.

VIII. 548 B Μοῦσης τῆς μετὰ λόγου. κ.τ.λ.

(d) παρά (with accusative).

a. 'In the course of.'

II. 362 B παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὁφελεῖσθαι: IV. 424 B; VII. 530 E. Cp. τὸ παράπταρ, and see Hdt. II. 60 ταῦτα παρὰ πάντων πόλεως... πολεοῦ.

b. In VI. 492 E παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένην, it is doubted whether παρὰ means 'in consequence of' (cp. Thuc. I. 141, § 7 παρὰ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ἀρέτειαν, Xen. Hipparch. § 5), or 'contrary to.'

(c) περί.

a. Like ὑπέρ, 'on behalf of.'
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II. 360 B ό περί τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων.
3. For περί pleonastic, see esp:

IV. 427 Α τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰδος τόμων πέρι.

VII. 539 C τὸ ἄλογον φιλοσοφίας πέρι.

(f) πρός.

a. πρός τιν εἶναι or γέγονεθαι, 'to be engaged (or absorbed) in a thing.'

VIII. 567 Α πρός τῷ καθ᾿ ἡμέραν . . . εἶναι, 'to be engrossed with their daily avocations.' Phaedo 84 C, Phaedr. 249 C, D.

b. But in IX. 585 Α πρός πληρῶσει . . . γέγονεθαι, 'to be close upon repletion.' So in Phaedr. 254 B πρός αὐτῷ τρ' ἐγένετο. κ.τ.λ.

c. With accusative.

VIII. 545 B πρός . . . ταύτην, 'in comparison with this' (emphatic).

§ 25. (g) ύπέρ. The less common use with the genitive, nearly = περί, 'concerning,' is clearly present in II. 367 Α ταῦτα . . . Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ ἄλλοις τοῦ τε ύπέρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγουν ὡς (Thrasymachus is not imagined as speaking in behalf of Justice). For other instances in Plato see Apol. 39 Ε ἡδέως ἀν διαλεξθεῖτιν ύπέρ τοῦ γεγονότος, κ.τ.λ., Laws VI. 776 Ε ύπέρ τοῦ Δίως ἀγωρεύων. And, for several in Aristotle, Bonitz' Index Aristotel. s. v. ύπέρ, 1 b.

(h) μεταξὺ.

a. μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων, 'by the by,' Phaedr. 230 Α.

b. With a participle, μεταξὺ ἀναγιγράφοιτικον Phaedr. 234 D.

c. τὸ μεταξὺ, 'during the interval until.'

See Mr. Herbert Richards' note in the Classical Review for December, 1888, p. 324: 'Instead of a thing being between A and B, it is sometimes said to be between B, so that μεταξὺ practically means "on this side of," "short of." ' before reaching.'

Clear instances are Soph. O. C. 290, 291 τὰ δὲ | μεταξὺ τουτοῦ, 'in the interval before Theseus arrives,' Dem. de Cor. p. 233 sub fin. τῶν μεταξὺ χρόνων τῶν ὤρκων, 'the interval before the ratification.'
Part 1: Syntax—Particles.


So, probably, Rep. VI. 498 Α ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ μετὰ ἐκ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ, 'just after boyhood, in the interval before keeping house and engaging in business.'

V. Particles and Conjunctions (Digest, §§ 132—178).

The use of particles acquires its full development in Plato, who employs them with extreme subtlety, variety and precision, not only to mark with minute clearness the progress of the argument, the degrees of assent and dissent, and the modes of inference, but also to give the light and life of oral conversation to each successive clause.

Platonic particles have lately been made a subject of 'statistical' investigation, and W. Dittenberger and others have attempted with some success to test the relative age of different dialogues by the absence or comparative frequency of certain particles in them. The results have been summed up by Constantin Ritter, Untersuchungen über Plato, Stuttgart, 1888. The Republic is shown to come with Phaedrus and Theaetetus about midway between the Symposium on the one hand and the Politicus Philebus Laws on the other.

1. Καὶ.

(a) Καὶ adverbial.

a. The anticipatory use, though common in Greek, is still worth noticing, from the liveliness which it adds to many sentences:

I. 327 Λ καλὴ μὲν ὡς μοι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπῇ ἔδωξεν εἶναι, ὥς μὲν τοι ἤπτον ἐφαύνετο πρέπειν ἢν οἱ Θόρακες ἐπερπον.

II. 375 Ο ἤδοι μὲν ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ζωῖσ, ὥς μὲν τὸ ἄν ἦκαστα ἐν ὧ δὲ ἡμεῖς παρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακί.

β. Ἰνα καὶ.

IV. 445 C δεῦρο . . . Ἰνα καὶ ἐδῆς. 'Come hither . . . that you may really descry.'
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γ. In interrogative phrases:

IV. 434 D τί . . . καὶ ἐρωθήμερ; 'What, after all, are we to say?'

IV. 445 Ῥ το ἀνα . . . ἢ υ Ῥ καὶ ἐκή ἔχει ἡ κακία, 'that you may see how many, in point of fact, are the varieties of vice.'

Cp. Gorg. 455 Λ ἐδωμερ τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς.

δ. In affirmative sentences, giving additional emphasis:

1. 328 εἰ διὰ χρόνον γὰρ καὶ ἐρωτάκη αὐτῶν, 'for indeed it was long since I had seen him.'

ε. καὶ ταῦτα 'in this too.'

1. 341 C οὐδὲν ὅπερ καὶ ταῦτα = 'discomfited as usual;' or as you would be if you attempted to shave a lion.'

ζ. At once pointing and softening an asyndeton (cp. αὖ, πάντως).

1. 350 D τότε καὶ εἶδον ἑγὼ, πρότερον ὅπερ θαυμάζων εἰρήματα. See note in loco.

η. With implied preference for an alternative:—'as well' = 'rather' (cp. Phil. 33 B ἐτι καὶ εἰσαθῆσαί).

III. 460 B ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μεῖν, ἂν δὲ εγώ, καὶ μετὰ Δάμανος βουλευτόμεθα. 'For the matter of that, said I, I had rather we conferred with Damon.'

V. 458 B ἀναβάλεσθαι καὶ ὑπερθον ἐπισκέψασθαι.

IX. 573 D τούτο ἢ ν καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς. 'that, it would be as well (i.e. better) for you to tell me.'

θ. With ὅστε, emphasizing the clause.

IV 421 D ὅστε καὶ κακοὶς γίγνεσθαι, 'I mean so as to deteriorate.'

Cp. the idiomatic use with ὅσ εἰπεῖν in X. 619 D ὅν ὃ καὶ εἰπεῖν, where καὶ really belongs to the whole sentence.

ι. Displacement (hyperbaton or trajection) of καὶ. A possible instance is VI. 560 η ἢ, καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεώρηται, where (see note in loco) the difficulty may be solved by joining καὶ οὕτω.—'If they look at it in this light rather (supra § 5) than in the other.' But the reading is doubtful, and perhaps ἡ οὐκ, ἐὰν should be read, with ἃ, merely changing τοι in what follows to τε.
(b) καὶ conjunctive.

a. In narrative, indicating prompt sequence (as in the § 27. familiar phrase καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον).

1. 327 B κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη, Πολέμαρχος περιμέναι. καὶ ἐγὼ μετεστράφην τε, κ.τ.λ. 'Whereupon I turned about.' &c.

β. In abrupt questions with a tone of surprise (as in καὶ πῶς;) to which καὶ gives emphasis.

1. 338 C τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος φῆς ἔμφερον δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο, ὥ Θρασύμαχε, τί ποτὲ λέγεις; 'Pray, Thrasymachus, what can you mean by that?'

Obs.—Similarly καίτοι interposes a sudden question.

1. 350 E καίτοι τί ἀλλὰ βοάλει; 'What else in the name of common sense would you have?'

2. 376 B καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἂν φιλομαθείς εἶη;

vii. 522 D καίτοι πῶς τ ν' άιτὼν οὕτι στρατηγὸν εἶναι:

(c) καὶ virtually disjunctive (§ 7).

III. 411 Λ ὅσον καὶ ἀγριώκος, 'either cowardly or rude' (the former being the effect of music without gymnastic, the latter of gymnastic without music).

VII. 518 B καὶ εἶ γελῶν, κ.τ.λ.

In these cases καὶ is possibly preferred to ἣ on account of euphony. The result is a slight inexactness of expression.

Obs.—The former of two correlatives καὶ . . . καὶ = 'both . . . and' is brought in after the beginning of the sentence in vii. 536 B τάνωσίν τακ καὶ πράξομεν καὶ φιλοσοφιάς ἐτε πλεῖο γέλωτα κωτατλής- σομεν. 'This gives additional emphasis= 'not only . . . but also.' Cp. iv. 440 δ ἱπομένοι καὶ νικά καὶ οὐ λήγει, κ.τ.λ. 'It not only prevails but perseveres,' &c.

2. ἄλλα. § 28.

(a) In animated conversation ἄλλα often opposes what is now advanced to the position attributed in thought to the other speaker. Thus in the opening scene of the Republic (327 B) — ἄλλα περιμένετε. ἄλλα περιμένομεν — the first ἄλλα opposes the entreaty that they should remain to their apparent intention of departing; the second ἄλλα opposes their willingness to remain to the supposed necessity of
further entreaty. So on the following page (328 b) the
first ἀλλά emphasizes entreaty as before, the second opposes Socrates' present assent to his previous show of reluctance.
Cp. 338 C ἀλλά τί οὐκ ἐπιθετές; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθελήσεις.
(b) ἀλλ' ἥ. This familiar idiom occurs frequently after negatives, e.g. IV. 427 C οὖν ἡμισμεθα ἐξηγητῇ ἀλλ' ἥ τῷ πατρῷφ. 'we will consult no other authority, but only that which our fathers consulted.'

Also after an interrogative with negative meaning, IV. 429 B τίς ἄν ... εἰς ἄλλο τι ἀποβλέψαι ... εἰποι ἄλλ' ἥ εἰς τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ. See L. and S., s. v. ἀλλ' ἥ.

(c) Since δὲ often takes the place of ἀλλά in the Laws and in Aristotle (see Bonitz, Ind. Ar. s.v. δέ, p. 167 a 1. 19), it is worth while to notice the use of δὲ after the negative in—
I. 349 B, C εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ ἄξιοι πλέον ἔχεω ... τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου.
I. 354 Α ἀθλιών γε εἶναι οὐ λυπιτελεῖ, εἰδωλύνα δέ.
IV. 422 D οὖδ' ἡμῖν θέμας, ἤμιν δέ.

§ 29.

3. Μέντοι.

Μέντοι is a particle having a distinct and prominent office in Platonic dialogue.

(a) In affirmation it marks what is now said alters the case.

I. 328 C χρῆν μέντοι. Cephalus pleads that Socrates should make an exception to his general rule by visiting the Piracus:—'But you really should.'

I. 331 E ἀλλὰ μέντοι ... τοῦτο μέντοι. μέντοι here is not merely adversative, but implies reflection.

IV. 440 Α οὗτος μέντοι, ἐφη, ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, κ.τ.λ.

(b) In questions it calls attention to some fact or previous statement which has been overlooked and is inconsistent with what has just been said.

I. 339 B οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἀρχοντὶ δίκαιον φῆς εἶναι; 'But, by thc by, is it not your view that it is right to obey authority?'
1. 346 Α οὖχ έκώστη ἑράτωμεν μέντοι φαμὲν έκώστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτῳ ετέρων εἶναι;

In such expressions μέντοι not only, like ὑπόν, claims assent, but also implies that the new statement is one which affects the argument.

(c) In replies, it often expresses deliberate assent (after reflection) to an objection or suggestion which alters the point of view.

I. 332 Α ἄλλο μέντοι νῦν Ἰλ', ἔφη. 'There you are right, he said; he meant something different from that.'

II. 374 Ε ἥμετερον μέντοι.

4. Τοι.

Τοι, 'I may tell you.' For idiomatic uses see

I. 330 Β οὐ τοι ἐνεκα ἥρώμην. 'Well, that was just my motive for asking.'

I. 343 Α δὴ τοι σε, ἔφη, κορυζόντα περιορα. 'Why,' said he, 'because she lets you drivel.'

Gorg. 447 Β ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τούτω πάρεσμεν. 'Indeed, that is just why we are here.'

Prot. 316 Α Ἡρατάγορα, πρὸς σε τοι ἡλθομεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Ἰπποκράτης οὕτως.

The use of τοι is often a delicate way of bespeaking attention to what is said.

5. Μέν.

Μέν is used without δὲ following not only in the phrases εἰκὸς μέν, δοκῶ μέν, but in other connexions, as in 111. 403 Ε ἄλληται μέν γὰρ οἱ ἀνρεῖς τοῦ μεγάστον ἀγάπον. 'For, to begin with,' &c. V. 466 Ε ἐμολ μέν... ἔμμεθολφ χρῶμενος, κ.τ.λ.

Obs.—In v. 475 Ε ἀλλ' ἁμιῶν μὲν φίλοσόφοις the δὲ is supplied by the respondent; τοὺς δὲ ἀληθῶν, ἀνθρωπος λέγεις; Cρ. Π. 380 Ε ἕπο μέν ἄλλον... 381 Β ἈΛΛ' ἀμα αὐτὸς αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.

6. Υε.

Besides its ordinary use (very frequent in Plato) in giving a qualified or intensified assent, γέ also

(a) limits the application of a statement:
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1. 331 B ἀλλά γέ ἐν ἀνθ' ἑρός, κ.τ.λ.

VI. 506 E τοῦ γέ δοκούντος ἐμοὶ τὰ ἴν, and
(b) usually with participles it emphasizes what is put forward as the ground of a preceding statement.

Polit. 260 C ὑ μαλλον τῆς ἐπιτακτικῆς ὄν ὄντα αὐτῶν τέχνης ὅμοιομεν, δεσπόζουν γέ: 'Or shall we rather assign him to the preceptive art, since he commands?'

Rep. VIII. 547 Α ἀνάγκη Μοῦσας γέ οὔτας.

So also perhaps

V. 478 B ὑ ὄν γέ (sc. τὸ ὑ ὄν). 'Not-being, since non-existent, should be called no-thing.'

And, without a participle:

1. 331 D τῶν γέ σώμ. i. e. 'of the argument, since it is your property.'

VI. 485 E ὤ γέ τοιοῦτος, 'since that is the description of him.'
(c) δέ γέ ('yes, but') often introduces a second statement, which in some way modifies the first.

1. 335 D ὁ δέ γέ δίκαιος ἀγαθός.

VIII. 547 E, 549 B, 553 C, 556 B, 561 E. &c.

7. Γάρ.

(γέ ὁπα remain uncompounded in Theact. 171 C.)

(a) Explaining something implied or understood. Cp. Hdt. IX. 92, § 2 μετὰ σφέων γάρ, κ.τ.λ.: VI. 111, § 2 ἀπὸ ταῦτης γάρ σφι τῆς μόρχης, κ.τ.λ.

Rep. II. 365 D ἐπὶ γάρ τὸ λαμβάνειν (there is a difficulty, but it is not insuperable; for,' &c.).

III. 413 B τῶν γάρ πον μαθάνεις; '(I have said enough); for I suppose you understand me now.'

VI. 491 C ἐχεῖς γάρ τῶν τύπου ὄν λέγω.

So commonly in replies—'yes, for —,' 'no, for —,' &c.

(b) Introducing an inference under the form of a reason.

'the truth is,' 'the fact is.' Lit. 'That is because.'

I. 338 D βδελυγός γάρ εἰ, 'that shows your malignity.'

Cp. Gorg. 454 D ὧν ὣν γάρ αὐτί ὄν ταῦτα ἔστιν, 'that is another proof of their difference.'
Δή marks what is said as manifest, either in itself, or in connexion with a preceding statement: 'you know,' 'of course,,' 'to be sure.' Sometimes *ironic*, 'forsooth' (as in ὡς δή). In questions it demands proof or certainty, or asks for something more explicit.

(a) Idiomatic combinations of δή with adverbs and conjunctions:

a. With adverbs of time = 'just,' νῦν δή, 'just now' (passim), αἰτίκα δή μάλα, 'just immediately' (1. 338 B), τότε δή, 'even then' (Symp. 184 Ε).

b. καὶ ... δή and καὶ δή καὶ, singling out the most prominent *item* in an enumeration or series:

I. 352 Α (ὦ ἄν ἔγγειντα, εἶτε πόλει τινὶ εἶτε γένει εἶτε στρατοπέδῳ ... ) καὶ ἐν ἔρι δή.

II. 367 Α οἴνον ὅραν, ἀκοῦειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δή, 'and in particular the being well and strong.'

VIII. 563 Ε. 564 Α ἐν ὁραι τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, καὶ δή καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἦκεστα (καὶ δή ομ. Par. Α). Κρ. Men. 87 Ε, Theaet. 156 Β.

γ. δή οὖν: οὖν δή.

II. 382 D κατὰ τι δή οὖν τοῦτο τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεύδος χρὴταιμον;

'On which, *then*, of these grounds, *in particular*, is falsehood useful to God?'

VI. 497 C δῆλος δή οὖν εἰ ὅτι μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρήσει ... 'Now, *then*, I see plainly that the next thing you will ask is ...'

VII. 526 D ἄλλα οὖν δή, εἴπον, πρὸς μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα βραχὺ τι ἂν ἔξωκαί ... 'Howbeit, it is manifest, said I ...'

VIII. 545 D πῶς οὖν δή, εἴπον, ... ἡ πάλις ἤμεν κινηθήσεται;

'How, then, in point of fact, shall our city be disturbed?'

(b) δή, with imperatives, giving peremptory emphasis:

φέρε δή, ὅτι δή (passim), σκόπει δή (1. 352 D), ἡχε δή (ib. 353 Β).

Hence Baiter's emendation of V. 450 Ε πειρῶ *δή* for πειρῶ ὁν (Par. Α) is at least plausible, although the reading of Π M πειρῶ οὖν is perhaps preferable, because less abrupt.
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(c) ὡς δὴ, 'since forsooth!'

I. 337 C ὡς δὴ ὁμοιὸς τοῦτο ἐκεῖνῳ, 'as if there was any comparison between the two cases.' Quite different from this is the effect of ὡς δὴ τοι.

II. 366 C ὡς δὴ τοι . . . πολλὶν τον συγγρόμυν ἔχει, κ.τ.λ., 'since truly, as you are aware.'

§ 33. 9. Μήν.

Μήν bespeaks attention for a fresh topic, generally in combination with a conjunction, καὶ μήν, ἄλλα μήν . . . γε, οὔτε μήν, &c.

Plato shows a growing fondness for this particle, and employs it in new ways, especially in questions, asking for something fresh or different from what has been said.

(a) μήν alone:

VII. 520 E παρὶς μὴν μᾶλλον ὡς ἔπι ἀναγκαῖον . . . εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον, 'let me observe, however.'

VII. 524 C μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμακρῶν ἐόρα, 'you will observe that vision too had perception of great and small.'

VII. 528 Λ φθορῶς μὴν οὐδ' ἄν ἄλλῳ, κ.τ.λ., 'though, to be sure, you would not grudge any incidental benefit which another may reap.' Cp. Phaedr. 244 B, Theaet. 193 D.

(b) ἄλλα μήν . . . γε:

VI. 485 D ἄλλα μὴν ὅτι γε εἰς ἐν τι αἰ ἐπιθυμίαι σφῶρα ῥέπονσιν, κ.τ.λ., 'well but, observe —.'

(c) μήν in combination with an interrogative:

a. In such expressions there is generally an ellipse of ἄλλο—i.e. an implied contrast or antithesis. In other words, μήν gives to the interrogative an intonation = 'what else?' or 'what then?'

I. 362 D ἄλλα τί μήν; εἰπον, 'but what more, then, would you desire? said Ι.'

VII. 523 B οὐ πάντως, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἠτυχές οὐ λέγω. ποῦ οὖν μήν, ἔφη, λέγεις; 'You have not hit my meaning.' But what, then, are the things you mean?'
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β. Hence τί μήν; acquires the force of strong assent: 'what else?' i.e. 'that, certainly.'

VI. 508 D ὅταν ἐς γ’, οὕμαι, ὁν ὁ ἡλιός καταλάμπῃ, σαφώς ὁρῶσι, κ.τ.λ. τί μήν; 'of course.'

Obs.—W. Dittenberger has shown (Hermes, xvi. pp. 321 ff.) that τί μήν; is absent from two-thirds of the Platonic dialogues, but increasingly frequent in Phaedr. (12 times), Rep. (35), Theaet. (13), Soph. (12), Polit. (26), Phileb. (26), Laws (48).

The combination γε μήν, which is very frequent in the later dialogues, above all in the Laws, occurs only twice in the Republic:

I. 332 E μὴ καίμουσι γε μήν, κ.τ.λ.. 'well but, if men are not ill,' &c.

V. 465 B τά γε μήν σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν, κ.τ.λ.

10. Αὖ and πάντως.

Αὖ and πάντως, though not conjunctions, serve to connect sentences which are otherwise in asyndeton.

IV. 427 B τελευτησάντων αὖ δήκαι, 'moreover, how the dead are to be buried' (v. r. τε αὖ).

VI. 504 E πάντως αὐτὸ ὅπως ἀναγκαίας ἀκήκοας.

Theaet. 143 C, Symp. 174 B, Gorg. 497 B, Polit. 268 E.

So εἶτα—as in other Greek—expressing impatience:

I. 338 D εἶτ’ ὅπως ὁσθα, κ.τ.λ.. Protag. 359 E:

and αὐτικα in adducing an example. Protag. 359 E, &c.

This last idiom occurs also in a subordinate clause.

I. 340 D ἐπεὶ αὐτικα λατρῶν καλεῖς, κ.τ.λ.

11. Ἀρα.

Ἀρα is not only a particle of inference (like οὖν) but also, and in Plato more frequently, a sign of reference. This has sometimes been overlooked by interpreters. Socrates and other speakers are often engaged in developing opinions which they do not endorse, or in relating what
is matter of hearsay. In such passages, ἀρα is constantly used to direct attention to the fact that the speaker is not uttering his own thought. The light particle enables Plato to dispense with such clumsy additions as (a) 'as my informant said,' (b) 'according to the theory I am expounding,' or (c) with reference to other speakers, 'according to the theory which they uphold,' or 'which you uphold,' or 'as we are expected to think.'

(a) Ἰ. 364 B, ἄρα καὶ θεω τολμῶν . . . βίων κακῶν εἶναι, 'that, as they declare,' &c.

(b) Ἰ. 362 A, τὸ δὲ τοῦ Λεῖσχύλου πολὺ ἃρα ('is really, according to their view') ἀποθέτομον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἄδικον.

Χ. 598 E, ἀνάγκη . . . εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, 'he must, according to them, make his poetry with perfect knowledge.'

(c) Ἰ. 332 E, χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαίωσιν; 'Justice is useful in peace also, according to you.'

Χ. 600 C, τοῦ πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ('according to the view in question') . . . Ὄμηρον δ' ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.

12. ποι.

πον = 'I presume,' appealing to the knowledge or recollection of the respondent; often used in recalling what has been previously said.

VI. 490 C, μέμηται γὰρ ποι.

IX. 582 D, διὰ λόγων ποι ἐφαμέν δειν κρίνεσθαι.

Hence perhaps also in VIII. 562 B: we should read τοῦτο δ' ἃρα ἀπ' τούτων παλαιστών.


It is needless to do more than to cite a few scattered uses which appear to be specially Platonic. (Uses of ἃρα, for example, in Plato fall under the headings now given in L. and S. s.v. μὴ)—

(a) ὃδε in negation.

a. There is a courteous, reassuring use of ὁδὲ, ὁδαμῶς,
&c., which is not intended to be taken seriously, but only to prepare for a modified restatement. This may in some cases be formally accounted for by supplying ἄλλο, &c. (below, p. 216 β), but not, for example, in

IX. 578 D τί γὰρ ἀν φοβοῦστο;

Οὐδέν, εἴτεν ἄλλα τὸ αἵττον ἐννοεῖς; ‘Why indeed?’ said I. ‘But do you know the cause?’

V. 472 B ἄλλα τί τούτο γ’; ἐφη.

Οὐδέν ἄλλα ἔναν εὑρομεν, κ.τ.λ., ‘Oh, merely to find,’ &c.

The courtesy is sometimes ironical: as in

IV. 424 D Οὐδ' ὅρ ἐργάζεται, ἐφη, ἄλλο γε ἦ κατὰ σμικρόν, κ.τ.λ., ‘Oh!’ said he, ‘it is innocent enough, I dare say. All that it does is to undermine morality,’ &c.

These examples may justify a similar rendering of

V. 461 C, D πατέρας δὲ καὶ θυγατέρας . . . πῶς διαγρώσονται ἄλληλων;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἦν ο' ἐγώ. ἄλλα ἂφ' ἦς, κ.τ.λ., ‘Oh! simply in this way, said I.’

Although it is of course possible to take the words to mean literally ‘not at all,’ i. e. they will never know their actual parents.

β. Οὐ πάνυ in Plato has various shades of meaning, from (1) ‘not quite,’ to (2) ‘not at all.’

(1) V. 474 D οὐ γὰρ πάνυ γε ἐννοῶ. ‘I cannot quite recall it,’ rather than, ‘I have it not at all in mind.’

(2) VI. 504 E οἶκ των ὡν σε . . . ἁφεῖται . . .

Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν ο' ἐγώ, ‘Certainly not, said I.’

The stronger meaning may, however, be sometimes indirectly implied,—the speaker, as so often in Greek, saying less than he means.

IV. 429 Α οὐ πάνυ χαλεπών, ‘not so very difficult,’ i. e. ‘surely not difficult at all.’

(b) Interrogatives.

a. The regular interrogative use of ὃ in confident questions (= ‘don’t you think’ &c.) is to be distinguished

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from the negative assertion with interrogative meaning, assuming a negative reply ("you don't think so, surely?"):

II. 362 D où τί πον οἶει, ... οὐ Σώκρατες, ἵκανως εἰρήσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου;

β. Slightly different from both is the use in

V. 455 E (again assuming an affirmative answer) γυμναστική ὅρα οὖ, αὐδὲ πολεμική; 'And (will you tell me that) there is not an athletic nor yet a warlike woman?' Cp. Theaet. 145 A ἀρ' αὐδὲ γεωμετρικὸς; 'But will you tell me that he is not a geometrician?'

γ. ἢ and ἀρα, emphatically interrogative, commonly anticipate a negative reply.

(1) I. 348 C ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν; 'Do you mean to tell me that Justice is Vice?' (The particle here might ironically anticipate an affirmative answer, but the following examples confirm the above rendering.)

III. 396 B τὰ τουαίτα ἢ μυρήσουται; 'Shall we allow them to imitate such things as these?'

V. 460 C ἢ καλῶς ἐξεῖ; 'Is that an honourable thing?'

VIII. 552 A ἢ δοκεῖ ὁρθῶς ἐξεῖν;

(2) VII. 523 E τί δὲ ὡς; τὸ μέγεθος ... ἀρα ἵκανως ὧρα; (resumed with ἀρ' οὖκ ἐνδεέως immediately afterwards).

δ. But ἀρα; with ironical emphasis is sometimes practically equivalent to ἀρ' οὖ;

VI. 484 C τὸντι ὡς, ἢν ὡς ἐγώ, ἀρα ὡς ὡλοῦ ...; Καὶ πῶς, ἐφή, οὖ δῆλον;

Cp. Soph. 221 D ἀρ', ὡ πρὸς θεῶν, ἠγνοεῖκαμεν, κ.τ.λ., 'Can it be that we have failed to recognize their kinship?' i.e. 'Are they not, after all, akin?'

ε. And ἢ in ἢ γάρ; 'Surely that is so?' puts a strong affirmation with an interrogative tone (cp. supra a).

Gorg. 449 D ἢ ιδαντική περὶ τὴν τῶν ἰματίων ἐργασίαν ἢ γάρ; 'Surely that is so?'

In X. 607 C, however, this use is 'mixed' with the ordinary interrogative use of οὖ.
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"γάρ ... οὐ καθεῖ ἐν' αὐτῆς καὶ σὺ; 'Do not you feel her charm? Surely you do?"

Obs.—This use of ἤ may be pressed into service to account for vi. 500 θ ἢ, καί εἶν ouτοῦ θεώτατα. But ἢ καὶ εἶν may be corrupted from ἤ οὐκ εἶν, through ditography of ε and dropping of οὐ.

ζ. For ἄρα μή, μῶν, μῶν μή (I. 351 E, VI. 505 C) in doubtful questions, see the Lexica.

(c) Exceptional uses of μή. These mostly occur where § 38, either some generalized notion, or some idea of prohibition, has been implied.

a. Where a relative has preceded:

ΠI. 357 Β ὁσαί τάλανς εἰς καὶ ηθέν ... γέγραται ἀλλα, κ.τ.λ. (See above, p. 174, 2 (b)).

VIII. 559 Β η τε μή παῦσαι ζοντα δνατη (so η). See note.

X. 605 Ε οὖν έαντον ... μή ἄξοι είναι. Μή is here used in putting the case generally.

In Hipp. Maj. 295 C οὐ ἄν δοκῶσι τοιοῦτοι εἰναι οὖν μή δνατοι ὄραν, the hypothetical turn of expression follows οὐ ἄν δοκῶσιν.

β. In oratio obliqua (M. and T., § 685).

I. 346 Ε διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἐγώγε ... καὶ ἄρτι ἐλεγον μηθένα ἐθέλειν· ἐκούτα ἄρχει—recalling the general statement in 345 Ε τῶν ἀλλας ἀρχάς ... ὅτι οὐδείς ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἐκών.

X. 602 Α πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρήσθαι ἐπιστήμην εξεῖ ὃν ὄν γραφή, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὀρθὰ εἴτε μή;

Theaet. 155 Α μηθέποτε μηθέν ἄν μεῖζον ... γεγέσθα ... τούτο μῆτε αἰδεύσεσθαι ποτε μῆτε φθινεῖν. Socrates is recording the 'postulates' or a priori determinations of the mind. 'Are in the former sentence adds the notion of impossibility. So τίς ἄν in Apol. 27 D τίς ἄν αὐθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῦσας ἥγοιτο εἶναι, θεώς δὲ μή;'

γ. A shadowy sense of prohibition seems present in VIII. 553 D where οὐδὲν ... εἶ λογιζέσθαι is followed by τιμῶν μηθέν, as if ἁναγκάζει or some such word had preceded. So possibly in III. 407 D οὐκ ἐπιθετεῖν ... μή οὐσθαί θεῶν θερα—
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πεινευ, the change to μή is occasioned by some reminiscence of κατοδειξαί . . προστάτευ, preceding. See note in loco.

Obs.—For idiomatic accumulation of negatives, see especially χ. 610 λ-ε ἡ τοιαύ . . ἀπόλλυσαι.

§ 39.

14. Formulae.

(a) Of question—ἡ ὅ; τίς μηχανή μή ὅ; ὅ; &c. For ἡ γάρ; see above p. 210, ε.

(b) Of reply—πάνε γε, σφόδρα γε, καὶ μάλα. πάνε μὲν ὅ; ὅ; πατάπασι μὲν ὅ; ὅ; κομδῳ μὲν ὅ; ὅ; φαινεται, ὅ; φαινεται, δοκεῖ γε δή. πῶς γάρ; πῶς γὰρ ὅ; ὅ; τί μή (sc. ἀλλο); (See above, under μή, p. 206.)

The degree of assent or dissent implied in each case varies somewhat with the context.

(c) Of connexion, τί δέ; τὸ δὲ γε, ἀλλο τι ἢ (cp. Herod. II. 14. &c.), ἀλλο τι; ἀλλο τι ὅ; ὅ;

a. The question whether τί δέ and τί δὲ δή are to form a separate sentence, or to be joined to the words that follow them, is one that can only be determined by the immediate context. See especially L. 349 B, C, E; V. 468 A and notes in locis.

b. For ἀλλο τι in apposition to the sentence, see below, p. 221.

Obs. 1.—Single words habitually used in parenthesis are not treated as breaking the unity of a clause, but may be immediately followed by an enclitic. This applies, not only to ὥς and the like (for which see especially vi. 564 λ), but to a vocative, e.g. L. 337 ἐ πῶς γὰρ ὅ; ν. ἐφήν ἐγώ, ὑ βελτίστε, τίς ἀποκρίνατο;

Obs. 2.—For the common transference of ἡ ἢ, ἢτι, πῶ from temporal to logical succession, see especially ii. 370 D, iv. 430 D—432 B.

Obs. 3.—ἄληθες, τῇ ἄληθεια, ὄντως, τῷ ὄντι may be taken under the present head. M. Schanz has shown that in the later dialogues ὄντως gradually takes the place of τῷ ὄντι. But when he argues that because ὄντως occurs five times in Bb. v—vii while it is absent from
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Bb. i–iv, Bb. v–vii are ‘late,’ he loses sight of his own observation that τῷ ὰντε is naturally avoided in conjunction with other cases of ὄν.

VI. Ellipse and Pleonasm. § 40.

1. Ellipse.

To maintain the effect of conversation and to avoid monotony, Plato constantly represents his speakers as omitting what, although essential to the meaning, is assumed to be obvious to the hearers. Hence a frequent duty of the interpreter is to supply the word or words ‘understood’:—especially (a) in references, (b) in replies, (c) in antitheses, (d) in transitions, and (e) where a word of simple meaning is absorbed in some neighbouring word. Under this head should also be noticed (f) familiar abbreviations.

(a) In references.

I. 341 B τῶν ὡς ἐποιεῖ ἐπείν (sc. οὕτω προσαγορευόμενον). The incomplete expression is explained by the reference to 340 D λέγομεν τῷ ρήματι οὕτως.

(b) In replies.

I. 334 D μηδαμῶς (sc. οὕτω τιθῶμεν).

I. 349 B οὐδὲ τής δικαιας (sc. πράξεσις).

IV. 428 E πολύ, ἐφη, χαλκέας (sc. πλείονος οἴμαι ἐνέργειας τῷ πόλει).

V. 451 D κοινῆ, ἐφη, πάντα (sc. οἰκομεθα οὕνει αὐτῶς πράττειν τοὺς ἀρρεσιν).

V. 468 A λέγ', ἐφη, τοῦ ἄν (sc. καταφαίνοντο σοι).

V. 473 A ἃ σὺ ἐπιπάττεις (sc. ἀποφαίνειν ὡς δυνατά ἐστι καὶ ἃ).

VI. 508 C ὅταν δὲ γ', οἴμαι, ὡν ὁ ἡλιος καταλάμπῃ (sc. ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τις τρέπῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς).

VIII. 552 C ἐδόκει (sc. τῶν ἀρχαίων εἶναι).

IX. 585 D σῶμα δὲ αὐτῷ ψυχῆς οὐκ οἶει οὕτως; (sc. ξυ τῶν ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχειν).

Cp. Phaed. 73 A εἰν μὲν λόγῳ, ἐφη ὁ Κέρης, καλλιστῶ (sc.
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Obs. 1.—In continuing a conversation, the indirect form is sometimes used with the ellipse of εἰπέ. Rep. 1. 348 Β ὅποτέρως... ἀρέσκα; Euthyd. 271 Β. Cp. Polit. 261 Ε ὅποτερον ἄν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ξυμβαίνῃ (sc. ὑπομνάσομεν).

Obs. 2.—A special idiom is the ellipse of the apodosis with a new protasis, participial or otherwise. Phaedr. 228 έ δέξασθαι γε πρῶτον, ὁ φιλότης (see above, p. 179, Obs. 3). Rep. 1. 338 C εἰν μάθῳ γε πρῶτον;

1. 340 Α εἰν σὺ γ', ἐφη, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσῃς.

Obs. 3.—Note the occasional omission of a comparative with ἦ following.

1. 335 Α προσθέειν... ἦ... ἐλέγομεν.

Symp. 220 Ε ἐμὶ λαβεῖν ἡ σαυτῶν.

(c) In antitheses.

11. 360 Α ἡκὼ δὲ δήλῳ (sc. ἡκὼ δὲ αὐτῷ στρέφομεν τῷ σφενδάνῃ δήλῳ γέγρασθαι).

111. 412 D μὴ δὲ, τοῦτοντων (sc. εἰ δὲ οὖντο εἰκενον μὴ εὖ πρῶτοντος, ἔμπαινειν καὶ ἐαυτῷ κακῶς πράττειν).

1111. 444 D τὸ δὲ νόσον παρὰ φῶσιν, κ.τ.λ. (sc. τὸ δὲ νόσον ποιοῖν ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ σῶματι παρὰ φῶσιν καθιστάναι, κ.τ.λ.).

(d) In transitions:—i.e. in passing from one alternative to another, or to a new topic.

I. 351 B ἦ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης (sc. τῷ δύναμιν τοῦτον ἐχεῖν);

II. 366 D ὡς δὲ (sc. οὕτως ἐχεῖ), δήλον.

IV. 428 C τί δὲ; τῇ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ (sc. διὰ τὴν... σκέυων ἐπιστήμην);

VI. 493 D οὔτε μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ. (sc. δῆλον ἐστὶ, from δοκεῖ preceding).

Obs.—In Plato, as in other Greek, the affirmative notion is often assumed in passing from a negative—e.g. ἔκαστος supplied from οὔδεισιν in

11. 366 D οὔδεῖς ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἄλλ' ὑπὸ ἀναθρίς... ψέχει τῷ ὑδακτείν.

VI. 560 Β οὔδε γάρ... σχολή... βλέπειν... ἄλλα (καρπὸς) μμεῖσθαι...
And sometimes the word to be supplied is more general than that which precedes—e.g.

v. 460 ε μηδε Ἐλληναι ἄρι δεῦλον ἐκτήσατο (sc. δει from δοκεί δίκαιον, κ.τ.λ. preceding).

Somewhat similarly in VIII. 557 Ε μηδε αὖ, εάν τις ἄρχειν νόμος σε διακολύψῃ ἡ δικάζειν, μηδεν ἤττον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν, the general notion of 'no compulsion' (sc. έξειναι) is continued from μηδεμιάν ἰνάγκην supra. 'There is nothing to compel you any the less for that to be a ruler and judge,' i.e. there is nothing any more on that account to prevent you from exercising both functions.

(c) Absorption by a neighbouring word. The want of the § 41. word omitted is not felt because of another word which suggests it to the mind. Cp. Herod. II. 87 τοὺς τὰ πολυτελέστατα (sc. σκευασμένους) σκευάζουσι νεκροὺς.

II. 358 ὅ εἰ σοι βουλομένῳ (sc. λέγω) ὁ λέγω.
II. 364 Α ποιηροὺς πλουσίους (sc. οὐνας) καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεως ἔχοντας.

II. 366 Ε ἄλλως ἡ δόξας (sc. έπαινούντες, κ.τ.λ.).
II. 372 Ε καὶ ὑψα (sc. ἐχειν) ἀπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι.
IV. 421 Β ὁ δ’ ἐκεῖνο λέγων . . . (sc. ἐλεγεῖν).
IV. 439 Α τῶν τινός (sc. οὖντων suggested by εἰναί following). See note in loco.

V. 452 Α παρὰ τὸ ἔθος (sc. φαινόμενα) γελοῖα ἄν φαίνομαι.
VI. 488 Α ναύκληρον (sc. μὲν) μεγέθει μὲν, κ.τ.λ.
VI. 510 Β ἄλλ’ αὕτης, ὅν δ’ ἔγώ (sc. μαθήσει, which follows soon).

VII. 517 D φαίνεται . . . γελοῖος (sc. ὄν) . . . ἀμβλυνώττων.
IX. 589 Ε ὁ δ’ ἡ δέ ψέκης οὐδὲν ὑγιές (sc. λέγει, from ἀληθεύει preceding or ψέγει following) οὗτ’ εἰδὼς φέγει δ’ τι ψέγει.
X. 615 Β, C τῶν δ’ εἰθός γενομένων (sc. ἀποδιανύστων: the whole passage relating to the dead). See Essay on Text, p. 121.

Obs.—Such omissions are not purely accidental, but are due to instinctive avoidance of cumbrous tautology.
On Plato’s use of Language.

I. Familiar abbreviations.

a. Certain adjectives readily dispense with the verb substantive. The idiom is frequent with ἄξιος and ἓτοιμος (Parm. 137 C ἓτοιμος σου, ὦ Ἀρμενίδη) but is extended by Plato to other words.

II. 358 A ἄλλα ἐγώ τίς, ὦς ἐοικε, ὄνομαθής.

III. 467 B ἀδώτως τῷ μῇ μελετῶτι.

IV. 598 D εὐθύθης τίς ἀνθρωπος.

Obs.—The substantive verb is similarly omitted with ἀνάγκη, τίς μηχανή, &c., also in εἰ μή εἰ, κ.τ.λ.: III. 411 E, IX. 581 D. In II. 370 εἰν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία, the subjunctive ἦ is dropped.

β. Ἀλλος is constantly omitted with interrogatives and negatives.

I. 332 C ἄλλα τί οἶει (sc. ἄλλο); I. 348 C ἄλλα τί μὴν (sc. ἄλλο); V. 461 D οὐδαμῶς (sc. ἄλλως).

V. 472 B οὐδέν (sc. ἄλλο).

Also in the hypothetical formula εἰ μὴ τί ἄλλα.

On ἄλλο τι, which is sometimes called an ellipse, see below, p. 221. Obs. 2. Another phrase which is appositional not elliptical is ἐν ἀνθρῷ εἶν (I. 331 B).

γ. The indefinite subject is dropped, as in the common idiom, κωλύει ἐν τῷ νῦν, &c.

IV. 445 A εἰάν τε λανθάνῃ εἰάν τε μή (sc. ὁ δικαία τε πράττων καὶ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεῦσαν).

V. 478 B ἄρ’ ὅν τῷ μή ὅν δοξάζει (sc. ὁ δοξάζων).


δ. Transitive verbs used absolutely, i.e. without express object.

I. 335 D ψάχχειν . . . ύγραίνει . . . βλάπτειν.

II. 368 B ὅ τι χρῆσωμαι (sc. ύπαίνων τῷ λόγῳ).

III. 392 D περαίνουσιν.

III. 411 A ὅταν μὲν τις . . . παρέχῃ.
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III. 411 E διαπράττεται.
IV. 420 C ἀπολαβόντες.
VII. 525 D οὐδόμη ἀποδεχόμενον.
IX. 585 E χαίρειν ἄν ποιοὶ (sc. τῶν ἀνθρώπων).

Obs.—Several of these words (χρῆσθαι, περαίνειν, ἀπολαμβάνειν, ἀποδέχθαι) belong to the technical language of the dialectical method. See also

v. 467 B οἷον . . . φιλεῖ (sc. γίγνεσθαι).
viii. 565 E οἷα δὴ φιλαύσι (sc. ποιεῖν).

ε. In some technical phrases a feminine abstract substantive is suppressed, as e.g. τέχνη in ἡ ἰατρική, &c. (sexcenties). Similarly

III. 397 B πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν (sc. χορδήν), 'in the same tone.' See note in loco.

IV. 432 Λ δὲ ὅλης (sc. τῆς λύρας).
Ibid. διὰ πασῶν (sc. τῶν χορδῶν).

ζ. One of two alternative or correlative expressions is sometimes dropped.

VI. 486 C (πότερον) εὐμαθῆς ἢ δυσμαθῆς.

Obs.—Thus ὁ μὲν is omitted where ὁ δὲ follows, e.g. Phaedr. 266 Λ σκαία, τὰ δὲ δεξιά. This idiom appears more frequently in the later dialogues (Tim. 63 ε &c.).

N.B.—For the special idiom with μεταξύ (vi. 498 Λ) see above, p. 198, γ.

η. Other conversational ellipses are
I. 343 C οὕτω πόρρω εἶ (sc. τῆς γνώσεως).
V. 467 C ὅσα ἀνθρώπων (γνωστικοστ).
sentence before introducing it, but weaves it into that which is half finished, often to the sacrifice of formal coherency. Thus rhetoric interferes with grammar.

A good instance of Plato's love of amplification occurs in II (380 a foll.), where Socrates insists that evil must not be attributed to God:

'All' ἐὰν τις ποιή ἐν οἷς ταῦτα τὰ ᾠμβεία ἔνεστι, τὰ τῆς Νιώβης πάθη, ἢ τὰ Πελοπιδῶν ἢ τὰ Τρωίκα ἢ τί ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων; ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐστέον αὐτὰ λέγειν, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ, ἔξωμενον αὐτόν σχεδόν ὅν τίνι ημεῖς λόγοι ἤτοιμεν, καὶ λεκτέον, ὡς ὁ μὲν θεὸς δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἀγαθά εἰργάζετο, οἱ δὲ φωναῖτο κολαζόμενοι· ὡς δὲ άθλιοι μὲν οἱ δίκην διώμετε. ἢν δὲ ἦν ὁ ὀρῶν ταῦτα θεῶς, οὐκ ἐστέον λέγειν τῶν ποιήσεσθαι. ἀλλ', εἰ μὲν οτι ἐδεύθησαν κολάσεως λέγομεν, ὡς θόλιοι οἱ κακοί, διώμετε δὲ δίκην ἀφελοῦντο ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐστέον: κακώς δὲ αὕτων φάναι θεῶν τινι γίγνεσθαι ἡγαθόν οὕτω, διαμαχήτων παρὰ τρόπῳ μήτε τινά λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν πόλει, εἰ μέλλει εἰνομήσεσθαι, μήτε τινα ἀκούειν, μήτε νεῶτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, μήτε ἐν μέτρῳ μήτε ἄνευ μέτρου μυθολογοῦντα, ὡς οὔτε ὁσία ἢν λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε εὕμ- φορα ἡμῖν οὔτε σύμφωνα αὑτὰ αὐτοῖς.

Here observe (1) the accumulation of examples characteristically summed up with ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, (2) the disjunctive mode of statement, put first affirmatively (either one or other), then negatively (not both); then affirmatively again, then once more negatively with increased explicitness and emphasis, and with the characteristic qualification εἰ μέλλει εἰνομήσεσθαι. Observe also (3) the addition of the participle μυθολογοῦντα, and of εἰ λέγοιτο. Note further (4) the pleonastic φάναι anticipating λέγεω, and (5) the clinching of the argument in the last clause, ὡς οὔτε ὁσία, κ.τ.λ. The examination of this one passage may prepare the student for much that he will find elsewhere. Cp. especially VI. 489; II. 374 B-D Ἀλλ' ἄρα ἢ παρασχορέον; IV. 421 B-C. A simile or illustration is often expanded in this way, e.g. III. 402 A ὡσπερ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ. See also the pleonastic use of participles in Symp. 218 A B.
(a) The most ordinary pleonasms are those in which § 43: a notion already implied is made explicit in a subsequent phrase.

II. 358 E πλέον δὲ κακὸ ὑπερβάλλειν, κ.τ.λ.
II. 371 Δ καπηλων . . . γένεσιν ἐμποιεί.
VI. 486 Δ ζητόμεν δείν.
VI. 490 Λ παρὰ δόξαν τοὺς νῦν δοκουμένοις.
VIII. 555 Β τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ός πλουσιώτατον δεῖν γύρνεσαι.

(b) Specially Platonic is the expletive use of ἐπιχειρεῖν, φιλεῖν, κινδυνεῖν, ἐχομαι and other verbs as auxiliaries. See also VI. 500 Μ μελετήσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ὑθη . . . τιθέναι: VII. 520 Β ἐκτίνειν . . . προθυμεῖσαι. So Cephalus, in his garrulous talk about old age, speaks of the time when one comes near to thinking that he is about to die, ἐπειδὰν τις ἐγγὺς ἕ τοι οἰεσθαι τελευτήσειν (I. 330 B). For the pleonastic or expletive use of participles (ἐχων, &c.) see above, p. 177 (f).

(c) The amplifying, expansive tendency of Plato's language has a distinct bearing on the treatment of the text. The excision of supposed 'glosses' and 'accretions' by which editors have tried to prune away such redundancies, must be carried far beyond the limit of even plausible conjecture, if the tendency itself is to be disproved. (See Essay on Text, p. 110.)

V. 477 Β, C φίλομοιν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὀφτων, αἰς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα α δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πῶν ὁ τί περ ἀν δύνηται, οἶνον λέγω ὃψιν καὶ ἀκοῆ τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἀρα μανθάνεις ὑ βουλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἴδος.

Obs.—The addition of an equivalent phrase often adds a touch of admiration or scorn.
I. 331 Α ἡδεία ἐλπὶς . . . καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος.
II. 364 Ε διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδίας ἡδονῶν.

(d) A special idiom, not exclusively Platonic (see L. and S., s. v. II. 8), is the pleonastic (or adverbial) use of ἄλλος.
Cp. especially Hom. Odys. IX. 367 μῆτῃρ ἧδε πατῆρ ἦδ
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Allou πάντες ἐταίροι: Herod. IV. 179, § 1 ἄλλην τε ἐκατόμβην καὶ δὴ καὶ τρίποδα χάλκεων.

a. ἄλλος attributive.

II. 368 B ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ἑμετέρου τρόπου, 'from your manner of life, not from your words.'

II. 371 Λ γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμισθυρῶν ... καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων, 'and also of that ministering class.'

III. 404 Λ, B πολλάς μεταβολάς ... μεταβάλλοντος ύδάτων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀίτων, 'enduring many changes of drinking-water and also of food.'

b. In other cases ἄλλος is predicative or adverbial, but still pleonastic:

X. 617 B ἄλλας δὲ καθημένας πέρεξ, κ.τ.λ., 'and sitting there, moreover, round about.'

The Fates are thus contradistinguished from the Sirens (or perhaps 'there were others ... daughters of necessity,' &c.). Cp. the idiomatic ἄλλως in Gorg. 470 D συγγενόμενος ἀν γυνῆς, ἄλλος δὲ αὐτοθεν οὐ γιγάντεσκεις.

(e) Αὐτός τε καὶ, with expansion of the correlative phrase:

III. 398 Λ αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα βουλόμενος ἐπιδείξοισθαι, 'bringing his poems for exhibition with him too.'

IV. 427 D αὐτός τε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει, 'and call your brother also to assist.'

VII. 535 Ε ἦ ἄν ... χαλεπῶς φέρῃ αὐτή τε καὶ ἐτέρων ψευδομένων ὑπεραγιανάκτη.

(f) Double comparative and superlative:

I. 331 B οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ... χρησιμώτατον.

II. 362 C θεοφιλέστερον ... εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν.

§ 44.

VII. Apposition.

One very frequent consequence of Plato's discursiveness is what may be loosely termed the apposition of sentences, —the second being often not the exact equivalent, but an explanation or expansion of the first. Cp. Herod. I. 23, § 2 θάνατα μέγιστον ... Ἀρίωνα ... ἐπὶ δελφίνος ἐξενιχθέντα:
Three cases may be distinguished:—

1. Where a pronoun or a pronominal phrase or adverb resuming a preceding statement is followed by a restate-

ment of the same thing, more or less expanded or modified.

I. 337 C καὶ σὺ οὖν ποιήσεις; ὃν ἐγὼ ἀπείπον, τοῦτων τι ἀποκρινεῖ;

II. 365 C ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὅθε τρεπτέαν ὅλως πρόθυμα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα

κύκλῳ περὶ ἐμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραπτέον, κ.τ.λ.

III. 416 Μὴ τοιούτων . . . ποιήσωσι πρὸς τὸν, πολίτας, ἐπειδὴ

αὐτῶν κρείττους εἰσίν, αὐτὶ εὐμμάχων εἰμιεῖν δεσπόταις ἀγρίως

ἀφομοιωθῶσιν.

IV. 429 Ε, 430 Α τοιούτων . . . ὑπόλαβε . . . ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἤμας

. . . μηδὲν οὗν ἄλλο μηχανάσθαι ή, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 517 Β τὰ δ’ οὖν ἐμοὶ φασίν μεν οὔτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ

γνωστῷ . . . μόνιμος δράσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 532 Α οὖτω καὶ ὅταν τοῖς τῷ διαλέξεσθαι ἐπιχειρή, ἅνεν

πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ’ αὐτὸ ὁ ἐστιν ἐκαστὸν

ὄρμη (subjunctive) καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ, κ.τ.λ. Here the protasis

is expanded.

X. 605 Β ταυτῶν καὶ τῶν μιμητικῶν ποιητὴν φησιομεν κακὴν

πολιτείαν . . . ἐμποιεῖν.

Obs. 1.—The frequent formula of transition with the interrogative

follows the analogy of this mode of construction—

1. 332 E τι δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; ἐν τῶν πράξει, κ.τ.λ. εἰ passim.

This form is better suited to the majority of cases than the other

punctuation τι δέ; ὁ δίκαιος ἐν τοῖς πράξει, κ.τ.λ.

vii. 515 B τι δὲ τῶν παραφερομένων; οὐ ταῦτα τοῦτο;

although the latter is also sometimes required by the context:

vii. 517 D τι δέ; τάδε οἱ τι διαμαστῶν, κ.τ.λ.

Obs. 2.—So ἀλλὰ τι, when not followed by ή, forms virtually

a separate clause in apposition.

1. 337 C ἀλλα τι οὖν, ἐφη, καὶ σὺ οὖν ποιήσεις; ‘You mean to say

that that is what you are going to do?'

So 1. 331 B ἐν ἄνδρ’ ἐνός: vi. 498 B πῶς τοινυπιοντο. Also τὸ δέ (Soph. 248 D; Laws iii. 676 c).

vii. 527 Α τὸ δ’ ἐστι ποιν πῶς τὸ μάθημα, κ.τ.λ. (Digest, § 22).
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17. Similarly, the relative pronoun, although not forming a separate clause, often introduces a long sentence, towards which it stands in apposition. (Digest, §§ 10 ff.)

II. 368 D ἓκτελέσωμεν τὴν σκέψιν, ἢν φύθημεν, κ.τ.λ. 'A method similar to that we should have adopted, if' &c.

IV. 434 D ἐκείνοις ἐτῶν τῆς τετάρτης μανιᾶς, ὡν, κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 352 E. 353 A τὸ πῶδος, ὃ φασίν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱδώνῳ ἤττᾶσθαι.

So oôv, vi. 488 A oôv oí γραφῆς, κ.τ.λ. 'As painters do, when they delineate monsters.'

§ 45. 2. Apposition of Clauses,—where a statement is immediately followed by a parallel statement, in the same construction, with no conjunction between (Asyndeton).

I. 329 C, D παρατάσαι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γῆρᾳ πολλῇ εἰρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἑλενθέρια, ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι παύσωται κατατεύονται καὶ χαλάσωσι, παρατάσαι τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, δεσποτῶν πάνυ πολλῶν ἐστὶ καὶ μανιμένων ἀπηλλάχθαι. (Some MSS. insert γὰρ after ἐπειδὰν.)

II. 359 B, C εἰ τοιοῦδε ποιήσαμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ δόντες ἐξουσιάν . . . ἐπακολουθήσαμεν.

V. 457 C λέγε δὴ, ἵδω.

VII. 530 A οὐκ οἶδε . . . τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ;

VII. 540 E διασκευασθῶσαι . . . ἐκπέμψωσιν.

VIII. 557 C κυνύνειει . . . καλλίστη ἀυτῇ τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι ὁσπερ ἱμάτιον ποικίλον . . . καὶ αὐτῇ . . . καλλίστη ἣν φαίνοιτο.

IX. 589 D τοιοῦτε τι γίγνεται, λαμβάνων, κ.τ.λ. Cp. Phaedo 95 C; Gorg. 493 E.

Obs. 1.—Between clauses thus related a question is sometimes interposed.

VII. 540 E ὅταν . . . διασκευασθῶσιν . . . Πῶς; ἔφη: . . . ἐκπέμψωσιν.

Obs. 2.—Slightly different from the foregoing is the emphatic repetition, with asyndeton, of what has been said—

(a) giving the effect of a second apodosis:

I. 339 οὐκ ἔχουν . . . ὁμολογήσθαι . . . ὅταν . . . , ἢμα τότε . . . οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβάειν, κ.τ.λ.

I. 340 B τοὶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.

II. 372 B θέλεσθαι . . . εὐωχήσονται.
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So III. 413 c; vi. 497 b.

N.B.—The case of viii. 545 β ὅναμα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω ... ἀλλ' ἢ τιμοκρατίαν, κ.τ.λ. is peculiar and should probably be met as W. H. Thompson suggested by reading ἀλλ' ἢ τιμοκρατίαν, κ.τ.λ.

(3) The protasis is likewise (1) repeated with variation, or (2) an additional protasis subjoined.

(1) viii. 529 β εάν τέ τις άνω κεχρησ ... ἐπίχειρη μανθάνει, εὖτε μαθέων ἰν ποτέ φημι αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.

(2) I. 331 c εἰ τις λάξοι ... εἰ μνείς ἀπαιτῶ. Cp. Theact. 210 B, C εάν τοῖς ... ἐγκύμων ἐπίχειρῆς γέμνησαι ... εάν τε γέγυγ ... εάν τε κενός ἱς, where the two alternative hypotheses are subordinate to the principal one.

Obs. 3.—This, like other Platonic idioms, is used with greater abruptness in the Laws. See especially, Laws iv. 708 b ὅταν μὴ τῶν ἑσμὼν γέμνησαι τρόπον, εὖ γένος ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἰὸν χώρας οἰκίζηται.

VIII. Co-ordination (Parataxis). § 46.

While in all syntax the subordination of clauses gradually supersedes their co-ordination, this tendency is checked in Greek by the fondness for analytical and antithetical expression, not only giving to co-ordination a temporary survival, but also favouring some independent developments of it, which interfere with the complete regularity of subordination. The crossing of the two methods may confuse the interpreter, but it enriches the style.

1. Interposition of one or more co-ordinate or parallel clauses with μὲν or τέ after the sentence is begun.

(a) μὲν.

II. 367 E καὶ ἔγω ἀκούσας, ἀεὶ μὲν ὅτι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ 'Αδειμάρτου ἡγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἡσθην.

III. 407 C, D φῶμεν καὶ 'Ασκληπίων τοῦ μὲν φύσει ... τὰ ὅ εἰσι ... θεραπεύειν (see notes in loco).

III. 415 άτε οὖν ἐννυγγείεις οὕντες πάντες τὸ μὲν πολὺ ὁμοίων ἀν οὕμων αὐτοῖς γεννώτε, ἐστι δ' άτε ἐκ χρυσοῦ γεννηθείη ἄν
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ἄργυροίν καὶ ἐξ ἄργυροῦ χρυσοῦ ἐκγονοὶ καὶ τάλλα πάντα οὕτως ἐξ ἀλλήλων.

IV. 421 A. B ἐὰν μὲν οὖν ἤμεῖς μὲν ... ὁ δ' ἐκείνο λέγων ... ἄλλο ἀν τι ἦ τόλμων λέγοι.

VIII. 552 B ἢ ἐδόκει μὲν τῶν ὁρχύντων εἶναι. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ οὐτε ὁρχών οὐτε ὑπάρχον ἢν αὐτῆς. ἄλλα τῶν ἑτοίμων ἀναλώσης; Ὀ. Laws VI. 765 ε. ἀνθρώποις δὲ. ὁς φαμεν, ἢμερον, κ.τ.λ., where although μὲν is omitted, the mode of expression is virtually the same.

(b) τέ.

II. 357 A ὃ γὰρ Γλαύκων δεῖ τε ἀρθρεύοντας ὄν· τυγχάνει πρὸς ἀπαστα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ... οὖκ ἀπεδεχατο.

III. 404 C καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἐφι, ἰσοσὶ τε καὶ ἀπέχονται.

See also II. 359 D ἄλλα τε δὴ [δ'] μυθολογοῦσι θαυμαστά, κ.τ.λ., when the same idiom may perhaps justify the omission of ἀ. as in Par. A

2. Δὲ in apodosis.

The use of δ' οὖν in resumption is a special case of this. The general idiom is too common to require further illustration. See. however, Symp. 183C ἐπειδὰν δὲ ... μὴ ἔσω τε ... ἐπὶ δὲ ταῖτα τις ὃν βλέψας, κ.τ.λ., for a striking example of its effect.

Δὲ is also added to a participle subjoined to a sentence, VIII. 544 C δευτέρα καὶ δευτέρως ἐπαινοῦμεν, καλομένη δ', ὀλυντρίῳ: IX. 572 E εἰς πᾶσαν παραγομάν, ὄνομαξιαρένην δ', ... ἐλευθερίαν ἀπασταν.

3. Two complex sentences, opposed with μὲν and δὲ, are bound together by a single interrogative or negative. This may fairly be regarded as a speciality of Platonic syntax, though not unknown to other Greek writers. In a simpler form it occurs, e.g. in Aesch. Prom. 507, 508—

μὴ ἵνα βροτοὺς μὲν ὁφέλει καρῷ πέρα, σαντοῦ δ' ἀκήδει δυστυχοῦστον.

Eur. Bacch. 311, 312—

μὴδ', ἵνα ὄδυσα μὲν, ἢ δὲ ὀὰξα σον ροσεῖ, φρονεῖν δόκει τι.
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Cp. Shakespeare, _M. of V._ i. 3. 180:

'I like not fair terms and a villain's mind.'

_Macb._ ii. 2, 12:

'The attempt and not the deed confounds us:'

and a complete example occurs in _Lysias_, contra _Eratosth._ § 36 οὐκοῦν δεινόν, εἰ τοὺς μὲν στρατηγούς, οὐ̲ ενίκων ναυμαχοῦτες . . . βανάτω ἐξημώσατε . . . τούτων δὲ, οὐ . . . ἐποίησαν ἥμτρηθήματα ναυμαχοῦτας . . . οὐκ ἀρα χρῆ . . . ταῖς ἐσχάταις ζημίαις κολάζεσθαι. (Sec also _Xen._ Mem. I. 4. § 17: III. 4. § 1.)

This form is employed where the combination of the two statements is deprecated or denied, i.e. to signify either that they ought not to be true together or cannot be so. The enormity or impossibility is marked more pointedly by the union of the two contradictories in a continuous sentence.

I. 336 Ε μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἷον, εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐξητούμε, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἡμᾶς ἐκώντας εἶναι ἕποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλήλους ἐν τῇ ζητήσει καὶ διαφθέρειν τὴν εὑρεσιν αυτοῦ. ὒλαιοιν δὲ ζητοῦντας, πράγμα πολλῶν χρυσίων τιμιότερον, ἐπειθ' οὗτος ἀνοίγτως ὑπεύκειν ἀλλήλους καὶ οὐ ἀποθάδειν ὁ τὶ μᾶλλον φανήγα αὐτῷ.

II. 374 Β, Β 'Ἀλλ' ἀρα τὸν μὲν σκυτοτόμον . . . ἢ οὗτο ράδιον, ὡστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ἀμα πολεμικὸς ἐσται . . . πετευτικὸς δὲ ἢ κυβευτικὸς ἱκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἰς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῖτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπητιθεύειν;

III. 406 Β ὅ ἡμείς γελοίως ἐπὶ μὲν . . . ἐπὶ δὲ . . . οὐκ, κ.τ.λ.

III. 407 Α, Β ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διδάξωμεν, ποτέρον μελετητέον τοῦτο τῷ πλούσιῳ καὶ ἄβιστον τῷ μῇ μελετῶτι, ἡ νοστροφία τεκτονικῆ μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἀλλαὶς τέχναις ἐμπόδιον τῇ προσέξει του νοῦ, τὸ δέ _Φωκυλίδου_ παρακέλευμα οὐδέν ἐμποδίζει.

IV. 445 Α γελοιόν ἔμοιγε φαίνεται τὸ σκέμμα γλύπεσθαι ὑδῆς, εἰ τοῦ μὲν σώματος τῆς φύσεως διαφθειρομένης δοκεῖ οὐ βιωτὸν εἶναι . . . τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτον ό ζῷον φύτεως ταραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτῶν ἀρα ἐσται, κ.τ.λ.

V. 456 Β οὐκ ἀλλὴ μὲν ἡμῖν ἀνόρας ποιήσει παιδεία, ἀλλὴ δὲ γυναίκας.

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IX. 589 D, E eι μέν ... eι δέ ... οὐκ ἄρα ; and, without μέν, V. 456 A.

Similarly, but with the second statement deferred, VIII. 556 B, C σφας δέ αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶι — ἀρι' οὐ πραγμάτως μὲν τοὺς ρέους, κ.τ.λ. (three lines), αὐτῶν δὲ πλὴρ χρηματισμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμεληκτάς, κ.τ.λ.

X. 600 C ἀλλ' οἴει. δο Γλαύκων, κ.τ.λ.

N.B.—Such introductory words as δειν' οἱ, γελοιον οἱ, have the force of a negative.

Obs. 1.—A clause is sometimes prefixed or appended to such composite sentences, just as if the meaning had been simply expressed, e.g.

V. 456 C πρὸς γε τὸ φιλολογίαν γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἄλλη μέν, κ.τ.λ.

Obs. 2.—Sometimes instead of introducing the sentence with a negative, two alternative suppositions are co-ordinated and followed by an apodosis relating to both combined; so as to point the antithesis between what is preferred and its opposite.

IV. 421 A, B εἴ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μέν . . . ποιούμεν . . . ο δ' ἐκεῖνο λέγον . . . — ἀλλο ἀν τι ἤ τίδιν λέγαι.

§ 47. 4. Disjunctives.

A clause, apparently pleonastic, is often introduced with ἦ to enforce a rule by adding to it the sanction of a penalty. This formula is especially frequent in the Republic.

III. 401 B προσαναγκαστέων τῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἡθους ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἦ μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ποιεῖν, 'else they shall be prohibited.'

III. 401 B διακαλυτέον τὸ κακοῖθες . . . μήτε . . . ἐμποιεῖν, ἦ ὁ μὴ οὖσ τε ὅν οὐκ ἐπεδύοι παρ' ἡμῖν ὑμιμουργεῖν. See p. 219 (a).

V. 463 D περὶ . . . του ὑπῆκουν δεῖν εἶναι τῶν γονέων, ἦ μήτε πρὸς θεόν μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων αὐτῷ ἀμείνον ἐστεθαί.

VI. 490 Α ἦν (sc. ἀλήθειαν) διώκειν . . . ἐδει ἦ ἀλαζών ὅστις μην ῥηματὶ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας.

VI. 503 Α τὸ δόγμα τούτο μήτ' ἐν πόροις μήτ' ἐν φόβοις . . . φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἦ τῶν ἀδυνατούματα ἀποκριτέων.
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VII. 525 B τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτέον εἶναι γενέσεως ἔξαναι, ἡ μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι.

(Cp. Isocr. Aeginet. § 27 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπελθεῖν οἷον τ’ ἤμ, ἡ δοκεῖν ὁμελεῖν.)

Obs.—Another mode of introducing such a sanction,—not falling under the same grammatical heading,—is the incidental assertion of a condition in a hypothetical or participial clause, in which the word μέλλει generally occurs—

II. 365 C, D ἀλλ' ὤμοι, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐθαμονήσειν, ταύτη ιτέων, ὅσ τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει.

II. 372 δ ἐπὶ τε κληνῶν κατακείσθαι, οἴμαι, τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

So in vi. 491 B εἰ τελέως μέλλοις φιλοσοφοῖς γενέσθαι, words unduly suspected by Cobet.

5. Minute or verbal antithesis.

§ 48.

The Greek love of antithesis gives rise to forms of expression which, if taken literally, are over-emphatic or even inaccurate.

(a) Thus ἄυτός is sometimes emphatically used where the antithesis is too minute to be pressed.

II. 370 E ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . κατοικίσατι γε ἄυτὴν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιούτον τόπον, κ.τ.λ. 'The city,' as distinguished from the citizens.

II. 371 B ἐν ἄυτῃ τῇ πόλει.

Antithetical formulae are also used ironically to suggest the equivalence of an alternative of which one side is tacitly preferred.

II. 373 E μὴ τ' εἰ τι κακῶν μήτε εἰ ἀγαθῶν ὁ πόλεμος ἐργάζεται (cp. Herod. VIII. 87, § 5 οὕτε εἰ . . . οὕτε εἰ).


Such antithetical redundancies as I. 346 Α ἐκάστην . . . ἐκάστοτε, V. 462 Ι. μέρους πονηθοῦσας ὁλη, VII. 516 Β ἄυτὸν καθ' ἄυτον ἐν τῇ ἄυτοις χώρα, and such reduplications in climax as III. 406 Α, B πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μᾶλιστα, V. 449 Ι. μέγα . . . καὶ ὁδόν are extremely frequent.
The following are more noticeable:

IV. 441 C τά αὐτά μὲν ἐν πόλει, τά αὐτά δ' ἐν... τῇ ψυχῇ.
X. 605 B, C ὁυτε τὰ μείζων ὡστε τὰ ἐλάττων ἰδανικώςκοιτι.
X. 618 C βίων καὶ χρηστών καὶ ποιημάτων διαγνωσκοίτα.

(b) The love of antithesis often gives a negative turn to a sentence; VIII. 556 C. D ὅταν... ρηματι... καταφρονώνται...

6. Introduction of the reverse or contrary statement. In dwelling on one side of a distinction or antithesis the other side is introduced with apparent irrelevancy where it is not immediately in point. This is another way in which co-ordination breaks the smoothness of subordination.

A clear example is VII. 528 άλλα σαντού ἔνεκα τὸ μέγαστον ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους. φθονοίς μὴν οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλω, κ.τ.λ.

See also:

I. 349 B. C εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίων μὴ δικοῦ πλέον ἐχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δικαίως, τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου:
II. 358 άλλα ὑπὸ Ὄρασιναόχον ὡς τοιούτων ὅν ψέβεται, ἀδίκαι δ' ἐπανείπται (σμ. Παρ. Α).
II. 374 ὃς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδόν ἐπιτηδεύων, ἄλλα παρέγγυχρώμενοι:
V. 455 Ε. 456 Λ πολεμική, ἡ δ' ἀπόλεμος.
VI. 490 Ε τῶς φθοράν, ὡς διώλλυται ἐν πολλοὺς. σμικρὸν δέ τι ἐκφεύγει.

VIII. 520 D οὐκ ἐθελήσουσι ξιμπονεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐκαστοῦ ἐν μέρει, τοῦ δὲ πολύν χρόνων μετ' ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ;

VIII. 546 D (if the text is sound) ἤμων (τῶν Μονωτῶν) πρῶτον ἄρξονται ἀμελεῖν... ἐλαττον τοῦ δέοντος ἰδησμόμενοι τὰ μονοτικῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς (δεύτερά τε γυμν. Μαδν. εἰ.).

VIII. 552 Α τὸ ἐξείδει πάντα τὰ αὐτῶν ἀποδόθει, καὶ ἄλλῳ κτίσασθαι τὰ τούτον.

VIII. 559 C ὃν τούτῳ ἔφεσθαι ἰσχύοντος, τοῦτον ἐλέγομεν τῷ τούτῳ ἱγνώντω καὶ ἐπιθυμιώδει γέμοντα καὶ ἀρχύμενον
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...τὸν νῦν μὴ ἀναγκαίως. τὸν δὲ ὑπὸ τὸν ἀναγκαίων φειδωλὸν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν;

Obs. 1.—The same love of completeness shows itself in the frequent addition of limiting or qualifying clauses, such as ὅταν γίγνεται, ἃν μὴ πάσα ἀνώγηκη, ὅσα ἀνθρώπῳ, ἵσον γέ μ' εἰδέναι, κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν οὐ εἰς τὸ δυνατόν and the like, also in the addition of single words which remind the reader that there is another point of view, especially of δοκοῦν, καλοῦμενος, λεγόμενος, or νῦν λεγόμενος, &c. to mark what belongs to ordinary unphilosophic opinion. For other examples of similar fulness of expression, see

IV. 430 c καὶ γὰρ ἀποθέσθην, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ, πολιτικὴν γε.
vi. 492 ἓ ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου.
vii. 523 λ ὅ γ' ἐμαυδοκοῦν.

Obs. 2.—Note also, as illustrating the same over-emphatic or exaggerating tendency, the multiplication of pronominal words in the same sentence: τοιούτους γε καὶ σὲτω (πί. 416 λ), μηδεμιὴ μηδαμώς (Laws vi. 777 e), εἰτε ὅπη ἐχει καὶ ὅπως.—also the addition of the negative side in such expressions as ἀλλὰ σμερῆν οἳν διαφέρουν, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον καὶνθέκουν, θεωρεῖν η μὴ. A striking example of this sort of thing occurs in π. 369 c where in introducing the division of labour, Socrates is not contented with saying that different men have different wants and need various helpers, ἄλλων ἐπ᾽ ἄλλου ... χρεία, but adds τὸν δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλου, 'and this man yet another, for another want,' to show not only that different men need different helpers, but that each requires more than one.

IX. Deferred Apodosis.

Digression and Resumption. § 49.

1. It is a natural consequence of the expansion of sentences, and especially of the tendency of parentheses and subordinate clauses to take an independent form, that the main statement at first intended is thrust aside, and, if not wholly lost, can no longer be expressed in strict continuation of the original construction. The sentence becomes like a tree whose leading stem has been distorted or broken. This is particularly apt to occur in the course of those elaborate similes of which Plato is fond. Cp. Lysias, contra Eratosth. § 6, Xen. Mem. iv. 2, § 25.

1 See Prof. Jowett’s note on Rom. ii. 16.
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1. 337 Α. Β εὖ ὅνω ἤφησθα ὅτι εἰ τινὰ ἔρωτι. κ.τ.λ. (four lines intervene) δήλων οὕτως σοι ἣν. κ.τ.λ. Cp. V. 471 C.

I. 352 Β-Δ ὅτι μὲν γὰρ (twelve lines intervene) ταῦτα μὲν ὅνω ὅτι οὕτως ἔλει, κ.τ.λ.

III. 402 Α. Β ὡσπερ ἀρα . . . γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἰκανῶς εἶχομεν. ὅτε . . . (eight lines intervene) . . . ἄρ' οὖν, ὅ λέγω, . . . οὕτως μουσικοί πρότερον ἐσάμεθα.

IV. 418 Α ὡσπερ τοῦτον. κ.τ.λ.

VI. 495 D, E οὐ δὴ ἐφεμένου πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὕπο δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ ὀμιομυγμένων ὡσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηται. οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐγκεκλαμμένου τε καὶ ἀποστερομένου διὰ τὰς μασανιὰς τυγχάνοντων, κ.τ.λ. The apodosis, if any, comes half a page below, ποι' ἀπὸν ὁφόμεν γενών . . . ἄρ' οὖν . . . σοφόσμετα:

VIII. 562 B ὅ προθεύετο. κ.τ.λ.

V. 609 C ὡσπερ σῶμα, κ.τ.λ.

Thcact. 197 C ὡσπερ εἰ τὶς ὄρνιθας ἀγρίας, κ.τ.λ. Hence this occurs without a distinct correlative.

V. 463 D πέρι τε τοὺς πατέρας. κ.τ.λ.

VII. 522 Β αἱ τε γὰρ τέχναι. κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 568 D εἰν τε ἱερὰ χρὴματα, κ.τ.λ. (if *πολυμέρειον is read. See note in loco).

IX. 575 Α τῶν ἐχοντά τε αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.

Obs.—The apodosis is sometimes given in the reply;

IX. 577 Α, Β εἰ οὖν οὐδημον . . . ὁ ὀρθότατ' ἄν . . . προκαλοῖο. ΙX. 582 Ε ἐπεδή δ' ἐμπερίᾳ . . . Ἄνωγκη . . . εἴραι.

§ 50. 2. As in all conversation the consciousness of imperfect expression is apt to occasion the attempt to recover preciseness by the introduction of superfluous words, so in the conversational style of Plato it often happens that what has been already stated or implied is resumed with some increase of explicitness, often with the addition of a formula of reference, such as ὅ λέγω, ὡσπερ εἰτον, &c. Thus the effort to be exact leads to further irregularity of structure and sometimes even to a degree of confusion.
(a) The simplest case is where the antecedent to a relative or correlative clause is made explicit with τοῦτο, ταύτα or some other demonstrative word. This is common in Greek and is used more for emphasis than for clearness.

The same remark applies to αὐτὸς τε καὶ and to καὶ ταύτα. See above, p. 220 (c).

In some instances, however, the demonstrative is thus inserted from the fear of losing the thread of the discourse, when the phrase that has been put emphatically foremost has been amplified:

IV. 440 B τάς δ’ ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτὸν κοινωνήσαντα . . . οἰμαί σ’ οὐκ ἄν φάναι . . . τοῦ τούτου αἰσθένεια, where the construction also becomes more definite.

So 1. 331 B τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοιτά τινα ἐξαπατήσαι . . . μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ.

Or, where there is no amplification, but the order has been disturbed by emphasis, the chief word is resumed with an oblique case of αὐτὸς.

V. 477 D ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμιν τινα φῆς εἶναι αὐτήν, κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Gorg. 483 E where the construction is disturbed by the substitution of a general for a particular expression, ἡ ἄλλα μυρία ἄν τις ἔχετι τοιαῦτα λέγειν.

(b) In an explanatory clause, the chief word in the sentence to be explained is often resumed by a synonym:

II. 359 B ἀγαπᾶσθαι . . . τιμῶμεν.

II. 359 C εἰη δ’ ἄν ἡ ἐξουσία . . . οἷαν ποτὲ φασὶ δύναμιν, κ.τ.λ.

X. 611 C, D τεθεάμεθα . . . ὁσπέρ οί . . . ὀρῶτες οὐκ ἄν . . . ἕδοεν . . . , οὕτω . . . θεώμεθα, κ.τ.λ.

(c) In resuming a deferred apodosis, a conjunction is often introduced; and, as μὲν οὖν usually introduces a digression, so δ’ οὖν is the regular formula for resumption.

I. 330 E καὶ αὐτῶς,—HeaderText1—, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γῆρως ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὡσπέρ ἣν ἐγγυτέρω ὅν τὸν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον τι καθορη ἀντα—

ὑποψίας δ’ οὖν καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἡδον καὶ σκοπεῖ, εἰ τινὰ τι ἡδικηκεῖ.

This, reduced to normal syntax, might be thus ex-
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pressed:—ήτω υπό τῆς τοῦ γῆρως ἀσθενείας, ἦ υπὸ τοῦ μάλλον τι καθάραν τὰ ἐκεῖ. ὑποψίας καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται. But the addition of ὅπερ ἐγγυτέρω ὄν, by occasioning the change to the indicative, disturbs this orderly arrangement and requires the insertion of ὅν ὄν.

Cp VIII. 362 ο διεξετεῖτο ... ἀγαθὸν ... τοῦτο ὅ ἦν *ποιον πλουτὸς ... ἡ πλουτὸς τοῦν ἀπληστία, κ.τ.λ.

X. Remote Reference.

§ 51. The power of holding firmly by a complex thought appears (1) in the continuation of the main construction in spite of interruptions; and (2) in the pertinence of replies, showing that the respondent has fully grasped the main question, although the previous statement has been complicated by digressions.

(1) III. 413 E. 414 A τὼν ... ἀκόματον ἐκραίνοντα καταστατέον ἀρχοντα ... καὶ τιμᾶς δοσέων καὶ ἥτοι καὶ τελευτήσαντι, ... μέγιστα γέρα λαγχάνοντα. Cp. Phaedo 81 L οὕτω μὲν ἐχουσα ... ἀπερχεται ... αἱ ἀφικομενη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ ευδαιμον εἰναι, πλάνης ... ἀπηλλαγμένη ὅσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνήμενων ... μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διάγωντα 1.

VII. 540 D ἔγχωρεῖτε ... ἐλθεῖν. Then follows a sentence of nineteen lines with a break and appositional asyndeton in the middle, then the construction with the infinitive is resumed with πλείστα διήσεων 541 Α.

(2) III. 405 B, C ἦ δοκεῖ σοι ... τοῦτον αἰσχρον εἶναι ... (ten lines) ... οὐκ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἐκεῖνον ἐτὶ αἰσχρον.

IV. 439 B οὐ ὅ ἀλάγων ... (five lines) ... οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰκότως.

VI. 491 E οὐκ. ἀλλὰ, ἦ ὅ ὅσ, οὕτως (see note in loco).

VIII. 578 B, C ἦ ὅε συγγραφή ... (nine lines) ... πάνω γ', ἔφη, γενναία.

IX. 573 E ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη ... (six lines) ... σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

1 διάγωντα  ὡς supported by the Petrie papyrus against διαγωνή. Heindorf's conjecture.
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XI. Imperfect Constructions.

Attraction. Hypallage, Zeugma.

Very often, however, as in all Greek, the attraction of the § 52. nearest word, or an agreement that is apparent only, prevails over logic. The speaker is contented with a prima facie appearance of concord. The frequent redundancy of expression causes this anomaly to be more common than it would otherwise be.

1. Construction with the nearest word. (What is commonly known as Attraction is a special case of this.)

II. 370 Ε ἵνα οἱ τε γεωργοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀροῦν ἔχοιεν βοῖς, οἳ τε οἰκοδόμοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρήσθαι ὑποξύγιοις (i. e. ἔχοιεν ὑποξύγια οὕτω χρήσθαι αὐτοῖς).

III. 392 δέ πάντα, ὅσα ... λέγεται, διήγησις ὅσα τυγχάνει.

III. 409 Ἀ ἀρετή δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρώφοι. Mr. H. Richards would read παιδευμένη. But if precise exactness is required, should it not be χρηστῆ φύσις παιδευομένη?

III. 416 Α ἀισχίστον ποιμένι τοιούτων ... τρέφειν κύνας (ποιμένι in construction with ἀισχίστον takes the place of ποιμένι the subject of τρέφειν). Ib. ἐπιχειρήσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν. Madvig would omit κακουργεῖν. But the pleonastic infinitive is rendered easier by the frequent use of ἐπιχειρεῖν with infinitive in Plato so that ἐπιχειρεῖν κακουργεῖν τα πρόβατα is also suggested.

IV. 421 Κ ἔστενον ὅπως ἐκάστους τοῖς ἐθνεσιν ἡ φύσις ἀποδιδώσει τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας (where the meaning is ἔστενον τὰ ἐθνη μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας οὕτως ὅπως ἡ φύσις ἐκάστους ἀποδιδόσει).

V. 454 τοιοῦτοι σιγ. agreeing with γέρως, instead of plur.

V. 459 ὅ δέι άκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων.

V. 472 Π παράδειγμα οὗν ὅποις ὅ καλλιστος ἄνθρωπος (οὗν is neuter because of παράδειγμα).

V. 473 μοντο εἰς ταύτων συμπέσῃ, δύναις τε πολιτική καὶ φιλοσοφία. τούτο is singular by prolepsis. H. Richards
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would read ταύτα. But cp. IV. 435 άο γε ταύτων αν τις προσείποι, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 520 D ἐν πόλει ἦ ἡ κιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρθρειν... ταύτην ἄφαιτα... ἀνάγκη οἰκείοθεα (for πόλιν εἰν ἦ, κ.τ.λ.).

VII. 526 C άο γε μείζω πόλον παρέθει... οὐκ ἂν βαδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὑροίς ὡς τοῦτο (ὡς is said as if οὕτω μέγαν and not μείζω had preceded; and this is occasioned by οὐδὲ πολλὰ coming between. 'You will not easily find any that give more trouble: not many that give as much.'

VII. 534 άτα μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἡ ὁσων οἱ παρελημνυότες—a place at which the critics have stumbled. It may no doubt be explained by supplying ἡ ὁσων λόγων οἱ παρελημνυότες λόγοι ἐνέπλησαν ἡμᾶς. But it seems more probable that ὁσων (for ὁσοί) follows the case of πολλαπλασίων.

Obs. 1.—In comparisons the antecedent is often attracted into the relative clause.

vi. 485 D ai ἐπιθυμϊά... ὡσβενεταρμ, ὀσπερ ῥείμα... ἀπωχετευ-μένον.

VII. 539 D μὴ ὡς νῦν ὁ τυχῶν καὶ οὐδὲν προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ' αὐτό.

x. 610 D μὴ, ὀσπερ νῦν διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ' ἄλλων... ἀποθησάκοσιν οἱ ἄθικοι.

A striking example in Phaedo 84 ά is supported by the Petrie papyrus. Πηρελόπης τινα ἐναστίως ἵστον μεταχειριζομένης.

Obs. 2.—The mood of a verb is affected by an intervening conjunction, though not strictly in construction with it.

ix. 591 C, ὁ οὐχ ὄπως... ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένοις ζήσει, ἄλλ' οὐδὲ... τοῦτο προσεμένων, ὄπως... καλὸς ἐσται, ἢν μὴ... μέλλῃ... ἄλλ' αἰ̂τ... φαῖνηται... φαῖνηται should have been φαῖνεται depending on the first ὁσω. Cp. v. 466 ἐ διακονείν, σε. δεῖσην.

Obs. 3.—The verb of a relative clause is often attracted into the infinitive of oratio obliqua: vi. 492 C; x. 614 C; 619 C &c., cp. Herodotus.

Obs. 4.—The conclusion or answer, instead of following the main sentence, sometimes takes the nearer construction:

1. 336 E μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶον... (five lines intervene) ὑπείκειν... καὶ οὗ σπουδάζειν... οἶον γε οὗ (sc. σπουδάζειν ἡμᾶς):—the original sentence μὴ γὰρ δὴ, κ.τ.λ., is lost sight of.
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IV. 421 Ε ἔτερα δὴ ... εὐρήκαμεν ... ποιὰ ταῦτα; Πλούτος τε, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ πενία.

The nominatives really answer to the accusative ἔτερα, but this is lost sight of, the case of ταῦτα being ambiguous.

VI. 492 C, D ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν νεόν ... τίνα οὐεὶ καρδίαν ἀσχεῖν; ἢ *ποιὰν αὐτῷ παθείαν ... ἀνθέξειν, ἢν οὐ ... οἰκήσεσθαι ... καὶ ἐπιεθείεν-σεως, κ.τ.λ.

Πολλή ... ἀνάγκη.

The answer refers to the last clauses of the preceding sentence, and takes no notice of the question.

2. Parallelism. § 53.

(a) The action of a verb is extended to several nouns although it is strictly applicable to one only (‘zeugma’).

VIII. 553 C τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτούς καὶ ἀκώλλας παραξωνύματα: the participle is strictly applicable only to ἀκώλλας.

(b) On the other hand, a preceding construction is continued, although some other construction is really required.

V. 453 D ἢτοι δελφίνα ... υπολαβεῖν ἢν ἢ τιμα ἀλλην ἀπορον 

σωτηρίαν (φανεραί αὐτ).

IV. 431 C τὰς δὲ γε ἀπλὰς τε καὶ μετρίας ... ἢν ὀλίγους τε 

ἐπιτεύξει, κ.τ.λ. The accusative is carried on from ἀπλάς τε 

καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐπιθυμιάς, supra.

V. 467 C προσμηχανάθαι governed by δεί in ὑπαρκτέων.

VI. 510 B τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ... ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται εἰς ὑποδε- 

σεως ... τὸ δ' αὖ ἔτερον τὸ ἐπ' ἄρχῃν ἀνυπόδετον ... ἱοῦσα (sc. 

ζητεῖ) where to two parallel clauses a single expression is 

applied, which is only suitable to the former of them. The 

higher dialectic is above Necessity.

VII. 528 C ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ... κολονύμεια, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητού- 

των, λόγον οὐκ ἐχόμενων καθ' ὁ τι χρήσιμα.

(c) In replies the construction is sometimes continued 

from the previous sentence, although involving some 

harshness in the immediate context.

VI. 507 E τίνος δὴ λέγεις; here the genitive may be ex- 

plained as = περὶ τίνος; see above, p. 184 (b), but it is more
probably occasioned by a reference to what precedes: τίνος.

SC. μὴ παραγενομένων.

VII. 531 Τοῦ προσομίων ... ἡ τίνος λέγεις; A construction may be found for τίνος by supplying τὸ ἐφηγορ, but the genitive is more probably occasioned by assimilation to the preceding construction.

VIII. 547 Τῷ ὅτε γε φοβεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. The dative is parallel to τωσ τοὺς τουτών (supra b) but is inconsistent with what follows (548 λ) τῷ πολλὰ τῶν τουτών ζῶν ἔχει;

VIII. 558 Α. The words αὐτῶν μερότων have a possible construction with εἶδες, supra, but really follow the case of ἀνθρώπων which is genitive absolute.

Obs. 1.—An imperfect construction is sometimes supplemented by epexegeesis.

v. 464 ἐπικαίδοτες ... πῶλων ἀφοματ πρὸς μέρος αὐτῶν ... ὡς ἔχει.

Obs. 2.—The parallelism not only of cases and moods, but also of adverbs should be noted.

v. 475 Ε πῶς αὐτὸ λέγεις;

οὐδομός ... ραθός ('not in a way easy to explain'). Cp. Symp. 202 Ε πῶς τοῦτο, ἐφην, λέγεις; καὶ ἦ, ὦβιος, ἔφη.

§ 54.

3. Interchange of subject and attribute (Hypallage).

The common idiom by which the attribute of a subordinate word (such as an infinitive) is attached to the subject of the main verb,—e.g. ὅδικαίς εἰμι ποιεῖν,—has an extended use in Plato.

VII. 537 Β οὖτος γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ... ἀδύνατός τι ἀλλο πράξαι.

VIII. 559 Β ἢ τε μὴ πάϊσαι ζώντα δύνατη, 'in that one cannot suppress it while one lives.' See note in loco.

Hence VI. 489 λ ταῖς πώλεσι ... τίνυ διάθεσιν ἐοικε = τῆς τῶν πώλεων διαθέσει ἐοικε, and in VIII. 562 Α τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος ... γέγραται; appears to be equivalent to τίνα τρόπον γέγραται τυραννίδας;

See also VI. 496 Α προσήκονται ἀκούσαι σοφίστας = οἷς προσήκει ἀκούσαι σ. ('to be so described'). Cp. Eur. Or. 771 οὐ προσήκομεν κολάξειν τούτοις = οὐ προσήκει τούτοις κολάξειν ἡμᾶς.
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As a word is sometimes attracted out of its proper construction, so the speaker sometimes hesitates between two constructions and fuses both into one. Familiar instances are—

I. 347 Δ ὄν ὅ ἐνεκά, ὡς ἐοικε, μεσθόν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν.

VI. 485 Δ ὅ... ἔλεγομεν, τὴν φύσι... δεῖν καταμαθέων.

VIII. 560 Δ ὃς ἀγροκών... οὕσταν πείθοτες ὑπερομίζοντι (πείθοτες... εἶναι, ὑπερομίζοντι ὃς... οὕσταν).


(a) Apparent solecisms.

I. 351 C εἰ μὲν, ἐφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἔχει, ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία. Cp. Theact. 204 Δ ἐκείνῳ δή, ὡς γὰρ φαμέν, μία θέα... γιγνομένη η ὑσταλβῆ.

II. 378 C πολλοῦ δεὶ γιγαντομαχῶς τε μυθολογητέον, κ.τ.λ. (πολλοῦ δεὶ is treated as an adverbial phrase = οὐδαμῶς).

III. 414 C οὔδ' οἶδα εἰ (i.e. μόλις) γενόμενον ἂν. Cp. Tim. 26 B οὐκ ᾧν οἶδα εἰ δυναίμην.

IV. 444 B τοιοῦτον ὅτις... οἷον πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύσειν. 'Τοιοῦτον ὅτις οἷον δουλεύσειν would be Greek. So would τοιοῦτον ὅτις ὃστε π. a. δουλεύσειν. But the text as it stands is not Greek at all.' H. Richards. It may stand as Platonic Greek.

V. 478 D εἰ τὰ φανεῖν οἶον ἀμα ἃν τε καὶ μὴ ἃν (confusion of οἶον εἶναι with φανεῖν ἃν).

X. 615 D οὖθ' ᾧν ἦξει (expressing more of certainty than ἦκοι ᾧν, more of modality than ἦξει: Cobet ej. οὖθ' μὴ ἦξει).

Perhaps also in the doubtful passage, I. 333 Ε λαθεῖν... δεινότατος ἐμπούσα, there is a confusion of δεινότατος λαθεῖν ἐμπούσα with δεινότατος λαθῶν ἐμπούσα, the position of δεινότατος suggesting the construction of ἐμπούσα. But see note in loco.

(բ) Fusion of the objective and subjective aspects of the same notion.
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IV. 434 ιδίαν... εἰς ἐνα ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἰδίᾳ τὸ εἰδῶς ταῦτο ὀμολογήται, κ.τ.λ. (It is not the εἰδῶς which goes or turns to individual men.) H. Richards, who proposes ιοῦσιν.

IV. 442 μή τῇ ἡμίν ἀπαμβλύνεται... δικαιοσύνη. 'Justice' here is the notion of justice as formerly conceived.

V. 450 θαρραλέων, 'fearless,' i.e. not dangerous, a thing to be attempted without fear. Cp. Soph. Phil. 106 ὁκ ἄρ' ἐκείνῳ γ' οὐδὲ προσμείζαι θρασύ:

(c) Abstract and concrete.

a. Attributes are personified.

II. 382 ποιητῆς... ψευδῆς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔιν, 'The lying poet has no place in our idea of God.'

VIII. 534 τοῦ κηφήνος ἐγγαγεῖς... ἑπιφυμίας.

IX. 575 C, D ὡς ἄρ... πλεύστον ἐν τῇ πονηρῷ τύραννον ἔχῃ.

b. In X. 617 ἄρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θητοῦ γένους, 'the beginning of another cycle of mortal race' is put abstractedly for 'the beginning of your time for again belonging to the race of mortals.'

γ. Name and thing.

V. 470 οὐσίας καὶ ὀνομάζεται ὄντα παύσα, πόλεμός τε καὶ στάσεις, οὕτω καὶ εἴηται ὄντα, ὅτα ἐπὶ δυνοῖν τινῶν διαφοραῖν.

(d) General with particular.

IV. 435 Ω' γ' ταῦτ' ὑπ' τις προσέπτοι, κ.τ.λ. 'That which receives the same appellation' is the just, whether just man or just state, but these, although univocal, are not one thing. Cp. V. 473 καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦτ' συμπέση, κ.τ.λ. (p. 233).

(e) Part with whole (synecdoche).

II. 371 Ε' πλήρωμα... πολεμός εἰσι... καὶ μισθωτοὶ,'Hirelings will help to make up our population.'

(f) Constructions κατὰ σύνεσιν may be included here.

V. 455 κρατεῖται takes a genitive in the sense of ἡττᾶται.

XII. Changes of Construction.

§ 56. 1. From the relative to the definitive pronoun.

It is a well-known peculiarity of Greek syntax that in
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continuing a relative sentence, a definitive or demonstrative pronoun takes the place of the relative.

1. 353 D ἐστιν ὁτι ἄλλοι ἡ συνή ὁδικαῖον ἄν αὐτὰ ἀποδόομεν καὶ φαίμεν ἵδια ἐκεῖνης εἰναι.

VI. 511 C αἰς αἰ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοικ μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ... αὐτὰ διέσταται οἱ θεώμενοι.

IX. 578 C ὡς ἄν ... ἦ καὶ αὐτῷ ... ἐκπορισθῆ, κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 452 D ὃ φῆς σὺ μέγιστον ἁγαθὸν εἶναι ... καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

Obs.—In Plato although the sentence passes out of the relative construction it is still partially affected by it.

II. 357 B ἄν ὅποια δώρα, ἀνθρωπεῖς καὶ μηδὲν ... διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται άλλο. See above, p. 211, a.

So in passing from a participial clause which is equivalent to a relative.

1. 337 E πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδῶς ... ἐπεῖτα ... ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη, where μὴ εἰδὼς = ὡς μὴ εἰδείη.

2. Another consequence of the comparative laxity of the § 57. Greek sentence is the frequent change from a dependent to an independent construction. (See esp. Hom. II. XV. 369, Lysias, c. Eratosth, § 38.)

II. 383 ὡς μὴτε αὐτοὺς γύνασας ὄντας ... μὴτε ἦμᾶς ψεῦδοι παράγειν. Here παράγειν returns to construction with λέγειν, the subordinate clause, ὡς ... ὄντας, being ignored.

IV. 426 C τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν ... μὴ κινεῖν ... ὡς ὃ ἄν ... θεραπεύῃ ... ὄντος ἄρα ἁγαθὸς ... ἐσταί (H. Richards would read ὄντος ὢς ἅρα).

V. 465 E γέρα δέχονται ... τοιτες τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἄξιος μετέχουσιν. Here μετέχουσιν is co-ordinated with δέχονται, passing out of the subordinate participial construction.

VIII. 549 C, D ὃταν ... τής μητρὸς ἀκούν ἄχθομεν ... ἐπείτα ὁρώσης ... καὶ ... αἰσθάνηται. αἰσθάνηται which has the same subject with ὁρώσης, κ.τ.λ., passes out of the participial construction, and is construed immediately with ὃταν.

IX. 590 C ὃταν τις ἀσθενεῖς ... ἔχη τὸ ... ἐδοκεῖ, ὃστε μὴ ἄν δύνασθαι ἀρχεῖν ... ἀλλὰ θεραπεύειν ... καὶ τὰ θωπεύματα ...
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µόνον δύνηται μαρθάνειν: δύνηται passes out of the construction with ὅστε, and returns to the construction with ὅταν. The last two instances might also be referred to mistaken parallelism: see above, p. 235. The reading of Π. 364 C (βλάψει) may be sustained as an example of this tendency, and, in the same passage, 365 A περιμένει is to be retained.

Obs.—Note also the converse return from the finite verb to the participle.

vii. 531 A φασίν... ἀρμασθητούντες.
and from inf. to partic.

iii. 403 B. ε ὤτως ὄμιλειν... εἰ δὲ μὴ... ἔφεσεντα.

§ 58. 3. Change of subject.

This frequently occurs when there is some alternation between the active and passive voice.

1. 333 C ὅταν μηδὲν ἐγὼ αὐτῷ χρήσθαι ἄλλα κείσθαι;
Π. 359 E, 360 A ἀφανῇ αὐτῶν γενέσθαι... καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἴχομένου.

Π. 377 B μάλιστα γὰρ ὃς τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδύεται τῦπος.

iii. 409 E, 410 A. The subject changes from the arts to the professors of either art respectively.

iii. 414 D ταῦτα... πᾶσχειν τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν.

4. Limitation of subject.

v. 465 C ὃν ἀπηλλαγμένου ἂν εἶν (sc. οἱ πολίται)... κολα-
κείας τε πλοιστῶν πένητες. κ.τ.λ.

viii. 555 C, D ὅταν... ἄλληλους θεώμενοι (sc. οἱ πολίται)
μηδαμῷ ταύτῃ καταφρονώμεναι οἱ πένητες ὑπὸ τῶν πλοιστῶν.

5. From the dative in regimen to the accusative in agreement with the subject of an infinitive. (This change occurs in other Greek writers from Homer downwards.

Π. IV. 341, 342 σφραῖν μὲν τ' ἐπέοικε μετὰ πρώτοις ἑώτας ἑστάμεν.)

IV. 422 B, C εἰ ἔξει... ὑποθεύοντι... ἀναστρέφοντα κρούειν;


In many sentences, the notion which it is intended to
make prominent is put forward either in the nominative or accusative (see above, p. 183, γ), and is left with no definite construction, the turn of the sentence being subsequently modified. (Cp. Soph. El. 1364–1366 τοὺς γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ λόγους, πολλαὶ κυκλόται νῦκτες ἥμερα τ’ ὕσαι, αἵ ταῦτα σοι δείξουσιν, Ἡλέκτρα, σαφῆ.)

II. 365 Λ ταῦτα πάντα … λεγόμενα … τὶ οἴσμεθα ἀκονούσας νέων ψυχᾶς ποιεῖν. Here the shadow of a construction is supplied by ἀκονούσας.

II. 365 Β τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα … ὁφέλος οὐδὲν φασιν εἰναι.  
III. 391 Β τὰς τοῦ … Σπερχειοῦ ἱερὰς τρίχας Πατρόκλου ἤμωι, ἔφη, κόμην ὀπάσαμε φέρεσθαι.

V. 474 Ε μελιχλώρους δὲ καὶ τοῦνομα, κ.τ.λ.
VI. 487 Β παραγόμενοι … μέγα τὸ σφάλμα … ἀναφαίνεσθαι.
VIII. 565 Δ, Ε ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος … ἀνάγκη ὅ ὁ τούτω λύκῳ γενέσθαι.
VIII. 566 Ε πρὸς τοὺς ἐξω ἑχθροὺς τοῖς μὲν καταλαγῇ, κ.τ.λ.

7. Addition of a summary expression, without a con- § 59. junction, to clinch a series or enumeration which has been given whole or in part.

II. 373 Λ κλίναι τε προσέσονται … ἐκαστα τοῦτων παντοδαπά.
IV. 434 Λ πάντα τάλλα μεταλλαστάμενα.
VIII. 547 Δ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις.
X. 598 Β τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιμονηγοῖς.

Obs.—A conjunction is sometimes inserted.
VII. 523 Δ καὶ πᾶν ὁ τι τοιοῦτον.

8. In resumption after a digression (see above, pp. 229 ff.) the construction is often changed. See especially, in the rambling speech of Pausanias in the Symposium, the passage 182 Δ–183 Β ἐνθεμηθέντι γὰρ … ἐνθάδε νομίζεσθαι. where, amongst other irregularities, the dative ἐνθεμηθέντι is in no construction, because the ‘deferred apodosis’ is resumed (183 C) with a fresh turn of expression, ταῦτη μὲν ὦν οἰηθεὶ
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av τις, κ.τ.λ., in which the original construction is forgotten. (Badham proposed to read χε for γάρ.)

Rep. vii. 532 b, c ἢ δὲ γε ... λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφῆς ... πᾶσα αὐτὴ ἡ πραγματεία ... ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν.

The passage has been already quoted above, p. 183 γ, but it is a strong instance of the peculiarity here spoken of.

§ 60. 9 From interrogative with negative meaning to direct negative:—

III. 390 Α—C τι δὲ; ποιεῖν ἄνδρα . . . (fifteen lines); οὐδὲ 'Ἀρεώς τε καὶ 'Αφροδίτης . . . δεσμὸν δὲ ἐτέρα τοιαύτα.

10. Other anacolutha.

The laxity of the conversational style admits of changes which can hardly be brought under the preceding heads. Some words have only the 'shadow' of a construction, the sentence continuing as if that had been expressed which is only implied, or else returning to a connexion from which the intervening clauses have broken loose; or some new connexion or antithesis is suggested in the act of speaking.

Π. 362 B τὰ κεδώρα βλαστάνει βουλεύματα, πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν . . . ἐπειτα γαμεῖν . . . ἐκδίδοναι . . . ἱμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἰς ἄν ἐθέλῃ . . . εἰς ἄγονας τοίνυν ἑώτα . . . περιγύνεσθαι . . . Here ἄρχειν and the following infinitives are in apposition with βουλεύματα, but in περιγύνεσθαι the sentence has reverted to the construction with φύσισι (supra Λ).

ΠΙ. 387 D, E φαμέν δὲ ὡς, ὅτι . . . τὸ τεθνάναι οὐ δεινών ἡ γίνεται . . . οὐκ ᾗρα . . . δύνασθαι σαυ λέγομεν, ὡς . . . ἡκιστα ἐτέραν προσδεῖται . . . ἡκιστα ἄρ' αὐτῷ δεινῶν στερηθήναι . . . ἡκιστῇ ᾗρα καὶ δύνασθαι (sc. φύσισι). (Çp. vi. 501 D ἢ ἐκείνους φήσειν μᾶλλον, where see note.) The last infinitive, while perhaps occasioned by στερηθήναι, which is in a different construction, must borrow its government from φαμέν and λέγομεν preceding. Others would supply προσήκει from δεινῶν.

ΠΙ. 388 E, 389 Α οὐτε ᾗρα ἀνθρώπους . . . οἷς τοις ποιῇ, ἀπο- θεκτέων, πολὺ δὲ ἄττον, εἰν δεινῶς.
III. 389 C κάμνουτι . . . λέγειν . . . µή τὰ ἄντα λέγοντι (the participle co-ordinate with the infinitive).

III. 399 A, B κατάλειπε . . . τὴν ἀρµονίαν, ἣ ἐν τε πολεµικῇ πράξει ὄντος ἀνδρείου . . . µιµήσατος φθόγγους . . . καὶ ἀποτυχόντος . . . ἀµυνοµένου τὴν τόχην καὶ ἄλλην αὖ ἐν εἰρήµικῇ . . . πράξει ὄντος, ἢ . . . πείδοντος . . . ἡ . . . ἄλλῳ . . . µεταπειδοῦτοι ἐαυτῶν ἐπέχοντα. To obtain a construction for ἐπέχοντα one must go back to µιµήσατο or to κατάλειπε.

III. 407 C, D φῶµεν καὶ 'Ασκληπιίδων τοὺς µὲν . . . ὑγιεινὸς ἔχοντας . . . τοῦτος µὲν . . . καταδείξαι ιατρική . . . τὰ ὅσηµατα ἑκβάλλοντα . . . προστάτευσι διαίτα . . . τὰ τ’ εἴσω . . . γενοµηκότα σώµατα ὄνκ ἐπιχειρεῖν διαίτα . . . ἀπαντλοῦντα . . . µακρῶν καὶ κακῶν βίων ἀνθρώπων ποιεῖν, καὶ ἐκγεννά αὐτῶν . . . ἔτερα τοιαῦτα φυτεύειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν µη δυνάµενον . . . ζηµι µὴ ὁισθάνῃ δεῖν θεραπεύειν.

Goodwin (M. and T., 685) quotes several instances of the exceptional use of µή in oratio obliqua after φαίνω ἀν, πάντες ἔρωσι, τίς ἄν . . . ἴγνοιτο. (I omit those in which µή is combined with ἀν, and also Rep. I. 346 E ἐλεγον µηδένα ἑθέλειν, for which see above, p. 211 b.)

These examples may justify the supposition that the change from ὄνκ ἐπιχειρεῖν to µή ὁισθάναι is merely capricious. But I would suggest, 1st, that it is occasioned by the sound of µη δυνάµενων, and 2nd, more doubtfully, that while ἐπιχειρεῖν is parallel to ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὁισθάναι is in regimen after it—he prescribed that the physician should not think, &c. A further doubt occurs whether the subject of φυτεύειν is Ἀσκληπιίδων, τὸν ἱατρόν, or τοὺς ἀνθρώπους from ἀνθρώπῳ, supra. See note in loco.

IV. 424 B ὅπως ἄν . . . φιλάττωσι, τὸ µή νεωτερίζειν . . . ἄλλων ὡς ὅπως τε µᾶλλον φιλάττειν.

The infinitive φιλάττειν is co-ordinate with νεωτερίζειν, but the construction is forgotten. Plato would not consciously have said φιλάττωσι τὸ φιλάττειν. The infinitive is taken as a vague imperative, or as depending on ἀνθεκτέον.

VI. 488 C αὐτοῦ δὲ . . . περικεχύσθαι δειοµένους, κ.τ.λ.

In what follows the infinitive takes the place of the
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participle, e.g. ἄρανεω, πλεύν. Then there is a return to the participle in ἐπανοίγοντας...ψέγοντας. Then, if the MSS. are right, the nominative takes the place of the accusative in ἐπανοίγοντες...οὐκαρεοντι possibly suggested by the nominatives, πείθοντες and βιαζόμενοι, which have intervened.

VI. 492 C ἦν οὖν κατακλυσθείσαν...οἰχύρεσθαι...καὶ φήσεω. The subject is changed, and the sense continued as if no negative particle had preceded.

VI. 510 E τοῦτοι μὲν...χρώμενοι, ζητούντες τε αὐτά ἔκεινα ὀθεύν. But perhaps δὲ should be read.

VII. 517 Α ἄρ' οὖν γέλοιτ' ἄν παράσχοι...καὶ...ἀποκτενώναι ἄν. If the text is sound the construction reverts to ἐννύομον supra 516 E.

VII. 530 B καὶ ζητεῖω appears to depend immediately on ἀτομον ἡγήσεται, losing count of the intermediate words.

VIII. 556 C, D ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν...η καὶ...ἀλλὰς θεώμενοι μηδαμῇ ταύτῃ καταφρονώταται. θεώμενοι really takes the place of a subj. θεώτατα καὶ ἔπειτα, κ.τ.λ.

IX. 581 D ὁ τε χρηματιστικὸς...τί δὲ ὁ φιλότιμος...τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον.

Obs.—A curious instance of wilful ambiguity occurs in

1. 344 E ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι...τοίτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν; Ἐικας, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ. Thrasymachus says, 'you see, my view is different from yours,' meaning that injustice is profitable.

Socrates replies, 'You do seem to take a different view,' meaning 'you seem to think the question unimportant.'

In several of the above instances, those who do not allow for the extent of irregularity in Platonic syntax have recourse to conjecture.

§ 61. 11. Specially noticeable are the frequent interchanges or combinations (a) of singular and plural, (b) of masculine or feminine and neuter (in speaking of abstractions), (c) of the artist with his art, (d) of a city with her citizens, (e) of the soul (or some part or function of the soul) with the person: and, what is equally noticeable, the opposition of the soul to the man.
(a) Singular and plural—

I. 344 B, C έπειθάν δέ τις πρός τοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνθραποδικών ὁμοιότητα, τῶν ἀυξομένων συνειδήσει καὶ μακάριοι κέκληται . . . ὅσοι ἄν πύθονται αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.

III. 399 D αὐλοποιοῦσι ή αὐλητάς . . . ή οὐ τοῦτο πολυχρωστάτων.

III. 411 B, C καὶ ἔὰν μὲν . . . λάβη . . . ἐμπλεφ. 

VI. 496 C, D τοῦτων . . . οἱ γενόμενοι, . . . λογισμῷ λαβών, κ.τ.λ.

VI. 498 B, C οὕτων . . . ἐκτὸς γίγνηται . . . ἀφέτοις νέμεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 554 B, C ἐν αὐτῷ . . . αὐτῶν.

VIII. 555 Α ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων . . . περινοστεὶ ὀσπερ ἔρως.

IX. 571 C τὰς περὶ τὸν ὑπνόν . . . ἐκείνου.


So with transition from particular to general VIII. 554 Α Ὕσαυροποιοῦσ αὐτής οὖς ή καὶ ἐποιεῖ τὸ πλήθος.

Obs. 1.—A collective plural has sometimes a singular verb (v. 462 E, 463 Α ἔστι μὲν . . . ἀρχοτές τε καὶ δῆμος) and a collective singular, a plural relative (vi. 490 ὁ σμικρὸν δὲ τι . . . οὔς, κ.τ.λ.). In iii. 399 Π, quoted above, τοῦτο is a collective singular.

Obs. 2.—When two things are joined or brought under a single notion, they are spoken of as one (iv. 435 Α ταύτων . . . μεῖζών καὶ ἔλαστον: v. 473 Ν καὶ τοῦτο . . . δύναμις τε . . . καὶ φιλοσοφία). Hence we have the part in apposition to the whole (vii. 526 Α τά ἐν . . . ἔσον . . . ἔκαστον πᾶν παντὶ), and singular and plural are correlated where the former is universal, the latter particular (x. 601 Ν χρώμενον ἐκάστῳ . . . οἷα ὀγαθὰ ἡ κακὰ . . . ὑ χρήται).

(b) Masculine or feminine alternating with neuter—

II. 359 C πλεονεξίαν, ὑ πάσα φύσις, κ.τ.λ.

II. 363 Α αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην.
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III. 401 D δ τε ἑυθύμως καὶ ἄρμονία . . . φέροντα.
III. 410 E αὐθεντίτοι αὐτοῦ (sc. τῆς φύσεως).
IV. 428 Α κατάδηλον . . . ἡ σοφία.
IV. 428 B τούτῳ γε αὐτῷ, ἡ εὐθυλία.
V. 449 D κοινωνίαν . . . ὄρθως . . . γιγανόμενον.
X. 611 B τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχῆν, κ.τ.λ.

Obs.—Even where a concrete masculine noun is used abstractly, it has a neuter correlative.

II. 382 E ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῖν.
VI. 494 D νοῦς οὐκ έστιν αὐτῷ . . . τὸ δὲ οὐ κτῆτων.

(c) The artist and his art.

III. 409 E, 410 οὐκοῦν καὶ ἱατρικὴν . . . μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης δικαστικῆς κατὰ πόλιν ρομοθετήσεις, αἱ τῶν πολιτῶν σοι τοὺς μὲν εἰφρεῖς . . . θεραπεύσομεν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ . . . αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν;

Mr. H. Richards would read αὐτοῖ. But observe that in that case ἐσονοῦν and ἀποκτενοῦσιν would both refer as θεραπεύσομεν does to ἱατρική and δικαστική combined.

The plural here is κατὰ σύνεσιν as the dual in VIII. 550 Ε πλοῦτον ἄρετῆ διέστηκεν . . . τοιναυτίων ῥέοντες. So dialectic and the dialecticians in VII. 537 Ε τὸ νῦν περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι κακῶν . . . : παρανομίας . . . ἐμπιπλανται.

(d) The city and her citizens.

IV. 433 Ε ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν . . . ὅ δὴ καὶ ἐχοντι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν.
VIII. 551 D τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκονῦντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.

On the other hand the city is opposed to the citizens (as in Thuc.): II. 370 Ε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν, IV. 428 C, D οὐκ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς βουλεύεται, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ ἐαυτῆς δῆσ.

(e) The man and his mind. (This may also be regarded as a point of style. Cp. esp. Phado, pp. 82, 83.)

III. 411 Α, Β οὖν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον . . . ὡσπερ σιδηρον ἔμαζαξε (τὸ θυμοειδὲς) . . . ὅταν δ’ ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνίγῃ . . . τήκει . . . ἔως ἄν . . . ἐκτέμη ὡσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, κ.τ.λ. (with ἀδύνου infra ψυχῆν is to be supplied).
IV. 440 C, D ὅταν τις οἶηται . . . πραΐνοι.
VI. 486 Λ ἢ οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοία . . . οἰόν τε οἴει τοῦτο μέγα τι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον;
VI. 503 C, D τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἡθη . . . χάσμης ἐμπίπτειναι.
The plural requires a masculine subject.
VI. 503 D, E δεῖν αὐτῷ (masc.) μεταδιδόναι . . . σπάνιον αὐτὸ οἷεὶ ἐξεσθαι . . . βασανιστέον δὴ . . . εἰ . . . δυνατῆ (sc. ἢ φύσις αὐτή).
X. 620 E ἀγείν αὐτήν . . . κυροῦντα ἢν λαχῶν ἐἴλετο μοῦραν.

XIII. Rhetorical Figures. § 62.

1. Personification enters largely into Greek idiom and is very characteristic of Plato. The argument (λόγος) is of course continually personified. A strong instance occurs in VI. 503 Λ παρεξιλότος καὶ παρακαλπτομένου τοῦ λόγου, πεφοβημένου κυνείν τὸ νῦν παρὸν.

Hence in VI. 484 Λ διὰ μακρῷ τινὸς διεξελθόντος λόγου, this reading (ΛΠΜ) is probably to be retained in preference to διεξελθόντες (X ι).

Amongst many personifications perhaps the most striking is that in VIII. 568 D describing the difficulty experienced by tragic poetry in mounting 'constitution hill,' ὀσπερ ὑπὸ ἀσθματος ἀδυνατοῦσα πορείεσθαι. Books VIII and IX indeed abound with bold personifications: see esp. IX. 573 Λ δορυφορεῖται τε ὑπὸ μανίας, IX. 587 Σ δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς.

The use of personifying words often adds a touch of liveliness to the style.

ἔθελω (cp. Herod.): IV. 436 Β τοῦτον τάναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν . . . οὐκ ἔθελήσει ἄμα. Cr. Π. 370 Β.
V. 459 Σ μὴ δεσμεύοντος μὲν σῶματι φαρμάκων, ἀλλὰ διαίτη ἐθέλοντων ὑπακούειν.

νοεῖν (I. 335 E), λέγειν, ἐπανεῖν, ψέγειν, καλεῖν of words and phrases (IV. 431 Α τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ κρείσττω αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.).

ἀμφισβητῶ: IV. 442 Ε εἰ τι ἢμῶν ἐτι ἐν τῇ ἄμφισβητεί. ἢττω: III. 388 Ε ἰσχύραν καὶ μεταβολῆν ἢττεί τὸ τοιοῦτον.
To this head belongs the adjectival use of ἄδειλφος, ἐταίρος III. 404 B, IV. 439 D.

ποιώ: a special use of ποιεῖν (intrans.=‘to behave’) may be noticed here because occurring sometimes with an impersonal subject.

II. 365 A τῷ οὔτω άκονούσας νέων ψυχᾶς ποιεῖν.
IV. 432 A οὐχ οὔτω ποιεῖ (‘acts’) αὐτῇ.
So probably in VII. 523 Ε οὔδε ποιεῖ ἐκάστη αὐτῶν (τῶν αἰσθήσεων).

For the same use with a personal subject see V. 474 ˊ ὁ οὐχ οὔτω ποιεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς: ‘Is not this your way?’

III. 416 B μὴ τοιούτον . . . ποιήσωσι, κ.τ.λ.
V. 469 B πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πῶς ποιήσουσιν;

§ 63. 2. Continued Metaphor. The two chief examples in the Republic of this figure, which serves at once to enliven and to connect discourse, are the image of the wave in Book v, and the allegory of the cave in Book vii. The former is a good instance of the way in which an image grows in Plato.

It may possibly have been suggested by some preparatory hints in Book iv. See esp. 441 C ταῦτα . . . μόνις διανευκαμεν. This renders more natural the incidental remark in V. 453 ˊ ἃν τέ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἃν τέ εἰς τὸ μέγαστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὃμως γε νεὶ οὐδὲν ἦπτον: (ibid.) οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν ἑνστέον καὶ περατέον σώζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ἦτοι δελφινά τυχα ἐλπίζοντας ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν ἃν ἡ τινα ἄλλην ἀπορον σωτηρίαι. So far, although the image of a ‘sea of difficulty’ has appeared in connexion with the fear of ridicule and the mockery of comic poets (452 B), there is no hint of combining the notion of laughter with that of the waves. Four pages afterwards (457 B, C) we are found to have escaped from the first great ‘wave’ which had threatened to swamp us. And, after a still longer interval,—the digression about usages of war having intervened,—it appears at 472 A that the three stages of difficulty are distinctly thought of as a τρικυμία, of which the
third and greatest wave is now impending. Hence, as the result of all this, when the discussion culminates, and the moment has arrived for the audacious figure of the laughing wave, it is introduced without any effect of violence, (473 C) εἰρήνεται τῷ ὀν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτι τῇ ἀτεχνῷ ὁσπερ κύμα ἐκγελών (‘bursting in laughter’) καὶ ὀδοξία κατακλύσεως.

Similarly, the descriptions of the evil states in Books VIII, IX are linked together by the growing image of the drones in the hive (distinguished as stinging and stingless) which culminates in the description of the master passion in the tyrannical individual as a mighty winged drone—ὕπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφήνα τινα (IX. 573 A).

Again, the incidental phrase βίων κατασκευή (VIII. 557 B) helps to render more natural the impressive conception of the inward πολιτεία, ‘the kingdom of Heaven within,’ at the close of Book 1X. 592 Β ἐν σώματι . . . παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὀρᾶν καὶ ὀρῶντε ἐαυτῶν κατακιζεῖν. Also in IX. 588 Ε the words καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν λέοντα serve to make less abrupt the introduction of the serpent element—τὸ ὑφεώδες (ib. 590 Β).

Other instances of Plato’s love of climax and gradation are the elaborate account of the misery of the tyrant in IX. 576-588, and the demonstration of the unreality of poetry in x. 598, 599. (Cp. the treatment of Pleasure in the Philebus.)

3. Cumulative illustration. The effect of liveliness and § 64. also of fertility of conception is often produced by the substitution of one illustration for another before there has been time for the first to be applied. Thus in the quick succession of examples with which Socrates poses Polemarchus, after showing that the just man is inferior to the draught-player as a partner in draughts, to the builder in the laying of bricks, &c., instead of simply asking, ‘to whom then is he superior, and in what? ’ he brings in a fresh example at the moment of asking.
I. 333 B: ἀλλ' εἰς τίνα ὅθη κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνώς τοῦ κεφαραστικοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ κεφαραστικός τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρομμάτων; 
Cp. Theaet. 147 A where in showing the absurdity of the definition of πηλος—πηλος ὁ τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλος ὁ τῶν ἐπιπλαθῶν καὶ πηλος ὁ τῶν πλινθουργῶν—an unexpected addition is made to it,—εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες, εἴτε ἄλλων ὀντισωνοῦν δημιουργῶν.

So in IV. 421 A—where he has been arguing from the examples of the husbandman and potter that the life of the guardians must be arranged so as to secure their devotion to their proper work,—instead of proceeding to say that this is the more necessary in proportion to the high importance of their function, he suddenly introduces to our notice the class of 'botchers,' whose work is the least important of all:—νευρομαφοὶ γάρ φαίλοι γενόμενοι, κ.τ.λ.

Hence it is probable that in V. 479 B—τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἑστιά-σεσιν, κ.τ.λ.—there are ἅπαξ illustrations and not one only. See note in loco.

§ 65. 4. Irony and Litotes. The tendency to under-statement, which in Thucydides and elsewhere renders ὅχι ἵππον = μάλλων and the like, is strengthened by the peculiar irony of Plato. In a few places this irony has been a cause of obscurity, e. g.—

(a) I. 337 C ἄλλο τι ὧν, ἡθη, καὶ σὺ ὑπὸ τοιῆσεις; 'I suppose, then, that is what you mean to do?'
IV. 423 C-E φαιλον ... φαιλότερον ... φαιλα.
V. 451 B ὥστε εὖ μὲ παραμυθεί.
VII. 529 A οὐκ ἀγεννῶς (cp. Phacdr. 264 B).
It gives rise to doubt about οὐ πάνω, μὴ πάνω τι, &c. See above, p. 209 B.

Obs.—The alternation between irony and seriousness, which Plato sometimes introduces with marked effect, has also given rise to misapprehension.

1. 344 E ἔγὼ γάρ ἀματι, ἡθη ὁ Θρασύμαχος, τούτι ἄλλως ἤχειν. ἴσοικας, ἵν ὡ τ' ἔγώ. (See note in loco.)
(b) The constant insertion of qualifying phrases, to avoid the appearance of dogmatism, belongs to the same tendency. To this may be referred the frequent use of τάχ’ ἂν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπέων, εἰς τὸ δυνατόν, ἂν μὴ πάσα ἀράγη, εἰς ὁσον ἐνδέχεται, and VII. 527 A καὶ σμικρά.

(c) Ironical collocation of words (παρὰ προσδοκίαν) II. 373 Α ἐφαρμαῖ καὶ πέμματα. (See note on II. 373 Β θηρευταί.)

5. Recurring phrases.

Besides the qualifying expressions mentioned in the last paragraph, Plato employs certain recurring phrases or façons de parler, partly (a) to maintain the resemblance to ordinary conversation, and partly (b) to keep before the mind the pervading antithesis between the actual and the ideal.

(a) Of the former sort are ὁρα ἂν εἶν, τίς μηχανή; τὸ λεγόμενον, πᾶση τέχνη, εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ, εἰ μὴ τι (sc. ἄλλο), εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, and the ‘pronominal’ phrases noticed above, p. 196 (g).

The frequent use of ὃ δαμόμει, ὃ δαμασίε, ὃ πρὸς Διός, &c. marks the rising interest of the discussion. See esp. IX. 574 B ἀντεχομένων ὃς καὶ μαχομένων, ὃ δαμασίε, γερος τε καὶ γραός, κτ.λ. A similar effect is produced by the repetition of ἡ δ’ ὃς in the course of a reported speech. Cp. ἐφι λέγων in Herodotus.

(b) To the latter motive,—the contrast of actual and ideal,—is to be ascribed the constant use of δοκῶν, λεγόμενος, καλούμενος, δόξαζομένος εἶναι, οἴμενος (I. 336 Α, III. 395 D &c.): also of ποιομένος = ‘esteemed’ in VI. 498 Α, VII. 538 Κ,—where see notes. Special uses of οὖτος, ἐκεῖνος, ὦςε, ἐνθάδε, ἐκεῖ, ὦν (VI. 489 Ε τοὺς ὕν πολυτικοὺς ἀριθμοῖς) are grounded on the same antithesis.

6. Tautology and Repetition.

(a) Plato is not in the least afraid of repeating the same word and often does so accidentally in the same passage with a difference of meaning. This happens very frequently with δοκεῖν, δόξα, and other words which have both a vernacular and a philosophical sense. Especially noticeable are:
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III. 415 C τήν ... προσήκουσαν τιμήν ἀποδόντες ... τιμήσαντες:
where H. Richards would read τιμήσαντες <κατ’ ἀξίαν>.

V. 449 D ἀλλὰς ἐπιλαμβάνει πολιτείας, ‘You are taking up another form of State,’ with V. 450 Λ ἐπιλαμβάνειν μον, ‘taking me up,’ i.e. ‘checking my discourse’ immediately following.

VIII. 546 D ἀρχοντες ... καταστήσονται, ‘rulers will be appointed’ (passive).

Ibid. καταστήσονται ... τοὺς ἀρίστους, ‘they will appoint the best men to be their rulers’ (middle voice).

Cp. Laws VIII. 840 E, 841 Λ τίνα δὴ συμβολεύεις αὐτοῖς τίθεσθαι νόμον, εὰν ὁ νῦν τιθέμενος αὐτοῖς ἐκφύγῃ; where τίθεσθαι is middle, and τιθέμενος passive.

For Rep. VIII. 547 E ἀπλοῖς ... ἀπλονστέρους see note in loco.

Obs.—There are limits to this as to other anomalies and it is very improbable that in vi. 499 E ff. ἀλλοίων ... δόξαν should mean, first, ‘a different opinion from what they now have,’ and then ‘a different opinion from that which we maintain,’ or that in X. 601 D, ἐ τῶν χρώμενον ... ἄγελον γίγνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ οἰα ἁγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ... ὁ χρῆται ὄνων αὐθητῆς ... περὶ τῶν αἰλὼν ... ἐπιτάξει ὄνων δεὶ ποιεῖν, the words οἰα ἁγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ... ὁ χρῆται should mean ‘what the instrument does well or ill,’ and not ‘what specimens of the instrument the maker makes well or ill.’

(b) On the other hand the language is varied without apparent reason.

VII. 530 ἑξῆκον ... ἀφήκεν and often elsewhere.

§ 67.

XIV. Order of Words.

(Cp. Digest, §§ 287–311.)

The freedom of conversation allows of great variety in the order of words, and Plato has used this liberty for purposes of effect, sometimes putting words to the front to give importance to them, sometimes reserving a surprise, and sometimes merely avoiding harsh collocations. Thus
unusual order is employed (1) for emphasis, (2) for euphony, or (3) for both together. (The general rule that the more emphatic notion stands first in Greek—not last, as often in English—of course holds in Plato as in other writers.)

1. (a) A phrase is rendered more emphatic by separating the words of which it is composed and placing unemphatic words between. (Phaedr. 247 B ἄκραν . . . ἀψίδα.)

I. 339 E ἄρα τότε . . . οὐκ ἀναγκαίον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὕτως δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τούναντιον ὡς ὃς σὺ λέγεις (see note in loco).

VI. 492 A ἔκεν μὴ τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσας θεῶ τύχῃ.

VI. 499 C πόλεως τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθήναι.

IX. 572 B καὶ πάντα δοκοῖσιν ἡμῶν εἴναι μετρίας εἶναι.

IX. 582 C ἀπὸ γε τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὗν ἑστι, πάντες τῆς ἤδονῆς ἐμπειροῦν (i. c. πάντες ἐμπειροῦν τῆς γε ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἤδονῆς, οὗν ἑστι).

(b) In order to bring an emphatic notion into prominence, a relative, interrogative, or negative word is postponed.

II. 363 A τοῖς ὁσίοις ὃ φασι θεοὺς διδόναι.

II. 377 E ὃς Κρόνος ὡς ἑτυμωρήσατο.

III. 390 B μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς ὃ ἐβουλεύσατο.

III. 413 C τοῦτο ὃς ποιητέων.

IV. 437 D οὗν δίψα ἑστι δίψα ἄρα γε. κτλ., where the inversion has led to an error of punctuation (see v. rr.).

V. 453 D ὡς μὰ τὸν Δία, ἐφη, οὐ γὰρ εὐκάλῳ ἐοικεν (= οὐ γὰρ εὐκάλῳ ἐοικε, οὐ, μὰ τὸν Δία).

2. Euphony.

(a) The interlacing of clauses has sometimes no obvious motive except a more euphonious rhythm.

III. 396 C ὃ μὲν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢν δ', ἐγώ, μέτριος ἄνηρ.

Phaedo 99 C τὴν ἰὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷον τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθήκατε δύναμιν ὁστὶ νῦν κεῖσθαι.

(b) A special case is the displacement of adverbs through the adherence of the preposition to its noun. (See Vahlen on Ar. Poet. 1457 A, 31 μὴ ἐκ σημαινόντων: 'quae collocatio et apud Ar. ipsum multa habet exx., et apud alios.')

Cp. Herod. II. 27 κάρτα ἀπὸ θερμών χωρέων: Dem. de Cor. § 288 ὧς παρ' οἷκεστάτῳ.
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III. 391 D ὄρμησι τοὺς ἐπὶ δείκται ἀρπαγάσ.
VI. 492 A μὴ ἐν προσηκούσῃ.
IX. 590 A πολὺ ἐπὶ δεισιδέρω ἀλέθρω.

§ 69. 3. Both emphasis and euphony seem to be consulted in the displacement or trajectory of αὐ, ἤδη, καί.

(a) The habitual postponement of αὐ to the negative at once emphasizes the negation, and, in the case of οὐκ αὐ, avoids an undesirable hiatus. The use of μὴ αὐ probably follows the other idiom by assimilation.

III. 393 D ὕπα δὲ μὴ εἶπης, οτι οὐκ αὐ μαθήνεις.
IV. 442 A δὲ τῆρησετον μὴ . . . πολὺ καὶ ἵσχυρον γενόμενον οὐκ αὖ τὰ αὐτῶν πράτη.
VI. 499 D τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς . . . οτι οὐκ αὖ δοκεῖ, ἑρεὶς;
Cp. Theact. 161 A οἴει . . . ἑρεῖν ὡς οὐκ αὖ ἐχεῖ οὔτω τὰῦτα.
Crat. 391 C ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ αὖ σὲ ταῦτα ὑφέσκει, κ.τ.λ.
Aristoph. Pax 281 τί ἐστι; μῶν οὐκ αὖ φέρεις;
Αὐ comes even between the preposition and the noun:
II. 371 D τοῖς δὲ ἀυτὶ αὖ ἀργυρίων.
IX. 577 B καὶ ἐν αὖ τοῖς δῆμοσίοις κωβύγοις.

(b) An emphatic ἤδη is placed foremost although in meaning really attached to a word from which it is thus separated. In some cases this arrangement avoids cacophony.

V. 452 B ἀλλ' καὶ ἤδη τὰς προσβυτέρας.
VII. 531 E ἀλλὰ ἤδη, εἴπον, [οὐ] μὴ δυνατοί τιμεῖς (S. τιμω) ὑπετε, κ.τ.λ. (avoiding μὴ ἤδη).

(c) Similarly καί is sometimes separated (ὑπερβατῶς) from its word.

V. 470 B, C ὁμιν εἰ καὶ εἶ τόδε πρὸς τρόπον λέγω.
[VII. 500 A ἤ, καὶ εἰσὲν οὔτω θεωταί, κ.τ.λ. (joining καὶ οὔτω, but see note in loco and supra, p. 200 i.)]

In IX. 573 D τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἑρεῖς, καὶ although joined to ἐμοὶ really emphasizes both pronouns.


It is sometimes postponed together with the interrogative, though belonging to the whole sentence.
IX. 571 C λέγεις δὲ καὶ τίνας ... ταύτας (i. e. τίνας καὶ λέγεις);
Cp. Hdt. viii. 89. § 1 ὁλέγοι δὲ τινος καὶ Ἐλληνον, where καὶ belonging to the whole clause is attracted by the emphasis to Ἐλληνον. See also ib. iii. 36, § 4 Σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ τολμᾶς συμβουλέων.

(d) ἀλλὰ ... ἃ is widely separated in v. 467 δὲ ἀλλὰ γὰρ, φήσωμεν, καὶ παρὰ δοξαν πολλά πολλοῖς ἃ ἐγένετο.

(e) Observe the position of τε in λέγειν λόγον τε in v. 472 A, according to Par. A, and of μὲν in vi. 508 E, but see notes in locis.

4. Words introduced διὰ μέσου by an afterthought may sometimes disturb the order of the sentence.

IV. 425 Ἐ ὁσπέρ τοὺς κάμινοντας τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ὧπὸ ἀκολογίας ἐκβήναι πονηρὰς διαίτης, where the position of ὧπὸ ἀκολογίας belongs to the whole phrase οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ἐκβήναι.

V. 467 C καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον καθόυν (see note in loco).

5. Parenthetical words are introduced sometimes before an enclitic, sometimes between a preposition and its case.

I. 337 τὸς γὰρ ἂν ... ὁ βέλτιστος, τὸς κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 564 Α ἔξομα τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας.

So in Phaedr. 227 B οὐκ ἂν οἶξεν, κ.τ.λ. the parenthetical word divides ἄν from the verb.

N.B.—All these peculiarities of rhythmical arrangement become more marked in the later dialogues, especially the Timaeus and Laws.

XV. Grammatical irregularities considered in relation § 70. to the text.

It will probably be objected that in these remarks too little account has been taken of the alterations introduced by recent editors into the Platonic text. The emendations of Cobet, Madvig, Badham, and W. H. Thompson are manifestly deserving of attention. But before adopting them wholesale, or even to the extent to which they were embodied in the fourth Zürich edition, several considerations should be
carefully weighed. (1) The balance of anterior probability is against the best founded conjecture when this is opposed to the consent of the MSS. (2) How few of the changes confidently proposed by Schleiermacher, van Heusde, Ast, Heindorf, and K. F. Hermann, are at this moment accepted as certain! (3) In the last resort the context must decide. But in judging of the context, it is not enough to be well skilled in grammar and logic, or in the law of parsimony that presides over a terse literary style. The special conditions of Attic dialogue should be taken into account, and, as these are chiefly to be learned from Plato, some such synoptical survey as has been here attempted is required to assist the student in comparing Plato with himself. If the result of such an endeavour, based on the traditional text, is to bring out a series of phenomena which to those who are intimately acquainted with Greek and with the nature of language commend themselves even in their irregularities as natural and consistent, it follows that the number of places in which conjecture is found necessary will be considerably reduced. If, on the contrary, the redundancies and anomalies to which reference has been made are to be regarded as unworthy of the great stylist and dialectician, and the acknowledgement of them inconsistent with true reverence for him, the process of conjectural emendation. precarious as it is at best, must be largely extended before all such unsightlinesses can be removed. And should this labour be completed, the doubt may ultimately recur whether Plato's image has not suffered like that of the great English poet, whose bust (according to Sir Henry Taylor) was 'sadly smoothed away into nothingness at the instance of some country neighbour of Wordsworth's, whose notions of refinement could not be satisfied without the obliteration of everything that was characteristic and true.'

There is an extreme to be avoided in both directions, and rational critics will probably be found to admit that
the distinction between what is sound and unsound often turns upon a question of degree. There are emendations which secure acceptance by their convincing quality—which 'jump to the eyes' of the reader as well as of the emender at the first flash. Such is Schneider's τίμη μάλιστα for ἐπὶ μάλιστα in Rep. VIII. 554 B, such is Geer's παύσων for πᾶσων in VI. 494 B, and Mr. Archer Hind's ἐν τῷ μέρει for ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει Theaet. 190 C. There are others of which a high degree of probability may be safely predicated, such as van Prinsterer's ἐκάστος for ἐκαστος (v. r. ἐκάστοτε) in VI. 493 B. Such simple changes as πάντων for πάντος (VI. 497 D), κατηκώφ for κατήκου (VI. 499 B), τῷ δ' αὐ. τό for τῷ δ' αὐτό (VIII. 547 B), when they have the effect of restoring a smooth and idiomatic context, may be accepted without cavil. The transposition of χαύρων καὶ in III. 401 E (based on a reference in Aristotle—but cp. Laws VI. 751 D) although supported by the similar syllables in ὅντειραινὼν, and even Graser's τί οἰώμεθα in IX. 581 D can only be regarded as highly probable (the same may be said of ὅσοι for ὅσων in VII. 534 A, οἰκείων ἐνότος for οἰκείων ἐχοντος in IX. 590 D, αὐτόχεωρος for αὐτόχεωρας in X. 615 C), and there is good reason for rejecting the seemingly simple alteration of διδόντεs to ἄδοντες (II. 365 D), and that of βλάψει to βλάψεω (a MS. emendation) in the preceding context, II. 364 C. Madvig's ingenious conjecture in X. 608 A, ἀπόμεθα for αἰσθόμεθα, may well appear convincing at first sight. It gets rid of a non-classical form; it merely presupposes the miswriting of COO for CO; and it seems naturally enough to echo ἕπαμοντες in the sentence immediately preceding. But on closer inspection, the use of δ' ὅνω requires the resumption not of what immediately precedes (with only ἐνλαβιόμενοι . . . τῶν τῶν πωλλῶν ἐρωτα coming between) but of the main apodosis answering to the words in the comparison, ἃσπερ . . . βία μέν, ὄμως δὲ ἀπέχονται.

1 Although supported by the v. r. διδομένου (Ven. II) for ἀδομένου in III. 398 D. But there is no reason for assuming corruption. See note in loco.
Either ἀφεξόμεθα, therefore, or some equivalent word, and not ἀφεξέομεθα, is what the context requires.

§ 71. Accretions consequent on the admission of glosses into the text, are a form of corruption to which all classical writers¹ are liable. The assumption of such alteration has been of late extensively applied to Plato. It is supported by such manifest instances as Theaet. 190c, Rep. IX. 580d, and it cannot be denied to have a legitimate place, although the condition of some dialogues, such as the Phaedo and Cratylus is found in point of fact to give more scope for it than is the case with others. But the editors who, after the manner of Hirschig, have bracketed or excised every phrase that could not conveniently be tied upon the trellis-work of logic, should be asked to pause and consider whether these 'overgrowths' do not belong to the native exuberance of the Athenian language in its times of leisure (Theaet. 172c, d). Their ideal of trimness seems too like that of the old English (or Dutch) gardener—

'Go thou, and like an executioner,
Cut off the heads of too fast growing sprays,
That look too lofty in our commonwealth.
All must be even in our government.'²

But, it will be said, some superfluous clauses in the Republic are omitted in Par. A, the earliest and most authoritative MS. This is perfectly true, but, before drawing conclusions from the fact, it is right to understand the nature and extent of it. First, then, account should be taken of the observation, which is easily verified, that in most of these instances there is present either 'homoeoteleuton' or some other condition slippery for scribes; e. g.—

II. 358 Α ψέγεται [ἀδικία ἡ ἐπαυεῖται].
360 Α τῶν ἄγγελων γενέσθαι [τῶν παρὰ τῶν βασιλέων, add. in mg.].

¹ See especially Hdt. iv. 127, § 5.
² Shakespeare, Richard II. iii. 4. 33 36.
II. 364 η σωφροσύνη [τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη].
366 Αι τελεταί [αὖ μέγα δύνανται].
367 Α ψέγειν [ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν add. in mg.] with ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν in preceding line.
373 Α [καὶ τίν ποικιλία], καὶ χρυσόν, κ.τ.λ.
376 Α [φιλόσοφορ] καὶ φιλομαθή.
378 Α τοιοῦτα [λεκτέα].
379 Α ἐὰν τε τίς αὐτὸν ἐν ἐπεστὶ ποιη [ἐὰν τε ἐν μέλεσι] ἐὰν τε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ.

This argument is greatly strengthened by considering the omissions in Ven. II, also due to homoeoteleuton, or in some cases to the dropping of a line. See E on Text, pp. 103, 104.

Secondly, it is by no means an indifferent circumstance § 72. that these omissions all come within a certain limited space in the Republic. We should have to search far in order to gather an equal number from elsewhere, and those which do occur in the later portions of the dialogue for the most part involve the loss of indispensable words, and are to be accounted for by the accidental dropping of a line.

Thirdly, that some of them at least were the errors of a scribe appears from the omitted words being supplied in the margin by the diorthotes, either from the archetype of Α or from another MS. And it should be observed that the words bracketed are not in every case superfluous. It would be rash to cancel αὖ μέγα δύνανται (II. 366 Α), though they had been omitted in more MSS. than one, and the clause ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν (ib. 367 Α) would have to be supplied if it had been omitted by all the scribes. But if these omissions are due to the copyists, the others can not be assumed not to be so. And the redundancy, even where indisputable, has been shown to be not inconsistent with the manner of Plato. The case of IX. 580 Δ where Α reads τὸ λογιστικὸν δέξεται, and another MS. (Par. K) λογισ−
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τικὸν ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμικὸν δέξεται, for the simple δέξεται, stands on a different footing (see note in loco), and it may be admitted that a somewhat similar corruption may have crept into vii. 533 E: ὃ ἀν μόνον ὑπλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω σαφηνεία ὃ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ, though the interpolation is here less manifest and correction consequently more difficult, if not impossible. The whole sentence is omitted in Ven. E. (P. on Text. pp. 112, 113.)

PART II.
PLATONIC DICTION.

i. NEW DERIVATIVES AND COMPOUNDS.

ii. SELECTION AND USE OF WORDS.

iii. PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY.

§ 1. Plato's vocabulary is that of highly educated Athenians of the fourth century B.C., enriched with special elements derived (a) from the Socratic love of homely illustration, (b) from poetic and other literature, in the way of quotation, adaptation, imitation, and allusion, (c) from the innovations of the Sophists, both rhetorical and eristic, and (d) from habits of speech fostered within the Academy as a philosophical school.

i. NEW DERIVATIVES AND COMPOUNDS.

The restrictive or selective tendency of Attic Greek, reserving one word for one idea, and rejecting many synonyms, has been repeatedly illustrated 1. 'No Attic writer would have used it (Ἐφράμη) for νεῖρα: but not only does it occur in Herodotus more frequently than the soberer term, but even a scientific writer like Hippocrates employs it. Again, if we compare the usage of πάλαις and κλήμες, it will be seen that the more picturesque of the two words has in all Attic, but that of Tragedy,

been ousted by the colourless term, though in Ionic prose
the former remained the commoner.'

The converse or complementary tendency, to have
a word for everything and to invent new terms to express
novel distinctions, has been less observed. Yet in com-
paring Plato's language with that of Thucydides or Anti-
phon, or the tragic poets, or even Lysias or Isocrates, it is
impossible not to be aware that the discarding of picturesque
or 'coloured' synonyms was accompanied with the in-
vention of many novelties in the expression of abstract
notions. This increasing copiousness, forming part of the
improvement and development of prose-writing, is of
unquestionable significance, and exercised a marked influence
on all the subsequent literature.

Plato himself remarks on the introduction of new-fangled
terms by Protagoras and others, and on Prodicus’ affected
love of minute verbal distinctions. He himself might have
been asked by a malicious questioner why he should
employ δικαίωτης and διαφορότης when such old friends as
δικαίοσύνη and διαφορά were available. The answer is that
similar changes were multiplying on every side, and had
become a part of the natural medium of cultivated ex-
pression. 'Correct' writers like Isocrates might be sparing
in their use, but the extent to which they had found their
way into general currency may be estimated from Xenon-
phon. Δικαίωτης, for example, is one of a large number of
derivative words that are found in Plato and Xenophon,
and in no earlier writer.

A few others, of which the same remark is true, may be § 2.
cited here in passing. To name them all would occupy
more space than can be fitly given to a mere collateral
illustration.

∂νδρείκελον
∂πειροκαλία
∂νυποδήσια
∂μελέτητος
∂νυπόστοτος
∂νύτιμος

1 'Ορθοίστειά γε τις... καὶ ἄλλα πολλά καὶ καλά Phaedr. 267 e.


§ 3. Some doubt is thrown on the whole inquiry, because it is necessarily limited to the extant remains of Greek literature. It is impossible to trace the steps by which the change referred to was gradually realized. But the following list of derivative and compound words which are found in Plato and in no earlier writer \(^1\) may serve roughly to indicate the general fact that in the time of Plato a large class of words had recently come into use (he may even have added to the number) to express abstract notions of various kinds. This effervescence of language is naturally correlated to the stir and eager alacrity of thought which the Sophists set in motion and to which Socrates himself contributed. We may trace the beginnings of it in Antiphon's use of such derivative words as \(\mu\rho\alpha\iota\alpha\), \(\alpha\iota\tau\iota\iota\alpha\iota\), \(\beta\iota\alpha\omega\tau\iota\alpha\) \(^2\). It would be interesting, were it only possible, to ascertain how far the language of Democritus or of Hippocrates had advanced in this direction. But Democritus is too often paraphrased by those who quote him, and the works ascribed

\(^1\) It has been assumed for the purpose of this Essay that the first occurrence of a word in Greek literature is pretty sure to have been noted in the edition of Stephanus' Theaetetus by Dindorf and others.

\(^2\) Or, to go further back, in the use of \(\delta\pi\rho\alpha\iota\alpha\) by Herodotus iv. 134.
to Hippocrates are of doubtful authenticity. For this reason no account is taken here of many words which are common to Plato and Hippocrates or the Pseudo-Hippocrates. Where a word recurs in later writers, I have added the names of those by whom it is used. The influence of Plato on the subsequent usage is often apparent.

(a) New Derivatives.

a. Substantives in

-εία:

ἀτρομούθεια Lach. 197 b : Josephus.
εὐμάθεια Rep. 490 c : Callimachus.
νόθεια Phaedr. 235 D, Theaet. 195 c : Lucian.
ἀρδοεπεία (due to Protagoras) Phaedr. 267 c : Dionys. Hal.

-εία:

γοητεία Rep. 584 A : Diodor., Lucian, Dio C.
ἐθελοδουλεία Symp. 184 c : Lucian.
ἐπιτροπεία Phaedr. 239 E (ἐπιτροπία (sic) occurs in a fragment of Lysias) : Dionys. Hal.
προπαϊδεία Rep. 536 D : Clem. Alex.

-λα:

ἀβελτεία Theaet. 174 c, Symp. 198 D : Aristot., Plut.
ἀκαίρια Symp. 182 A : Dem., Aristot.
ἀλλοδοξία (-έω) Theaet. 189 b : Dio C.
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ἀναλογία Rep. 534 A. Frequent in later Greek.
ἀγαρμοστία Phaedo 93 C : Lucian, Plut.
ἀπεργασία Prot. 312 D : Plut.
ἀρφευσία Symp. 192 A : Zeno Stoic.
ἀσυμμετρία Gorg. 525 A : Aristot., Theophr.
βασκαρία Phaedo 95 B : Aristot., Philo.
γνωμολογία Phaedr. 267 C : Aristot., Plut.
γνωσασία Theact. 169 C : Aristot., Dionys. Hal., Dio C.,
Polybius.

*ἐκονολογία Phaedr. 267 C, 269 A.
ἐλευσινολογία Phaedr. 272 A : Schol. in Sophocl.
ισυρροπία Phaedo 109 A : Plut.
ιστοργία Symp. 197 A : Theophr.
κηδεμονία Rep. 463 D : Dio C., Philo.
μακρολογία Prot. 335 B, Gorg. 449 C : Aristot.
μελωποία Symp. 187 D : Aristot.
μετεωρολογία Phaedr. 270 A : Plut.
μισανθρωπία Phaedo 89 D : Dem., Stobaeus.
μυσολογία Phaedo 89 D : Plut.

*τεκμοστλία Rep. 499 E.
οἰκοφθορία Phaedo 82 C : Plut.

*διληγομανία Prot. 321 B.
παυεραστία (-έω) Symp. 181 C : Plut., Athen., Lucian (the
verb only).

παυεραστία Symp. 208 E : Heliod., Theodorct.

* Words marked with an asterisk are found in Plato only.
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

πολύεδία Rep. 580 D: Cyrill. Alex.
πολυχορία Rep. 399 C: Plut., Athen.
ραφφοδία Ion 533 B, Tim. 21 B: Aristot., Athen., Lucian, &c.
συμφωνία Crat. 405 D, al.: Aristot., Plut.
φιλεραστία (-ῆς) Symp. 213 D: Aristocen. (-ια), Aristot. (-ῆς).
φιλογνωστία (-έω, -ικός) Symp. 182 C, al.: Athen., Plut.
(verb only).

-ον (Diminutives):—

§ 5.

σκολύθριον Euthyd. 278 B: Pollux.
τεχνίων Rep. 495 D: Athen., Dio C.
τεχνόδριον Rep. 475 E: Clem. Alex.

-μα (neut.):—

άμφιοβίτημα Theact. 158 B: Plut.
*ἀναλόγιμα Theact. 186 C.
*ἀπείκασμα Crat. 402 D, 420 C.
ἀποβλάστημα Symp. 208 B: Theophr.
ἀπολόγημα Crat. 436 C: Plut.
ἀπόσπασμα Phaedo 113 B: Galen.
*ἀφομοίώμα Rep. 395 B.
διακόνημα Theact. 175 E: Aristot.
δυσχέρασμα Phileb. 44 D: Suidas.
*καρτέρημα Meno 88 C.
*λήμμα Gorg. 486 C.
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μεθολογία Πλ. Φαιδρ. 229 c: Plut., Lucian.
δημολογία Πλ. Φαιδο 93 D, al.
*περιπτωμα Prot. 345 B.
πρόστιμα Charm. 164 E, Φαιδρ. 238 B: Plut
*σκειραφήμα Θεα. 208 E.
χειροφήμα Gorg. 450 B: Dionys. Hal.

-μός:
βαδισμός Charm. 160 C, al.
χωρισμός Φαιδο 67 D: Theophr., Plut.

§ 6.
-τής (icem.):
ἀλλοτριότης Symp. 197 C: Dem., Plut.
ἀνασίτης Φαιδο 74 B: Aristot.
ἀνωμαλότης Tim. 57 E, al.: Plut.
διαφορότης Θεα. 209 A, Rep. 587 E. Parm. 141 B, C.

Stobaeus.
ἐτεροώτης Parm. 160 D: Eustath.
ὁμαλότης Tim. 57 E: Aristot., Plut.
ποιότης Θεα. 182 A: Aristot., Hermog.
στρογγυλότης Μενο 73 E: Aristot., Theophr.

-σύν:
ἀλλοτριοπαγμοσύνη Rep. 444 B: Proclus.
φιλοπαγμοσύνη Rep. 549 C: Dem., Pollux, Strabo.

§ 7.
-σίς:
ἀνάκουσις Euthyd. 302 E: Theophr., Plut.
*ἀνομολώσις Θεα. 166 B.
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

 webdriver:Symp. 183 A: Themist.
 webdriver:Crat. 426 D: Aristot., Themist.
 webdriver:Prot. 327 B: Aristot., Stobac.

*ἐπιγάζωσις Phaedr. 266 E.
 webdriver:Phaedr. 246 B: Philostr., Philo, Dio Chrys.

Diog. Laert., Porphy
 webdriver:Symp. 183 A: Josephus, Sirach.

Euseb.
 webdriver:Phaedo 101 C.
 webdriver:Apol. 40 C, Phaedo 117 C.
 webdriver:Crat. 411 D.

Ep. of James.
 webdriver:Phaedo 111 B, Theaet. 156 B: Aristot., Theophr.

Gal.
 webdriver:Rep. 584 C.
 webdriver:Rep. 584 C.
 webdriver:Rep. 407 B: Def.
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*συμπίπτειν Crat. 427 A.
σύνισις Phaedo 97 Α, 101 C: Aristot., Theophr., Plut.

§ 8. — τὸς (masc.):
*αἰσθητὴς Theact. 160 D.
ἀναλωτὴς Rep. 552 B, C: Dio C.
παίδευτής Rep. 493 C: Plut., Polby., Diog. L.
—τήροιν:—
δικαίωτὴριον Phaedr. 249 Α: Philostr., Suidas, Hesych.
—οῖν:—

Verbals in -α or -η:—
*μεταστροφή Rep. 525 C, 532 B.
συμπλοκή Soph. 262 C: Aristot., Polby., Lucian, Dionys. H.

§ 9. β. Adjectives in
—δῆς:—
ἀειός Phaedo 79 Α, al.: Aristot., Theophr., Plut., Philo, Dio C.
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

αλενημιδοθής Rep. 470 D: Plut., Pollux, Dio C.
θυποειδής Phaedo 86 a: Plut., Julian.
κηφηνώδης Rep. 554 b: Cleomedes.
µονοειδής Phaedo 78 d, al.: Theophr., Polyb.

*σειλημώδης Symp. 217 D.

-ιος:—

-κός:—

§ 10.


*ἀγοραστικός Crat. 408 δ.

ἀναλωτικός Rep. 558, 559: Clem. Alex.


ἀστρονομικός Rep 530 a: Theophr., Philo.


*αὐλοσκοικός Euthyd. 289 c.


δοξαστικός Theact. 207 c: Aristot.

*ἐλλιμενικός Rep. 425 D.


ζυνοχικός Phaedr. 253 c: Philo, Eustath.


λογογραφικός Phaedr. 264 B: Pollux, &c.

*λογοποιικός Euthyd. 289 c.


μετρητικός Prot. 357 D.
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*μημητικός Rep. 346 λ.

μηθικός Phaedr. 267 c: Plut., Athen., Dionys. Hal.

μηθολογικός Phaedo 61 b: Pollux.

γομοθετικός Gorg. 464 c, al.: Aristot., Theodorus Metoch.

αικοδομικός Charm. 176 c: Aristot., Theophr., Plut.


παρακελευστικός Euthyd. 283 b: Pollux.


πετευτικός Charm. 174 b: al.: Eustath.

πιστικός Gorg. 455 λ: Aristot.


*προμηθικός Theact. 150 λ.


*φανταλικός Ion 538 b.

*σεληνικός Symp. 222 c.


στατικός Charm. 166 b: Aristot., Strabo, Arrian.

στοιχαστικός Gorg. 463 λ: Aristot., Clem. Alex.


αφενδονητικός Lach. 193 b: Schol. in Lyc. 633.

τελεστικός Phaedr. 248 d: Plut., Tetrab. in Ptolemaeum.

Budaeus.


*φιλογνωστικός Rep. 456 λ.

-λός:—


-ρός:—

αἰσχροτημός Gorg. 487 b: Hesych.

-τός:—

*ἀναμηνιτός Men. 87 b.

Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

παραληπτός Prot. 324 B.
παρασκευαστός Prot. 319 B, 324 A, C.
πλανιτός Rep. 479 D: Hesych.
πρόκριτος Rep. 537 D: Aristot., Dio C.
προσποιήτος Lys. 222 A: Aristot., Dem., Dio C., Philo, Dionys. Hal., &c.

σταθμός Charm. 154 B: Pollux, Suidas.
σύσταστος Symp. 190 E: Athen., Pollux, Hesych.

γ. Adverbs in

-ως:

ἀγαμένος ¹ Phaedo 89 A: Aristot.
ἀπαρακαλέπτως Euthyd. 294 D: Heliodorus.
*ἀπαίστως Theact. 144 B.
*ἐμποδιζομένος ¹ Crat. 415 C.
*ἐπιθυμητικός Phaedo 108 A.
*ήμαρτημένως ¹ Meno 88 E.
*καρτεροῦντως ¹ Rep. 399 B.
*μεμελημένως ¹ Prot. 344 B.

παρακυνδυνατικός Rep. 497 E: Longinus.
παραστατερμένος ¹ Rep. 399 B: Iamblichus.
πεπλασμένος ¹ Rep. 485 D: Aristot.
προσποιήτως Theact. 174 D: Dio C.
*συνγραφικός Phaedo 102 D.
*ὑφαστικός Crat. 388 C.

-ί:

ἀγκλαστι Euthyd. 278 E: Plut., Lucian.
ἀφοφητί Theact. 144 B: Aristot., Themist., Lucian.

-η:

*πλεοναχή Rep. 477 A.

-σε:

*μηδαμώσε Rep. 490 A.

¹ From participles.
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§ 12. A. Verbs in

-απων:


-εινω:

γυαπατείω Phaece 64 B: Damasc. ap. Suid., Euseb.

-ευω:


γυντείω Phaece 84 B: Plut., Lucian.

-εω, -εομαι:

ἄβολω Rep. 437 C: Plut., Dio C., Philo.


αλλοτριομορεω Theeact. 195 A: Dio C.

*αναρμοστεω Rep. 462 A.

εμεσχηλεω Rep. 545 E: Lucian, Philo.

ηενχειμορεω Rep. 617 C: Herodian, Strabo.

μετεωροπορεω Phaece 246 C: Plotinus, Philostr., Aelian.

όμοδοξεω Phaece 83 D: Theophr., Strabo, Polyb.

παιδοσπορεω Phaece 250 E: Aelian.

παραστειω Lach. 179 C: Diphilus ap. Athen., Plut.

παρεκπολεω Charm. 163 B: Lucian.

ψηφολογομοι Rep. 545 E: Themist.

φιλογυμναστεω Prot. 342 C: Plut., Athen., Iambil.

φιλοτεχνεω Prot. 321 E: Epictetus, Athen., Aelian, Polyb., Diod.

§ 13. ζω, -ζομαι:


αθαοιομαι Apol. 34 D: Themist.

γαργαλιζω Phaece 251 C: Clem. Alex.

*ενθουσιαζω Apol. 22 C, al. (elsewhere -αω).
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

μετημβραίζω Phaedr. 259 A: Porphyry.
-ως, -όματι:—
ἀνυμοιων Rep. 546 B: Themist.

(b) New Compounds.

§ 14.
a. Substantives:—
κλωποιός Rep. 596 E: Dem.
*κλωπογός Rep. 597 A.
συνοπαθός Phaedr. 248 C: Themist., Iambi., Clem. Al.
ψευδόμαρτυς Gorg. 472 B: Aristot., Athanas., Cyrill.,
Pollux.

β. Adjectives:—
ἀδιαπότης Soph. 238 C: Athen., Olympiod.
ἀδιάφθορος Phaedo 106 D: Dem., Plut., Aelian.
*ἀθερμός Phaedo 106 A.
ἀκεντρός Rep. 552 C: Plut., Philo, Athen.
ἀκροσφαλής Rep. 404 B: Plut., Hesych., Themist., Polyb.,
Clem. Al.
ἀμερής Theaet. 205 E: Aristot., Lucian, Plotinus.
Al., Iambi., Dionys. A.
ἀμετάστροφος Rep. 620 E: Themist.
ἀναφής Phaedr. 247 C: Plut., Lucian, Philo. Dionys. A.
ἀνέγγυς Rep. 461 B: Plut., Dio C.
ἀνεξέταστος Apol. 38 A: Aeschin., Dem., Plut., Themist.
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ἀνερμετιστος Theact. 144 Α: Plut., Themist., Theodoret., Dio C.
ἀνομολογούμενος Gorg. 49,5 Α: Aristot.
*ἄξωκοισώγητος Rep. 371 Ε.
*ἄφρατος Rep. 533 Α, Crat. 407 Π.
ἄρτυμελής Rep. 536 Β: Dio C., Themist.
ἀρτιτελής Phaedr. 251 Α: Himer., Nomn.
ἀσύνθετος Phaedo 78 Α: Dem., Aristot., Theodor., Polyb.
ἀσώματος Phaedo 85 Ε: Aristot., Plut.
ἀτηκτός Phaedo 106 Α: Aristot., Galen.
*ἄψυκτος Phaedo 106 Α.
βραχυτράχυλος Phaedr. 253 Ε: Aristot., Diodor.
δαξάσοφος Phaedr. 275 Β: Aristot., Clem., Al.
*δυσγοήτευτος Rep. 413 Ε.
δυστιεφεύτης Rep. 432 Α: Dio C., Themist.
*δυσεκάσκυτος Phaedo 110 Β.
*ἐπεισαγώγυμος Rep. 370 Ε.
ἐπεξέλεγχος Phaedr. 267 Α: Aristot.
*θησαυροποιός Rep. 554 Α (quoted by Pollux).
λογοδαιδαλός Phaedr. 266 Ε: Pollux.
μελίρρυτος Ion 534 Α: Eustath., Nomn.
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.


*μετεωροσκόπος Rep. 488 E.


*μυθολογικός Phaedo 61 B (Pollux).


νεοτέλης Phaedr. 250 E: Lucian, Phot., Hesych., Himer.

ap. Phot.

νομογράφος Phaedr. 278 E: Suid., Diodor.

νομφόληπτος Phaedr. 238 D: Plut., Pollux, Synes.

*οικτρόγοος Phaedr. 267 C.

οιλόκληρος Phaedr. 250 C: Aristot.. Polyb., Philo.

ομοήθης Gorg. 510 C: Aristot.. Eustath., Pollux.


ομοφυής Phaedo 86 A: Theodoret., Cyrill., Psellus.


*παγγέλωνος Phaedr. 260 C, al.

πάμμεγας Phaedr. 273 A, al.: Lucian.

παμπιλάνως Theact. 181 B: Aristot., Plut., Athen., Themist.


πάνδηνως Rep. 610 D: Dem., Dio C., Lucian, Galen.


πολυλόγος Phaedr. 275 A: Philostr., Cleobul. ap. Stob..

Damasc. ap. Suid.


Galen, Theodoret.


πολυμελής Phaedr. 238 A: Pollux.

*περίονυμος Phaedr. 252 C.

*σιμοπρόσωπος Phaedr. 253 E (Pollux).
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*συμπεριγγωγός Rep. 533 D.

σύμψηφος Gorg. 500 A: Dem., Plut., Diodor.

περατολόγος Phaedr. 229 e: Philostr., Liban.


ἐνειλόνος Phaedr. 270 A: Plut., Themist., Damasc.

φιλαναλωτής Rep. 548 B: Pollux, Dio C.

φιλεραστής Symp. 192 b: Aristot.


φιλογύναεις Symp. 191 D: Aristaen.


*φιλοποιητής Rep. 607 D.

*φιλόφρυς Lys. 212 D.

φιλοσώματος Phaedo 68 b: Plut., Pollux, Philo, Euseb.


§ 15. γ. Verbs:

ἀναβιώσκομαι Phaedo 71 e: Theophr.

ἀναβρυχύσομαι Phaedo 117 D: Philostr., Suid.

ἀνακαγχάω Euthyd. 300 D: Plut., Lucian, Athen.


ἀνέλλω Symp. 206 D: Hesych., Suid.

ἀνεπεμνάω Phaedo 63 A: Plut., Dio C., Lucian, Philo.

ἀνομολογέομαι Symp. 200 E: Dem., Plut., Lucian.


ἀντεποτάω Euthyd. 295 b: Plut., Clem. Al.

ἀντισώματα Lach. 186 D: Liban., Herenn.

ἀντίδουξάω Theaet. 170 D: Diog. L.

*ἀντικακονφργέω Crit. 49 c.
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

άντικαταλείπω Rep. 540 B: Iambl.
άντισπαρατεῖνω Phaedr. 257 C: Iambl., Dio C.
*άντιστόμαι Theaet. 178 C.
άπαθανατίζω Charm. 156 D: Aristot., Lucian Diodor.
άπαιναιχυντεῖω Apol. 31 C: Dem., Cyrill., Porphyry.
άποδεῖσυmp. 190 E: Aristot., Theophr.
άποδρύπτω Rep. 495 E: Joseph.
άπομαντεῖομαι Rep. 505 E: Dio C., Galen, Iambl.
άπομεστόμαι Phaedr. 255 C: Plotin.


*άποπολεμέω Phaedr. 260 B.
άποσαφεῖ Rep. 348 B: Lucian, Dio C., Galen, Joseph.
άποσκιάζω Rep. 532 C: Dio C., Budaeus.
άποσκιάπτω Theaet. 174 A: Lucian, Dio C.

άποστικτῶ Theaet. 150 C: Aristot., Lucian, Philostr.
άποστοξεῖω Theaet. 180 A: Dio C., Lucian.
άποστυπῶ Theaet. 191 D: Theophr., Lucian, Porphyry.
*διαιμαστιγῶ Gorg. 524 E.
*διασκευωρέω Rep. 540 E.
εξαγριαίνω Lys. 206 B: Plut., Philo, Joseph., Dio C.
*μεταδοξάζω Rep. 413 C.

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*παραποτούραι Theact. 162 B.
προσδοξίς Theact. 178 E: Aristot.
προκολακεύω Rep. 494 C: Plut.
προλυπόμαι Phaedr. 258 E: Aristot., Dio C.
προομολογέω Phaedo 93 D: Aristot., Philo.
προσηλώ Phaedo 83 D: Dem., Plut., Lucian. Diodor.,
προσκρόω Phaedo 89 E: Alciplhr., Dem., Aeschin.,
Aristot., Plut., Themist.
συγκορυβαντιζω Phaedr. 228 B: Euseb., Suid., Synes.
συμπαρακαθίζομαι Lys. 207 B: Dem., Themist.
*συμπένθομαι Meno 71 B.
συμπεριπατέω Prot. 314 E: Plut., Themist., Lucian, Athen.
συμπεριφέρω Phaedr. 248 A: Aeschin., Aristot., Lucian,
Polyb., Diog. L.
*συμπροσμείγμι Theact. 183 E.
συμπαρέρμόμαι Phaedo 112 B: Plut., Aristaen.
συμπατικτό Theact. 156 E: Pollux.
συνέλομαι Parm. 136 D: Dem., Plut., Dio C.
συνεπαιράνω Gorg. 586 B: Gregor.
*συνδιαπέτομαι Theact. 199 E.
συνδιασκοπείω Prot. 349 B: Philo, Joseph., Athanas.
συνδιατελεώ Phaedo 91 B: Dem.
Monothel.
συνεπιτατέω Rep. 528 C: Eustath.
Part II: Diction - Vocabulary.

*συνθαμβίοι Ion 535 E.
*συνοδύρομαι Menex. 247 C: Plut., Gregor.

*συνοίρομαι Rep. 500 A.

Obs.—The above list is not exhaustive, and in particular, it does § 16. not include what has been characterised as the peculiar vocabulary of the later dialogues.

This is marked (1) by a further stage of the process which has now been described. Such words as the following are foreign not only to earlier Greek, but to most of the dialogues of Plato.

(1) The late dialogues show an increasing tendency to return to earlier Attic or Ionic, and especially to tragic forms. When Dionysius couples Plato with Thucydides as employing the earlier Attic style, he must be thinking of the Laws and kindred dialogues. The occasional use of τέκνον for παιδίον is one of many examples of this. Another is the preference of φλαίρος to φαιλος. Note also the increasing frequency of the Dative Plural of the first and second declension in -σι(ν).

(3) Certain changes in Plato's philosophical terminology will be noticed under a separate head.

1 For a full treatment of this subject see Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, edited by L. Campbell, Oxford University Press, 1867, and compare the Essay on Structure, &c. Excursus, above, p. 46 ff.

2 See also αἰνιγμῶς, κλαμυσθή, παθή, τίρφες, χαρμίνη, &c.
ii. Selection and Use of Words.

The foregoing enumeration serves to illustrate some novelties of diction which had become rife in Plato's time. Certain peculiarities in his choice of words, and in his special employment of them, may be treated more briefly under the following heads:—

(a) Vernacular words, including those borrowed from the arts of life.

(b) Picturesque uses (1) borrowed, or (2) imitated from Epic, Tragic, and Lyric poetry.

(c) Metaphorical Generalization.

(d) Playing with words (1) ironically, and (2) etymologically.

(a) Vernacular words.

Words of common life.

Plato's use of such expressions may be illustrated by reference to the writers of the Old Comedy. Compare, for example, the use of the following words in Plato and Comic poets.

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<tr>
<td>ἀμέλεις</td>
<td>Phaedo 82 A</td>
<td>Ar. Nub. 877</td>
<td>Eupolis Phil. 5</td>
<td>Ar. Ach. 811</td>
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<td>ἄνακογχυλιῶζω</td>
<td>Symp. 185 D</td>
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<td>ἀστείος</td>
<td>Phaedo 116 D, Rep. I. 349 B</td>
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<td>βαλανέως</td>
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<td>βδελυρός</td>
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<td>βλίττων</td>
<td>Rep. VIII. 564 E</td>
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<td>είτα</td>
<td>Theaet. 148 E</td>
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<td>εἷς εωθυνοῖ</td>
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<td>κρούμα</td>
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<td>κυρβζεις</td>
<td>Polit. 298 D</td>
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<td>λαβή</td>
<td>Phaedr. 236 B</td>
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<td>λυγιζομαι</td>
<td>Rep. III. 405 C</td>
<td>Eupolis incert. 44</td>
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<td>μᾶζα</td>
<td>Rep. II. 372 B</td>
<td>Ar. Eq. 55</td>
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We may distinguish (α) trivial or familiar expressions, (β) 'household words,' in the literal sense (τὰ οἰκετικὰ ὄρο-
ματα Soph. 226 A. B), (γ) words belonging to special arts and
handicrafts. And we shall not depart from Plato's own
view of the matter if we include under this head the 'cant'
or 'slang' terms of the rhetorical schools.

(α) Amongst the familiar idioms which Plato adopted to
give the natural effect of conversation to his writings, the
following may be specially noted:—

The insertion of ὦ δαμόνε, ὦ δαμάστε, ὦ μακάρε, ὦ γαθε,
ὧ τὰν, and other appellative formulae, some probably the
humorous inventions of Socrates or Plato.

The familiar ἤ δ' ὦς &c. (found in Cratinus and Aris-
tophanes). The phrase is a survival from the Old Attic
speech.

Socrates' familiar oath ἐὰν τὸν κύνα.

The pleonastic use of ἤκω with participles to denote
recurrence (Phaedo 60 C ἤκειν δή, κ.τ.λ. : Rep. V. 456 B
ἡκομεν ἄρα εἰσ τὰ πρότερα περιφερόμενοι).
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ποιών, denoting various moods of amusement or scorn, as in Rep. I. 330 A ποιών ἐπεκτησάμην; Gorg. 490 D ποιών ἰματιων;

The epexegetic ἰδειν with adj. (Phaedr. 253 D λευκός ἰδειν &c.).

The deictic αἰτωσί Rep. I. 330 B.

πολλάκις (= 'perhaps'). ποιέω ('I behave myself so and so'), ποιέμαι pass. ('I am accounted so and so'), αἰτίαν ἐκω, 'I am reputed' (Theaet. 169 A): the words ἄγαπῶ ('I am content'), ἀδολέσχῃ, ἀκκίζομαι, κυώνευω ('I am likely,' cp. Hdt. IV. 105), μελαγχολῶ, ναρκῶ, ναυτίω, νεανίκος, περικρούομ. σκληρύνῄς, τρίβων, χαμάζηλος, χαμεύομαι, and the expletive use of ἐπιχειρεῖν.

Obs. 1.—The idiomatic use of ποιώ with adverbs = 'I behave myself so and so.'—cp. Thuc. II. 59 ποιώντας ἄπειρ αὐτὸς ἤλπιζω—occurs in Rep. I. 330 C. II. 360 C, 365 A. III. 416 B. VI. 494 C.

Obs. 2. The special use of ποιέμαι (passive) is more dubious, but see the notes on Rep. VI. 498 A. VII. 538 C, where it appears that the meaning 'are esteemed or held to be' is alone suitable.

But in Laws XI. 930 D τὸν ποιόμενον = 'of those who claim it as their child.'

Obs. 3.—Plato sometimes quotes vernacular idioms from other dialects—

Rep. IX. 575 D μητρίδατο, Κρήτης φασί.
Phaedo 62 A ἐπεὶ Ζεύς. ἐφη, τῇ αἴτει φωνῇ εἰπών.

Obs. 4.—Other idiomatic uses, obviously derived from common parlance, are the following:


παιδαγωγεῖον, 'I conduct personally' (I. Alc. 135 d): cp. Rep. X. 600 E αὐτοὶ ἐν ἐπαιδαγωγουσίν. 'They would have been his inseparable followers.'

κείμαι, 'I am ruined' or 'undone' (cp. Herod. VII. 176, § 8 τὸ πλεὸν αὐτοῦ (τοῦ τείχους) ἢ ἤπεν χρώνου ἐκείνου), Rep. IV. 425 A. V. 451 A.
**Part II: Diction—Choice of Words.**


αἵρεω, 'I gain an advantage,' Rep. ii. 359 a, iii. 410 b. αἰρόντες λόγος, the common idiom, Rep. iv. 440 b. slightly modified, Rep. x. 607 b ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἦμας ἔφει.


δραίττομαι, 'I seize by handfuls.' Lys. 209 E.

ἐλυττων, 'case,' 'outside,' Rep. ix. 588 E.

(β) 'Household words.' Cooking, nursing, familiar objects, &c.

άμφιδρομία Theact. 160 E.

ἀγεμαίαν Theact. 151 E.

ἀνθη Phaedr. 230 B.

ἀπομύττο Rep. i. 343 A.

βαλανεύς Rep. i. 344 D.

βράττω Soph. 226 B.

γυρῶν Theact. 161 D.

διαττῶ Soph. 226 B, Crat. 402 C.

ῑψω Euthyd. 285 C.

ἡδύνιμα Rep. i. 332 D.

λύπη Symp. 193 A.

αὐγέ Symp. 185 D.

οὐλα Phaedr. 251 C.

ὀφυν Gorg. 518 B.

τέμμα Rep. ii. 373 A.

σκίμπους Prot. 310 C.

σκολύθρων Euthyd. 278 B.

σποδίζω Rep. ii. 372 C.

τεράχιων Symp. 191 E.

τίθη Rep. i. 343 A.

φορμίσκος Lys. 226 E.

χαλεστραῖον Rep. iv. 430 A.

χώνη Rep. iii. 411 A.

Obs. 1.—Words belonging to games of strength or skill are intermediate between this and the next heading.—i.e. they are at once vernacular and technical—

ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω θείν (? ) Rep. x. 613 B.

ἀποθελείω Prot. 326 B, Rep. vi. 504 A.

ἀποκλείσωμαι Rep. vi. 487 c (as a term in draughts).

ἀρταῖκω Lys. 206 E.

ἀσκολιάζω Symp. 190 D.

ἀστραγαλίζω Lys. 206 E.

δρόμου ἄκμη Rep. v. 460 E.

λαβὴ Phaedr. 236 B.

λυγίζωμαι Rep. iii. 405 c.

ἄλμπικος Rep. ix. 583 B.

пись Rep. vii. 540 A.

παρακεῖνω (‘flinch’) Rep. vii. 540 A.

παρικρούω Lys. 215 C.

στρόβιλος Rep. iv. 436 D.

ὑπελῆ Phaedr. 254 E.

Obs. 2.—Allusions to banqueting customs are of course frequent:
and amongst these may possibly be reckoned τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἔστιν μεταφοράς ἔσωκε Rep. v. 479 b. See note in loco.

§ 19. (γ) Handicrafts and other arts.

Agriculture.

ἀπονετεύω Rep. VI. 485 D.
ἀφετος Rep. VI. 498 C. Crp.
Prot. 320 A.
βδάλλω Theaet. 174 D.
βλάττω Rep. VIII. 564 E.
καιθήλιος Symp. 221 E.

Hunting.

θάμνος Rep. IV. 432 B.
ξυρος Rep. IV. 432 D.

Medicine.

ιλιγγιάω Phaedo 79 C.
ιλιγγος Rep. III. 407 C.
κατάφορος Crat. 440 D.

φυσά Rep. III. 405 D.
ημφαλης Thcaet. 149 D.
μεθύμα Rep. III. 405 D. Crp.
Crat. 440 D.
σφυξο Phaecdr. 251 D.

Music, dancing, the drama.

αρμονία Theaet. 175 E.

διὰ πασῶν Rep. IV. 432 A¹.


Phyle Rep. v. 455 D (χασμά-

θέων Charm. 169 C).
χολή Rep. VIII. 564 B.
ψωράς Gorg. 494 C.

¹ Prob. also πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν 'sc. χορήγη' Rep. III. 397 B.
Part II: Diction—Choice of Words.

ψοκρήτης Charm. 162 D.
χορευτής Phaedr. 252 D.
χορός Euthyd. 279 C.

ο οίνοι πάντων κριτής Rep. IX. 580 B (see note in loco).

Painting, stationary, pottery:

ἄνδρείκελον Crat. 424 E.
ἀποχραίω Rep. IX. 586 B.
διαγράφω Rep. VI. 500 E.
διαγραφή Tim. 55 C.
ἐκκαθαρίω Rep. II. 361 D.
ἐκμαγεῖον Tim. 72 C.
ζων, 'a figure,' Rep. IV. 420 C, VII. 515 A, and χυτρεύς Rep. IV. 421 D.

Spinning, weaving and clothes-making.

ἵτριον Phaedr. 268 A.
κατάγω Soph. 226 B.
κερκίς Soph. 226 B, Crat. 388 A.

nuvopoláthos Theaet. 147 A.
κοροπλάθος Theaet. 147 B.
μελίχλωρος Rep. V. 474 E.
πλυθοφυός Theaet. 147 A.
σμίλη Rep. I. 353 A.

Obs.—Allusions to the arts of the fuller (γραφεῖς), currier (ἐκλεινω), dyer, ἀλουργὸς, ώδος, δευτοποιῶν, ἐκλύζων, βαφεῖς, &c., are also frequent.

Navigation.

κελεύειν, to act as coxswain, Rep. III. 396 A.
κυβερνήτης Rep. I. 341 C.
ταύκληρος Prot. 319 D.

θέωτες ἢν τότε ἐγγύπτα αὐτοῦ Rep. III. 417 sub fin.

τῶν δεύτερων πλοίων Phaedo 99 D.

The Mysteries.

ἐποπτεύω Laws XII. 951 D.
ἐποπτικά Symp. 209 E.
θρώνωσις Euthyd. 277 D.
μυείσθαι Symp. 209 E. Phaedr.

250 C, Gorg. 497 C, Phaed. 81 A, Men. 76 E.

ραβδηκοφόρος, βάκχος Phaed. 69 C.

Rhetorical Schools.

δεύτερας Phaedr. 272 A.
ἐικονολογία Phaedr. 267 C.

ἐπιπλασιωλογία Phaedr. 267 C.

ἐπιπλασιωλογία Phaedr. 266 E.
ορθοεἰσεια Phaedr. 267 c. πυθαραλογία Theaet. 162 E.
παραψυχός Phaedr. 267 A. ὑπερβατῶν Prot. 343 E.
παρέστησις Phaedr. 267 A.

§ 20

\textit{(a)} Epic, Lyric, and Tragic elements.

(Rep. VIII. 345 E φῶμεν αὐτὸς τραγικῶς, ὡς πρὸς πάϊδας ἠμᾶς παιζόντας καὶ ἔρεσικηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδὴ λεγούσας, ύψηλολο-
γομενῶς λέγειν.)

Plato’s dialect is for the most part the purest Attic. But, besides quotations from poetry, which he occasionally weaves (with adaptations) into his prose, he frequently makes conscious use of words borrowed from the poets, and properly belonging to the diction of an earlier time. In adorning his style with these, sometimes half-humorously, sometimes in genuine earnest, he not unfrequently modifies their meaning by adding an ethical significance to what in the earlier and simpler use was merely physical. (E.g. βλοσυρός in Homer means ‘rugged in appearance,’ in Plato ‘sturdy in character,’ &c.)

\textit{(a)} It must suffice here to give a short list of the more striking examples: the graphic language of Herodotus being counted for this purpose as poetic diction

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{άδελφος} (adj.) Rep. IV. 421 C.
  \item \textit{άκτις} Tim. 78 D.
  \item \textit{ἀληθῶς} Phaedo 65 C.
  \item \textit{ἀλκίμος} Rep. X. 614 B.
  \item \textit{ἀρακηκίω} Phaedr. 251 B.
  \item \textit{ἄπτως} Rep. VII. 534 C.
  \item \textit{ἐμαρμαρῆ} Phaedo 115 A.
  \item \textit{θαμῖς} Rep. I. 328 C.
  \item \textit{θέμις} Symp. 188 D.
  \item \textit{θεοεἰς} Phaedo 95 C.
  \item \textit{θεοεἴκελος} Rep. VI. 501 B.
  \item \textit{θεσπέτως} Rep. II. 35 A.
  \item \textit{ικταρ} Rep. IX. 375 C.
  \item \textit{ινδόαλλομαι} Rep. II. 381 E.
  \item \textit{κοθαμαχός} Phaedr. 254 E.
  \item \textit{κυμαίνω} Phaedo 112 B.
  \item \textit{μελέγης} Phaedr. 269 A.
  \item \textit{μήμα} Phaedr. 244 D.
  \item \textit{ναυτιλλομαι} Rep. VIII. 551 C.
  \item \textit{οἶμος} Rep. IV. 420 B.
  \item \textit{ὀμαῖος} Rep. II. 364 E.
  \item \textit{παραπαῖω} Symp. 173 E.
  \item \textit{πολυάρατος} Theaet. 165 B.
  \item \textit{πόριμος} Symp. 203 D.
\end{itemize}

\textit{This use is rare in Attic prose, but see Isocrates, Paneg. p. 55, § 71 Bekker.}
Part II: Diction—Use of Words.

In this connexion it is right to observe the frequent transference from a physical to an ethical meaning.

A similar (although more naïve) use of graphic words to express mental things is observed in Herodotus: e.g. χαλέπως ἐλαμβάνετο (II. 121 d), &c.

Poetic Allusions. These will be mentioned in the notes. In a few cases the reference is doubtful, as in Ἡ Διομήδεια λεγομένη ἀνάγκη in Rep. VI. 493 D.

Καδμεία νίκη (Laws I. 641 C) involves some mythical allusion to which the key is lost. The supposed reference to the σπαρτοῖ is not sufficiently clear.

Parody and Imitation.

For humorous imitations of poetic diction, see especially Rep VIII. 545 E ὁ π(ι)ως ὁ τρωτὸν στάσις ἐμπεσε.

Phaedr. 237 A, B ἀγετε ὡ, ὡ Μοῦσαι, ... ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε τοῦ μοῦθου.

Ibid. 252 B, C (ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπώκτων τῶν ὅ τι θυτὸν θυτοί μὲν Ἠρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηρόν, ἀθάνατοι δὲ Περσῶτα, διὰ πτερόφοιτον ἀνάγκην).
On Plato's use of Language.

Rep. VIII. 550 ἠλλος ἄλλη πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον.

In a similar spirit, if the reading be sound, a humorous turn is given to the quotation from Homer in Rep. III. 388 Α τοτέ  ὁ ὅρθιον ἀναστάτα | πλουίζοντ' ἄλφαντ' ἐπὶ θίν' ἄλος ἀτρωγήτων.

§ 21. (c) Metaphorical Generalization.

In all philosophical writing, thought inevitably reacts on language. The effort to define, distinguish, generalize, leads insensibly to novel uses of words. And Plato's method, like that of his master Socrates, largely consists in the attempt to rise to universal conceptions through the analysis of ordinary speech. At the same time he casts his thoughts in an imaginative mould, and his turn of mind, as exhibited in his writings, is eminently plastic and creative. Hence it is difficult, in describing his use of words, to draw an exact line between the work of fancy and that of logic, between metaphor and classification.

The extension of the meaning of θηρευτής, for example, in Rep. II. 373 B (side by side with that of μυητής) appears at first sight to justify the remark τατ' εστὶ ποιητικὸς λέγειν μεταφοράς. But in the Sophistes it is gravely stated that the genus Huntsman comprises several species, as General, Lover, Sophist, Fisherman, &c. Thus what a modern reader would assign to fancifulness—in this particular instance tinged with irony—Plato himself attributes to ἀναγωγή.

a. The use of μουσική in the Republic is here directly in point. Because in Plato's view melody is inseparable from words, and words from thoughts, not only μουσική, but the cognate terms ἀρμονία and ρυθμός are used by him in a greatly extended sense. See especially Prot. 326 B πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τῶν ἀρθρόπον εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ ἀναρμοστιὰς ἐθεταί.

Phaedo 61 ΄ ὁς φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὁυσὶς μεγίστης μουσικής.

Theaet. 175 ἐν οὖθε γ' ἀρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος, κ.τ.λ.
β. Under the same heading of figurative abstraction may be fairly brought the graphic use of words denoting physical states to indicate mental phenomena. See above, p. 287 (b).

(1) ἀνατίθεμαι, 'I retract,' literally 'take back a move' (in draughts), Phaedo 87 A.
διαβολή, 'prejudice,' lit. 'calumny,' Rep. VI. 489 D.
ἐταμος (adj.), 'akin to,' lit. 'companion of,' Rep. X. 693 B.
θήρα, 'pursuit,' lit. 'chase,' Phaedo 66 C.
θρέμμα, 'creature' (used of an argument personified), Phaedr. 260 B.
κέρας, 'an offensive weapon,' Rep. IX. 586 B.
κυρίττω, 'I attack,' Rep. IX. 586 B.
μούσα, extended to include philosophy, Rep. VI. 499 D.
ὄναρ, 'dream,' i.e. 'impression,' Rep. VIII. 563 D.
ὄνειρόττω, 'I have vague (unverified) impressions,' Rep. VII. 533 C.; cp. V. 476 C.
δρῇμα, 'vehicle,' i.e. ground of belief, Phaedo 85 D.
παναρμόνιος, transferred from music to discourse, Phaedr. 277 C.
συλλαβή, transferred from letters to ideas, Theaet. 203 C.
ὑπαρ, 'with clear thoughts,' Rep. V. 476 C. D.
φυτών, 'organized being,' 'organism,' Rep. II. 380 E, VI. 491 D.
ψυχαγωγία, extended to include rhetoric, Phaedr. 261 A.
(The usual meaning appears in ψυχαγωγός Aesch. Pers. 687; Eur. Alc. 1128.)

Obs.—A word which properly belongs to an aggregate is applied to a constituent part, which is thus regarded in a more general aspect.
πλήρωμα Rep. II. 371 E.
So ἰκανὸν λόγον, Rep. II. 376 D, means one which is necessary to completeness.

(2) For bold graphic uses, see ἀνατιθέμενος, 'to re-illumine' (the eye of the mind), Rep. VII. 527 D.
§ 22. (d) Playing with words.

The Cratylus shows what might be made of the Greek language by 'victorious analysis' at play. The freedom which is there sportively abused has left many traces in other dialogues. Sometimes ironically, but sometimes also quite gravely, words are employed in new senses suggested by analytical reflexion.

a. Ironical Catachresis.

b. Etymological Analysis.

a. The exact meaning is made evident by the context. A good instance is the singular use of ἑυκορεῖν in Rep. IX. 574 D, to denote an act of sacrilege, 'He will industriously clean out some temple.' For other instances consult the Lexicon under the 'facetious words' ἀγενής, ἀστείος, γειτάδας, γεγραῖος, γλασχρός, εὐδαιμών, καλὸς (especially VIII. 562 A). κορψός, ύψαίνω, φαῖλος, χαρίεις, χρηστὸς.

It may be observed by the way that the word εἰρωνεία, from meaning 'dissimulation,' generally acquires in Plato the specific meaning of 'pretended ignorance.'

Obs. 1. A return is sometimes made (above, p. 250) from the ironical to the serious meaning.


Rep. IV. 426 λ, Β τάδε αὐτῶν οὐ χαρίειν; ... οὐ πάνιν χαρίειν.

Obs. 2. The constant use of ἐπισκής for χρηστῶς or ἀγαθός, although not ironical, partakes somewhat of the general tendency to understatement. So also μετρίως, ἴκανος (Rep. VI. 499 λ), &c.

b. Etymological Analysis.

(1) Sometimes a word is used quite simply in the etymological sense, which, however, is indicated by the context: Theaet. 149 β ὅτι ἄλοξος οὕτω τὴν λοχεών εἴληχε, 'the goddess of childbirth, although not a mother.'
Part II: Diction—Philosophical Terms.


(2) More frequently the play on words takes the form of an oxymoron or a downright pun.

Rep. II. 382 Α τό γε ὦς ἀληθῶς πειεῖς.
Symp. 198 Ἀ ἀδεῖς... ἄδεις.
Phaedr. 247 C, D τό γε ἀληθές εἰπεῖν, ἀλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας.

Rep. VI. 509 D ἵνα μὴ οὐρανδόν εἰπὼν ὄξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι.
Rep. VI. 507 Α κίβδηλον ἀποδίδοις τόν λόγον τοῦ τόκου.
Rep. VII. 527 Α, IX. 574 B. C ἀναγκαῖος.
Rep. VII. 540 Α δαίμονιν... εὐδαίμονι.

Obs. 1.—This tendency becomes exaggerated in Plato's later manner:—Soph. 254 Α τριζῇ, Tim. 90 C εἰδώμων, Phileb. 64 Ε ἕμμφαρα, Tim. 55 Α ἀπειρός, Laws II. 656 C παθέω, ib. IV. 717 B νοσῶ.

Obs. 2.—Plato's fanciful etymologies afford no real ground for critical judgement on his text. See note on Rep. I. 338 Α, ἐν φιλο-νεικεῖν (cp. IX. 581 Α, b), E. on Text, p. 131.

iii. Philosophical expression.

It has been suggested in the preceding section that § 23, the growth of reflexion and, in particular, the Socratic search for definitions had in Plato's time already exercised a natural and inevitable influence on words. This was the beginning of a process which tended ultimately to give an approximately fixed connotation to the chief terms of constant use in mental and moral philosophy. But the result was still far distant, and even in Aristotle the appearance of definiteness is often illusory.

In all ages philosophers have been apt to dream of a language which should be the exact, unvarying counter-
part of true conceptions. The dream has not been realized, and if it were, would not the very life and progress of thought be arrested? Philosophy reacts on common language, and in employing it again, is sure to modify it further. But the process cannot have, and ought not to have, either finality or absolute fixity. In some departments of knowledge, Mathematics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Anatomy, Jurisprudence, such an aim is obviously legitimate;—the use of technical terms in them is clearly necessary. But Mental Philosophy is in danger of becoming hidebound, if it be not permitted to her to draw afresh, and to draw freely, from the fountains of common speech.

In Plato, at all events, philosophical terminology is incipient, tentative, transitional. And although this remark applies with especial force to what have been called the 'dialogues of search,' where the method is 'peirastic' or 'maccutic,' leading to an avowedly negative result, it is a serious error even in dealing with the more positive and constructive dialogues to assume strict uniformity of expression. In a few rare instances the metaphysical significance acquired by a word or phrase in one dialogue may be thought to have influenced the use or application of the same term in another. Thus in the Timaeus the meaning attached to διάδοσι (35 B), and to θατέρου φύσις (35 B, 74 A), may bear some relation to the definitions in the Philebus (26 D) and Sophist (257 D). But even where such connexion may doubtfully be traced, it by no means precludes the occurrence of other philosophical uses, still less the continued employment of the word or phrase in its ordinary vernacular sense. And the instances which have been adduced are quite exceptional. The contrary

1 See Ward in Encyc. Brit. ed. ix. Art. Psychology: 'It seems the fate of this science to be restricted in its terminology to the ill-defined and well-worn currency of common speech, with which every psychologist feels at liberty to do what is right in his own eyes, at least within the wide range which a loose connotation allows.'
practice is more frequent. The special meanings assigned to δίανοια and πίστις in Rep. vi. 511, vii. 534 A are not to be found elsewhere in Plato. Even the definition of Justice, so carefully elaborated in Rep. iv, though once alluded to in ix. 586 E, can hardly be said to affect the connotation of the term elsewhere. Nor does the definition of δύναμις by the young mathematicians in Theaet. 148 B for a moment supplant either the ordinary or the scientific uses of the word.

Thus, while attempts are made to give a precise meaning to words denoting philosophical conceptions, such attempts are inchoate, intermittent and casual. The very nature of dialectic, as an ‘interrogation’ of language, forbids the assumption of technicalities, nor can Plato’s literary instinct tolerate the air of pedantry, which such buckram stiffening involves. The formal terminology of Rhetors and Sophists (ὁρθοεπεία, ἀπορροή, &c.) is the object of his frequent ridicule. In two of the most elaborate of his dialogues he reminds the reader that precise verbal distinctions, such as Prodicus affected, are rarely of any use in philosophy, and warns young men that a liberal indifference to mere words is the condition of growth in wisdom; just as in the Cratylus he had long since pronounced against looking for the truth of things in words. That second course (δεύτερος πλαῦς), for which Socrates declares in the Phædo as preferable to the bare assertion of an unapplied first cause, —the endeavour to find in the mirror of language, however confusedly, some reflexion of eternal truths,—is really a method which dissolves the apparent fixity of ordinary speech, and awakens thought to new conceptions which, the more firmly they are held, can be more freely and variously expressed.

These remarks are here to be exemplified by the con-

1 See esp. Laws i. 631 c.  
2 Theaet. 184 c; Polit. 261 E.  
3 Cratylus 439 Α, Β.  
4 Phædo 99 D.
sideration of a few cardinal expressions\(^1\), which may be roughly classified as (a) Metaphysical, (b) Psychological, and (c) Dialectical, although such distinctions are not clearly present to the mind of Plato.

§ 24. \((a)\) **Metaphysical Terms.**

\(\text{E} \text{id} \text{o} \text{s} \).

This word, which Aristotle and others have made the symbol of Platonism, is used by Plato himself with entire freedom, and very seldom with a pronounced metaphysical intention. He has nowhere defined it.

**Ordinary meanings.**

The word was in common use amongst contemporary writers.

a. \(\text{E} \text{id} \text{o} \text{s} \) was still used, as in Homer, in the literal sense of 'outward appearance,' 'visible form.'

(1) Xen. Cyrop. IV. 5, § 57 \(\varepsilon \kappa \lambda \varepsilon \zeta \delta \mu \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \sigma \alpha \tau \omega \rho \upsilon \tau \omega \varsigma \tau \varsigma \) \(\tau \alpha \varepsilon \delta \eta \beta \varepsilon \lambda \tau \iota \sigma \iota \sigma \varsigma \tau \iota \).

(2) In Xenophon (Cyn. 3, § 3 \(\alpha \tau \delta \varepsilon \kappa \lambda \varepsilon \rho \gamma \alpha \) \(\tau \alpha \varepsilon \delta \eta [\kappa \nu \varepsilon \varsigma] \): ib. 4, § 2 \(\iota \varepsilon \chi \nu \varepsilon \rho \alpha \) \(\tau \alpha \varepsilon \delta \eta \), \(\varepsilon \text{id} \text{o} \text{s} \) nearly = \(\varepsilon \varepsilon \mu \alpha \varsigma \), bodily constitution or condition.

b. But it had acquired the secondary meaning—

(1) Of 'a mode of action or operation'; so in Thuc. II. 41, § 1 \(\varepsilon \pi \iota \pi l\varepsilon \iota \upsilon \tau \) \(\alpha \nu \varepsilon \delta \eta \ldots \tau \sigma \omega \mu \alpha \alpha \upsilon \tau \rho \kappa \kappa \varepsilon \tau \varsigma \) \(\pi \alpha \rho \varepsilon \chi\varepsilon \theta \varsigma \omega \), 'to adapt himself to the most varied forms of action,' ib. 50, § 1 \(\tau \alpha \varepsilon \delta \eta \tau \varsigma \varsigma \nu \tau \sigma \nu \), 'the course of the disease,' III. 62, § 3 \(\epsilon \nu \sigma \omega \varepsilon \iota \delta \varepsilon \iota \ldots \tau \sigma \tau \iota \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon \zeta \varepsilon \), 'the peculiarity of the course they took,' VI. 77, § 2 \(\varepsilon \pi \iota \tau \sigma \tau \iota \tau \alpha \varepsilon \delta \eta \tau \rho \varepsilon \rho \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \nu \), 'becoming themselves to this policy,' VIII. 56, § 2 \(\tau \rho \varepsilon \varepsilon \tau \sigma \tau \iota \varepsilon \iota \tau \alpha \varepsilon \delta \eta \), 'had recourse to such a method of proceeding,' ib. 90. § 1 \(\varepsilon \nu \nu \tau \tau \iota \iota \varepsilon \tau \tau \epsilon \tau \nu \nu \nu \varepsilon \iota \delta \varepsilon \varepsilon \), 'opposed to this policy' or 'platform' (\(\varepsilon \text{id} \text{o} \text{s} \) here seems more definite than \(\iota \delta \varepsilon \alpha \) in \(\tau \theta \alpha \tau \alpha \tau \iota \iota \iota \iota \)).

(2) In the language of rhetoric this use was naturally transferred from action to speech, so that in Isocrates,

\(^1\) \(\iota \nu \alpha \mu \eta \tau \iota \rho \alpha \tau \tau \omicron \omega \mu \epsilon \theta \alpha \) \(\epsilon \nu \pi \tau \omicron \lambda \omicron \upsilon \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \) (Soph. 254 c).
Antid. § 80 ὁλος ἐἴδεσι προειλόμεν χρῆσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, it seems to mean an entire course or line of argument, as distinguished from a single phrase.

c. Ἐιδος was already used in common speech, with associations from the primary meaning, in a still more general sense, approaching to the abstract notion of 'mode,' 'sort,' 'kind.' Hippocrates περὶ ἀρχαῖς ἡλικίας, § 15 αὐτὸ τι ἐφ' ἐωτὸν θερμῶν, ἡ ψυχρᾶν . . . μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἐἴδει κοινωνέον.

Thuc. III. 82 τοῖς ἐἴδεσι διηλλαγμένα, 'differing in character.'

Isocr. 190 D, E (Ἐναγόρας, § 10) τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ δέδομαι κόσμοι . . . καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλώσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὑφόμασιν, . . . ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐἴδεσι διαποικιλὰ τὴν ποίησιν.

Isocr. 294 D (κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν § 20 Bekker) ἐὰν τὸν μὲν μαθητήν πρὸς τῷ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν οὕτων χρῆ τὰ μὲν ἐἴδη τῶν λόγων μαθεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

These, the ordinary uses of the word, may all be readily § 25. exemplified out of Plato.

α. (1) Rep. X. 618 A ἐπὶ ἐἴδεσι καὶ κατὰ κάλλη.
Charm. 154 D τὸ ἐἴδος πάγκαλος.
Symp. 189 E τὸ ἐἴδος στρογγύλων.
Prot. 352 A ἀνθρωπῶν σκοπῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐἴδους.

(2) Rep. III. 402 D ἐν τε τῇ ψυχῇ . . . ἐνότατα καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐἴδει, 'in mind and body.'
Symp. 196 A ὑψὸς τὸ ἐἴδος, 'of flexible make.'

β. (1) Rep. IX. 572 C ὀρμήσας εἰς ὑβρίν τε πάσαν καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖνων εἴδος, 'their way of life' (where ἢδος has been needlessly conjectured).

(2) Rep. V. 449 C ἐἴδος ὀλον οὐ τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκκλέπτειν τοῦ λόγου, 'a whole chapter.'

III. 352 A τί . . . ἡμῶν . . . ἐτι λοιπὸν εἴδος ; (cp. Laws VI. 7.51 A).

II. 363 E ἄλλο αὐ̂ τὸ ἐἴδος λόγων.

See also Phaedr. 263 C καλὸν γοῦν ἀν . . . εἴδος εἰ̂ ἐκατατε-νοηκόν.

c. Rep. II. 357 C τρίτων δὲ ὄρης τι . . . εἴδος ἀγαθῶν, 'a third kind of good.'
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Gorg. 473 E. ἄλλο αὖ τούτῳ εἶδος ἐλέγχων ἔστίν: Rep. III. 466 C, υἱὸς ἀπειρίᾳ τοῦτον τοῦ εἶδους τῆς ἰατρικῆς, 'this mode of practice.'

IV. 424 C, εἶδος ... καὶ γόν μονοκής μεταβάλλει, 'a new style in music.'

And therefore in passages of more distinctly philosophical import the interpreter is by no means bound to drag in a ready-made 'doctrine of ideas' (εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη) wherever the word εἶδος happens to occur. This can hardly be done without violence, for example, in the following places:—

Rep. II. 380 D ἄλλαττοιτα τὸ αὐτὸν εἶδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφὰς.
VI. 511 A, τοῦτο τοῖς νοητοῖς μεν τὸ εἶδος ἐλεγον.
VII. 530 C, οὗ μὴν ἔρ, ἄλλα πλείω ... εἴδη παρέχεται ἡ φορά.
VIII. 532 E, (ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις) κατὰ ποίᾳ δὴ εἴδη διέστηκε.

VIII. 544 D, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἴδη τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι, ὅσαπερ καὶ πολιτείων.

And in the concluding passage in Book VI, where εἶδος is the cardinal term, it is applied to the visible forms as well as to the invisible (510 D, τοῖς ὀραμάτως εἰδέσαι προσχρώνται, compared with 511 B, C, αἰσθητῶ παντάπασιν υἱοῖς προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ' εἰδέσαιν αὐτοῖς δὲ αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη). Obs.—In Phaedr. 249 b where εἶδος has been used in the logical sense (infra p. 298, γ) it recurs in the same passage (1) for the imaginary form or nature of the soul, and (2) for the form and appearance of the noble steed.

§ 26. Platonic uses.

Εἶδος as employed by Plato is a word of extremely wide significance, and even where its use is avowedly technical (as in Phæad. 102 A) it receives not a new meaning but a new application. It is applied so variously that it can hardly be defined more closely, as a philosophical term in Plato, than by saying that it denotes the objective reality of any and every abstract notion. Nor is the word in this its philosophical sense by any means confined to
the Platonic 'ideas.' The crude idealists of Soph. 246 are no less than Plato himself believers in εἶδος. And in the passage of the Republic just referred to (VI. 510, 511) the connotation of εἶδος is not confined to the classification of natural objects, nor to mathematical principles, nor to moral truths. It includes also ἐπιστήμη, ἀλήθεια, οὐσία, ἡ τοῦ ἄγαθον ιδέα and all other philosophical conceptions to which the mind of Plato had attained when the book was written.

The application of the term in different passages, even within the limits of one dialogue, is by no means uniform.

α. Εἶδος is an ethical notion regarded as an object of § 27. thought.

The chief instance of this use in the Republic is III. 402 B, C ὁδὸς μοναστικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα ... πρὶν ἣν τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδος καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἔλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὀσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ ἐναντία πανταχόν περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνώντα ἐν οἷς ἐνεστών αὐσθανώμεθα καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μῆτε ἐν συμκροῖς μῆτε ἐν μεγάλοις ἀτιμάζωμεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἴσωμεν τέχνης εἶναι καὶ μελέτης; where observe that two lines lower down the word is used in the vernacular meaning of 'bodily constitution' (ἐν τῇ νήχη ... καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδει: supra p. 294. a (2)).

Cp. Parm. 130 B δικαίων τι εἴδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἄγαθον καὶ πάντων ... τῶν τοιούτων.

Ib. 135 C καλῶν τε τί καὶ δίκαιων καὶ ἄγαθων καὶ ἐν ἐκαστῶν τῶν εἴδων.

β. This meaning is extended from ethical universals to all universals, implying at once the abstract notion and the essential nature of the thing.

Phaedo 100 B, C εἶναι τι καλῶν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό καὶ ἄγαθον καὶ μέγα καὶ τάλλα πάντα, resumed in ib. 102 B with εἶναι τι ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἴδων.

Crat. 440 B ἐί δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος μεταπίπτει τῆς γνώσεως, ἀμα τὰ ἀν μεταπίπτοι εἰς ἄλλο εἴδος γνώσεως, κ.τ.λ.

Rep. V. 476 Α, X. 596 Α εἴδος γὰρ ποὺ τι ἐν ἐκαστὸν
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eiόνωμεν τιθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ, ὥσ ταύτων ὄνομα ἐπι-φέρομεν.

Parm. 135 d. (See also ib. 130 c, d where the doubt is raised whether there is any such essential nature attaching to dirt, mud, hair, and other insignificant things.)

γ. Εἶδος is the reality of a general concept.

Phaedr. 249 b ὁ δὲ γὰρ ἀνθρωπον ἀνωτέρων κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 277 c, Rep. VIII. 544 D ἦτις καὶ ἐν εἴδει . . . κεῖται; Men. 72 c.

(1) Εἶδος is thus a logical whole, containing the particulars under it. Rep. V. 475 b παντὸς τοῦ εἶδους, Theact. 178 Α, ib. 148 d.

(2) But it is also a part, i.e. a subordinate species: Phaedr. 265 E κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι τέμπειν, Rep. V. 454 Α διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαφορούμενοι . . . ἐπισκοπέων, Theact. 181 C, 187 c.

Obs. 1.—Εἶδος when thus employed signifies a true and natural, as opposed to an arbitrary division. Cp. Polit. 262, 263.

Obs. 2.—In the passage of the Phaedrus p. 265 ff., the word is also used in the familiar idiomatic sense of a line of argument or mode of reasoning (see above, p. 295 b (2)) τούτων δὲ τῶν εἰκόνος ῥηθέντων δυνῶν εἴδουν . . . τὸ δ' ἐτερον δὴ εἶδος τὶ λέγεις; See also ib. 263 b, c.

δ. Εἶδος is applied, not only to the species into which a genus is divided, but also to the parts of an organic whole. These two conceptions are, in fact, not clearly kept apart by Plato.

Thus the Soul in Rep. IV. 435 ff. is shown to have three forms or natures (εἶδη), which are her parts (μέρη, p. 442), but are also species, having varieties under them (VIII. 559 Ε, alib.), and are repeatedly spoken of as γένη.

ε. Εἶδος is the type of any natural kind, comprising its essential attributes.
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Theact. 157 B, C ἄνθρωπον τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἐκαστὸν ἐφῶν τε καὶ εἴδος.

Parm. 130 C ἄνθρωπον εἴδος χωρίς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οίων ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν πάντων, αὐτῷ τί εἴδος ἄνθρωπον ἡ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος.

Obs.—This is the μονᾶς of Phileb. 15 Α ἐν ἄνθρωπον . . . καὶ Β.λ. ἐνα, κ.τ.λ., about which there, as in Parm. 130 C, B, Socrates expresses himself doubtfully.

ζ. Εἴδος is also used of an abstract whole, conceived as separable from the parts, as in

Theact. 204 Α ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονός εἰν τι εἴδος ἐτέραν τῶν πάντων μερῶν ;

η. Εἴδος is used not only for the type of a natural kind § 28. (man, horse, stone, &c.)—though on this point, as we have seen, there is in Plato’s mind a lingering doubt,—not only for generic attributes (good, beautiful, wise, &c., Phileb. 15), but also to denote an idea of relation, as for example, the idea of similarity.

Parm. 128 Ε αὑτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ εἴδος τι ὑμοιότητος.

In Rep. V. 454 Β τί εἴδος τὸ τῆς ἐτέρας τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τί τείνων ὑπικύμεθα ; the meaning of εἴδος is further explained by πρὸς τί τείνων. And in Phaedo 74, 75, although the term εἴδος is not expressly used of αὑτὸ τὸ ἴσον, yet the whole course of reasoning implies that this, together with μεῖζον καὶ ἐλαστὸν, is included amongst the εἴδη spoken of in ib. 102 Α.

θ. Lastly, εἴδος is applied to each of the primary forms or elements of thought. These come into question most in the dialectical dialogues (Theact., Soph., Polit., Phileb.), but the use referred to is much the same with that which occurs already in Phaedr. 263 B εἰληφέται τινὰ χαρακτῆρα ἐκατέρων τοῦ εἴδους. See especially Parm. 129 D, E. Theact. 184, 185, 197 D, 202 Α, Soph. 254 C, Phileb. 23 B, C, and again Soph. 258, where the θεστέρου φύσις is described as an εἴδος, and also as having an εἴδος (i.e. a real nature corresponding to its definition).
The chief meanings or applications of *eidos* as a philosophical term in Plato may accordingly be thus tabulated:—

*Eidos* is

1. an ethical notion. Rep. III. 402 c, D, &c.
2. a universal nature. Phaedo 160 b, c.
5. the type of a natural kind. Theact. 157 b.
6. a pure abstraction. e.g. the whole as separable from the parts, Theact. 204 a.
8. any primary form or element of thought, Theact. 184, 185, Parm. 129 c—e, Soph. 254 c, &c.

Γένος.

γένος often occurs in the Republic, Parmenides, and later dialogues, interchangeably with *eidos*, though suggesting rather the notion of *kind*, than of *form* or *nature*.

Rep. v. 477 b, c φύσιν δινάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων . . . εἰ ἄρα μακάριες ὁ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος . . . ἰβ. D, E εἰς τί γένος . . . ἦ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος ;

Parmenides 129 c αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἰδη.

See also Polit. 285 c, 286 d.

This use is especially frequent in the Sophistes.

γένος is combined with ἰδέα in Laws VIII. 836 D τὸ τῆς σῶφρινος ἰδέας γένος.

Obs.—The use of γένος becomes more frequent in the later dialogues and at the same time the applications of *eidos* and ἰδέα become more varied. For confirmation of these assertions the student may consult the following passages:—


'iδέα.

īdea is the feminine form of εἶδος. It is naturally the more picturesque word and is accordingly more frequent in the more imaginative and exalted passages. From this cause, and from its adoption as a term of Stoicism, the word has passed over into Latin and thence into modern literature and philosophy.

Ordinary meanings.

a. In the literal sense, = 'form,' 'appearance,' īdea is used by Pindar, Theognis, Euripides, Aristophanes, Herodotus, and Thucydides (VI. 4 ὁτὶ δρεπανωείδες τὴν ἱδέαν τῷ χορίῳ ἐστὶ).

b. In Herodotus it has the slightly more abstract meaning of Nature, description (I. 203 φύλλα τοῦμοίρε iδής, 'leaves of such a nature'; II. 71 φύσιν . . . παρέχοντα iδής τούμην, 'their nature and description is as follows'; VI. 119), and even of a line of thought or policy, VI. 100 ἐφφόνων δὲ διφασίας īdea.

c. In Thucydides, where (acc. to Bétant) the word occurs fourteen times (see esp. III. 81, § 5 πᾶσα τῇ ἱδέᾳ κατέστη θανάτω), it has acquired the further meaning of a plan, or mode of operation (see above, εἶδος, p. 294, b (1)).

II. 77, § 2 πᾶσαν ἱδέαν ἐπεκόμων, 'they devised every plan.'

III. 62, § 2 τῇ . . . αὐτῇ ἱδέᾳ ὑπερον . . . ἀπτικῶς, 'on the same principle.'

d. In Isocrates īdea already signifies a form (1) of life, (2) of speech, (3) of thought (see also Aristoph. Nub. 547 ἄλλ' ἄει καυχᾶς ἱδέας εἰσφέρων σοφίζομαι, Ran. 384, Av. 993).
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(1) Isoc. p. 21 (Nicocl. § 46) δέι δὲ χρήσθαι μὲν ἁμφοτέρας ταῖς ἰδέαις ταύταις (dignity and urbanity).

32 E. τὰς μὲν μὴ μετεχούσις τούτων τῶν ἰδεῶν (Ἀρετᾶς) μεγάλων κακῶν αὐτίας οὖσας, ‘those virtues that have no share of temperance and justice.’

The ἰδέαι referred to are σωφροσύνη and δίκαιοσύνη.

36 Λ ἐν ταῖς αὐτίαις ἰδέαις (explained by ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις, ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις, &c.).

259 E. (Panathen. § 141) τᾶς . . . ἰδέας τῶν πολιτείων τρεῖν εἶναι.

(2) 42 C. (Panegyr. § 7) εἰ μὲν μηδαμῶς ἄλλος οὐκ ἢ ή ἄλλος ἡ μὲν μᾶς ἰδέας.

210 E. (Helen. Encom. § 16) ἐστι δ’ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν . . . ὁ λόγος, 294 C (Sophist. § 18).

(3) 312 C. (Antid. § 12) τοσαῦτας ἰδέας καὶ τοσοῦτον ἄλληλων ἀφετατοῖς συγγραμμάσαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν, ‘notions so important and so remote from one another.’

(4) A special use occurs in 216 E. (Helen. Encom. § 62) ὅσα ταύτας τῆς ἰδέας κεκοιμώμηκε, where αὕτη ἡ ἰδέα is the attribute of beauty.

(The word is hardly, if at all, used by Xenophon.)

§ 30. Thus it is evident that by the time of Plato the word ἰδέα was ready for his philosophical use. But before touching on this, it is important to observe, as in the case of εἴδος, (1) that he also employs it freely in all the senses (except perhaps that marked ε) above-mentioned, and (2) that even in philosophical passages it is by no means always used with a scientific or technical intention. Such an intention is only to be assumed when the context places it beyond doubt.


Phaedr. 251 A ἡ τῆς σώματος ἰδέαν.

Phaedo 108 D τῆς . . . ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς.

Polit. 291 B ταχὺ δὲ μεταλλάττομαι τὰς τε ἰδέας καὶ τὴν ὀνάμαν εἰς ἄλληλους.

b. Rep. II. 369 A τῆς τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ
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ελάττωρος ἰδέα ἑπισκοπῆτες, 'the resemblance of the greater in the form of the less.'

Rep. II. 380 D φαυτάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις ἰδέαις.

Tim. 58 D τῶν τῶν σχῆματος ἰδέαν, 'the shape of the figure.'

v. This meaning is possibly approached in Rep. vi. 507 E ὅπερ σμικρὰ ἄρα ἰδέα, κ.τ.λ., 'by a notable expedient' (?); Phaedr. 237 D, 238 A. But it is hard to find in Plato an exact parallel for the Thucydidean use.

v. Phaedr. 253 B εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου ἐπιτήδειμα καὶ ἰδέαν ἁγιόσως, 'into conformity with his practices and way of life.' Cp. εἰδός, p. 294, b (1).

Even where the context is highly philosophical, ἰδέα often retains its usual, vernacular, meaning. Thus in Phaedr. 246 A it is used not of absolute Justice, Beauty, &c., but of the nature or conformation of the soul, as it is there figuratively described. And in Theact. 184 C, D the word is similarly applied, not to Being, sameness, difference, and the other primary notions, but to the nature of the mind perceiving them—εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὁ τι δεὶ καλεῖν, πάντα τάδε ἑντεύξει.

Platonic uses.

The transition to the specially Platonic use is well marked in Parm. 131 E, 132 A οὖν σὲ ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἐν ἑκαστὸν εἴδος οὐσθάντα εἶναι. ὅταν πάλιν ἄτα μεγάλα σου δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἰσος δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἡ αὐτῆ εἶναι εἰτε πάντα ἓδοντε, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ μέγα ἑγεὶ εἶναι, 'when you look at them together, there appears to you one and the same form (or idea) in them all.'

a. ἰδέα, as a philosophical term, signifies rather form than kind. The meaning of a class, which εἴδος often essentially connotes, attaches only accidentally to ἰδέα. The latter term immediately suggests the unity of a complex notion as present to the mind. It is thus used to describe the work of συναγωγή, where εἴδος denotes the result of διαφέρεις:—

Phaedr. 265 D, E εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορφώντα ἄγειν τὰ
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Theaet. 205D, E, Soph. 253C, D, Phileb. 60D.

Observe the frequent combination of μὴ ἰδέα.

See also Phaedo 103D, E—where at first sight the terms may seem to be interchanged—μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ ἐννοτοῦ ὑράματος εἰς τὸν ἄλικ ξρώμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, δὲ ἐστι μὲν ὡκ ἐκεῖνο, ἐχεῖ δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἄλικ ὁτανπερ ἦ... 104C οὐδὲ ταύτα ἔοικε ἑδομένου ἐκείνης τὴν ἰδέαν ἦ ἄν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὡτῇ ἐνακτίᾳ ἦ. On a closer inspection it is seen that ἰδέαν corresponds not to εἶδος but to μορφήν in the preceding sentence.

§ 32. It follows that each εἶδος, or distinct and definite kind, has its own ἰδέα, or notional form.

Euthyphr. 5D τὸ ἀνώτιον... αὐτὸ δὴ αὐτῷ ὁμοιόν καὶ ἔχει μὲν ταῦτα ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ὅσιότητα.

Phil. 25B τὸ μικτὸν (εἶδος)... τῶν ἰδέαν φύσομεν ἔχειν;

β. In Rep. VI, where Plato dwells on the unity of knowledge and characterizes the philosopher as a spectator of all time and all existence, the term ἰδέα, in the more precise philosophical sense, occurs with special frequency.

VI. 486D, E ἦν (ὑπάρχουσα) ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὀντος ἰδέαν ἐκάστου τὸ αὐτοφύνει εὐάγγειον παρέξει.

VI. 507B, C τὰς... ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μὲν, ὁρῶσθαι δ' οὖ.

And the process so indicated naturally culminates in the contemplation of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Closely akin to this last is the use in Phil. 67B οἰκειότερον... τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέα.

And in the more imaginative description of the parts of the Soul towards the end of Book IX ἰδέα again takes the place of εἶδος:—

588C, D μίαν μὲν ἰδέαν θηρίων ποικίλων... μίαν δὴ τοῖνυν ἄλλην ἰδέαν λέοντος, μίαν δὲ ἅρπωτον (he had just said in illustration συχνὰ λέγονται ἐνοπλευρικῶς ἰδέαι πολλαί εἰς ἐν γενέσθαι) 1.

1 To estimate Plato's freedom in the use of terms, words like ὄρος, τύπος,
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γ. Ἠδέα is also preferred in speaking of an organic whole, in which the parts or elements are merged:—

Thaet. 204 Α μία Ἠδέα εἰς ἑκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γνησιοτέρην.

The word Ἠδέα may be regarded as symbolizing the union of thought and imagination in Plato.

αὐτός.

a. The emphatic use of αὐτός is the most constant and § 33. characteristic of the various modes in which Plato expresses his belief in the absolute reality of universals. The term Ἠδέα in its technical sense is absent both from the myth in the Phaedrus and from the discourse of Diotima in the Symposium, where εἶδος, too, only comes in by the way. But the pronominal use now in question perpetually recurs. It is needless to quote passages at length: it is enough to refer to Lys. 220 B, Crat. 439 C, D, Phaedr. 247 D, Phaedo 74 B, 76 C, 100 B, C (αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, cp. Rep. VI. 485 D, X. 604 A), Symp. 211 B (αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μεθ' αὐτοῦ), ib. D (θεωμένῳ αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν), Rep. I. 342 A, II. 393 A, IV. 438 C, V. 472 C, 476 A—C, 479 A, VI. 493 E, 506 D, E, VII. 532 A, X. 612 A, Parm. 133 D, &c., Thaet. 175 B, C (αὐτής δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας).

β. Yet, while thus consecrated to special use, the § 34. pronoun is far from losing its proper idiomatic sense. Words like αὐτοῦδικαιοσύνην belong to later Platonism, although, through a not unnatural error, they have found their way into MSS. of Plato (E. on Text: above, p. 71). Such a form as αὐτοῦνθυρσοῦσιν nowhere occurs, and, though the neuter pronoun is often joined to a feminine abstract word, frequent changes of the order clearly prove that they do not adhere together as in a compound. See for example

μορφή, μοράς (Phileb.), μοῖρα, φίλον (Polit.), μέρος, μέλος, στοιχεῖον, μύρον, σχήμα, ἐνάς, should be considered. This is more noticeable in later dialogues. The expression is more varied, as the philosopher becomes more sure of his ground.

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Rep. I. 331 C τούτο ὅ αὐτό, τῇρ ὑποκαιωσάμην . . .
Theaet. 146 E ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅ τι ποτ’ ἔστιν.

And consider the context of Π. 363 Α οὖκ αὐτὸ ὑποκαιωσάμην ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, where Par. A reads αὐτοδικαιοῦμην.

Once more, the Platonic student must often refrain from Platonizing. Even in passages where the ‘doctrine of ideas’ is immediately in question the emphatic αὐτός occurs in the ordinary vernacular sense. The context must decide. Thus in Rep. VI. 510 E αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα . . . 511 Α αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεὶσι, the pronoun refers to τοῖς ὑπομένους ἔδεασ supra, individual objects themselves as opposed to their shadows or reflexions, although in the words τοῖς τεταγμένοις αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα . . . καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, what has here been called the special use of αὐτός has intervened. Compare Parm. 130 Ω χρῆ φάναι καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρίς, ὅποιοι αὐτῶν ὃς Ἦμεισ μεταχειριζόμεθα,—‘the actual hair, mud, dirt, &c., of common life’: Soph. 241 E (περὶ) εἶδομων . . . εἶτε φαντασμάτων αὐτῶν, ἣ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν, κ.τ.λ., ‘illusions themselves or the arts concerned with them.’

γ. It follows that there is nothing specially Platonic in such uses as Crat. 432 Ω τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα (‘name and thing’), or Theaet. 202 Α αὐτὸ ἐκείνο μονὸν τις ἐρεῖ (‘the term by itself apart from attributes’).

§ 35. Εἶναι, ὅ ἐστι, τὸ ὅν, τὰ ὄντα, τὸ ὃν ἔκαστον, ὄντως, ὢσια.

(Theaet. 186 Α τούτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπησε.)

In all Greek philosophy, and not in Plato alone, metaphysical truths are expressed through εἶναι, its inflexions and derivatives. The cause of this is partly to be sought in Eleaticism, but largely also in the Socratic form of questioning, τι ἔστι:

The student who would learn of Plato in simplicity should clear his mind of Aristotelian distinctions, such as those in the third book of the Metaphysics, and, still more carefully of Dascyn. Wesen. Ansich, Fürsich.
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*Anundfürsichsceyn*, and other terms of modern German philosophy.

a. *Oúσία* is the truth of predication, as sifted out by § 36, dialectical discussion (Prot. 349 B); in other words, it is the reality of definition:

Rep. X. 597 A ὃ δή φαμεν εἶναι ὃ εστι κλώη.

Phaedo 75 D perì ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπιστήμημέθα τούτο, δ ἔστιν: ib. 65 D.

Phaedo 78 C αὐτή ἡ ὀσία ἤς λόγων ὄδομεν τῷ εἶναι:

Phaedr. 245 E ψυχῆς ὀσίαιν τε καὶ λόγου τούτων αὐτῶν τιν Λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται.

Bein, so conceived, is called in Phaedo 76 C, 1) ἡ τουαύτη ὀσία.

β. τά ὄντα, τὸ ὑπ’ ἑκαστον, have nearly the same force.

Phaedr. 247 E καὶ τάλλα ὀσιάτως τά ὄντα ὄντως θεωσαμένη.

ib. 262 B ὃ μὴ ἐγνωρίκως δ ἔστιν ἑκαστον τῶν ὄντων.

Theact. 174 A τῶν ὄντων ἑκαστόν ὅλον.

Rep. VI. 484 D τοὺς ἐγνωσώτας μὲν ἑκαστὸν τὸ ὑπ’.

γ. But sometimes, in moments of exaltation, the whole § 37. of Being (like the sea of Beauty in the Symposium) is spoken of as one *continuum*, which, as the object of intellectual contemplation, exists in a region above the Visible:—

Phaedr. 247 C ἢ γὰρ ἄχρωματος τε καὶ ἀφημάτιστον καὶ ἀναφής ὀσία ὄντως ψυχῆς ὀσία κυβερνήτη μόνῳ θεατῆ ὑπ’:

ib. D, E ἐπιστήμης, οὐχ ἢ γένεσις πρώσεστι, οὐδ’ ἢ ἐστί ποι ἐτέρα ἐν ἐτέρῳ ὀσίᾳ ἡν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἄλλα τῆν ἐν τῷ δ ἔστιν ὑπ’ ὄντως ἑπιστήμην ὀσίαν. (Cp. Tim. 29 C, 35 A.)

The white light of Being so conceived is parted into the primary colours, as it were, of Knowledge and Truth, as for example in Rep. VI. 508, 509. where, however, the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ dominates over ὀσία as well as over ἐπιστήμη and ἀλήθεια. See also for the totality of Being, VI. 486 A θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρώμον, πᾶσης δὲ ὀσίας. And, for ὀσία as abstract truth. VII. 525 C ἐπ’ ἀλήθειαν τε καὶ ὀσίαν.
§ 38. δ. In the dialectical dialogues οὐσία and τὸ ὄν have again the more logical meaning: 'Reality, answering to truth of conception:' or the essence of a thing as defined (Polit. 283 E. Phil. 32).

For example, in the strikingly modern passage of the Theaetetus quoted above, this sentence occurs, 186 B τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αὐσθήμεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὑσταύτως . . . τὴν δὲ γε οὐσίαν καὶ δ τι ἐστόν καὶ τὴν ἐναντίότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὴ τῆς ἐναντίότητος αὐτή ἡ ψυχή ἐπαινοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἀλληλα κρίνεις πειρᾶται ἡμῖν. And, just below, τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὄφέλειαν ('what they are and what good they do') μόργας καὶ ἐν χρώμα διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παράδειγμα παραλείγεται οἷς ἐν καὶ παραλείγεται. And in the main argument of the Sophistes, τὸ ὄν is positive truth or reality, as opposed to negation. The verb of existence is attenuated to the copula, passing from the notion of essence to that of relation. Yet this dialectical procedure does not preclude a recurrence to the language of 'ontology':—

Soph. 254 Α, Β ὁ δὲ γε φιλόσοφος, τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ὑδέα, διὰ τὸ λαμπρόν αὐτὸ τῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὑπετής ὀφθήμαι τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὁμάτα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορίζετα ἀδύνατα.

A different shade of meaning is observable according as εἶναι is opposed to γίγνεσθαι or φαίνεσθαι (Tim. 27 D, Parm. 165 Α).

ε. A special meaning of οὐσία = μικτὴ οὐσία, 'concrete reality,' is formulated in Phil. 27 Β, and applied in Tim. 35 Α. But to examine this at present would be to travel too far beyond the stage of Platonism embodied in the Republic.

ζ. If the philosophical meanings of ἔνδος, ὑδέα, αὐτός, are crossed by the vernacular meaning, this happens inevitably also in the case of εἶναι in both its meanings, (1) as the copula and (2) as the substantive verb.
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(1) Rep. vi. 507 b πολλὰ καλὰ . . . καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως εἰναὶ φανεῖ τε καὶ διορίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ.

(2) Parm. 135 D, Ε οὐδὲν χαλεπῶν . . . ὁτιων τὰ ἐντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν.

So οὕσια in the sense of ‘property’ occurs in Phaedr. 252 a καὶ οὕσια δι’ ἀμέλειον ἀπολλυμένης παρ’ οὐδὲν τίθεται. And there is a play on both uses of the word (property and truth) in Gorg. 472 Β ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλεις μὲ ἐκ τῆς οὕσιας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

Μετέχειν, μέθεξις, μετάσχεσις, ἔχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν, προσχρήσθαι. § 39. μετάληψις, κοινωνία, μετείναι, παρείναι, παρουσία, ἀγγείον (Lys. 219 D), ἑνείναι, προσγίγνεσθαι, προσεῖναι, παραγίγνεσθαι, ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὁμοίωσις, μίμησις, παραδείγμα, περιφέρεσθαι, περιτρέχειν, μετατίθεσθαι, πεποθθέναι, πάθος ἔχειν, συμπλοκὴ.

(ἐίπε παρουσία, ἐίπε κοινωνία, ἐίπε ὅπη δή καὶ ὅπως προθαγορευμένη,—ου γὰρ ἐτί τούτο διασχυρίζομαι Phaedo 160 D, cp. Rep. v. 476 c, d.)

See Arist. Metaph. i. 6, § 4 τὴν μέντοι γε μέθεξις ἢ τῆν μύρησιν, ἢτις ἃν εἰ ἕν τῶν εἰσών, ἀφεῖσαι ἐν κοινῷ ἔτηεῖν.

a. In his first discovery of the supreme reality of universals, Plato lightly assumes the correlation between them and the particulars of experience. He is more concerned in asserting this than in explaining it. And he expresses his conception in a variety of ways. When Socrates in the Phaedo substitutes a dialectical for a physical method, he implies a causal relation of idea to fact—ἐφημοῦ γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἴδος ὁ πεπραγμάτευμαι (Phaedo 160 b), and he explains this by participation: ib. 6 εἰ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλῆν αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ. He does not, however, confine himself to the word μετέχειν, as if this were the chosen term of the school: μεταλαμβάνειν (102 b) is freely substituted, also κοινωνία (100 D). And it is observable that the abstract nouns, μέθεξις, μετάληψις (Parm. 131, 132, 151 F), do not seem to have been at this time in use.
§ 40. 3. The participation of the particular in the universal is otherwise spoken of as the presence of the universal in the particular: Phaedo 130 D ἡ ἐκείνην τοῦ καλοῦ εἶτε παρουσία, εἶτε κοινωνία. Κρ. Ι.Υ.ς. 217 D καὶ μὴν παρεῖ ἡ ἀν αὐτῶς λειτουργία: Charm. 158 E. Ἐνείναι — 'to inhere' is similarly used in the Republic: III. 402 C τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδη ἀλλ' ἐν ὀσὶν ἐνείναι. In the same passage these moral attributes are spoken of as 'carried about' πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα; and in Theaet. 202 A, though not in stating Plato's own theory, general predicates are said to run round about, περιτρέχειν, amongst particular subjects.

§ 41. γ. The relation of the universal to the particular is elsewhere regarded as the relation of the Perfect to the Imperfect, or of the Ideal to the Actual. Plato in the Phaedo does not feel this point of view to be inconsistent with the former. In that dialogue (p. 74) the reminiscence which is the germ of knowledge is accounted for by the resemblance of things transitory to eternal truths, known by us in a pre-existent state. The perception of equality and inequality, for example, is referred to the recollection of Ideal Equality (ἀετὸ τὸ ὦτον). Sense-perceived equality recalls this by resemblance, but falls short of it. ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἄμαρμησκηται τίς τι, ἀρ' οὖν ἄναγκαιον . . . ἐννοεῖν, εἶτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἶτε μὴ, κ.τ.λ. In Phaedo 69 B the ordinary Virtue is called ἁμαρμαρφία, and in 76 D occurs the phrase, ταύτα (τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων) ἐκεῖνη (τῇ οὐσίᾳ) ἀπεικάζομεν.

§ 42. This form of Plato's Idealism appears principally (1) in passages marked by strong ethical aspiration, or (2) where his speculation takes a cosmological turn. The image often employed is that of pattern and copy, borrowed from the 'imitative' arts, especially from the art of painting.

(1) Moral improvement is continually represented as a process of assimilation to the Divine (see esp. Theaet. 176 B). And in this connexion Plato treats the notions of participation and assimilation as interchangeable. For
instance in Phaedr. 253 A the words καθ’ ὠςον ὄννατον θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν are immediately followed up with ποιοῦσιν ὡς ὄννατον ὄμοιότατον τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ. See Arist. Met. I. 6, § 3 τὴν δὲ μεθέξιν τούτων μόνον μετέβαλεν οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φαίνει εἶναι τῶν ἄριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει τούτων μεταβαλὼν. τὴν μέντοι γε μεθέξιν ἡ τῆς μέμησιν, ἦτε ἂν εἰν τῶν εἰδών, ἀφεῖσαν εὖ κοινῷ ζητεῖν.

In the Republic, the perfect or ideal state is more than once described as a pattern of which the actual state is to be a copy:—V. 472 D, ἐπαράδειγμα ἐπιούμεν ὁμοφόρα ἀγαθῆς πόλεως, VI. 500 E οἱ τῶν θείων παραδείγματι χρώμενοι χαράγματοι. And the same ideal is to be the pattern for the individual, whether the perfect state is realized or not,—IX. 592 B ἀλλ’...ἐν οὕτῳ ὡς εἰς παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὃρᾶν καὶ ὀρθῶς ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. This comes near to the exalted tone of Theaet. 176 E παραδειγμάτων...ἐν τῷ ὃντι ἐστῶτων, τοῦ μὲν θείων εἴδαμωνιστάτον, τοῦ δὲ ὁθέων ἀδιαμοιεστάτον...λανθανοντι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιόμενοι διὰ τὸν ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀγομοιόμενοι, where the conjunction of opposites has a similar effect to that in Phaedo 74 D.

And in the Politicus (273 B, 293 E, 297 C) the true statesman is represented as imitating from afar the principles of Divine Government.

Similarly in Rep. VI. 500 C, Timaeus 47 C, the philosopher is described as imitating the universal order. See also Tim. 88 C κατὰ δὲ ταύτα...τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἀπομιμοῦμενον εἰδός.

(2) In the last-mentioned passages there is a union of § 43. the ethical with the cosmological strain. The following may serve to illustrate the place which μῦθος holds from time to time in Plato's cosmogony. In the mythical description of the Earth in Phaedo 110 foll., the colours and the precious stones known in human experience are but meagre samples (δείγματα) of those on the upper surface of the globe as seen from above. In the vision of Judgement at the close of the Republic (not to dwell on the
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(παραθείγματα) the orrery turning on Necessity's knees, although partly pictorial, is partly also an ideal pattern (and in some occult or inconsistent way an efficient cause) of the revolutions of the planets.

In the Phaedrus, 270 B, earthly realities are ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἐκεί; and each lover makes himself and his beloved like his god (ἄγαλμα).

And in the allegory of the Cave (Rep. VII) into which less of what is purely mythological enters, natural objects in their most essential forms are described as σκεφαστὰ εἴδωλα. things manufactured after the supreme realities, and moved by hands unseen so as to cast their shadows on the wall. Elsewhere in the Republic, the figure of substance versus shadow repeatedly appears: II. 365 C, 382 D, III. 401 B, 402 B, C, IV. 443 C, V. 472 C, VI. 510, 511, VII. 516 A, 520 C, 534 C, IX. 587 D. Cp. Lysis 219 C, D, Phaeud. 250 A, B. And a similar strain of metaphor is carried further in the Timaeus, where the world is an εἰκὼν, or true image (not σκιά, an imperfect likeness) of the νοητῶν εἴδων, whose forms are stamped upon the chaotic receptacle of space 'in a strange and hardly explicable way.' (Tim. 50 C.)

§ 44. Meanwhile the other metaphors of participation in the ideas, real presence of the ideas, communion with the ideas, are by no means discarded. For the Republic it is enough to quote V. 476 C, D, where indeed the two modes of expression (τὸ ὁμοιον . . . τὰ μετέχουσα) are conjoined,—as they are in Parm. 133 D. See also VI. 505 A ἤ καὶ ὁδίκως καὶ τὸλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὑφέλιμα γέγυματο.

In the later dialogues (Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim., Laws) the relation of the individual to the universal is altogether less in question. See Excursus, Essay on Structure, p. 46 ff. But μέθεξε still takes place between subject and predicate, or between substance and attribute.

Cp. Tim. 38 E, 39 α ἐν μεν ὁ παραθείγματος, εἴδων ὑποστέθη, νοητῶν καὶ ἀν] κατὰ ταύτα ὅτι, μίμησαι ὅπαραθείγματων, δεύτερω, γένεσιν ἔχον καὶ ὁριστῶν.
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Soph. 247 ά δικαιοσύνης ἔξει καὶ παρουσίᾳ (L. C.'s conjecture δ. ε. κ. φρονήσεως has been approved by Schanz, but see the words which follow, τῶ γε δινατόν τῷ παραγόντεσθαι καὶ ἀπογάγεσθαι πάντως εἰναι τι φθονοῦσιν), which show that the correction is not absolutely necessary.

Ib. 248 C ὅταν τῷ παρῇ . . . δόναμις.

Ib. 256 ά διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὖ πάντ' αὐτῶν.

Phil. 16 D μίαν ἱδέαν περὶ παντῶς . . . ζητεῖν εὐρήσεων γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν.

Ib. 60 B, C τῷ πληθυσμῷ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷ τῶν ἄλλων. τίνι;

ὁ παρείπ τούτ'] ἀεὶ τῶν ζωῶν διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ,

μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἑτὶ προσδείκται, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεωτᾶτον ἐπεί.

Polit. 268 B μονικῇς . . . μετείληφεν.

Ib. 269 D πολλῶν μὲν καὶ μακαρίων παρὰ τοῦ γενώματος μετείληφεν, ὅταν οὖν δὴ κεκοινωνηκέ γε καὶ σώματος, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 273 B, 275 D οὐ μετόν.

Tim. 34 E μετέχοντες τοῦ . . . εἰκῇ. 36 E, 58 E μετίσχει μᾶλλον κινήσεως, 77 Λ, B μετασχῆ . . . μετέχει, 90 C καθ' ὅσον . . . μετασχεῖν ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται.

δ. The ἀπορίματα raised in the Parmenides, then (with § 45. which cp. Phil. 15), have not had the effect of banishing 'participation' (see esp. the examples just quoted from Polit., Phileb.). Yet it was there shown that particulars could not partake in the universal εἴδος, either (1) wholly, or (2) in part, nor (3) as individuals in a common form, nor (4) as objects of thought, nor (5) as copies of a pattern (καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὐτή τῶν ἄλλων γέγονεσθαι τῶν εἴδων οὐκ ἄλλη της ἡ εἰκασθήναι αὐτοῖς). Nor are these difficulties solved in the latter portion of that dialogue. What is really shown there is the inadequacy of the Zenonian dialectic, since by subjecting to it the Eleatic hypothesis of One Being, this is proved (1) to have no predicates, (2) to have all predi-

1 In Parm. 133 β there are two stages in the descent from the ideas to individuals, (1) ὁμοίωσις, subsisting between the idea and its ὁμοιόμενα or concrete type, and (2) μεθέξις τοῦ ὁμοίωματος.
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cates, and (3) to have neither all nor none, but to be in transition between them. Plato thus hints indirectly at the root-fallacy which he has ridiculed in the Euthydemus, and of which he finally disposes in the Sophistes—the blank absoluteness of affirmation and negation. By the series of inferences which Parmenides himself sums up in the concluding paragraph, Plato, it may be fairly said, ἐξημφοτέρικε τὸν τοῦ Ζήμωνος λόγον (cp. Euthyd. 360 b).

§ 46. ε. This is not done without a motive, and the motive may be gathered in the words of Socrates, Parm. 129 c—E εϊ... αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τἀνατά ταῦτα πάθη πάγχοιτα. ἄξον θαυμάζειν... ἐν... πρῶτον μὲν διανεῖματι χωρίς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη. αἶον ὁμοιότητα τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ στᾶσι καὶ κύρισι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴτη ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράνυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίγη, ἡγαίμην ἐν ἐγωγ', ἐφη, θαυμαστῶς. Cp. Phileb. 14 d. The discussion of those ἄπορια has cleared the ground for truer modes of conception. Something like a theory of predication is at length formulated. But even in the Philebus the construction of ideas into a κόσμος τις ἄσώματος is carried only a little way, and after the relativity of ideas is proved, Plato still speaks of them as absolute, and still employs metaphorical language to indicate metaphysical relations. Yet the point of view is no longer quite the same as before.

As the conception of the nature of predication becomes more distinct, a new stage of inquiry is reached in the search for an order and connexion of ideas. A rational psychology begins to clear away the confusions of a crude ontology. And while in the untried effort to account for γένεσις, language is still affected with dualism and tinged with mythological imagery, a far less dubious light is already shining on the world of thought.

§ 47. In the Phaedo and elsewhere, moral and other 'ideas'—αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ἀγαθόν, ὁῖκανον, ὁἰστον, ὁτον, μέγα—were ranked together as coordinate, or summed up as ἡ ἀλώς ὁμία and
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set over against the transitoriness of individual objects, τὰ
tovτων (sc. τῶν εἴδων) μετέχοντα. But in the concluding
passage of Book VI, and in what follows it, there is a reve-
lation of the unity and organization of knowledge, implying
(1) that there is an order in the intellectual world, and
(2) that there is a way upward and downward ¹ between
intellect and sense: moreover that above knowledge, truth
and being, there is the supreme domination of the good.
But the statement is in general terms, and no account is
taken of the difficulties which are raised, without being
solved, in the Parmenides. In the Theaetetus (185 c) it is
clearly seen that Being, Unity, Number, likeness, difference
and goodness (even when relative) are notions of a higher
order than other generalizations of experience—they are
birds that fly everywhere about the cage ²—and also that
there are relations between them (Theaet. 186 B τὴν οὐσίαν
... τῆς ἐναρτιότητος). The existence of such relations amongst
the highest ideas (or primary forms of thought and being)
is what the Stranger in the Sophistes undertakes to prove;
and here the long-familiar words κοινωνία, μετέχειν, μετα-
lαμβάνειν, ἐνεώια (also ἔμμεμεῖς, ἐνοικεῖν, συνοικεῖν, δέχεσθαι,
προσάπτειν, περιτρέχειν, μετατίθεσθαι, μιχθῆναι, ἀφμόττειν, προσ-
αρτᾶσθαι, συμμοφονεῖν, σύμφυτων ἔχειν) ³ are again in frequent
use. Even the dim form of Space in the Timaeus, the
γενέσεως τιθῆνη, is spoken of as εἴδος τὸ... μεταλαμβάνον... πη
τὸν νοητὸν, and again as (εἰκόνα) οὐσίας ἁμῶς γε πως ὄντεκχο-
μένην ⁴. At the same time the other metaphor of Pattern
and Copy comes once more into service, not now, however,
merely to express the relation of particular to universal,
but to throw light upon another difficulty, the possibility

¹ Cp. Heracl. Fr. 69 Bywater δόλοι ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὄλη.
² Theaet. 197 ὁ ὁ cp. Soph. 254 c.
³ See Soph. 216, 223, 228 B, 235 A, 238, 248, 249 A, 250 E, 251, 252, 253,
255, 256, 259; Polit. 309; Phil. 15 24 37. 57. 60, 66.
⁴ Tim. 45 D, 51 A, 52 C: cp. ib. 64 D λύπης δὲ καὶ ἦδωρς οὐ μετέχον. The
simple words ἔχειν, λαμβάνειν, βικτῆσθαι are often similarly used. So too ἡ
στείρεσθαι Phileb. 67.
of false opinion (φενοῖς δόξα) and of falsity (φενοῖς λόγος). And as the idea of predication becomes more distinct, other modes of expression of a more definite kind are introduced—πεπονθέναι Parm. 148 A, πάθος ἔχειν Soph. 245 A, πάθημα πάσχειν, συλλαβή Theact. 202, συμπλοκή Theact. 202 B, Soph. 262 C, 240 C, σύγκρασις Polit. 273 B, &c., Phil. 64 D, &c., κόσμος ὁσώματος Phil. 64 B.

§ 48. We are at present concerned not with Plato’s philosophy, but with his use of Language. Else more might be said not only of his various modes of expression, but of the increasing clearness of his thoughts, and of an approach to system.

His expressions are various, because almost always figurative. Metaphorical language about philosophical notions is necessarily broken and inconsistent, and cannot without confusion be tested by a logical standard. Many phases of the Ideas occurred to Plato’s mind. They are universals, realities, absolute, relative: they represent the most abstract and the most concrete notions: they are isolated, and also ‘flying about’ everywhere among objects: they are akin to numbers, though not the same with them. Plato does not attempt to harmonize all these different views; they are experimental conceptions of the Universal, which he gradually brings back more and more to what we term common sense,—to psychology and logic from a fanciful ontology. His language about them in the Phaedrus, Meno, Phaedo, is different from that which he uses in the Philebus and the Laws; or rather in the two latter dialogues the transcendental form of them has almost disappeared. If instead of dwelling on his use of terms we consider his thought and intention 1, we find that in the dialectical dialogues and those which go with them (Tim., Critias, Laws), through grappling with the difficulties which his own theories have raised in relation to

1 τι... διαοχύμενος εἶναι Theact. 184 A.
contemporary opinion, he is confronted more and more closely with the great central questions of all philosophy: the essence of thought, the meaning of the Universe, the conditions and possibilities of human improvement for the individual and for communities. The last word of Plato on the nature of Mind is hardly different from the language of Modern Philosophy. What can be more 'modern,' for example, than the definition of Thought in Soph. 265 D, E., or than several of the psychological distinctions in the Philebus?

Other terms having a metaphysical significance may be dismissed more briefly.

Φύσις.

§ 49.

The word φύσις (after appearing once in Hom. Od. X. 303, for the 'virtues' of a drug) occurs in writers from Pindar to Aristophanes with various shades of meanings:—birth, growth, stature, native character or disposition, inherent power or capacity, as well as in the more general sense of that which is natural, or in accordance with experience, as opposed to what is artificial, acquired, conventional, or monstrous.

Herodotus II. 45 already has the idiomatic phrase φύσιν εχει (ένα εύντα τόν 'Ηρακλέα ... κός φύσιν εχει πολλὰς μυριάδας φονεότατα). Thucydides repeatedly speaks of 'human nature' (ή ἀνθρωπεία φύσις I. 76, II. 50, III. 45, 84; see also III. 82, § 2 ένω ἄν άνθρωπων φύσις) and in V. 105, § 2 ύπο φύσεως άναγκαίας, he alludes to the inevitableness of 'natural law.'

Professor Burnet in his able work on Early Greek Philosophy argues with much force in favour of the thesis that 'the word which was used by the early cosmologists to express the idea of a permanent and primary substance was none other than φύσις, and that the title περὶ φύσεως so commonly given to philosophical works in the sixth and

1 Also in the Batrachomyomachia, in the sense of natural endowments.
fifth centuries B.C. does not mean "on the nature of things," —a far later use of the word,—but simply "concerning the primary substance"; and that 'in Greek philosophical language φύσει always means that which is primary, fundamental and persistent as opposed to that which is secondary, derivative and transient, what is given as opposed to what is made or becomes.'

The preciseness of this statement can hardly be borne out by quotations, but it may be accepted as an expression of the fact that the early philosophers in writing περὶ φύσεως had given to the word a new depth of meaning by choosing it as an expression for the uniformity of experience for which they sought to account. Hence κατὰ φύσιν, φύσει, παρὰ φύσιν are phrases in common use. And the opposition of the natural to the conventional (φύσει to νόμῳ) was a common-place of sophistical disputation, Isocr. Panegyr. p. 62 d, § 121 (Bekker) φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμῳ τῆς πολιτείας ἀποστεροῦσαν.

§ 50. In Plato the connotation of φύσις has not more fixity than that of other philosophical terms. The particular meaning is to be determined by the context in each case. The following uses appear to be specially Platonic:

1. Phaedo 103 C τότε μεν γὰρ ἔλεγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίον πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα γίγνεσθαι, ἐν περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον ὕπατο ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους, οὕτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὕτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει.

Here are three grades of reality. (1) the actual thing or object in which the idea is embodied (τὸ πράγμα τὸ μετέχων τοῦ εἴδους), (2) the idea as so embodied or 'immanent' (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν), (3) the idea as self-existent, absolute, 'transcendent' (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι). Φύσις. therefore, in this passage is the sum of self-existences, the immutable nature of things.

Compare Rep. X. 597 B: μία μὲν ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὐσία, ἥν

1 As in Parm. 133 d. quoted above, p. 313. note.
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φάιμεν αν, ὃς ἐγὼμαι, θεόν ἐργάσασθαι, ib. VI. 301 B πρός τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον . . . καὶ πρός ἐκεῖνο αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

2. But elsewhere the supreme agency of Nature is regarded as an heretical doctrine, opposed to the sovereignty of Reason and of God. Soph. 265 C τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι . . . τῷ τῷ φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾷ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτίων αὐτομάτης καὶ ἀνευ διανοίας φυσικῶς. ‘Nature’ is here not Eternal Law, but mere blind, unconscious energy, as opposed to Mind. Cp. Laws X. 892 C φύσιν βούλονται λέγειν γένεσιν τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα, κ.τ.λ.¹

3. In Phaedr. 270 φύσις is an extremely comprehensive word, including both worlds, the inward and the outward. This appears from the allusions to Anaxagoras and Hippocrates. Φύσις in this sense differs from οὐσία chiefly in referring more distinctively to the parts which make up the whole.

4. According to another mode of expression, the subject of philosophy is not all nature but every nature, Theaet. 173 E, Polit. 272 C.

In so denoting single or particular natures, φύσις is sometimes (a) the nature of the thing described, and sometimes (b) the thing itself as characterized, and the word in this sense is applied equally to natural kinds and to abstract notions.

(a) Rep. II. 359 B ἡ μὲν ὦν ὃ δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης . . . αὐτὴ ² (including both γένεσις and οὐσία, see context).

Phaedr. 245 E ἀθανάτου δὲ πεφασμένου τοῦ ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ κυριολεκνύμον, ψυχής οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγου τοῦτον αὐτὸν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται. τὸν γὰρ σῶμα, ὃ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖται, ἄψυχον, ὃ δὲ ἐνδοθεν αὐτὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἔμψυχον, ὃς ταύτης οὕσης φύσεως ψυχῆς (sc. τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ κυριολεκνύμον).

¹ Plato here claims that if the study of nature is the study of primary substances, it ought to begin with the study of mind, since mind is prior to the elements. He tries to wrest from the natural philosophers their chief catch-word—more openly and disputatiously than in the Phaedrus.
² The ‘Naturalist’ theory is in question, see πεφασμέναι Rep. II. 338 ε
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Rep. vi. 493 C τῷν δὲ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων καὶ ἀγαθῶν φύσιν, κ.τ.λ.
Ib. vii. 525 C ἐπὶ θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως.
Ib. X. 611 B μήτε γε αὖ τῇ ἀληθεστάτη φύσει τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχήν.

Soph. 245 C, 258 B, C; Phil. 25 A, 44 E.

(b) In the following places the nature is identified with the thing:—

Rep. ii. 359 C ὁ πᾶσα φύσις ('every creature') διόκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν.
Ib. iv. 429 D μίαν φύσιν τῷν τῶν λευκῶν.
Ib. vi. 491 A οὗν οὖσαν φύσεις ψυχῶν.

Polit. 326 E.

§ 51. 5. There is a pleonastic use of φύσις with a genitive, in this latter sense, which, like other periphrases, occurs more frequently in the later dialogues. But the Phaedrus affords more than one example:—

Phaedr. 248 C ἥ ... τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις.
Ib. 254 B τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν.
Soph. 257 A ἥ τῶν γενῶν φύσις.
Ib. 257 C, D (bis) ἥ δατέρων φύσις.

Polit. 257 D τὴν τοῦ προσώπου φύσιν.
Phileb. 25 E τὴν ὑγείας φύσιν.
Ib. 30 B τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν.
Tim. 45 D τὴν τῶν βλεφάρων φύσιν.
Ib. 74 D τὴν τῶν λευκῶν φύσιν. Ib. 75 A τὴν τῶν ὑσχίων φύσιν.
Ib. 84 C ἥ τοῦ μυελῶν φύσις.
(Cp. for similar periphrases ib. 75 A τὸ τῆς γλώττης εἴδος, 70 C τὴν τοῦ πλεεύμονος ἱδέων.)

Laws viii. 845 D τὴν ὀδατοὺς φύσιν.
Ib. ix. 862 D τὴν τοῦ ὀικαίων φύσιν.

The same use recurs in Aristotle. See Bonitz' Index Aristotelicus, p. 837 b.

6. Φύσις is constantly used in the Republic in the ordinary sense of natural disposition or capability (esp. Apol. 22 B, C) as distinguished from the complete development of mind or character:—
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III. 410 D τὸ θυμοειδὲς... τῆς φύσεως.

VI. 485 Λ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖν καταμαθεῖν.

The great frequency of the term φύσις in Plato's dialogues represents, what has too often been ignored, the experiential aspect of his philosophy.

(b) Psychological Terms.

As Plato's philosophical language becomes (1) more §52. subjective and (2) more accurate, his use of words to signify mental states, processes, or faculties, becomes at once more frequent and more precise. It would be an error, however, even in his latest dialogues to look for consistency or finality. When it is found that the definition of δικαίωσις, obtained with so much labour in the Republic, is tacitly set aside in the Laws, and that the disjunctive-hypothetical method so energetically put forth in the Parmenides nowhere distinctly recurs, it need not surprise us that the significance of διάνωσις in Theaet. 189 E. Soph. 265 D, E differs essentially from that assigned to the same word in Rep. VI. 511, or that αἴσθησις, ὁξία, φαντασία, τέχνη, ἑπιστήμη, φιλοσοφία, can only be said to have an approximate fixity of meaning.

Aἴσθησις.

a. Any immediate perception, intuition or consciousness.

Charm. 158 E, 159 άδηλον γὰρ ὅτι, εἶ σοι πάρεστι σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ποὺ ἐνοίησαι αὐτῆς, εἶπερ ἐνεστίν, αἴσθησιν τῶν παρέχειν, εἶ ἃς δόξα ἂν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἶ, ὅ τι ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖον τι ἣ σωφροσύνη.

This is the ordinary meaning as exemplified in Antiphon, Herod. p. 134, §44; Thuc. ii. 50, 61; Eur. El. 290; Xen. Hell. v. 1, §8; Anab. iv. 6, §13.

Obs.—Euripides (Iph. Aul. 1243) already has αἴσθημα, which, though frequent in Aristotle, does not seem to occur in Plato. A special meaning —'scent' as a hunting term occurs in Xen. Cyn. 3, §5; cp. Rep. ii. 375 λ.
b. Sense-perception in general, as opposed to γνῶσις, cognition, νόησις, intellec tion, λογισμός, reasoning: imper perfectly distinguished from δόξα and φαντασία.

Without entering here on the discussion of Plato’s philosophy of sensation, it may be observed that a comparison of Phaedo 79, Phaedr. 249, 250, Rep. VII. 524, with Phileb. 33, 38, 43 A, B, Tim. 43 C, shows that the reasonings attributed to the disciples of Protagoras in the Theaetetus, though rejected as a definition of knowledge, exercise a decided influence on the evolution of Plato’s psychology.

γ. Special modes of sensation, including the five senses, with others not separately named.

Phaedo 65 D ἤδη ὄνν πτώποτε τί τών τινωτών τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἴδες; Οὐδόμαως, ἢ δ’ ὅς. ‘Ἀλλ’ ἀλλή τωι αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήπτω αὑτῶι; Rep. VI. 507 E ἢ τοῦ ὁρᾶν αἰσθήσεις.


Thus the ἐπαρτία αἰσθήσεις of Rep. VII. 523 B, Soph. 266 C is an opposite impression of the same sense.

Obs.—Αἰσθήτος in Men. 76 D is said to be an expression in the manner of Gorgias: otherwise the word occurs first in Plato; and αἰσθητής, ῥήμαν in Theaet. 160 D, appears to be invented on the spot. It is cited by Pollux as an unusual word.

§ 53. Δόξα.

The opposition of ὁδεῖν at once to εἰρην and ἐπιστασθαί leads to the association of δόξα as the lower faculty with αἰσθητής. For example in Rep. VI. VII, where the clearness of a faculty is said to be proportioned to the nature of its object, δόξα seems to be concerned with the shadows, i.e. the visible world; in Phaedo 96 it is an involuntary judgement resulting from sense and memory, and in the Phaedrus the unlucky charioteer regales his steeds with τρωφή δόξαστη, because of his poverty in the ideas. But in
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Theaet., Soph., Phil., it becomes manifest that ὀξα is simply a judgement, given by the mind in answer to herself, which may or may not be coincident with an impression of sense, and may be either true or false. This is in accordance with the advance in psychological clearness which marks the dialectical dialogues.

In the earlier part of the Theaetetus, ὀξα φαντασία αἴσθησις are very closely associated, although in such an expression as in 179 C τό παρόν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἴσθησις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας ὀξαί γίγνονται, the distinction between αἴσθησις and ὀξα is accurately preserved (cp. Charm. 159 Α quoted above). It is only after the discussion in pp. 184—190, however, that the definition of ὀξα as διανοιάς ἀποτελεύτησις (Soph. 264 Α) becomes possible. For it has now been clearly brought out that ὀξα, opinion or judgement, is an operation of the mind, silently predicking one thing of another. Such predication or judgement may refer to any subject matter, but it may be false as well as true, and this gives occasion for the question, How is false opinion possible? See esp. Phileb. 37 C. D.

Opinion, so understood, is still distinguished from Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) which is always true, although this opposition is not sufficiently accounted for by the definition of ἐπιστήμη as ὀξα ἀληθὶς μετὰ λόγων. Δόξα ἀληθὴς holds a higher place in subsequent dialogues, Sophist, Philebus, Timaeus, than in the Republic, where it is condemned as 'blind.' Rep. VI. 566 C : cp. IV. 430 B.

For the vernacular crossing the specific meaning, see esp. VI. 490 Α παρὰ ὀξα ὀξα καὶ ὀξα [κυριαρχεῖν].

Obs.—The naturalness of the association of ὀξα with αἴσθησις appears from the passage of the Charmides (159 Α) above quoted. On the other hand, the constant use of ὀξα μαί in expressing a judgement of the mind, suggested the other meaning in which ὀξα is opposed to ἐπιστήμη. As the two meanings were not consciously distinguished, a confusion arose which helped to accentuate
Plato’s view of the uncertainty and fallaciousness of sensation; to which, however, Philosophy had from the first been predisposed, as appears from well-known sayings of Heraclitus and Parmenides.

§ 54. Φαντασία.

Φαντασία is properly the noun of φαντάζεσθαι (Soph. 260 E, Rep. II. 382 E), but is treated in Theaet. 152 c, 161 E as the noun of φαντάσθαι. In Soph. 264 A, B τὸ φαντάσθαι is defined as δόξα μετ’ αἰσθήμας or σύμμετρα αἰσθήμας καὶ δόξας. In Phileb. 39, however, there is a more elaborate description of imagination or presentation (Vorstellung). Opinion or judgement having been characterized under the figure of a scribe who writes down sentences in the mind, it is added that the scribe is corroborated by a painter, who illustrates what is written down. And the pictures of this artist may have reference to the past or future, and like the judgements which they accompany, they may be either false or true. The pleasures of Hope are thus accounted for. The word φαντασία does not occur in this passage. But it is obvious that the thing meant might be denoted by the term, and the mental images in question are spoken of as ζωγραφίματα (39 D) τὰ φαντάσματα ζωγραφημένα (40 A). In Rep. II. 382 E, where φαντάζεσθαι (380 D) has preceded, φαντασία are ‘illusory apparitions.’ The word carries a similar association in Soph. 260 E, &c.

The noun, although common (with its derivatives) in later writers, does not occur before the time of Plato.

§ 55. Διάνοια.

In the concluding passage of Rep. VI the word διάνοια acquires a specific meaning, to denote the faculty, or attitude of mind, intermediate between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, or between πίστεως and νοῆς. This definition stands in close reference to the context in which it occurs, and it is observable that διάνοια in this exact sense is hardly to be found elsewhere in Plato. The definition appears to rest on a false etymology, viz. δια-νοια, ‘mediate intellection,’
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'thinking through something,' as distinguished from pure intuition on the one hand and mere impressions on the other; because the abstract truths of mathematical science are studied through visible symbols (VI. 511 D ὑπεμεταχύ τὸ δόξης τῷ καὶ τῶν, cp. VII. 533 D, E). The psychology of the Theaetetus supplies a more accurate explanation of the term, as = 'mental discourse,' passing between subject and predicate, or predicate and subject. This view of ὑάνωσις recurs in the Sophistes (263 D). 

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In the great majority of instances διάνωσις (with its verb διανοεῖσθαι) is used in the ordinary Greek acceptations of (1) mental activity, (2) mind in act, (3) a particular thought or conception, (4) meaning, (5) intention.

§ 56.

διανοεῖσθαι, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐχεῖν πῶς, is properly a state or condition whether bodily or mental. But the psychological use of this word also is affected in Plato by a false etymological association from the active use of ἐχεῖν. The active use of ἐχεῖν occurs in Rep. IV. 433 E ἡ τῶν οἰκεῖον τε καὶ ἐκποιήσεις, Soph. 247 A δικαιοσύνης ἐχεῖν καὶ παρουσία, Theaet. 197 A ἐπιστήμης . . . ἐχεῖν. And it seems probable that in such passages as Phaedr. 268 E τὸν τὴν σήμερον ἐχεῖν ἐκστάσεις, Rep. VI. 509 A τὴν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἐχεῖν, IX. 591 B ὅλη ἡ νευρήματα ἐπὶ τοῖς τυμωτέραν ἐχεῖν λαμβάνει, although the ordinary meaning of 'condition' is present. Plato has the other association in his mind. For the more familiar meaning, see esp. Phileb. 11 D ἐχεῖν νευρῆς καὶ διάθεσις, κ.τ.λ.

Τέχνη—practical skill.

a. Skill as opposed to inexperience, Phaedo 89 E ἄρει τέχνης τὴν περὶ τὰ ὑποτελεῖα.
On Plato's use of Language.

3. Enlightened practice, as opposed to mere 'rule of thumb' (ἐπενεφείγα καὶ τριβη), Phaedr. 260 ν, 270 β, Gorg. 463 β (see Rep. vi. 493 β).

γ. Professional practice, opposed to that of an amateur, Prot. 315 A ἐπὶ τῆς μαθησίας.

δ. Art as opposed (1) to nature, Rep. ii. 381 β; (2) to divine inspiration, Ion 536 δ.

ε. A system of rules (Phaedr. 261 β).

ζ. τέχνη as distinguished from ἐπιστήμη is (1) a lower grade of knowledge (see the contemptuous diminutive τεχνόπορος in Rep. v. 475 ε); (2) (chiefly in the later dialogues) Knowledge applied to production (γένεσις), Laws x. 892 β, c.

Obs.—The actual sciences (as distinguished from the same studies when enlightened by philosophy) are called τέχναι in Rep. vi. 511 c τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καλομενῶν. The second (δ) and sixth (ζ) of these definitions reappear in subsequent philosophy.

§ 57. Ἐπιστήμη.

As in other cases (above, p. 292 ff.) the philosophical is to be distinguished from the ordinary use.

a. (1) The proper note of ἐπιστήμη, as distinguished from ὁδὸς, is certainty (Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1115):—

Rep. v. 477 β ἐπιστήμη ... ἐπὶ τῷ ὅτι πέφυκε, γρίφωνώ ως ἑστὶ τῷ ὄν.

(2) Hence in the specially Platonic sense, ἐπιστήμη is distinguished from τέχνη as speculative from practical knowledge.

Rep. iv. 438 c ἐπιστήμη ... αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἑστιν.

Parm. 134 λ αὐτὴ μὲν ὁ ἑστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τῆς ὁ ἑστὶν ἀλήθεια, αὐτὴς ἄν ἐκείνης εἰς ἐπιστήμη ... ἐκάστη δὲ αὐτὸ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ ἑστιν, ἐκάστοτε τῶν ὅτων ὅτιν, ὁ ἑστιν, εἰς ἄν ἐπιστήμη.

It is in this ideal sense that vain attempts are made in the Theactetus to define ἐπιστήμη. And this is the meaning of the word in Rep. vi. 508 ε and similar places.
β. The more ordinary use of the word, in which it is nearly equivalent to τέχνη, is sometimes guarded by the addition of the specific object:—

Rep. IV. 438 D ἐπειδὴ οἰκίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστήμη ἐγένετο, δήμευκε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ὡστε οἰκοδομικῇ κληθήματι.

Or by some qualifying word such as λεγομένην. See Rep. VII. 553 D ὑπὸ ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσετῶμεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, ὅπως δὲ ὄνοματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρων μὲν ἢ ὀόξης, ὀμνυροτέρων δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμης.

But this meaning of ἐπιστήμη also occurs without any qualification, especially in the plural, and quite as often in the later as in the earlier dialogues.

Rep. VII. 522 C ὡς πῶς οἱ προσχρῶνται τέχναι τε καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι.

Polit. 308 C τῶν συνθετικῶν ἐπιστημῶν: Philcb. 621 D.

The singular also appears in the sense of 'practical skill' (as in Thucydides, &c.).

Phaedr. 269 D προσλαβῶν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην.

Gorg. 511 C ἡ τοῦ ρεῖ ἐπιστήμη.

Φιλοσοφία.

§ 58.

The abstract noun as well as the adjective φιλόσοφος occurs in Isocrates, but not elsewhere before Plato, although φιλοσοφεῖν was in ordinary use (Herod. I. 30, Thuc. II. 40).

α. Φιλοσοφία is defined in the Republic (V. 475 E ff.) as the love of the whole, (VI. 486 A) θεωρία παινός μὲν χρόνου, πάινης δὲ ωνίας, and is elsewhere (Sophist. 253 B) identified with διαλεκτική.

β. But the word is also used in the more ordinary sense of 'mental culture,' 'scientific pursuit':—

Theaet. 143 D γεωμετρίαν ἡ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν.

Tim. 88 C μονακῇ καὶ πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσχρώμενον.

In Theaet. 172 C οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνου δια- τρόπαις, the plural seems to include Theodorus as a man of scientific culture.
§ 59. θυμός, τὸ θυμοειδὲς.

A tripartite division of ἡγεία appears in the Phaedrus-myth (Phaedr. 246 foll.), in Rep. IV. 435 foll., IX. 580 foll., and in Tim. 70. On the other hand in Rep. X. 612 a doubt is expressed whether the Soul in her true nature be divisible at all, and in Phaedo 80 B, C pure Soul is akin to the μοροειδὲς. In the Timaeus θυμός, or resentment, is expressly said to belong to the lower and mortal part, or aspect, of the Soul. But the function assigned to it is much the same as in Rep. IV. In Rep. IX, l. c., this part of the soul is more exactly described as φιλότιμον, and in the same passage the love of honour is resolved into the love of power. In the imagery which follows, the θυμοειδὲς is further analysed into the nobler and meaner forms of anger, the 'lion' being reinforced with a crawling serpent brood: IX. 590 B τὸ λεοντώδὲς τε καὶ ὀφειώδὲς.

The conception mythically expressed in the Phaedrus is less distinct, and though closely akin to the psychology of the Republic and Timaeus, is not precisely the same. The white horse yoked to the winged chariot is altogether of a noble strain (καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων), 'a lover of honour, with temperance and chastity', a comrade of right thinking, obedient to the voice of Reason.' He thus corresponds rather to the ideal in conformity with which the θυμοειδὲς is to be trained than to the θυμοειδὲς as such. Nor is the nobler steed entrusted with control over his

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1 Tim. 70 A τὸ μετέχων ὅν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπων καὶ θυμοῦ, φιλότιμων ὑμ., κατηγοροῦν ἑγγέτερου τῆς καφολῆς . . . ὅτα τοῦ λόγου κατήκων ὑμ. καλῶς μετ' ἑκείνου βίο φ τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν κατέχοι γένος, ὄπω· ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως τῷ ἐπιτάγματι καὶ λόγῳ μηδεμίᾳ πειθεθαί ἐκὼν ἐθέλου, τὴν δὲ δὴ καρδιαν . . . εἰς τὴν δορυφορικὴν οἰκήσιν κατέστησαν.

2 Shakespeare, Macbeth ii. 1:

'Macbeth.

'When 'tis, It shall make honour for you.'

'Banquo.

'So I lose none In seeking to augment it, but still keep My bosom franchis'd and allegiance clear, I shall be counsell'd.'
baser yoke-fellow. His work is done if he run his own course obediently.

It is probable that in the partition of the Soul in the Republic, Plato has not forgotten the Phaedrus. But he has also in mind the special requirements (practical as well as speculative) of the work in hand, and in particular the close analogy between individual and state, and the position of ἀνδρεία amongst the cardinal (civic) virtues.

Now ὑμοειδῆς, 'spirited,' is applied by Xenophon to a high-bred horse, such as that which symbolized the nobler passions in the Phaedrus—the word does not occur in earlier Greek: and ὑμός is the crude form of ἀνδρεία. Ἀνδρεία is the virtue of the guardians, who are φίλακες τῶν τε ἐκτὸς πολεμίων καὶ τῶν ἐντὸς φιλίων, and τὸ θυμοειδῆς is now formulated as the corresponding part of the individual Soul.

(c) DIALECTICAL TERMS.

No terms in Plato so nearly attain the fixity of technical use as those which bear on method, such for example as συμάγειν, 'generalize,' διαφέουσαι, 'distinguish,' λαμβάνειν, 'apprehend,' διαλαμβάνειν, 'divide,' ἀπολαμβάνειν, 'specify,' μετέχειν, 'treat,' μέθοδος, 'treatment.' This is most apparent in dialogues which represent the conversation of Socrates with his disciples—as in the Phaedo, Republic and Philebus. See Rep. VII. 532 D where Glaucon says, οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι μόνον ἀκοινωτέα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄδικος πολλάκις ἐπανετέον.

Διαλεκτική—διαλέγεσθαι—διάλεκτος.

Διάλεκτος is rational conversation, with associations derived from the practice of Socrates, and is opposed to barren disputation:—Rep. V. 454 Α ἔριδι, οὐ διάλεκτῳ πρός ἄλληλον χρώμενοι. Hence ἡ διαλεκτική (sc. τέχνη, s. μέθοδος) is the Platonic ideal of method. But the connotation of the term inevitably varies with the shifting aspects of that ideal.
On Plato's use of Language.

Meno 73 D ei μέν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐρυθτικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρώμενος, εἴπομέν ἂν αὐτῷ . . . κ.τ.λ., ei δέ ωσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ μνῆ φιλος ὑπετές βούλουστο ἀλλήλους διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πραότερον πως καὶ διαλεκτικῶτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

In the sequel it is explained that a dialectical answer is one having a true relation to the respondent’s previous admissions.

The word therefore has no reference here to any assumption of supra-sensual εἴη, but only to that living intercourse of mind with mind, which was the secret of Socrates 1. In the Phaedrus διαλεκτική is again associated with the same vivid reciprocity of thoughts. But both the Socratic method and its intellectual aim are now viewed under the glow of Platonic idealism at its most fervent heat, and the διαλεκτικὸς is now the master of knowledge that is at once comprehensive and distinct, seeing as one what is a whole in Nature, as different, what Nature parts asunder; overtaking the subtleties of reality with the movement of mind—his thought adequately grasping and following the Nature of things, at once in their infinity and unity. Thus he realizes the privilege which belongs at birth to every soul which takes the form of man: δεῖ γὰρ ἀνθρωπὸν ξυνεῖται κατ’ εἴδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἔστω 2 αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ ξυναρθρόμενον. τούτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνως, ἀ ποτε εἴδων ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθέσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπερίδοσθα ἢ τὸν εἰναὶ φαμεν, καὶ ἀνακόψασα εἰς τὸ σὲ ὑπός. διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνῃ πιεροῦσιν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια πρὸς γὰρ ἐκεῖνος δεὶ στί μνήμη κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς ωσπέρ θεός ὄν θείος ἐστι. These latter words are of course taken from the myth (249 C), but in the later portion of the same dialogue (266 B, &c.) the method referred to, if not exactly formulated, is more precisely indicated. True eloquence, it is

1 So in the Theaetetus Protagoras is made to claim fairness from a dialectical respondent. Theaet. 167 ε χαρίς μὲν ὁς ἄγωνιστόμενος . . . χαρίς δὲ διαλεγόμενος. Cp. also Crat. 390 c for the simpler meaning.
2 W. H. Thompson conjectured ἔστω.
there said, must be based on a scientific estimate of the human mind and of truth in all its aspects, and also of the mutual relations between these and various minds. This science is compared to that of Hippocrates, whose medical practice was based on profound study of the human body. Such an ideal, though vaguely sketched, is by no means severed from experience. Its unattainableness, indeed, lies rather in the infinity of nature than in the abstractedness of knowledge. In the Republic, on the other hand, the allegory of the cave and the ladder of the sciences carry off the mind into a region where actual experience seems of little account, and philosophic thought is imagined as moving among pure eido.,—εἰδευσιν αὐτοῖς ὅ ἀν αὐτῶν εἰς αὑτά. Yet here also, while the dualism is more evident, it is hard to tell how much is allegorical. For Socrates maintains that the philosopher, who has been trained in dialectic, will be no whit behind his fellow-citizens in practical wisdom, but on the contrary will be infinitely more capable, with equal opportunities, of dealing with any actual emergency.  

Συναγωγή—συλλογισμός.  

The most pervading note of διαλεκτική, and this appears both in the Republic and the Phaedrus, is comprehensiveness accompanied with clearness.

VII. 537 C ο... γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός, ο ὅ ὁ μὴ οὐ. Cr. Tim. 83 C where Socrates admires the man who gave the name of χολή to phenomena so diversified as those to which it is applied. This is again insisted on in Soph. 253 C,D—esp. in the words ο γέ τοῦτο δυνατὸν δρὰν μίαν ἰδέαν ὅ ὁνται στάντων, ... πάντη διαπεμένην ἵκανόν διανοθέτεται—another locus classicus on the subject. By this time, however, the questions turning on predication have come to the front,

1 In the Republic Socrates refuses to define διαλεκτική: but he describes it thus—ἡ ἡ διαλεκτικὴν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἵκαστον λαμβάνοντα τῇς υἱόσας; This follows a passage in praise of διαλεκτική in the light of the account of the mental faculties in Book vi.
and the method indicated is one of logical determination, according to the real participation of things in ideas, and of ideas or kinds in one another: τάτο τι ἂστω, ὑπερ κοινωνεῖν ἐκάστα δηνασαι καὶ ὅπῃ μή, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.

In the Politicus again, and also in the Philebus, the notion of method becomes still more concrete, involving not merely relation but proportion—τὸ μέτριον, μικτή φύσις, μέτρον. An increasing sense of the complexity of the world makes more apparent the hindrances to adequacy of method. At the same time dialectical improvement, the preparation and sharpening of the instrument, is prized apart from the immediate results. The notion of adapting logical weapons to the subject to be attacked is curiously expressed in Philebus 23 B φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλας μηχανῆς ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ τῶν πορευόμενων οἷον βέλη ἐχεῖν ἐτέρα τῶν ἐμπροσθεν λόγων ἐστὶ δὲ ὅσος ἐνία καὶ ταῦτα. And the conception of science, without losing the associations originally suggested by the conversations of Socrates, now includes not only the ascertainment of differences, but of finite differences, not only the one and many, but the ‘how many,’ Phil. 16 D.

Plato’s ‘dialectic,’ then, is not merely an ideal method, but the ideal of a method, which at best is only approximately realized, and presents different aspects according to the scope and spirit of particular dialogues. It is a conception which grows with the growth of Plato’s thoughts. In the Protagoras and Gorgias it is contrasted with popular rhetoric—the one exact and truthful, the other loose and careless of the truth; in other places to ἐρωτική (ἀντιλογική, ἀγωνιστική). Its end is neither persuasion nor refutation, but the attainment and communication of truth, of which the tests are universality and certainty.

§ 62. Ἐρωτική.

The marks of ἀντιλογική or ἐρωτική also vary with the stages of Platonism; but that which is most pervading,

1 Theaet. 166 ε, Rep. iv. 435 ε.
2 Phaedo 101 ε, Rep. v. 454, Theaet. 197 Α.
and which comes out most clearly where Plato’s own philosophy is ripest, is the crudeness of affirmation and negation, the root fallacy of confounding *dictum simpliciter* with *dictum secundum quid*.

**Διαίρεσις:** διαιρείν, διαιρέω&thta, διαλαμβάνειν, διακρίνειν, τέμνειν. § 63.

μέρος, μόριον, τμήμα, τομή, διαφυ&shcy.

While *διαιρείν* or *διαιρέω&thta* is the term most commonly used for logical division, and *μέρος* for the result, it is observable that in the later dialogues, where classification becomes more frequent, the expression is varied, some other word from the list given above being used instead.

**Obs. 1.**—’Απλών has two meanings, (1) admitting no further division, (2) true without qualification or distinction. (Gorg. 503 λ, Phaedr. 244 λ.)

**Obs. 2.**—’Απολαμβάνειν is to ‘specify,’ and for this *ἀπονέμεσθαι* is used in Polit. 276 δ and elsewhere.

The aor. participle *ἀπολαμβάνων* is used absolutely in Rep. iv. 420 e *τὰν ενδαίμονα πλάττομεν οὐκ ἀπολαμβάντες*.

Cp. ἀπομερίζω, ἀποχωρίζο.

**Λαμβάνειν.**

The simple *λαμβάνειν* has also a special use, nearly = *ἀπολαμβάνειν*, ‘to conceive,’ or ‘formulate,’ sometimes with the addition of *λόγος*.

Phaedr. 246 δ ὅν τὸν . . . αἰτίαν . . . λάβωμεν.

Rep. VIII. 559 λ ὅνα τὸπω λάβωμεν αὐτός.

Ion 532 ε λάβωμεν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ.

Rep. VI. 496 δ τὰντα πάντα λόγισμον λαβών.

Rep. VII. 533 Β οὐδείς ἦμιν ἁμφοτερήτως λέγων, ὅς αὐτὸν γε ἡκάστον πέρι, ὃ ἐστιν ἡκαστόν, ἀλλὰ τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὅδον περὶ παντός λαμβάνειν.

Phileb. 50 D λαβώντα . . . τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ.

**Ὑπόθεσις, ὑποτίθεσθαι.**

§ 65.

ʼὙπόθεσις in Plato is ‘an assumption,’ adopted as a basis of reasoning, either (a) dogmatic, or (b) provisional. Cp. Xen. Mem. iv. 6, § 13.
On Plato's use of Language.

a. Thaet. 183 B ὃς ῥέει γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἐξονεῖ ρήματα, viz. the dogmatic assumption that all is motion: Soph. 244 C τῷ ταῦτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέσειν, the doctrine of ἐι τὸ πᾶν.

b. Meno 86 E. ἔξ ὑπόθεσεως ... σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε ὑδακτῶν ἕστω εἴτε ὑπωσαίν. Here the nature of such hypothetical reasoning is illustrated by a geometrical example: 'If the figure applied to the base of the triangle is similar to it, then one thing follows, but not otherwise'. In this sense the word is used with reference to the Zenonian dialectic, of the proposition which is subjected to the indirect proof that it is untenable.

Accordingly, in Socratic reasoning, which proceeds by testing successive assumptions with negative examples, each proposed definition, while it maintains its ground, is called the ὑπόθεσις.

Euthyphr. 11 C ῥέει δέ, σαί γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν.

Phaedo 107 B ὃς μόνον γ', ἐφη, ὃς Σμμίλα, ὃ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα τε ἐν λέγεις (Simmias has just spoken of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man), καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρῶτας, καὶ εἴ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσίν, ὁμοὶ ἐπισκεπτέας σαφέστερον καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς ὑπολιθεῖτε: ... ἀκοντισθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον ὄντων μάλιστ' ἄνθρωπο ἐπακολούθησαν καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφῆς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω.

We may remember that it is the same Simmias, who earlier in the dialogue (85 B) puts forth the touching image of a raft, to represent the provisional nature of every human theory, in the absence of a divine, or superhuman, principle.

Now of these primary hypotheses, or first premisses, one of the chief is clearly that notion of true causes insisted on in Phaedo 100 B, 101 D, as the outcome of the procedure of Socrates, viz. that each thing is what it is by participation (μετάσχεσις) in the idea. 'All other modes of causation you will leave, says Socrates, to those who are cleverer than you
are. Fearing, as the proverb says, your own shadow, you will hold on to that sure ground of the assumption (τῆς ὑπόθεσεως). And if any one attacks you there, you will not answer him until you have tested all the consequences of the hypothesis itself. And if in the end you have to examine the grounds of your assumption, you will do so by a similar process, having framed a new and higher hypothesis, by the best lights you have, and so on until you reach a satisfactory result. But you will not, as the eristics do, confuse in argument the principle with its consequences; that is not the way to discover truth.'

Here the άρχή is the same with the ὑπόθεσις. It is therefore somewhat startling to find in Rep. VI. 511 C this very identification (α尔斯 αἱ ὑπόθεσεις άρχαι) made a ground of objection to the actual condition of the sciences. It will be said that this applies only to the mathematical sciences, and to them only in so far as they work through visible symbols, but this view is inconsistent with VII. 517 D; see the notes.

The apparent discrepancy arises out of what may be termed the overweening intellectualism of this part of the Republic, the same temper which prompts the notion of an astronomy without observations, and a science of harmony independent of sound. Plato is aware that he is setting forth an impossible ideal, but for the education of his 'airy burghers,' nothing short of the absolute will satisfy him. Allowing for this difference of spirit, the two passages just quoted from the Phaedo, for the very reason that they are less aspiring, throw light on the description of the true method in Rep. VII. 533 C ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑπόθεσις ἀναιροῦσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν άρχὴν, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται, and the corresponding passage in VI. 511.

For example, though it is by no means clear that by the ἰκανῶν τι of Phaedo 101 D, Plato means the same thing with the ἀνυπόθετων or the ὑέω τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, yet the description of the progress from the lower to the higher hypothesis is
parallel to the ladder of ideas in VI. 511 B τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος ὁμί ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπί ὑποθέσεις. οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὑμάς, ἐνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχήν ἵον, κ.τ.λ. The contrast between arguing about principles and their consequences also corresponds to this upward and downward way. And the words in Phaedo 107 B ἐὰν αὐτὰς (τὰς ὑποθέσεις) ἱκανός διέλθετε... ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ’ ὁσον ὄντων μάλιστ’ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθήσαι, further illustrate the notion of a 'higher analytic,' which in both dialogues is imperfectly shadowed forth: while the ultimate cause in the Phaedo 98 Α, 99 Β the 'reason of the best,' is a conception not far removed from the Idea of Good. It becomes apparent, when the whole tenour of these kindred passages is considered, that what Plato censures in the actual methods of 'Science' is not the use of assumptions, but the habit of regarding them as fixed and self-evident, VII. 533 Β ἐως ἄν ὑποθέσεις χρόμεναι ταῦτας ἄκυητος εἶσιν, μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν.

Obs.—The simple τιθέναι (sometimes τίθεσθαι)—in frequent use—is to 'posit' or 'assume,' not necessarily as the first step in an argument. Theaet. 190 Α δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὖτῆς.

§ 66. ἐν καὶ πολλά—στοιχείου.

It is clear from the classical passage of the Philebus 16 ff., that 'one and many' had become a recognized formula in the Platonic school. But it is also clear from the passage itself, especially when other places are compared, that the formula had different meanings and applications. (a) Single objects have many attributes. (b) Many individuals 'partake' in common of one ιδέα: the εἴδος is therefore one and many. (γ) Ideas themselves are complex, and variously correlated, yet many are bound in one under some higher notion, all partake of number and being, and Being is itself absorbed in the Good.

It is characteristic of Plato's later theory, that in the
Part II: Diction—Philosophical Terms.

Philebus. He not only dwells on this last aspect of the truth, but also speaks of it as a πάθος τῶν λόγων . . . ταρ' ἡμῖν, 'an affection or attribute of human discourse.' This point of view is all the more significant, when it is remembered that the discussions in the Parmenides, Theaetetus, and Sophist have intervened.

α. The first and simplest aspect of the 'one and many' § 67. appears in Plato, (1) as a Zenonian or Heraclitean paradox, (2) as a proof of the necessity of the Idea.

(1) Phileb. 14 C ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ . . . ἐνα γεγονότα φύσει, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς ἐμὲ, κ.τ.λ., τιθέµενος.

Parm. 129 C εἶ δὲ ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει ὅτα καὶ πολλὰ, κ.τ.λ.

Theact. 166 B τὸν εἰσαί τινα, ἀλλʼ οὐχί τοὺς, καὶ τούτους γεγοµένους ἀπείρους, ἐάντερ ἀνοµοίωτες γίγνηται.

In the Protagorean theory, as the mind is a bundle or succession of momentary impressions, each substance is a bundle or aggregate of transient attributes or presentations, Theact. 157 B, C ε ὁ δὴ ἄθροισµατι ἄνθρωπον τε τίθεµαι καὶ λίθον καὶ ἑκαστὸν ἔφον τε καὶ εἶδος.

(2) In Rep. vii. 523 it is shown by an example how the mind passes through the consciousness of diversity to the perception of unity. The finger is both rough and smooth; this awakens thought to the existence of roughness and smoothness, each as one several thing, and of their opposition as a reality. This is the psychological counterpart of many other passages where the diversities of sense are made the ground for assuming abstract unities.

β. One idea or form is shared by many objects. Beauty § 68. is one, the beautiful are many, &c. This point of view, with the difficulties attending it has been already discussed (above, p. 309 ff.; Μέθεξις, &c.). It may be called the formula of crude realism.

γ. The problem of solving these difficulties emerges together with the third and highest aspect of the ἐν καὶ πολλὰ in the dialectical dialogues. It is now that, as we have seen, clearer views of predication, a more subjective
point of view, and a higher comprehension of the ideas as forms of thought, of their interrelation and sequence, lead the way towards a rational metaphysics and psychology. The result is a scheme of thought, or as Plato himself terms it, a κόσμος τις ἀσώματος (Philebus 64 B), which is indeed empty of content, but has no insignificant bearing on the after progress of the Sciences.

In Theaet. 202, Plato deals tentatively with this later phase of the question through the contrast of στοιχεῖαν and συλλαβή. Here συλλαβή is the complex idea, which is itself resolved into a higher unity—e.g. the harmony of treble and bass notes, or the art of music as comprising various harmonics.

But in Polit. 278 B-D, as well as in Rep. III. 402 A-C, the στοιχεῖαν is the idea, while the συλλαβή is the combination of ideas in fact. Thus justice is justice, whether in commerce, war, judicial pleadings, or any other of the varied circumstances of human society.

§ 69. παράδειγμα.

παράδειγμα has two very different meanings in Plato, one of which has been already discussed (above, p. 310 ff.). The artist copies from a pattern (1); the merchant, for convenience sake, carries about (2) examples of his wares (ἐδείγματα Phaedo 110 B). The latter would seem to be the figure implied in the logical use of παράδειγμα for the illustration of one species by another of the same genus, the complex by the simple, the obscure by the familiar, the unknown by the known. A full account of this mode of argument is given by the Eleatic Stranger in Polit. 277 D ff. Cp. Prot. 330 A, Phaedr. 262 C. Theaet. 154 C, 202 E, Soph. 218 D.

For other 'dialectical' terms, expressing various aspects of predication, such as προσαγωγεῖον, προσάπτω, προστίθημι,

1 This passage is a good example of the concrete mode of conception which belongs to Plato's later style.
The wide gap which separates Plato’s use of philosophical terms from Aristotle’s may be briefly instanced in the case of (1) \( \text{oivos} \), (2) \( \text{diakritik} \), and (3) \( \text{sullogismos} \).

(1) The chapter of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, IV. 8, in which various meanings of \( \text{oivos} \) both as \textit{substance} and \textit{essence} are distinguished, would hardly have been intelligible to Plato, although between the transcendent Being of Rep. VI, and the \textit{mikth \text{oivos}} of Phil. 27 B, a long step has been made towards the conception of concrete existence.

(2) \( \text{diakritik} \) in Aristotle is intermediate between philosophy and common sense, a sort of tentative philosophizing which falls short of certainty—Met. III. 2, § 20 \( \eta \) \( \text{diakritik} \) \( \text{peirastik} \) \( \text{per} \) \( \delta \nu \) \( \eta \) \( \text{philosophia} \) \( \gamma \nu \omega \text{mastic} \). To Plato, as we know, the same term represented the highest reach of philosophic method.

(3) The word \( \text{sullogismos} \) occurs only once in Plato. Theaet. 186 D, where it is used quite simply, much as \( \text{analogismata} \) (ib. supr. C), to express the action of the mind in forming judgements from impressions of sense. The verb \( \text{sullogizetai} \), ‘to reason,’ ‘collect,’ ‘infer,’ is not infrequent, but is also used quite simply, as it might occur in ordinary discourse:

Rep. VII. 531 D kal \( \text{sullogismos} \) \( \text{tauta} \) \( \eta \) \( \text{estin} \) \( \text{allhlos} \) \( \text{okeia} \). ‘and these things are reasoned of from that general point of view in which they are mutually akin.’

Ib. 516 B met\( \alpha \) \( \text{tauta} \) \( \alpha \nu \) \( \hat{\eta} \) \( \text{delta} \) \( \text{sullogizeto} \) \( \text{per} \) \( \alpha \nu \text{to} \), \( \kappa \tau \lambda \). ‘in the next place he would proceed to infer that it is the Sun who,’ &c.

How far such uses are removed from the Aristotelian doctrine of the Syllogism appears on comparing any one of numberless passages.
On Plato's use of Language.

Rhetor. I. 2, § 8 ἀνάγκη συνλογιζόμενον ἡ ἐπάγοντα δεικνύει ὅτι οὖν.

Analyt. Pr. I. 1, § 6 συνλογισμός ὃς ἐστι λόγος ἐν ὧν τεθέντων τινῶν ἐπερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῖτα εἶναι.

Met. IV. 3, § 3 συνλογισμοὶ οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκ τῶν τριῶν ὁ δὲ ἐγός μέσον.

Analyt. Pr. I. 7, § 4 ἐστιν ἀναγαγεῖν πάντας τοὺς συνλογισμοὺς εἰς τοὺς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι καθόλου συνλογισμοὺς.

See also esp. Soph. Elench. c. 33 sub fin.

But it is observable that even in Aristotle both verb and noun occur elsewhere in the ordinary Greek sense. See Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s. vv.
## INDEX TO VOL. II.

### I. ENGLISH.

Contractions: Str. = Structure; R. = Relation to other dialogues; Ess. = Essay; Exc. = Excursus to Essay on Structure; T. = Text; App. = Appendices to Essay on Text; St. = Style; Syn. = Syntax; D. = Diction.

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