HEADQUARTERS X CORPS

OPERATION

CHROMITE

15 AUGUST – 30 SEPTEMBER 1950

UNCLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS X CORPS
WAR DIARY SUMMARY
FOR
OPERATION CHROMITE
15 AUGUST TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1950

APPROVED BY:
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UNCLASSIFIED

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PART I

THE GENERAL SITUATION IN KOREA - 1 AUGUST TO 15 SEPTEMBER 1950

By the 1st of August 1950, the United Nations Forces in Korea found themselves compressed into a tight perimeter. The south flank of this line rested just west of MAKAN, the center curved around TAEBU, and the northern flank ran east to the sea north of POHANG. The perimeter was held by elements of five US Divisions - the 24th, 25th, and 26th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Marine Brigade of the 1st Marine Division, and six Republic of Korea Divisions. (1)

On 7 August, the first sustained counterattack of the war by US troops was launched on the south flank of the perimeter to drive the enemy back from positions which threatened BUSAN. The 1st Brigade, US Marines participated in this successful attack. (2)

To make up for these losses in the south, the enemy attacked strongly towards TAEBU and captured POHANG on the east coast from the South Koreans. After POHANG was recaptured with the aid of a US Task Force and the attack on TAEBU stopped, the indications were that the enemy had made his last big effort. But these indications proved to be very misleading when in the first two weeks of September, the North Koreans launched an all out offensive which seriously threatened TAEBU frontally and by envelopment from the east; the entire UN line between TAEBU and POHANG was pushed back until an enemy breakthrough seemed likely. Only by the greatest skill and maneuver, did the Eighth Army prevent disaster. It was at this critical point that one of the most daring and successful amphibious operations of modern warfare reversed the tide of war completely. (3)

OPERATION CHROMITTE

Operations Plan 100 B with code name CHROMITTE was conceived less than two weeks after the war started, when General of the Army Douglas

(1) USASK Periodic Operations Report for 1 August 1950.
(2) USASK Periodic Operations Report for 7 August 1950.
(3) Congratulatory Message, President Truman and Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur.
MacArthur told his Chief of Staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, to begin considering a plan for an amphibious assault on the east or west coast of Korea. Inchon was determined upon as the amphibious landing area after an exhaustive study had been completed. (1)

As a result of General MacArthur's directive, CINUFE Operation Plan 100 B was prepared and published on 12 August. The plan boldly called for the committing of the GHQ Reserve and the 1st Marine Division in an amphibious operation to seize the Inchon-Seoul area and cut the main line of enemy communications and supply to his armies in the south. In conjunction with this seaborne envelopment, Eighth Army was to launch a major offensive from the south, and driving in a northwesterly direction along the axis Taegu-Taegon-Suwon, to effect a juncture with the amphibious forces at Seoul. (2) The Navy (3) and the Air Force had important roles of transportation, security, naval gunfire support, carrier aircraft support, and strategic bombing. The tactical air cover was to be furnished by the 1st Marine Air Wing (attached to the landing force) and some naval carrier aircraft support. The objective of Plan 100 B was the destruction of the North Korean Army south of the line Inchon-Seoul-Ulchin. (4)

THE ORGANIZATION OF X CORPS

As a cover for the organization of the invasion force, General Almond continued as Chief of Staff, GHQ, FEO. His new staff had the title, Special Planning Staff, GHQ, and his command was carried under GHQ reserve. The command was to be designated X Corps and the final assignment of forces was published in Operation Order No. 1, GHQ, UNC 30 August 1950. The major units assigned were the 1st Marine Division, which included the battle tested 1st Marine Brigade from Eighth Army, the 9th Infantry Division, 924 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How), the 96th Field Artillery

(1) Statement of Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond
(2) Map A.
(3) Commander Amphibious Group One and Commander Attack Force CTF 90 Opm
Order 14-50
(4) CINUFE Operation Plan 100 B, 12 August 1950.
Battalion (155 How), the 50th AAA AW Battalion (SP), Co A Reinf, 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, the 19th Engineer Combat Group, and the 2d Engineer Special Brigade. Service units brought the strength of the X Corps to 69,450. The 3d Infantry Division and the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team were retained in GHQ, UNC Reserve for future employment with X Corps. The 17th ROK Infantry Regiment joined the Corps at INCHON on 23 September.

When Major General Clark L. Ruffner, General Almond's Chief of Staff, assembled the nucleus of X Corps Headquarters on 15 August 1950, it marked the beginning of one of the most successful races against time in military annals. The target date was 15 September, just one month away. Failure to meet that deadline meant almost a month's delay before another landing attempt could be made. For only a short period each month, would tidal conditions at INCHON permit an assault landing across the beaches. The tide varied over 31 feet between ebb and flow. (1) But a month's delay could have meant defeat for UN Forces in South Korea. On the other side of the scales was the fact that amphibious doctrine called for at least 160 days to plan and mount such a large scale operation. (2) In spite of the great odds against it and the serious doubts of many experts, the X Corps of almost 70,000 men was organized and equipped, moved to staging areas, embarked and transported to Korea in time to make a successful amphibious assault at INCHON on D-Day, the 15th of September.

THE TERRAIN*

I - GENERAL DESCRIPTION

SEUL area is one of the few lowland tracts in mountainous Korea. The City of SEUL, with its port of INCHON, combine to make a focal point. The HAN-gang passes through SEUL but flows into the sea north of the area.

(1) Annex B, par 2, Opn Plan, Com 7th Flt No. 9-50.

*Extracts Terrain Handbook No. 65, FIE.
Sections of the river-plain are undulating. South of Inchon, hills appear close to the shore; the coastline is sometimes steep and high. Extensive drying mud-flats, up to eight miles wide, fringe the coastline and surround the off-lying islands, making navigation difficult. The Inchon area is subject to one of the most extreme tidal ranges in the world, exceeding 31'.

A hilly island, Wolmi-do, about one mile by half a mile, protects Inchon harbor. Approaches to the mainland are restricted by other small islands, and channeled by the multitude of mud-flats.

Inchon is located on a hilly promontory dissected by small flat stream valleys and is backed by rough terrain. Farther inland are extensive valley flats and lowlands planted in rice. The rice fields, wet in summer, impede cross country movement.

Near Seoul, the valley is of irregular width, generally varying between one-two miles. The inland hills are steeper than those near the coast, rising to approximately 2700 feet. The main road and rail routes are winding and restricted.

Seoul is the main commercial center of Korea and is a major road and railroad junction. Principal roads run south to Taegon, southeast to Chungju and Pusan, west to Inchon, northwest to Pyongyang and northeast to Wonsan.

The Han-gang at Seoul is from 200-500 yards wide, and is a barrier to N/S movement. The current is moderate to swift; banks are steep and frequently diked; the channel is nearly 1000 yards wide near the mouth.

Korea has an abundant water supply, which however, requires purification. Rainfall varies from 20 inches a year in the north to 60 inches in the south. June - September is the rainy season. On the small offshore islands water is very scarce.

Seoul and Inchon have municipal water works. The Han-gang is the main source of supply, and is purified for domestic consumption.

*Extracts Terrain Handbook Number 65, FED.*
Irrigation is extensively employed. Seasonal flooding of rice paddies hinders military operations.

II - MILITARY IMPORTANCE

A. Significance.

The Seoul-Inchon area lies in a commanding position at the head of most major transportation and communication arteries of Korea. Topographic corridors radiate from the lower Han-gang valley to the east towards Wonsan, to the north towards Pyongyang, and to the south towards Taejon. A force occupying this area is in a position to block almost all routes of North-South or East-West movement at the waist of the Korean peninsula.

The Inchon area is important in its location at the head of the broad, shallow Imnadraco Gulf, which offers shelter and ice-free anchorage for large numbers of vessels. Inchon is the major port of central Korea and Seoul is the most important city. The fertile Han-gang valley is the most important food producing area in Korea.

B. Military Development.

Developments of the North Korean Forces included light and temporary fortifications and emplacements. The Kimpo Airfield is the only major airfield in the area.

THE ENEMY

Enemy forces in the Inchon-Seoul area consisted principally of major headquarters, a replacement center, anti-aircraft defenses, operating personnel for an airfield, minor port, coastal defenses, and an army garrison force. In addition, in this area the North Koreans drafted replacements for North Korean forces; however, the state of training and mental attitude of these hastily mobilized "recruits" did little to increase the enemy potential in the objective area. UN prisoners of war were interrogated in Seoul, at the prisoner of war enclosure located in the city. ROK cities and towns occupied by North Korean forces had

*Extracts from X Corps Intelligence Summaries for August and September 1950
political advisory groups of approximately 5 Soviets, and had counter-
espionage groups of 7 or 8 Soviets. The total enemy strength in SEOUL
was estimated to consist of approximately 5,000 troops; enemy strength
at INCHON was reported on 25 July as 1,000; enemy strength at KIMPO
Airfield estimated at about 500; enemy strength at UIJONGBU, undetermined,
consisted of a "large" replacement training center. The 107th Regiment
occupied three locations northeast of SEOUL. Enemy forces, capable of
reinforcing the INCHON - SEOUL objective area, consisted of uncommitted
reserve divisions in rear of the line of contact with EUSA K, line-of-
communication type regiments in occupied territory, and small garrison
forces still located in North Korea. The enemy was incapable of organ-
izing additional combat divisions of the standard engaging EUSA K.
However, provisional regimental combat teams, brigades, or defensive
commands were within his capabilities for reinforcement. Estimates of
enemy strength proved to be very accurate as the operation progressed.

For what the three highest ranking North Korean POW's thought of
the INCHON - SEOUL Operations, see attached interrogations beginning p 26.
The detailed orders for the execution of the X Corps mission were published in Operations Order No 1, X Corps 28 August 1950. (1)

The details of the amphibious assault landing by the 1st Marine Division were published in Operation Order 2, 1st Marine Division and Operations Orders 14 and 15 CTF 90, USN.

A Battalion Landing Team of the 1st Marine Division was to make an initial landing on WOLMI-DO (GREEN BEACH) at 0630 hours, D-Day, to secure that Island prior to the major landing by the balance of the division. This step was essential because of the commanding position of the Island in relation to the Inchon shoreline. (2)

After the Wolmi-do landing the principal landings were to be made at 1730 hours, D-Day, on RED, YELLOW, and BLUE beaches at Inchon by the 1st Marine Division (less one Regimental Combat Team) (Reinforced) landing in amphibious assault. This division was then to seize a beachhead in the Inchon area. The beachhead was to be expanded rapidly by the 1st Marine Division to include Kimpo Airfield and the Han River line west of Seoul. The advance was to continue to seize and secure the city of Seoul, the terrain commanding Seoul, and measures taken to secure the Corps left flank.

The 7th Infantry Division (Reinforced) plus X Corps troops, were to land administratively from second and third echelon Navy convoys in the city of Inchon at a time to be designated after D-Day. The 7th Infantry Division was given the mission of protecting the Corps right flank and expanding the beachhead to the south of Seoul as far as Osan if necessary. (3) This Division was to provide one Regimental Combat Team for Corps Reserve.

The 17th ROK Infantry Regiment was to occupy Seoul on order after its capture by the 1st Marine Division.

The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team was to prepare for airborne or ground operations, or act as Corps Reserve depending on how the operation developed.

Logistical support was to be initially the responsibility of the 1st Marine Division until the Inchon Base Command could effect a relief. The Kimpo Task Force was to establish an air base at Kimpo Airfield and provide for its defense. The Seoul Area Command was to be prepared to assume administrative responsibilities for the City of Seoul, and to work with the South Korean Government in the city’s rehabilitation.

(1) Operation Order No 1, X Corps, 28 August 1950 (2) Map B (3) Map C
The Inchon Landing by the 1st Marine Division, 15 Sep 1950

1. The Inchon Landing by the 1st Marine Division, 15 Sep 1950
2. The Capture of Kimpo Airfield by the 5th Marine Regiment, 17 Sep 1950
   (20th MAR CORPS opened in Inchon 1800-19 Sep 1950)
3. First Han River Crossing by 5th Marine RCT, 20 Sep 1950
4. Capture of Suwon by 32d RCT, 21 Sep 1950
5. Capture of Yongdungpo by the 1st Marine RCT, 23 Sep 1950
6. Second Han River Crossing by the 1st Marine RCT, 24 Sep 1950
7. Third Han River Crossing by the 32d RCT, 25 Sep 1950
8. Juncture with 8th Army by the 31st RCT, 26 Sep 1950
9. Capture of Seoul by the 1st Marine Division and 7th US Infantry Division, 26 Sep 1950
THE I CORPS OPERATIONS 15-30 SEPTEMBER

1. INCHON LANDING

At 0628 hours 15 September 1950 the 3d Battalion Landing Team (BLT 3) of the 5th Marine Regiment crossed the line of departure and initiated the first amphibious assault landing (1) of American Forces against an enemy since Easter Sunday 1945 when the US Tenth Army landed on Okinawa.

Beginning at 0602, naval air made the first strike of the day against WOLMI-DO followed by more air strikes on the island and targets of opportunity island. Beginning at 0624, heavy shelling of WOLMI-DO by Cruiser Division 5 effectively reduced enemy gun and other emplacements covering Green Beach. At 0633 the first wave was on the beach and within 88 minutes the 3d BLT Commander reported WOLMI-DO secured.

Late in the morning, the 3d BLT began to advance on SO-WOLMI-DO, a small promontory extending south from WOLMI-DO. The North Koreans began a trial escape from the island, but were bombed on the causeway leading to INCHON, and those who attempted to swim toward land were strafed. By 1100 the Marines were cleaning up what little enemy resistance was left on SO-WOLMI-DO.

At 1645 hours the 1st wave of the 1st Marine Regiment (reinforced) consisting of Armored Amphibious Tractors of Company "A", 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, USA, crossed the line of departure and headed for Blue Beach. The landing wave of the regimental reserve (BLT-1/1) landed on the sea wall enclosing the salt flats wall to the left of Blue Beach. This mistake was due to great clouds of dust and smoke which hid the beach and navigational aids. Succeeding waves, including some LVTs carrying troops of assault elements, were diverted in time and led to the proper beaches. (2)

At 1732 hours, 2d and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marine Regiment, designated assault elements, commenced landing on Blue Beach. Assault troops were forced to climb over the fifteen foot high sea wall adjoining Blue Beach 2, using aluminum scaling ladders designed for the purpose. With the assault troops, a

(1) Support Air Control Center, USN Teletype Report 15 Sept
(2) 5th Marines Special Action Report 6 Sept - 7 Oct 1950
platoon of engineers immediately began improving the landing sites by installing cargo nets over the sea wall and breaching it by means of explosives. The assault troops reorganized their units in accordance with well coordinated plans and began to move inland toward their objective. As the assault troops moved forward they met light opposition consisting mostly of small arms fire and mortar fire; however, because of the enemy's inadequate observation, the assault elements were saved from accurate enemy mortar and automatic weapons fire. (1)

RCT 5 (-) landed at 1732 on Red Beach north of the WOLMI-DO causeway. The landing was made with two Battalions abreast in columns of companies against moderate opposition with only light casualties. Under cover of darkness the high ground immediately to the rear of the beach was seized at 2000 hours where the landing force halted and reorganized. By 2200 patrols were dispatched to the OA Line. (Map C). The OA Line was reached without opposition and outposted for the night; by 1850 hours, the Regimental Command Post was established ashore.

On 16 September at 0206 all objectives along the C-1 Line in the 1st Marine Regiment zone of action were seized and occupied. Hills 180 and 233 were outposted in strength by HLT-3/1 and by noon the C-3 Line was reached. At 1600 an attack to the BHL was launched and by dark the 1st Marines had advanced some 2000 yards. Throughout the night harassing, interdiction, and illumination fires were fired on selected targets.

During the same period, the 5th Marine Regiment launched an attack to capture the remainder of INCHON and other division objectives. The attack at 0630, was launched in a column of Battalions with the 2d Battalion in the lead. The column pushed east along the main east-west roads through the city. By 1100 the division C-3 Line was secured against light resistance, and on the right flank contact was made with the 1st Marine Regiment. The 3d KMC Battalion, attached to 5th Marines, mopped up enemy snipers in the city.

The rapidly moving 2d and 3d Battalions secured the BHL against scattered resistance just prior to darkness. (2)

The seizure of INCHON by the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments secured INCHON Harbor as a base through which 7th Division and other Corps elements could be

(1) 1st Marines Special Action Report 1-30 September 1950
(2) 5th Marines Special Action Report 6 Sept - 7 October 1950
landed expeditiously.

On 17 September after a quiet night the 5th Marine Regiment was attacked at 0600 by 5 enemy T-34 tanks and approximately 200 infantry in the zone of the 2d Battalion. All the tanks were destroyed by Marine Tanks, recoilless rifles, and rocket launchers; all enemy infantry were either killed or wounded. The enemy tanks were allowed to advance without opposition until they came in sight of the tank and anti-tank positions; when friendly tanks opened fire, Marine Infantry elements closed in on three sides to complete the destruction.

For the remainder of the day friendly attacks advanced against light opposition to seize Objectives Baker and Easy.

2. KIMPO AIRFIELD CAPTURED 17 SEPTEMBER 1950

As soon as Objective Baker was passed by the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, the 2d Battalion pushed north, with 2 platoons of tanks attached, to seize KIMPO Airfield. At 0700, under cover of darkness, KIMPO Airfield was secured against moderate resistance.

At 0700, the 1st Marine Regiment had jumped off in the attack and met with stiffer resistance than they had previously experienced. By 1300 the BML was reached by 1st and 2d Battalions with the aid of supporting fires.

By 0910, G Company, 1st Marine Regiment, mounted on tanks of G Company, 1st Tank Battalion, spearheaded a drive along the SEOUL - INCHON Highway, toward HCT-1 objective and ran into heavy resistance. The troops dismounted for the assault. The remainder of the 2d Battalion, loaded on DUKWs, followed at 1600, and by 1930 all elements were dug in for the night.

On 18 September the 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment received artillery fire in the early morning. At 0645, the 1st and 3d Battalions, supported by tanks, jumped off in an attack. The 2d Battalion followed the 3d Battalion. Progress was steady against enemy small arms fire. Casualties for the day were light.

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, in the early morning hours received a series of uncoordinated counterattacks until 0600, when the enemy, approximately 200 strong, attacked fanatically. This attack was also repulsed by a well executed defense in depth, and the enemy suffered heavy casualties. By 0600 hours, 18 September, the KIMPO area (Map C)
was completely cleared of enemy.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment continued to attack at dawn and occupied Objective FOX overlooking YOKKUNINGPO by 0930. Just before noon the 2d Battalion reached positions (Objective DOG) overlooking the HAN River.

The 5th Marine Regimental CP displaced to KIMPO Airfield at 1245.

On 18 September, elements of the 7th Division consisting of the 32d Infantry Regiment, 7th Reconnaissance Company, and part of the 73d Tank Battalion had landed at INCHON.

On 19 September, the 1st Marine Regiment attacked in zone at 1030 with two Battalions abreast. The 3d Battalion, on the left, made rapid advances against resistance consisting of small arms and mortar fire. The 2d Battalion met a well organized center of resistance immediately after the jump off.

The 1st Marine Regiment had met increasingly heavy resistance each day. From the line of departure forward the greater portion of the INCHON - SEOUL Highway was found to be mined in well selected locations.

At 1200, 32d Infantry Regiment, attached to the 1st Marine Division, relieved the 1st Marine Division elements on the right flank. The 2d Battalion of the 32d Infantry Regiment relieved the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment south of the INCHON - SEOUL Highway. The enemy continued to withdraw slowly to the hills south of the SEOUL - INCHON Highway, where the terrain is favorable for defensive tactics.

BLT 1/5 had been ordered late 18 September to prepare to attack and seize Hills 80 and 85 at 0700 the next morning. Before the scheduled attack on the 19th, Company C began to receive heavy small arms and sporadic mortar fire at 0615 from Hill 118. At dawn small groups were observed advancing toward the airfield in front of Company C and other groups were moving across the rice paddy to the front of the Company's position. Action was promptly taken to cut off the attack. While the enemy attack was being held by Company C, Company B began an attack to envelop Hill 118. After a heavy artillery concentration and air strike, Company B succeeded in taking the objective. This enabled Company C to move forward and take the ridge to the left. By 1055 Hill 118 was secured.

While awaiting the arrival of tanks, Company C and Company B consolidated
their positions before beginning the attack on Hills 80 and 85. The enemy was routed from Hill 80 by an air strike. Hill 85 was seized and occupied and the villages to the rear were cleared. Then enemy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire were directed against the Marine positions on Hills 80 and 85, a perimeter defense was set in on the reverse slopes of the two hills. 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment was relieved by 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment.

3. FIRST HAN RIVER CROSSING

The 5th Marine Regiment began hurried preparations for the crossing of the HAN River. At 1900 a reconnaissance patrol departed from KIMTO and arrived on the near bank of the HAN River at 1950. 14 swimmers departed for the far side of the river and reached the opposite bank at 2040 hours. A patrol reconnoitered the village and the high ground on the right with no contact; the patrol then returned to the river bank as planned and at 2100 gave the signal for the remainder of the reconnaissance company to cross the HAN River. The Company embarked in nine (9) amphibious tractors. At midstream, the enemy, which had been hidden on the high ground, opened fire with machine guns and mortars. The LVTs were ordered to return to the south bank. The swimmers were being fired upon and were also directed to return to the south bank.

The Marine swimmers determined that the beach location on the far bank at the old ferry site was suitable for the landing of LVTs.

During the day additional elements of the 7th Division came ashore and moved to support the 326 Infantry Regiment which continued to attack to the east. The 7th Reconnaissance Company maintained contact with the 1st Marine Division on the 7th Division north (left) flank.

On 20 September the 5th Marine Regiment (Reinf) crossed the HAN River at 0545, in column of battalions and turned southeast toward SEOUL. After the crossing, the 1st Marine Engineer Battalion and the 1st Shore Party Battalion conducted ferrying operations in the sector. The 5d KMC Battalion assisted the river crossing operations by patrolling to the north on the south bank of the HAN River and protecting the 1st Marine Division's left flank. (1)

The enemy offered stiff delaying action after the crossing of the HAN River. Initially the enemy held his fire, but upon reaching HANGJU he began fighting in the streets and on the slopes of the small hill to the east.

(1) 5th Marines Special Action Report 6 September - 9 October 1950.
The 5th Marine Regiment forced the enemy in this area to withdraw to the southeast under cover of another enemy battalion occupying prepared positions on the ridge line 3,000 yards southeast of the crossing site. After the initial phase, the enemy offered only slight resistance to the advance. Aided by very heavy naval and aerial bombardment, the Marines advanced to a point within four miles of SEOUL.

To the south the 1st Marine Regiment had advanced along the INCHON - SEOUL Highway against stiffening resistance; at 0430, 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, received an attack by an estimated enemy battalion northeast of the village of SCOA. The attack was stopped by front line units with rifle fire, bayonets, bazookas, and grenades. Later the 2d Battalion became heavily engaged with the advance elements of an attacking enemy force. Following artillery concentrations the 2d Battalion started a strong counterattack which inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. The remainder of the day all Marine units held their positions on the outskirts of YONJDUNPO. During the afternoon and throughout the night friendly air and artillery continued to bomb and shell the town in preparation for an assault the following morning.

During the same day the 7th Infantry Division opened its CP ashore. The 31st RCT debarked and concentrated in the area of CHANGSU-RI to secure the area to the south and protect the Division south flank. The 32d RCT advanced to the east taking Objectives Baker, Charlie, Dog, and Easy against stiffening enemy resistance.

The enemy conducted a delaying action through skillful employment of antitank mines in conjunction with small arms, machine guns, and mortar fire. In the course of the action, the 32d Infantry Regiment seized the commanding ground overlooking YONJDUNPO from the west and south. The X Corps had now gained positions from which to begin an assault on SEOUL.

On 21 September at 0630 the 1st Marine Regiment continued its advance along the INCHON - SEOUL Highway to YONJDUNPO and attacked the enemy with 3 Battalions; two from the northwest and one along the INCHON Road. The attack progressed against light resistance at first, but became increasingly heavy. The 1st Bn attacking from the NW was slowed in its advance by heavy casualties.
"A" Company maneuvered to the right and entered the town from the southwest. This maneuver was successful and by nightfall "A" Company had reached the road overlooking the airstrip. The Company held this position all night against enemy attacks killing 275 of the attackers. During the night the remainder of the regiment prepared plans to renew the attack towards "A" Company's position the next day.

The 5th Marine Regiment continued to enlarge the bridge head across the HAN River driving southeast along the general axis of the railroad leading into the city of SEOUL. The advance was slowed by artillery and mortar fire. The greater part of the opposition was soon reduced. However, during this period, the enemy continued to attempt crossings of the HAN River in various sectors and to extend their guerrilla activities.

4. CAPTURE OF SUNWON 21 SEPTEMBER 1950

On 21 September the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment captured the strategic hill mass, Objective F, easing the pressure on the 1st Marine Regiment attacking YONGUNGPO. The 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment captured the important communications center of ANYANGNI, cutting the withdrawal route of enemy units to the south and preparing the fall of SUNWON with its excellent airfield. After taking ANYANGNI, the 7th Reconnaissance Company continued to the south and entered SUNWON at 1830. The enemy in the city were caught completely by surprise. The Reconnaissance Company was immediately reinforced by a Task Force consisting of Company "B", 32d RCT, Company "A", 73d Tank Battalion, and a platoon of Engineers from Company "B", 13th Engineer Battalion. The G-3 of the 7th Division was killed on a reconnaissance near the SUNWON Airfield.

On 22 September at 0800, the 1st Marine Regiment continued their attack and advanced through YONGUNGPO linking up with "A" Company, 1st Marine Regiment. The enemy had apparently withdrawn all organized forces from the city during the night and the only opposition met was from sniper fire and long range mortars. The enemy had withdrawn across the HAN River leaving only a covering force south of the river.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, after debarking at INJUN, assumed
responsibility in the zone of action of 3d Battalion, KMC. With the latter unit, and X Corps Special Operations Company attached, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment protected the Corps left flank south and west of the Han River. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, remained in Corps Reserve while the 1st Battalion continued unloading.

During the day SUNWON Airfield was captured and placed in Operational status. Elements of the 31st Infantry Regiment moved to the SUNWON area to relieve a Task Force of the 32d Infantry Regiment made up of Company "K" and tanks from the 73d Tank Battalion, already in that area. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 32d Infantry Regiment continued to advance to the east and north in the 7th Division zone against moderate to light resistance.

The 5th Marine Regiment line west of SEOUL and north of the Han River extended from Hill 229 to SOGANG. On 23 September at 0700 the 1st Battalion, KMC, began an attack on enemy positions to its front in order to straighten out the line. Meanwhile, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 5th Marine Regiment, supported the advance by fire. In the advance only slight gains were made and the 1st Battalion, KMC, was unable to seize the objective. 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, was ordered to pass through the 1st Battalion, KMC, at 1500 hours to continue the attack. After this maneuver the 1st Battalion, KMC, moved to an assembly area. The attack was then continued against fierce resistance with heavy friendly casualties.

The attacking force was ordered to halt and consolidate its minor gains. The entire attack was held up pending the reduction of the heavily fortified enemy position in front of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment.

The enemy launched a counterattack at 1535 hours against the 5th Marine Regiment positions. This attack was repulsed. The left flank of the 5th Marine Regiment north of the river crossing site, remained quiet throughout the day.

5. THE CAPTURE OF YONGDUNGPO

At 1600 the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, had seized the Han River bridge approaches. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Marine Regiment attacked and drove some 4000 yards through YONGDUNGPO to positions along the south bank of the Han River. During the night the enemy launched two counterattacks against the 1st Marine Regiment.
The 7th Marine Regiment had little activity in its zone. The 7th Marine Regimental Headquarters and the 3d Battalion moved to assembly areas north of the HAN River.

The 7th Division was generally quiet at the front during this period with only minor activity against small units of the 9th NK Division. However, in the zone of the 32d Infantry Regiment the enemy was putting up stubborn resistance but was forced slowly to give ground. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the Regiment now occupied positions east of the hill mass south of the HAN River opposite SEOUL.

I Corps TAG (Marine Air Group 33) furnished close air support for the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division. Total number of sorties flown was 78. Total number of aircraft reported on station for close air support was 78. An estimated 400 enemy troops were destroyed in two tunnels on the north edge of SEOUL.

On 24 September the 5th Marine Regiment was subjected to enemy mortar and artillery fire. At 0520 the Regiment received a counterattack by 3 enemy regiments which was repulsed. (1) The 2d Battalion at 0640 resumed the attack against heavy resistance after a 20 minute artillery and air preparation. The 1st Battalion commenced moving slowly toward regimental objective 2 at 0700. At 0810, 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, began movement down the east spur of Hill 276 to attempt to outflank the heavy resistance in front of the 2d Battalion and to gain better observation to support the 2d Battalion by fire.

With stiff resistance facing them, 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, advanced toward Hill 105 sustaining heavy casualties. In order that the 3d Battalion could continue its attack in support of the 2d Battalion, the 1st Battalion was directed to move their reserve company from the right to the left flank, to relieve elements of the 3d Battalion on Hill 216. By 1430 the 2d Battalion had seized the objective (Hill 105) suffering its heaviest casualties of the Korean war.

6. **SECOND HAN RIVER CROSSING: 24 September**

The 1st Marine Regiment began preparation for the crossing of the HAN River at TONGDUNFC by sending reconnaissance elements to the crossing site early on the morning of 24 September. At first light, the Engineers attached

(1) Periodic Intelligence Report, I Corps, 24 September 1950
to the 1st Marine Regiment, began clearing the crossing area. The crossing of the initial battalion was delayed by mines at the crossing site.

By 0800 a reconnaissance party and the assault elements of the 26 Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, had crossed the HAN against sporadic mortar fire. Contact was made with the 5th Marine Regiment north of the river. The 26 Battalion moved rapidly into positions on the right flank of the 5th Marine Regiment and after the crossing the 2d Battalion began advancing on the hill mass of Hill 79. This advance was continued by the 1st Battalion, which executed a passage of lines of the 2d Battalion to seize Hill 79, in the face of heavy small arms, mortar and automatic fire. By 1600 the 3d Battalion was released from Division Reserve and crossed the HAN to join other Marine elements. During this period the Marine Battalions had advanced approximately 2000 yards. The Marines now held an almost solid line along the western side of SEOUL. (1)

The 17th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, began preparation to debark at INCHON. Meanwhile the 31st Infantry Regiment continued to consolidate defensive positions south of the airstrip at SUWON and astride the SEOUL-TAEJON Highway. The opposition continued light in that sector. Late that night an enemy road block and five tanks were knocked out in the SUWON area.

The 32d Infantry Regiment, after making a surprise predawn attack with the 2d Battalion, continued to move east against light enemy resistance and gained approximately 3000 yards.

The 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne REC, landed at KIMPO airfield and began relief of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, on the Corps left flank south and west of the HAN River.

I Corps TAC destroyed 7 enemy tanks in SEOUL, destroyed several mortar and machine gun emplacements and destroyed and dispersed troops along the front. Eighty-one sorties were flown.

On 25 September, prior to daylight, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, moved forward in column of companies through the 2d Battalion and gained contact with the 1st Battalion on the right. This movement involved a 90 degree turn in the direction of the attack. The 1st Battalion was required to withdraw slightly and pivot on its left flank, yet remaining within its new zone.

(1) 1st Marine Special Action Report, 1-30 September 1950

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Reorientation of the Regiment was particularly difficult due to passage of lines, a change in the Regimental direction of attack, and the unfavorable positions for supporting artillery on the opposite side of the Han River. These problems were overcome however, without loss of control and by 0700 the attack to the east was underway into SECUL. By noon the attack had gained momentum and continued forward with the support of tanks. At one point in the advance the 1st Battalion ran into an enemy position manned by approximately 1000 men. Concentration by 4.2 mortars flushed several hundred enemy troops from road blocks into the open where 1st Battalion machine gunners cut them down. The 3d Battalion was able to reach Hill 97 where contact was made with the 1st Battalion. All during the daylight hours there was heavy house to house fighting and the advance was hampered by fires in the city. At about 1930 hours the Marines tied in their positions for night defense. The regiment had advanced approximately 2300 yards during the period. (1)

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marine Regiment, had attacked at 0700, 25 September to seize that portion of SECUL in the regimental zone. Resistance was light and the 3d Battalion was supported by the 2d Battalion in its advance on Hill 105. At 1335, 2d Battalion seized Hill 72 and continued to attack to seize Hill 105. The Division Reconnaissance Company occupied Hills 216 and 296 relieving elements of the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion assembled in the rear of the 3d Battalion in order to make the final attack for the capture of SECUL in the regimental zone. The 3d Battalion later received a counterattack which was repulsed. (2) This counterattack delayed the immediate pursuit of the enemy who was withdrawing rapidly to the North.

After the day's actions the regiments were occupying positions approximately 2500 yards east of their original positions.

During the day the 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment was relieved by the 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne RCT. The 7th Marine Regiment then attacked east in the vicinity of Hill 285 in coordination with other elements of the 1st Marine Division meeting little or no resistance.

7. THIRD HAN RIVER CROSSING: 25 SEPTEMBER

(1) 1st Marine Special Action Report, 1-30 September 1950
(2) 5th Marine Special Action Report, 6 September - 7 October 1950
The 32d Infantry, 7th Division, attacked across the HAN River tightening the ring around SEOUL. Within one hour after the beginning of the crossing at 0630, the 2d Battalion had crossed the river in the face of enemy fire and by 1030 was on the slopes of the dominating hill mass of the first objective. By 1900 all primary objectives had been seized and the heights immediately south of SEOUL were in the hands of the 32d RCT. The 17th ROK Regiment crossed the river behind the 32d RCT to positions east of the 32d RCT. The rapid advance of the 32d RCT aided the Marine Units to continue their advance. (1)

MCT 17 off-loaded at Inchon and moved by foot and rail to positions near Antang-ni. Aerial observation reported the beginnings of an apparent withdrawal from SEOUl by the enemy.

I Corps TAC placed main effort on South Mountain in SEOUL. The area was neutralized and enemy troops dispersed. 114 sorties were flown during the day and 4 during the hours of darkness.

The time of attack of the 1st Marine Regiment for 26 September had been set for 0630, but on the night of 25 September the unit was alerted by G3 X Corps for an attack at 0145. There immediately followed a hasty coordination with the 5th Marine Regiment. As the assault was to be preceded by artillery fire and as the preparations for this were found inadequate the assault battalions were notified to stand fast, and the attack time was reset at 0200. However, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment received a heavy enemy attack shortly before 0200 on their left flank. The main force of the attack was directed down the SEOUL Highway from the northeast. The Battalion, due to extensive preparations for the jump off, was extremely well prepared to meet the enemy. The enemy rushed in several tanks which were blasted by the Marines. This engagement cost the enemy 7 tanks destroyed and 3 damaged. The attacking force was estimated at 12 T-34 tanks, at least two self-propelled assault guns, and a heavily reinforced infantry battalion, supported by 120mm mortars. These efforts on the part of the enemy continued until 0540 when the force was finally repulsed. By 0900 the 2d Battalion,

(1) War Diary Summary, 7th US Infantry Division, 1-30 September 1950
1st Marine Regiment, continued the attack in conjunction with the 1st Battalion on the right.

For the remainder of the day the advance through SEOUL was painstakingly slow. By 1300 physical contact was established between 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment and elements of the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment on the 1st Marine Division right boundary. Patrols from the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, met patrols from the 5th Marine Regiment at about the same time. (2) As soon as the attack against the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, had been repulsed at 0445 a patrol was sent east to contact the 1st Marine Regiment. This was an attempt to coordinate pursuit of enemy elements to the north. Due to heavy enemy resistance the 1st Marine Regiment was unable to advance to the point of contact. However, by 1140, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, launched an attack in coordination with elements of the 1st Marine Regiment, after making contact. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment that afternoon advanced 500 to 600 yards against light resistance. The 2d Battalion mopped up in its zone, while the 1st Battalion, KMC, mopped up in the areas to the rear of the regimental front line. It was generally quiet throughout the rest of the night in the 5th Marine Regiment zone.

The 7th Marine Regiment continued to protect the Division left flank and the FAN River crossing site.

The Division Reconnaissance Company remained on Hill 296.

The 3d Battalion, 187th Abn BCT, with the 3d Korean Marine Corps Battalion attached, continued the mission of protecting the Corps left flank on the KUMO Peninsula. 1st and 2d Battalions assembled in the vicinity of KIMPO Airfield.

Shortly after daybreak 26 September, Company "L" 32d BCT observed a large column of enemy moving east of SKUL and promptly launched a local attack. The rest of the BCT moved into Objective 2 against moderate enemy resistance. The 2d Battalion was counterattacked, but gave no ground and all units continued to move forward. (1)

(1) War Diary Summary, 7th US Infantry Division, 1-30 Sept 50.
(2) 1st Marines Special Action Report, 1-30 Sept 50.
The enemy continued to resist the 32d RCT attack on SEOUL by heavy to moderate sniper fire and street fighting. The Regiment advanced 2000-3000 yards to the vicinity of CHONGJUN-SO. Elements of the 17th RCT protected the HAN River crossing site and engaged in mopping-up operations.

The 26 Battalion, 31st RCT, reinforced by one company of the 1st Battalion, attacked south of SUWON and met well organized defensive positions supported by tanks and mortars. The attack progressed slowly. General Barr that evening ordered the 31st RCT to conduct a coordinated regimental attack to clear the enemy hill position south of SUWON. At this time the Regimental Commander had departed with a task force on a wide flanking movement to the south and east. The orders were delivered to this column near GSAN-NI. (1)

8. JUNCTURE WITH EIGHTH ARMY: 26 September 50

At 222520 September, elements of the 7th Infantry Division met elements of the 1st Cavalry Division about five miles south of SUWON. The last leg of the advance of the 1st Cavalry Division elements originated in the vicinity of CHONGJU. This juncture cut off North Korean Forces located in southwest Korea and marked the first meeting of the Eighth Army units from the south of Korea and X Corps units in the DHON-SOUL area.

9. CAPTURE OF SEOUL: 26 September 50

During the day General MacArthur issued the following communique:

"SEOUL, Capital of the Republic of Korea, is again in friendly hands. United Nations Forces, including the 17th Regiment of the ROK Army and elements of the U.S. 7th and 1st Marine Divisions, have completed the envelopment and seizure of the city.

While U.S. and ROK Marines and special troops drove to the northwest astride the HAN River to expand perimeter defenses, other Marine Units pushed into SEOUL from the northwest. Meanwhile, the 32d U.S. Regiment of the 7th Division, with the 17th ROK Regiment, in a bold sweep along the southern bank of the HAN, accomplished a second crossing of the river south-east of the city and occupied the commanding terrain on the outskirts, forcing the enemy garrison to flee in disorder to the north.

(1) War Diary Summary, 7th US Infantry Division, 1-30 Sept 50
The liberation of the city was conducted in such a manner as to cause the least possible damage to civil institutions." (1)

On 27 September, in the early morning, units of the 1st Marine Division resumed their attack against the enemy in the eastern portion of the City of SEOUL. In the 1st Marine Regiment zone the advance was made by the 1st and 2d Battalions against strong well organized resistance until the enemy position began to deteriorate late that afternoon. Approximately 3,000 yards were gained in the fighting.

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment advanced against light resistance and by 1015 hours had driven to the Russian Consulate Building. At 1610 the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment raised the American Flag over the Capitol Building. During the day the 7th Marine Regiment continued to protect the Corps left flank and repulsed a counterattack of battalion strength with the assistance of close air support at 1345. The 5th and 7th Marine Regiments made a link-up at 1500 hours.

On the ROKPO Peninsula, the 187th Airborne RCT conducted extensive patrolling.

By 1045 the 32d RCT was able to link-up with the 1st Marine Regiment after overcoming moderate enemy resistance. There were heavy enemy casualties in the sector and much enemy equipment was either captured or destroyed. To the east of SEOUL, the 17th ROK Regiment continued mopping-up operations.

In the 31st RCT sector, just prior to daylight, the task force under the 31st Infantry Regimental Commander was attacked by enemy tanks in USAN-NT, but they were driven off with bazooka fire and one tank destroyed. While proceeding north, a heavy fire fight developed, holding up the task force.

During the morning, the 31st RCT, minus parts of the 3d Battalion and the task force with the Regimental Commander, resumed the attack to the south from the SUNCOM area. This attack moved against a strong and determined enemy who was supported by artillery, mortars, and tanks. Progress was slow.

The Close Air Support Group attacked enemy machine gun, mortar, and artillery positions along the entire Corps front. Twenty-seven (27) requests

(1) Official Communique Number 9, dated 26 September 1950.
for strikes were received and sixteen (16) were flown for a total of seventy-eight (78) close support sorties. In addition, one (1) night close support mission was flown.

On 28 September elements of the 31st Regiment attacked north from CSAN-NI to eliminate the enemy cutting the road at NAESAMI-RI. The assault south from SUNCN was also continued. An air strike was called on Hills 118, 92, and a tunnel in this area with excellent results. The 57th and 92d Field Artillery Battalions fired heavy concentrations accounting for about half of the enemy casualties. The RCT, after overcoming heavy resistance, occupied all objectives by 1625 hours. (1)

In the 1st Marine Division Sector at 0645, 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Marine Regiment, continued to clear the remainder of SEOUL and seize Hill 133 and the commanding ground to the northeast. In the 1st Marine Division zone of action the enemy appeared to be broken and the division as a whole was engaged in mopping-up operations. The enemy had withdrawn all his forces from SEOUL except for small elements which had been left behind to fight a delaying action.

In the 5th Marine Regiment zone, patrols encountered no enemy resistance. As the Regiment’s zone had been cleared and all assigned objectives were secured, the 5th Marine Regiment was pinched out by the 1st Marine Regiment from the right and the 7th Marine Regiment on the left as planned.

The 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, and 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment provided security for the ceremony in SEOUL at which the government of South Korea was returned to the Capitol at SEOUL. By 2050 hours, mopping-up operations in the 5th Marine Regiment zone were completed.

The 3d Battalion, 32d RCT continued its advance north and cut the main highway running east from SEOUL. By 0200 hours, the 7th Division sector within SEOUL was cleared. X Corps then directed reconnaissance in force east of the TORSHON River.

1st and 2d Battalions, 187th Abn RCT were in Corps Reserve. The 3d Battalion (Reinforced) was designated Task Force Able with mission of pro-

(1) War Diary Summary, 7th U. S. Infantry Division, 1-30 Sept 50.
tecting the Corps left (north) flank. Security and Reconnaissance patrols from TF Able reported no enemy contact.

Close Air Support missions were conducted along the entire Corps front and consisted mainly of strikes against enemy mortar and machine gun positions and troops concentrations. All aircraft available were utilized.

By 29 September, X Corps had achieved its main objective in the SEOUL-INCHON area. There yet remained the clearing of the KINPO Peninsula and the seizure of UIJONGBU which was the refuge of North Korean troops fleeing to the north. X Corps activities consisted of patrol action. There were instances of weak counterattacks by the enemy which were quickly repulsed. On 29 September, at SEOUL, a liberation ceremony was held at the Capitol Building where General MacArthur turned over the government to South Korean President Syngman Rhee.

At 1800 hours on 30 September the 7th Division was relieved of responsibility in the SEOUL area and the RCT's prepared to move into new areas.

As the month of September ended, Operation Chromite was brought to a completely successful conclusion. Although some mopping-up was continued into October, decisive results had been achieved in the brief space of fifteen (15) days since the landing at INCHON on 15 September. The victory had been won at the cost of only 3,438 UN casualties as opposed to 14,000 enemy killed and 7,000 captured.
15 Sept 50 FW was attached to the Seoul Regiment located in Seoul.

FW first learned on 16 September 1950 that US Troops had landed in Inchon. However no information was released in detail. At this time FW was acting commanding officer of 1st Company (1st Battalion, Seoul Regiment) 19 September 1950. The Regiment received orders to move to their assigned defense positions in Seoul City and vicinity. The Seoul Regiment was the only known unit in Seoul at this time. Nothing was heard as to receiving reinforcements for the Seoul Regiment.

According to hearsay, on the southern front, the North Korean Army was closing in on Pusan, their last objective.

FW was told from higher command to lecture his troops "to die if necessary for the defense of Seoul".

The Inchon landing was quite a surprise to the troops of the Regiment who at no time were given any information concerning the battle situation. The Regiment was commanded by Col Lee Kyong U., who was last seen in Seoul.

American air attack and Artillery caused the most casualties among North Korean troops. FW had no actual combat experience. Men of the Seoul Regiment received anywhere from 15 days to 2 months of military training. Heard that the South Korean people voluntarily worked for the North Korean Army and were paid by the North Korean government. FW had no knowledge as to who or what General MacArthur was.

The Seoul Regiment was ordered to die if necessary to defend the city of Seoul. The Regiment received no reinforcements. FW had given up hope of holding Seoul on 22 September 1950 due to heavy air attack resulting in large North Korean casualties.

North Korean Army now has no possibility of defeating the United Nations Forces. There is no comparison between the American and Russian supplied North Korean weapons and equipment.

The North Korean people as a whole have no desire to have war. However, information revealed that the South Korean Army had attacked North
Korea by crossing the 38th parallel.

The North Korean Army presently is poorly equipped and only limited numbers of trained soldiers remain in North Korea.
LIEUT. GEN. KUM

Lt. Col. 27th Brigade (No serial Number)

On 15 September 1950, the 27th Brigade was located in Kumchon above Seoul. PW was attached to this brigade as Chief of Cultural section.

During the early part of September 1950, it was rumored among high ranking officers of the brigade that U.S. Forces would make a landing at Tonsan, Inchon, or Mokpo in the very near future. After the landing of U.S. Forces in Inchon, the 27th Brigade was ordered to defend an area 24 kilometers north of Seoul, parallel to the 38th parallel. The purpose of this defense line was to block any advancing U.S. troops heading north after the capture of Seoul. Designations of major North Korean units located in Seoul at this time were unknown.

Received no information concerning reinforcements in this area. Due to the poor communication system, no information was available concerning the situation on the southern front.

PW lectured his troops frequently, "to die if necessary to hold their position". Also informed them that the 27th Brigade would not receive reinforcements (did not receive any from south). PW believed it was difficult to defend the Inchon-Seoul area without any planes. However, stated that with planes available the North Korean Air Forces would defend this area. There was no disagreement between PW and his Senior Commander what-so-ever.

The 27th Brigade was commanded by Brig. General KANG YON KIL and Asst Colonel SHIN RI BON. Their present location is unknown.

American planes and tank guns caused the most casualties among North Korean troops. In a combat area U.S. Infantry should not be loaded on trucks, because they look so conspicuous and are very easily spotted for targets. Believes that guerrilla tactics were most successful against U.S. troops.

As an average, the men of the 27th Brigade received about 20 days of military training. According to hearsay the U.S. 1st Marine Division was considered as giving the greatest threat to North Korean Units. The North Korean Army while in Seoul received very little cooperation from South Korean civilians. Very few of the civilians voluntarily cooked meals for troops in their homes.
FW frequently lectured his troops that the South Korean Army had already been annihilated and therefore their enemy now was the United States. He told his troops to "die if necessary to protect their country from US aggression". FW gave no information to troops concerning the United Nations. General MacArthur was believed to be the Commander-in-Chief of the US troops in the Pacific Theater.

FW stated that the North Korean Army has still an adequate military strength (remaining in North Korea) to defeat the UN Forces. In the event this incident cannot be settled peacefully as North Korea desires the North Korean Army will continue to fight by guerrilla tactics for the next 10 to 20 years (even after being defeated by the United Nations Forces). FW has confidence that North Korea will eventually defeat the United Nations Forces. Every North Korean citizen has an unfavorable feeling towards America. It is always spoken and known among North Korean people that the war would have been over long ago without any damage or destruction of personal property if the United States had not aided the South Koreans and bombed the North Koreans.
KIM YON IK  

LT COL (107th Regt)

The 107 Regiment was located in KIMPO 15 September 1950. PW was temporarily attached to this regiment as Chief of Staff.

The regiment received no information concerning the INCHON landing, however, due to heavy naval gun fires and plane activities, the invasion was expected on or about 14 September 1950.

The 107 Regiment was originally ordered to defend the west coast excluding the Inchon area (west coast along the KIMPO area). However, immediately after the INCHON invasion the regiment was ordered to move and defend the entire area 4 kilometers northeast of INCHON.

At this time the 18th Division and the 64th Regiment were the only known North Korean units located in SEOUL. Heard that the 18th Division would receive an adequate number of reinforcements to defend SEOUL. No definite information was available on the southern front, however, informed sources indicated the North Korean Army was retreating in the TAEJUN area.

PW had no opportunity to lecture any troops, however, according to hearsay from Battalion Commanders, the troops' morale was very high and they had confidence in defending the INCHON - SEOUL area.

Knowing the present military strength in the SEOUL area, PW had no confidence in defending the INCHON - SEOUL area, however, with two well trained and equipped North Korea Corps the mission could have been accomplished.

The 107 Regiment was under the SEOUL Security unit commanded by Col Kim ---. Regimental Commander was Lt Col Che Han. After the INCHON invasion Lt Col Che Han ordered his regiment to retreat heading north without proper orders from higher headquarters in SEOUL. Therefore, he was arrested and was believed to have been court-martialed in SEOUL.

Air attacks and naval gun fire caused greater casualties among North Korean units. Air attack was the only type of US attack feared by North Korean troops (PW did not have any actual combat experience).

According to hearsay the American Infantry advance in the combat area was very slow and always gave North Koreans adequate time to reorganize in the front lines.
The men of the 107th Regiment received an average of 20 to 30 days of military training. PW believed that very little cooperation was given by South Korean civilians which was believed to be compulsory. South Korean civilians were employed and paid by the North Korean government.

Heard that General MacArthur was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces in Korea. No intelligence reports were received concerning the U.S. Han River crossing, however, was expected and that a Marine Unit would cross by amphibious tractors and landing craft.

While attending a military school, PW learned American strategy through Korean translated Russian books. PW had given up hope of defending Seoul when he first learned the landing of U.S. troops at Inchon. North Korean Army has no possibility of defeating the United Nations Forces. That little military strength remains in North Korea is very poorly trained and equipped and is not sufficient to be used in combat. However, he believes that guerrilla activities will continue for quite some time.

The North Korean people had confidence in victory, however, did not desire war.
A 40mm gun crew aboard the USS Mt McKinley prepares for action off the west coast of KOREA.

LST's assemble for the assault on Blue Beach, WOLMI-DO, INCHON, KOREA.

1st Mar Div tank-dozer covering a pillbox on WOLMI-DO.
U.S. Marines unload supplies from LST's at a debris-littered beach, Inchon.

Men of the 32d Inf Regt, 7th Div, debark from an LST at Inchon.

An LCM, carrying supplies, enters the tidal basin at Inchon.
A member of the 2d ESB throws a hand grenade into a cave
to force North Korean soldiers out, during the fighting
in the Inchon area.

Unidentified American soldiers rout a North Korean
soldier from a cave during the X Corps invasion of
Inchon, Korea.
Fortified position on WULNI-DD after the pre-invasion bombardment by Marine Air Arm and Naval gunfire.

A Russian made 76mm gun in a fortified position on WULNI-DD after the pre-invasion bombardment.
An LST, stranded on a pier by the receding water, indicates the extreme tide variation in the INCRON area.

LST’s are grounded by the receding tide off WOLMI-DO.
South Korean refugees, who returned to their homes after INCHON was secured, fight fires which resulted from the fighting.

South Korean refugees return to INCHON after the city has been secured.
G/A Douglas MacArthur, CINCUNIC, attends a briefing at the 1st Mar Div CP, INCHON. (Left)

G/A Douglas MacArthur and Maj Gen O. P. Smith, CG, 1st Mar Div, leaving the CP, 5th Mar Regt, INCHON. (Right)

G/A MacArthur visits the POW camp at INCHON.
Men of the 1st Mar Div move up the road from INCHON to SEOUL past a knocked-out Russian made T-34/85 North Korean tank.

An AMTRAC of the 1st Mar Div rolls through INCHON during the offensive launched by U.S. Marines against North Korean forces in that area.
Men and supplies move across the causeway that connects WOLMI-DO and Inchon after the city has been secured.

A bulldozer is used to pull a trailer full of supplies through the streets of Inchon.
Multiple 4.5 inch rocket launcher of the 1st Mar Div firing on retreating North Korean forces near INCHON, KOREA.

A battery of six rocket launchers is fired against North Korean forces by 1st Mar Div in the INCHON, KOREA, area.
Lt Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, CO, FMF FAC, immediately after alighting from the first American plane to land at KIMPO Airfield after its recapture.

(Right)

The B-17 of Maj Gen E. E. Partridge, CG 5th Air Force, at KIMPO Airfield on the first day the strip was usable following its capture by 1st Mar Div.

(Left)

US Marine helicopter is the first American plane to land on the newly recaptured KIMPO Airfield.

(Left)
Men of the 32d Inf, 7th Div, capture a prisoner on a hill on the outskirts of SEOUL. (Right)

Men of the 31st Inf, 7th Div, hunt out North Koreans hidden in the brush around YONGJON-NI, KOREA. (Left)

Men of the 32d Inf, 7th Div, advance up a hill on the outskirts of SEOUL. (Right)
Gen Edward M. Almond, CG X Corps, and Lt Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, CG FMF PAC, at the POW enclosure where some 300 POW's await processing at INCHON, KOREA.

North Korean soldiers, captured in the INCHON area, are taken to the POW camp.
Members of the 5th Mar Regt move toward the HAN River to engage the North Korean forces.

ROK Marines are loaded on DUKW's prior to moving to the front lines in the HAN River area.
The first trainload of ROK troops pulls into YONGDUNGPO from INCHON before the attack on SEOUL.

ROK Marines in DUKW's of the 5th Mar Regt, 1st Mar Div, cut through a field on their way to the HAN River during the offensive launched by UN Forces in that area.
AMTRAC's wait orders to cross the HAN River to join the assault on SEOUL.

AMTRAC's fire on an enemy held town from the HAN River bank.
Amphibious vehicles of X Corps line up to cross the HAN River into SEOUL.

U S Marines, riding in AMTRAC's use railroad tracks for a road after making a crossing of the HAN River in KOREA.
The railroad bridge spanning the HAN River from YONGDUNGPO to SEOUL (in background). (Left)

Marine Engineers build a raft on which to ferry heavy equipment across the HAN River. (Right)

73d Engr (C) Bn bridges a small stream in SUSA, KOREA. (Left)
A DUKW starts up the bank of the HAN River on the SEOUL side with men and supplies of the 32d INF.

American troops advance along the north side of the HAN River on their way to SEOUL.
An amputation in the field being performed by the En Surgeon of an Infantry battalion on the HAN River opposite SEOUL. The soldier was wounded in the attack on SEOUL.

Medics of the 5th Mar Regt use an AMTRAC and civilian litter bearers to evacuate wounded from the HAN River front.
The helpless homeless survey the ruins where their homes once stood in East SEOUL, KOREA.

Navy Corpsmen assigned to the 5th Mar Regt attend a Korean girl who was injured during the fighting at the HAN RIVER.
United Nations troops fighting in the streets of SEOUL, Capital of KOREA.

Tanks, supported by Infantry advance through the streets of SEOUL.

A Marine casualty is taken to the rear during the street fighting in SEOUL.
American M-26 tanks rolling down the streets in the city of SEUL.

A tank of the 32d Inf Regt, 7th Div, breaks through a barricade in SEUL, KOREA.

The combination of Infantry and tank gives mutual protection in the street fighting in SEUL.
These pictures are of the street fighting which affected the capture of SEUL, Capital of KOREA.
Convoy accompanying G/A Douglas MacArthur, CINCUNC, to
SEOUl crosses the HAN River from KIMPO Airfield.

The Korean Capitol Building, scene of the ceremonies
returning SEOUL to the Republic of Korea Government.
G/A Douglas MacArthur, CINCUNC, addresses guests attending ceremonies to restore the Capital of the Republic of Korea to its resident, Syngman Rhee.

Syngman Rhee (right center), President of Korea, expresses his gratitude to the UN Forces and G/A MacArthur, CINCUNC.

Opening the ceremonies to restore the Capital, SEOUL, to the Republic of Korea, G/A Douglas MacArthur, CINCUNC, leads the Lord's Prayer.
U.S. Navy LCUs waiting to be unloaded in the Incheon Harbor. The LCUs are operated this far in the harbor only during high tide.

Two U.S. Navy sailors sit stranded on an LCU due to low tide in the Harbor of Incheon. A 30 ft tide is one of the greatest hazards to small and large boats bringing in much-needed supplies.